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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

What the Federal Govt may do, especially when in a minority in the House, may bear no relation to what many CF members would 'like to see done', nor to maintaining any of our time-honoured alliances. Should this govt last that long, their hands will be tied by the will of the Bloc, Liberals and NDP...

The 'rightness' of the mission will become secondary to the need to secure votes.
 
Staff Weenie said:
What the Federal Govt may do, especially when in a minority in the House, may bear no relation to what many CF members would 'like to see done', nor to maintaining any of our time-honoured alliances. Should this govt last that long, their hands will be tied by the will of the Bloc, Liberals and NDP...

The 'rightness' of the mission will become secondary to the need to secure votes.
No matter what we think, we are duty bound to follow the legal orders of Parliament.
 
Indeed, it is a key sign of a healthy democracy that the military obeys the direction of a lawfully elected government (with all caveats on lawful commands etc).

What we want should never take priority over what the majority of Canadian citizens want.

We may stress the need to remain in theatre, but if we are ordered out, we leave.
 
July 22, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist
The Class Too Dumb to Quit
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan

I’m here in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. This is the most dangerous part of the country. It’s where mafia and mullah meet. This is where the Taliban harvest the poppies that get turned into heroin that funds their insurgency. That’s why when President Obama announced the more than doubling of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, this is where the Marines landed to take the fight to the Taliban. It is 115 degrees in the sun, and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is addressing soldiers in a makeshift theater.

“Let me see a show of hands,” says Admiral Mullen, “how many of you are on your first deployment?” A couple dozen hands go up. “Second deployment?” More hands go up. “Third deployment?” Still lots of hands are raised. “Fourth deployment?” A good dozen hands go up. “Fifth deployment?” Still hands go up. “Sixth deployment?” One hand goes up. Admiral Mullen asks the soldier to step forward to shake his hand.

This scene is a reason for worry, for optimism and for questioning everything we are doing in Afghanistan. It is worrying because between the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are grinding down our military. I don’t know how these people and their families put up with it. Never have so many asked so much of so few.

The reason for optimism? All those deployments have left us with a deep cadre of officers with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, now running both wars — from generals to captains. They know every mistake that has been made, been told every lie, saw their own soldiers killed by stupidity, figured out solutions and built relationships with insurgents, sheikhs and imams on the ground that have given the best of them a granular understanding of the “real” Middle East that would rival any Middle East studies professor.

I’ve long argued that there should be a test for any officer who wants to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan — just one question: “Do you think the shortest distance between two points is a straight line?” If you answer “yes,” you can go to Germany, South Korea or Japan, but not to Iraq or Afghanistan. Well, this war has produced a class of officers who are very out-of-the-box thinkers. They learned everything the hard way — not in classes at Annapolis or West Point, but on the streets of Fallujah and Kandahar.

I call them: “The Class Too Dumb to Quit.” I say that with affection and respect. When all seemed lost in Iraq, they were just too stubborn to quit and figured out a new anti-insurgency strategy. It has not produced irreversible success yet — and may never. But it has kept the hope of a decent outcome alive. The same people are now trying to do the same thing in Afghanistan. Their biggest strategic insight? “We don’t count enemy killed in action anymore,” one of their officers told me.

Early in both Iraq and Afghanistan our troops did body counts, à la Vietnam. But the big change came when the officers running these wars understood that R.B.’s (“relationships built”) actually matter more than K.I.A.’s. One relationship built with an Iraqi or Afghan mayor or imam or insurgent was worth so much more than one K.I.A. Relationships bring intelligence; they bring cooperation. One good relationship can save the lives of dozens of soldiers and civilians. One reason torture and Abu Ghraib got out of control was because our soldiers had built so few relationships that they tried to beat information out of people instead. But relationship-building is painstaking.

And that leads to my unease. America has just adopted Afghanistan as our new baby. The troop surge that President Obama ordered here early in his tenure has taken this mission from a limited intervention, with limited results, to a full nation-building project that will take a long time to succeed — if ever. We came here to destroy Al Qaeda, and now we’re in a long war with the Taliban. Is that really a good use of American power?

At least The Class Too Dumb to Quit is in charge, and they have a strategy: Clear areas of the Taliban, hold them in partnership with the Afghan Army, rebuild these areas by building relationships with district governors and local assemblies to help them upgrade their ability to deliver services to the Afghan people — particularly courts, schools and police — so they will support the Afghan government.

The bad news? This is State-Building 101, and our partners, the current Afghan police and government, are so corrupt that more than a few Afghans prefer the Taliban. With infinite time, money, soldiers and aid workers, we can probably reverse that. But we have none of these. I feel a gap building between our ends and our means and our time constraints. My heart says: Mission critical — help those Afghans who want decent government. My head says: Mission impossible.

Does Mr. Obama understand how much he’s bet his presidency on making Afghanistan a stable country? Too late now. So, here’s hoping that The Class Too Dumb to Quit can take all that it learned in Iraq and help rebuild The Country That’s Been Too Broken to Work.



NEW YORK TIMES
 
Interesting article by Franklin Spinney at http://www.counterpunch.org/spinney07142009.html .

Not only is the operational focus of the NATO forces physical, it is clearly reflective of and consistent with the interdiction theories of modern western conventional war, particularly those of Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, a very influential 19th century French theoretician who tried to systematize Napoleon's art of war. These theories reflect the incontestable fact that western combatant forces are heavily dependent on lines of communication (LOCs) for flows of supplies and reinforcements, and therefore, are highly vulnerable to physical disruption of LOCs. NATO's heavy dependency raises the ominous question of whether the fallacy of mirror imaging -- i.e., assuming the Taliban is vulnerable to something NATO is vulnerable to -- is again creating the same mistake it did for the Americans in Vietnam.
 
Two tidbits on how (maybe) politicians selling the mission more could have led to more public support - highlights mine.

This, from the Toronto Star:
....Military historian Jack Granatstein says Canadians likely could have been convinced to keep more than 2,000 troops in Afghanistan, if Prime Minister Stephen Harper and other federal politicians had done more to tell the public about the goals of the mission.

"The government ... has simply not been willing for the last two years to explain to people why we are there, what we are doing," he said. "We should stay, but I think it's very difficult to sustain a commitment to a military operation without public support. And the way you get public support is to have your political leaders tell you why you are there and why it's important." ....

and this from the Saskatoon-Star Phoenix (caveat:  I'm not buying the general tone of the whole editorial, comparing Canada's mission in Afghanistan to Dieppe):
.... In all the years Canada struggled with its mission in southern Afghanistan, Germany remained in what then was the quiet north, determined to avoid the fighting. This year, however, the Germans are discovering that war is never a spectator event. The fighting has spread north because there aren't enough NATO troops willing to pay the price to actually defeat the enemy.

This includes Canada, whose leaders were willing to put a few hundred troops in harm's way but never wanted to risk their own political careers by trying to convince Canadians the war only could be won with an all-out effort....

A quick reminder from the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada on "politicians talk about the why, bureaucrats talk about the how":
.... Ministers are the principal spokespersons of the Government of Canada. They are supported in this role by appointed aides, including executive assistants, communication directors and press secretaries in ministers' offices, and by the senior management teams of government institutions, which include deputy heads, heads of communications and other officials.

Ministers present and explain government policies, priorities and decisions to the public. Institutions, leaving political matters to the exclusive domain of ministers and their offices, focus their communication activities on issues and matters pertaining to the policies, programs, services and initiatives they administer....
 
Some praise from our American allies and a prediction for a deadly August 2009 in Afghanistan. The latter is upsetting to hear but the former is encouraging:

http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dc/2009/08/and-august-could-be-worse.html


And August Could Be Worse


August 3, 2009
Source: The Washington Bureau: The Mouth of the Potomac


(Here reproduced in accordance with the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.)

[BBM]
July was the worst month for U.S. troops in nearly eight years of war in Afghanistan and, for a change, U.S. allies also bore a heavy toll in the fight. Forty-one Americans were killed as U.S. forces ranged south and east to press the attack against the Taliban in July, and 35 NATO troops lost their lives, at least 22 of them British. The previous highest monthly casualty tolls in Afghanistan came in June and August of 2008, when 46 were killed. By contrast, seven troops were killed in Iraq last month, all American.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, have warned of another spike in casualties in August as Afghans prepare to vote in presidential elections later this month. Council on Foreign Relations military analyst Stephen Biddle, an adviser to McChrystal, put it this way last week: “Violence is going to go up. It’s not going to go down. At a minimum, it’s going to go up in the short term. It may go up and stay up for quite awhile.

“I mean, classic counterinsurgency involves a trade-off where, in order to bring violence down eventually, you have to operate in ways that accept risk and that reduce your ability to protect your own forces,” Biddle added.

In the first three days of August, six Americans, two Canadians and one French soldier have died. The French soldier, whose name has not been released yet, was the 29th killed in Afghanistan. The office of French President Nicolas Sarkozy issued a statement after the death renewing “France’s determination to fight alongside the Afghan people.”

The grim statistics have changed the tune at the White House, Pentagon and State Department, where once there was grumbling about how little the allies were doing in the war effort. On her Far East trip last month, Secretary of State Clinton mourned the losses and rejected the assertion of critics that U.S. casualties would be cut if the allies did more. “I think it’s unfair to link the tragic loss of Americans in the battle against the Taliban and their associated terrorist allies with a failure by our allies,” Clinton said. “Now we are bearing the brunt of the battle because we put more troops into it,” Clinton said. The U.S. currently has about 62,000 troops in Afghanistan and the allies under the NATO banner have about 32,000. But Clinton added that “we are very grateful for the contributions and the sacrifice of so many who have come to the aid of Afghanistan.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates took up the same theme in testimony to Congress, notably departing from the scornful rhetoric of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who dismissed the allies as “Old Europe.”

Gates spoke at length, and here’s a sample:

“I would tell you that we all wish that our allies would do more, but the reality is they are doing a lot. “They have 32,000 troops in there. They are taking serious casualties. The Canadians, the British, the Danes, the Australians, the Dutch are in the fight in a big way. “Now so are the French. And the north and the west are mainly quiet, but the Germans have thousands of troops there in the north and the Italians in the west, along with the Spanish. “They are responsible for more than half of the provincial reconstruction teams. They run 53 of the operational mentoring and liaison teams and have promised to fund 103 by the end of 2011. “So do I wish they had more there? Sure. But the fact is, they are participating and they are paying and they are paying with blood as well as treasure.”

The allied fallen come home differently than U.S. troops lost in battle. In the U.S., flag-draped coffins arrive at Dover Air Force Base, Del. Until Gates changed the policy, photos of the arrival ceremony were barred. Now, they are permitted if families give the okay. In Canada and Britain, the return of a warrior is cause for the nation to pause and offer public tribute.

It happened spontaneously in Canada. Firefighters would flash the lights of their trucks as the cortege passed carrying the coffin of a trooper from Canadian Forces Base Trenton, Ontario, on the hour-long drive to the coroner’s office in Toronto. Now Canadians honk their horns in tribute. They gather on overpasses to applaud. The Kings Highway 401 has officially been named the “Highway of Heroes.”

In Britain, the residents of Wootton Bassett began gathering about two years ago to show respect as the hearse carrying a soldier passed through on the way from Royal Air Force Base Lyneham to the morgue in nearby Oxford. Now the town’s undertaker in top hat leads the procession, and crowds have swelled to thousands waving flags and saluting. The Mouth thought it would be worthwhile to list the names of some of the NATO troops who have died in Afghanistan recently:

    * Canadian Maj. Michelle Mendes, 30, of Wicklow, Ontario.
    * British Trooper Phillip Lawrence, 22, The Light Dragoons, of Birkenhead, England.
    * Pvt. Benjamin Renando, 22, the Royal Australian Regiment, of Melbourne, Australia.
    * Albay (Col.) Faruk Sungur, 51, of Erzincan, Turkey.
    * Italian Caporal Maggiore (Corporal Major) Alessandro DiLisio, 25, of Campobasso, Italy.
    * French Caporal (Corporal) Nicolas Belda, 23, of Albi, France.
    * German Hauptgefreiter (Lance Corporal) Oleg Meiling, 21, of Thuringen, Germany.
    * Danish Konstabel (Pvt.) Lerche Mads Rasmussen, 21, of Slagelse, Denmark.
 
NATO's "ask"via the Globe & Mail:
NATO 's new secretary-general has called on Canada to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2011 – becoming the most high-profile official to publicly tackle the disconnect between Ottawa's decision to end its military mission and other NATO members' intentions to expand theirs.

"Of course I'm not going to interfere with domestic politics in individual allied nations, but seen from an alliance point of view, I would strongly regret if that became the final outcome of the Canadian considerations," Anders Fogh Rasmussen said Thursday when asked about Ottawa's decision to end the combat mission in 2011.

"At the end of the day it is a question of our own security – we cannot allow Afghanistan once again to become a safe haven for terrorists – and I also think it is in Canada's interest to ensure a peaceful and stable Afghanistan." ....

And Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon's response, from the Globe & Mail,
Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon said Ottawa won't be swayed by Mr. Rasmussen's comments.  He said Ottawa is intent on ending Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011. That's the plan laid out in a House of Commons motion adopted in March of 2008 by the Conservatives and the Liberal Opposition - a deal that ended their  back-and-forth feuding on the length and purpose of the Afghan mission.  "As you know, the resolution (link to motion) calls for us to end and stop our military intervention in 2011, and that is exactly what we will be doing," Mr. Cannon said. "That decision's been made known ... and we are going to stay the course." ....

Xinhua,
Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon quickly responded by saying that Ottawa would stick to its plan.  "On the other comments, however, our government is abiding by the motion passed in Parliament in 2008 (link to motion) -- that is that our combat forces will leave by 2011. We are staying the course," he said .... The Conservative government has vowed to withdraw troops in early 2011 ....

and Agence France-Presse:
Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon reaffirmed Thursday Canada's 2011 exit from Afghanistan despite reported pleas from NATO's chief for an extension of Canada's deployment in the war-torn country.  "Our government is abiding by the motion passed in Parliament in 2008 (link to motion) -- that is that our combat forces will leave by 2011," Cannon said .... In 2008, parliament voted to withdraw Canadian forces no later than 2011.

- edited to remove separate thread -
 

AP NewsBreak: US looks to Vietnam for Afghan tip
s

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090807/ap_on_re_eu/eu_afghan_lessons_of_vietnam

snip
When asked what could be drawn from the Vietnam experience, Karnow ( a leading Vietnam war scholar ) replied: "What did we learn from Vietnam? We learned that we shouldn't have been there in the first place. Obama and everybody else seem to want to be in Afghanistan, but not I."

"It now seems unthinkable that the U.S. could lose (in Afghanistan), but that's what experts ... thought in Vietnam in 1967,"

snip
     

By SLOBODAN LEKIC, Associated Press Writer Slobodan Lekic, Associated Press Writer –

BRUSSELS – Top U.S. officials have reached out to a leading Vietnam war scholar to discuss the similarities of that conflict 40 years ago with American involvement in Afghanistan, where the U.S. is seeking ways to isolate an elusive guerrilla force and win over a skeptical local population.

The overture to Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Stanley Karnow, who opposes the Afghan war, comes as the U.S. is evaluating its strategy there.

President Barack Obama has doubled the size of the U.S. force to curb a burgeoning Taliban insurgency and bolster the Afghan government. He has tasked Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander, to conduct a strategic review of the fight against Taliban guerrillas and draft a detailed proposal for victory.

McChrystal and Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to the country, telephoned Karnow on July 27 in an apparent effort to apply the lessons of Vietnam to the Afghan war, which started in 2001 when U.S.-led forces ousted the Taliban regime in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

Among the concerns voiced by historians is the credibility of President Hamid Karzai's government, which is widely perceived as being plagued by graft and corruption. They draw a parallel between Afghanistan's presidential election on Aug. 20 and the failed effort in Vietnam to legitimize a military regime lacking broad popular support through an imposed presidential election in 1967.

"Holbrooke rang me from Kabul and passed the phone to the general," said Karnow, who authored the seminal 1983 book, "Vietnam: A History."

Holbrooke confirmed to The Associated Press that the three men discussed similarities between the two wars. "We discussed the two situations and what to do," he said during a visit last week to NATO headquarters in Brussels.

In an interview Thursday with the AP, Karnow said it was the first time he had ever been consulted by U.S. commanders to discuss the war. He did not elaborate on the specifics of the conversation.

When asked what could be drawn from the Vietnam experience, Karnow replied: "What did we learn from Vietnam? We learned that we shouldn't have been there in the first place. Obama and everybody else seem to want to be in Afghanistan, but not I."

"It now seems unthinkable that the U.S. could lose (in Afghanistan), but that's what experts ... thought in Vietnam in 1967," he said at his Maryland home. "It could be that there will be no real conclusion and that it will go on for a long time until the American public grows tired of it."
 
Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Canada needs post-2011 Afghan strategy, experts; critics.
Murray Brewster, Canadian Press, 9 Aug 09
Article link

Ottawa is a place where plans are made.

There are always plans. And even plans to make plans.

Yet ask anyone in the corridors of power what the plan is for Canada and Afghanistan post-2011 and you're greeted with silence.

The musing last week of NATO's new secretary-general that he would "strongly regret" the exit of Canada's combat forces from Kandahar served to underline the unpleasant truth that the federal Conservatives have articulated no clear strategy beyond the call to bring the troops home.

When government ministers do occasionally tip-toe into that political minefield it's usually with the platitudes-laced generality that Canada will continue its important aid and reconstruction mission in Kandahar.

Canada does have its signature projects, which the government will be able to point to as accomplishments in the post-2011 time frame, but there is a growing consensus among experts that the government is closing its eyes and ears when it comes to Afghanistan.

It's a dubious strategy, especially when an anxious public is faced with mounting casualties, as was the case in July, the bloodiest month for coalition troops since the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban.

"You don't go to war because you like to fight. You go to war for political purpose," said Barry Cooper, of the University of Calgary's political science department.

"The political purpose of having troops on the ground in Afghanistan has to be restated because people tend to forget."

And that message needs to be driven home, regardless of whether Ottawa sticks to its pullout deadline or not.

It was easy to make the case in 2001 and 2002 following 9/11, but it's a tougher argument today, Cooper added.

Whether Ottawa bows to the mounting international pressure to stay depends on what the situation is like on the ground and that is likely to become much clearer after this month's Afghan presidential election, he said.

The provincial reconstruction base in Kandahar city, the showcase of Canada's development efforts, is tentatively slated to operate until 2015. Yet questions about how it will stay open and who will take over security for a growing civilian presence are left unanswered.

Beyond nut and bolts queries, there are more hard-headed considerations, such as what effect the withdrawal would have on Canada's relations with the United States, Britain and other allies who've also borne a major share of the fighting and dying in southern Afghanistan.

And then there is the tougher, more emotional reflection.

Families of hundreds of soldiers - killed or horribly wounded - will want to know what the sacrifice of their husband, wife, father, mother, son, daughter, brother or sister was all about.

Many of them say privately that Canada should not leave an unfinished war, but they are in the minority because repeated public opinion polls show overwhelming support to end the mission on schedule.

Whether it's because of political, emotional or institutional exhaustion, the Afghan question is one the Harper minority government would rather not have to face, especially now when its political survival is a week-to-week consideration.

Yet, the pressure is mounting.

Aside from NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen's somewhat clumsy appeal, the Obama Administration has sought advice on ways to convince Ottawa to stay.

The response on each occasion - led by Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon - has been swift and unyielding: 2011 as the pullout date is final.

"You can say that because it postpones any serious discussion in public about the purpose of Canadian troops in Kandahar province. That may change," said Cooper.

"I'll bet you dollars to donuts that a year from now they will say: Yes, things have stabilized and our original timetable will be adhered to - or they say things have changed and we have to revisit the issue and so on. If you look at the way any democracy has fought these kind of wars, these non-existential wars, that's what they all do."

That is precisely the concern of NDP Leader Jack Layton, who's party fought to end the current mission, and will oppose any further extension.

He called on the government to clearly outline what Canada's role will be in Afghanistan after the existing mandate expires.

"Lay out some sort of plan," he said. "You can't just leave things in such a vague, undefined way."
 
milnews.ca said:
NDP Leader Jack Layton - "Lay out some sort of plan," he said. "You can't just leave things in such a vague, undefined way."

Pot, this is kettle, you're black, over.
 
Ah yes, let's see "the plan" so that the Opposition can spend two years picking at it instead of helping to run the country.  And since we don't know what decisions will be made by the Government between now and then, let's provide every possible contingency plan, just so they know that all the options are being developed with equal effort and priority.

Then again, maybe there will be a change of Government by then.  Perhaps the Opposition parties should man up, demonstrate confidence, and publicly announce their plans for Afghanistan post-2011 on the theory that they will be in power by then.
 
milnews.ca said:
NATO's "ask"via the Globe & Mail:
And Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon's response, from the Globe & Mail,
Xinhua,
and Agence France-Presse:
- edited to remove separate thread -

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail is an opinion piece coauthored by Eugene Lang, coauthor (with Janice Gross Stein) of a generally well received book, The Unexpected War:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/what-was-natos-secretary-general-thinking/article1245343/
What was NATO's secretary-general thinking?
Canada will withdraw its combat forces from Kandahar in 2011

Monday, Aug. 10, 2009

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, newly minted NATO secretary-general, seems to have a hearing problem with Canada, or just isn't listening.

Last Thursday, he made a direct appeal to Canada to stay in Afghanistan in a combat role after its announced withdrawal date of 2011. “Seen from an alliance point of view, I would strongly regret if that became the final outcome of the Canadian considerations,” Mr. Rasmussen said.

Canada's “considerations” on a post-2011 role for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan reached a “final outcome” well over a year ago. The government has been clear. Parliament passed a resolution in March, 2008, stating that Canada will withdraw its combat forces from Kandahar in 2011. There has been no backsliding on this position, and that was underlined in the response from Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon.

Mr. Rasmussen either does not know the Canadian position, or he is trying to influence a change in it by putting public pressure on the government. The first is unlikely; the second should not be acceptable to Canada. At least Mr. Rasmussen should have noted that not only we, but the Dutch, are departing active combat – the Dutch earlier, in 2010. Why no such remonstrance for them?

For months now, there has been speculation that the Obama administration might pressure Canada to extend its Kandahar mission. To date, there is no sign of this occurring. For years, many in this country have been in the grip of a post-9/11 myth that Washington has put immense pressure on Canada at the highest political levels to commit forces in Afghanistan – and Iraq. This was never true during the Bush administration, and there is no evidence it is true in the early days of the Obama era. The U.S. knows Canada's position on Afghanistan, and evidently respects it.

It is too bad the same cannot be said of Mr. Rasmussen. He is speaking as a brand new secretary-general of an alliance that at worst is suffering an existential crisis – or at least is in a period of self-doubt. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been trying to agree on a clear raison d'être. The old one of “keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” lost its relevance 20 years ago.

NATO reinvented itself as an international – or at least Western – peacemaking force, absent any plausible UN alternative. It began operating “out of area” first in the Balkans in the 1990s and then in Afghanistan, beginning in 2003. Ever since, there has been talk of Afghanistan being the “defining moment” of post-Cold War NATO, with variations on the theme that “if Afghanistan fails, NATO fails.” The future of the Alliance allegedly hangs in the balance.

All of which is likely the motivation behind Mr. Rasmussen's comments. Nevertheless, Canada's remaining in Kandahar beyond 2011 will have little bearing on the ultimate outcome in Afghanistan or the future of NATO. Developments in Pakistan (for which NATO has no remit), the American “surge,” the outcome of the Afghan presidential elections this month, are much more crucial variables for Afghanistan.

Whatever its current difficulties, the U.S. is still the greatest military power on Earth, by several multiples. When it decides to commit its full strength to a military effort, the involvement of its allies becomes less than decisive (they have been almost irrelevant in Iraq, for example). In an alliance of 27 small-to-middle military powers, plus one that is bigger than all the rest combined, nobody is irreplaceable.

Finally, Canada's army is at the end of its tether, something the secretary-general is also evidently ill-attuned to. In March, army chief Andrew Leslie said the Canadian Forces may need an “operational break” of at least one year to regroup and refit. When the politicians and generals committed the Forces to Kandahar in 2005, they never anticipated a five-year commitment, and an out-of-control insurgency, that would see both people and equipment used up in combat to the point that we have reached now.

There is one final lesson to be drawn from Mr. Rasmussen's comments. They blow a hole in the conventional wisdom that, as a result of Canada's commitment to and sacrifices in Afghanistan, our standing in NATO is at an all-time high – that we have real clout again in Brussels.

It is hard to imagine a secretary-general of NATO failing to understand, or respect, the American or British positions on Afghanistan – or even, for that matter, that of the obstreperous French.

Eugene Lang is co-author of The Unexpected War – Canada in Kandahar , and former chief of staff to two Liberal ministers of national defence. Eric Morse is a former Canadian diplomat, now vice-chair of defence studies at the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto.


Lang is highly critical of Rasmussen, rightly so, in my opinion. Rasmussen is a veteran politician; he knows the political imperatives of minority governments; he understands the role of opinion on politics; he is well aware of the potential impact of outside pressure on an unpopular issue.

Rasmussen is not an idiot so I have to agree with Lang’s conclusion; Rasmussen would never dare to make such an intervention towards America, Britain or France. He dares do it to Canada because, IN HIS MIND, we “don’t matter” very much.

It is time for Canada to demand Mr. Rasmussen’s immediate resignation and replacement with a politically acceptable Secretary General.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Rasmussen is not an idiot so I have to agree with Lang’s conclusion; Rasmussen would never dare to make such an intervention towards America, Britain or France. He dares do it to Canada because, IN HIS MIND, we “don’t matter” very much.

It is time for Canada to demand Mr. Rasmussen’s immediate resignation and replacement with a politically acceptable Secretary General.

And if NATO won't fire him? His selection was not a simple or clear cut matter. To suggest that we, who were pushing a Canadian for the job, are motivated by more than sour grapes is a difficult proposition to sell.

The simple fact is that we don't matter very much militarily. We don't spend very much on defence and much of what we spend is not very useful in the present situation. Just for fun, sometime try to get an European to acknowledge that the Atlantic has a western shore. Better yet, try telling him that the western coastline of Canada and the United States is part of NATO's territory.

We also don't matter politically to a lot of the Europeans, who if they think of us at all, conjure up images of barbarians clubbing seals or robber barons clear cutting forests and strip mining the oil sands. That is, when we are not being painted as "US Lite." In the six decades plus since the end of the Second World War, our population has nearly trebled, while Europe has grown only slightly. Unfortunately our place in the world has declined almost in lock step. So, if Mister Rasmussen is looking for an easy target to belabour, blame Canada.

I also suspect that he is speaking for more than himself. At least he has the cojones to state what others may be thinking. I suspect that this is the first VISIBLE attempt to influence the Canadian government's position. Having already revealed my mistrust of the apparent public posturing, or lack of same, I wonder if other fish are being fried, or in deference to the dramatic Dane, other herring are being pickled?
 
Old Sweat said:
And if NATO won't fire him?
...


We quit.

NATO is on the verge of failing anyway. It is, probably, not going to “fail” in Afghanistan but it will not be able to come together and do another "Afghanistan" anywhere else – like, say, Sudan. So fail, it will, through inertia or, more likely, entropy.


Old Sweat said:
...
The simple fact is that we don't matter very much militarily. We don't spend very much on defence and much of what we spend is not very useful in the present situation. Just for fun, sometime try to get an European to acknowledge that the Atlantic has a western shore. Better yet, try telling him that the western coastline of Canada and the United States is part of NATO's territory.

We also don't matter politically to a lot of the Europeans, who if they think of us at all, conjure up images of barbarians clubbing seals or robber barons clear cutting forests and strip mining the oil sands. That is, when we are not being painted as "US Lite." In the six decades plus since the end of the Second World War, our population has nearly trebled, while Europe has grown only slightly. Unfortunately our place in the world has declined almost in lock step. So, if Mister Rasmussen is looking for an easy target to belabour, blame Canada.
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Too true, but our efforts to “punch above or weight” within NATO have earned us nothing but the disdain of the Europeans. Time to try another tack.


Old Sweat said:
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I also suspect that he is speaking for more than himself. At least he has the cojones to state what others may be thinking. I suspect that this is the first VISIBLE attempt to influence the Canadian government's position. Having already revealed my mistrust of the apparent public posturing, or lack of same, I wonder if other fish are being fried, or in deference to the dramatic Dane, other herring are being pickled?


I suspect you are correct; we are taking a course that most Europeans want to take – “cutting and running” from a war that the peoples have decided they don’t want to fight, irrespective of the prospects of winning it. But “we all” have to stay as long as the Americans do, don’t we? If the Netherlands and Canada go then who’s next: Australia, Britain, France, Germany? All of ‘em? Are there enough Americans to fight a long, long counterinsurgency campaign in all of Afghanistan - and win it?

But, on balance, I’m not sure our seat at the NATO table is worth the trouble – even though I’m a great fan of the “seat at the table” school of foreign relations.

We might do better to lead the way towards some new seats at new tables: in yet another Gn (a replacement for the G8, so that we can stay at that table); and in a new, less formal alignment of militarily capable democracies that can sub-contract the “robust” missions for the United Nations.

 
Old Sweat said:
So, if Mister Rasmussen is looking for an easy target to belabour, blame Canada.
blg_blame_canada.jpg
 
So fail, it (NATO in Afghanistan) will, through inertia or, more likely, entropy.

Good point about NATO
- inertia or entropy sets in when there is no plan or purpose.

The simple $64 dollar questions are :

- why is NATO in Afghanistan?

and

- better still - why is Canada in Afghanistan in the first place?


 
gordjenkins said:
So fail, it (NATO in Afghanistan) will, through inertia or, more likely, entropy.

Good point about NATO
- inertia or entropy sets in when there is no plan or purpose.

The simple $64 dollar questions are :

- why is NATO in Afghanistan?

and

- better still - why is Canada in Afghanistan in the first place?
osama-bin-laden.jpg

world_trade_centre.jpg

There.  Now you have my 2000 word answer.
 
Do you think-for one moment-  one second -finding or,,, whatever to ,,to Bin Laden would make one iota of difference to the present situation ??

You sir are living in the past
 
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