As Western military casualties in Afghanistan mount, the troop-contributing nations are blaming common scapegoats: ill-equipped soldiers, not enough helicopters, wrong vehicles, too many constraints on military actions, too little money, and poor leadership.
Their solutions seem simple: Increase the troops, give them more or different equipment, deliver more local development, even change the military leadership. The result should be fewer casualties and a nation on a path to stability and prosperity.
But if the experience in Afghanistan and other attempts at state-building teach anything, it is of the need to get the strategy and politics right first. At the onset of such missions, the right questions have to be asked: "For what purpose?", "How?", and "How long?" With the Afghan presidential election upcoming on Aug. 20 and Western forces contemplating how best to support local allies, these questions are as relevant today as they were at the start of the mission in 2001.
Today the mission in Afghanistan is failing because the purpose is unclear.
That's not to say that it's a lost cause. But instead of responding with a redoubled effort, how about a healthy dose of humility, a recognition that success will depend on internal Afghan actions rather than external Western ones?..
...the international formula for fixing failed states from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone is largely the same – a local political solution (often internationally brokered) followed by dollops of aid, often delivered by the only agency willing and capable of operating in such environments: the (foreign) military.
That institution, however, deflects focus from the political framework required for long-term change, stability, and prosperity. The military's commendable work in building schools, digging wells, opening healthcare centers, and bolstering local security forces is no substitute for a political agenda that is inevitably messy, complex, and fraught with setbacks and compromise, only progressing as the locals want.
Donor governments don't like this, of course. In a media age, they prefer delivery on things that can be seen and counted rather than dealing with more nebulous and inevitably high-maintenance local and regional political alliances. Problems also arise because the international parties routinely underestimate their opponents, militarily, politically, and in terms of their staying power. It is also because, in their eagerness to help themselves by helping others, they risk appearing not only messianic but imperialistic...
Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan may be a war of necessity rather than choice, but to date it is a campaign constructed on little more than hope, caricature, and hubris. Since its success or failure depends on how seriously Afghans take each other and the task at hand, a little humility and a little less external enlightenment and direction could work wonders. It would certainly help to take the shine off the imperial reflection and outline a cause worth fighting for – or not.
Greg Mills heads the Brenthurst Foundation,
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/people.htm
based in Johannesburg, South Africa, which fosters policies to boost Africa's economic performance. He served in 2006 as an adviser to the commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan [emphasis added].
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2006/05/afstan-update-uk-general-takes-command.html
He is currently on leave as a visiting scholar at Cambridge University.
