OldSolduer
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IMO, and not the most learned at that, is that the politicians have to crap or get off the pot.
It's not our war
We are there to assist, but the war in Afghanistan will not be won until its public institutions are stabilized
Nipa Banerjee
The Ottawa Citizen
26 Mar 09
Prime Minister Stephen Harper's comment that the war in Afghanistan is not winnable, has generated an immense amount of debate. Journalists, Canadian civil servants who have spent time in Afghanistan and families of Canadian soldiers who have served there, have taken offence. Certainly, Harper did not mean to degrade contributions made by Canadians -- soldiers and civilians alike. His comment only reflects the reality, discarding the prospect of solely a "military" solution in Afghanistan. To this I add, Canada winning in Kandahar is not the issue.
If we interpret this "war" as Canada's war in the Kandahar province, it is not winnable. Canada's combat mission in Kandahar does not represent the war in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is a war for stabilizing the country and it is a war of the Afghans. The international community is only there to assist. Canada happens to assist in Kandahar, the UK in Helmand and Netherlands in Uruzghan.
The instability in Afghanistan is, of course, largely due to the Taliban insurgency. But other elements, which also act as destabilizing factors and fan insurgencies, are weak state institutions -- both military and civil -- that are incapable of handling insurgencies. Weaknesses of public institutions are starkly reflected in inadequately trained and numerically small armed and police forces, lack of a free and fair justice system and weak public service delivery institutions. Weak public institutions are not only incapable of countering insurgency but they, in fact, feed insurgencies by allowing the insurgents to win over support of the public, frustrated with poor governance, lawlessness and the absence of essential services.
The counter-insurgency (the so called "war" against the Taliban) that Canada, UK and the Netherlands are leading in Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzghan respectively, is no doubt an essential element of the war of stabilization, but the insurgency will have to be ultimately countered by the Afghan army -- Mr. Harper rightly admits this. No less important are the struggles to establish good governance, the rule of law and the delivery of social and economic development -- the other essential elements of the war for stabilization of Afghanistan. Afghan institutions must take leadership roles in implementing reforms in these areas as well if the goal of stabilization is to be attained.
Despite strong signs of stability not emerging speedily enough, the war of stabilization could still be "won" if this war was ultimately led by Afghans. Unfortunately, the Afghan institutions remain weak. Although both the international community and the Afghan government share responsibility for the failure to strengthen state institutions, the continuing weaknesses largely reflect the international community's failure to build and sustain capacity of Afghan public institutions. Incorrect delivery mechanisms, un-strategic investments in and poor quality of technical assistance has resulted in billions of dollars of wasted aid resources, an the failure to develop Afghan capacity.
Today, seven-and-a-half years after November 2001, when the transitional government of Afghanistan came to power, the Afghan government does not have control over its security operations, its development budget or its development priorities, all of which are under the international community's control. Citing the weak capacity of Afghan institutions, the international community continues to deliver major portions (70 per cent) of aid resources not through Afghan institutions but through parallel mechanisms under their own control. This practice results in missed opportunities for building Afghan institutional capacities. If Afghan institutions remain weak, the objective of stabilization of Afghanistan will remain unattainable.
As long as Canada considers the war in Afghanistan as its war in Kandahar and continues to divert an undue proportion of total Canadian aid to this province through its signature projects, the stabilization objective will not be attained, no matter how hard it tries to sell the Canadian projects as "owned" by the Afghan government.
According to a study done by the Kabul-based Center for Afghanistan Peace Studies, development work delivered by the international community -- including CIDA and the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) -- is not appropriately coordinated with the local government and people. The study also found that development work has been undertaken, in many instances, without the knowledge of the local government and that the opportunity to generate local employment has been lost because local people are not being hired for much of the international community funded development work.
One must assess the extent to which Canadian measures are addressing the stabilization needs through strengthening of Afghan institutions. Paying the salaries of the entire police force in Kandahar (as announced by Lawrence Cannon and Stockwell Day) will not necessarily strengthen the institution responsible for law and order enforcement. Measures of this nature are, in fact, fiscally unsustainable and thus damaging for the Afghan government, in the long term. Continuation of un-strategic investments will fail to stabilize Afghan institutions and ultimately result in losing the war in Afghanistan.
Nipa Banerjee served in Afghanistan as Canada's head of aid program from 2003-06. She now teaches international development at the University of Ottawa and provides advice to the Ministry of Finance in Kabul on policy implementation.
President Barack Obama announced Friday that 4,000 paratroopers with the 82nd Airborne Division will head to Afghanistan this fall to train Afghan security forces.
“For the first time, this will fully resource our effort to train and support the Afghan Army and Police,” Obama said.
A White House official speaking on background could not say Thursday which brigade with the 82nd would fill the mission.
The deployment will fill the request by Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, for a brigade of trainers, the official said.
In a sign of the new importance the administration is placing on the mission, the 82nd Airborne troops will be broken into 10-to-14-member advisory teams, a Pentagon official said. Until now, the military has relied heavily on inexperienced National Guardsmen [emphasis added] to fill out the teams, though Marines have also filled that role.
“The change couldn’t be more dramatic,” said retired Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security, a nonpartisan defense think tank. “The 82nd Airborne Division is the nation’s shock force.”..
Since early 2008, a growing number of Marines have been used to train Afghan security forces.
On Thursday, the senior administration official said that the training mission in Afghanistan had been under-resourced for the past few years, and that the president wants to fix that.
Ultimately, the goal is to train an Afghan Army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000, he said.
McKiernan had requested a total of four additional brigade combat teams’ worth of troops and an additional combat aviation brigade [emphasis added].
So far, the Defense Department has announced the following units will be sent to Afghanistan to meet his request: The 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division; 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade; 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division; and 82nd Airborne Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade [emphasis added].
Newsmaker: Petraeus and Holbrooke
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The Americanization of the war in Afghanistan was inevitable once the conflict in Iraq began to wind down, because NATO countries in Europe -- with the exception of Britain, Denmark and the Dutch -- refused constant demands to send forces to the only places in Afghanistan that really matter: the east and south of the country.
The increase in activity is already breathtaking.
The most obvious evidence is the vast swath of real estate being claimed by American forces at the already overcrowded Kandahar Airfield, which is the logistical hub for the war in the south.
Every few minutes, giant transport aircraft disgorge troops, combat gear or supplies. There are new landing pads for more than 100 helicopters from the 82nd Aviation Combat Brigade. Seabees from the U.S. navy are frantically erecting scores of barracks and other buildings. Every road on the base is being torn up as plumbing and electricity systems are installed.
Outside the airfield, Canadian troops in Kandahar still outnumber Americans; but, by the end of the summer, four of every five soldiers outside the wire in Kandahar will wear a Stars and Stripes shoulder patch [emphasis added].
This dramatic move doesn't diminish Canada's key role in the volatile south. The Canadians will remain in the same numbers precisely where they are now: in one of the deadliest parts of the country, an area about the size of New Brunswick [i.e. the heavily populated districts around Kandahar City--Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi--where most of the province's people outside the city itself live]. In most places, it's less than 100 kilometres from Pakistan, where Taliban leader Mullah Omar is said to direct the insurgency from the city of Quetta.
What has changed is that the Americans are going to blanket much of the rest of Kandahar. They are to provide what a diplomat here has called "a protective crust" to the north and east of Kandahar City [emphasis added--including southeast of Kandahar, e.g. Spin Boldak, the crossing point for the main road from Quetta to Kandahar].
As a result, Canadian troops hope insurgents and their weapons will have a harder time getting through from safe havens in Pakistan...
...I think mirrors the Canadian government's position, frankly mirrors the great work done by John Manley and his counterparts [sic], I think it mirrors it just about as closely as it possibly could and we were a couple of years ahead of the curve.
...we are planning for the end of the military mission at the end of 2011.
...this is very good news. One of the conditions of the extension of our mission in Kandahar was getting a military partner in Kandahar province. Obviously the Americans are that partner and the Americans, quite frankly, are bringing in far more troops than we had initially believed we needed, or hoped for.
PM: Afghan role will remain deadly
Kathleen Harris
Winnipeg Free Press
30 Mar 09
More American boots on the ground won't make the mission easier or less deadly for Canadian troops in Kandahar, says Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
In an interview with CTV News, Harper said the influx of thousands more U.S. soldiers will take "some of the pressure" off Canadians operating in the dangerous south. But he warned that casualties are often a matter of bad luck and being in the wrong place at the wrong time. "We will continue to have a combat role. You can't provide a vigorous training support to the Afghan security forces unless that involves direct combat exposure yourself. So it will continue to be a dangerous mission, notwithstanding the fact we will be vastly reinforced by the American presence," he said.
The PM confirmed Canada's combat role will end in 2011 -- undeterred by President Barack Obama's new strategic plan for the region or his pitch for NATO partners to back the U.S.
Harper noted that by the scheduled exit date, Canada will have been in the war zone for nearly a decade.
And while the U.S. is making it a key foreign policy objective, Harper believes Obama doesn't want it to become an "endless conflict" either.
[For full article see Winnipeg Free Press]
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WALLACE:
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Prime Minister, does that mean that we're going to have to learn to live with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in that part of the world?
HARPER: No, I wouldn't — I wouldn't put it that way. I think what Secretary Gates said is correct, that first of all, we absolutely have to see the elimination of any kind of threat to the wider world, to North America.
Obviously, the Al Qaeda insurgency and the Al Qaeda element of this has to be — has to be eliminated. I think we agree with that...
...You may notice the (Obama) administration is much more clear on eliminating al-Qaida than eliminating the Taliban...
.... we are in Canada ramping up our civilian presence and our civilian commitments in Afghanistan in preparation for the end of the military mission. But we're going to continue to be there and continue to assist with governance and development challenges ....
So what?MarkOttawa said:Rather a different emphasis, wouldn't you say? And nothing about his government's interest in "eliminating" al Qaeda. Different strokes for different folks. Hmmm.
Brigadier-General Denis Thompson was commander of Canadian and NATO forces in Kandahar province up until last month, and we spoke with him from Kandahar on our show just before Christmas. Thompson joins us in studio to talk about the nine months he spent with the mission.
Let’s connect a few different data points so I can show you why I think events in Pakistan may very quickly come to a head — why I think some quite nasty and direct U.S. military intervention there is now likely, and soon.
I was struck last Friday by this excerpt from Barack Obama’s speech unveiling his new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy: “Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that Al Qaida is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan.” As I wrote on Friday, that language closely mirrors — and since this was a very important speech, should be read as having been designed to mirror — the language in the infamous Aug. 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief, “Bin Laden determined to strike in U.S.”
It’s been an article of faith among critics of George W. Bush’s pre-9/11 policy on terrorism that he didn’t take such warnings as a serious spur to action. Richard Clarke has built a post-public service career on assertions that, while the intelligence community had its “hair on fire” in the summer of 2001, the president didn’t act.
How credible are the threats Obama’s “multiple intelligence estimates” perceive? Obviously I’m not the guy who’s going to be able to judge that. But here’s Izzat Khan, a senior aide to Pakistan Islamist leader Sufi Muhammad, telling our Adnan Khan in this week’s extraordinary Maclean’s cover story, “I’ll tell you how we can end this war. If we can get our men close to the U.S., in Venezuela, or Brazil, or Canada [emphasis added], and attack them from there, then they will stop attacking us.” Adnan Khan adds: “Among the TNSM, there are already men who operate clandestinely, shaving off their beards and donning Western clothes.”
And then, as our Mike Petrou pointed out this morning, here’s Baitullah Massud, a leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, calling Western reporters to promise “an attack in Washington that will amaze everyone.”
In the face of these on-the-record threats, which may individually have little specific credibility but which together represent a pretty clear mindset, here’s what Obama said on Friday about U.S. action in Pakistan:
“Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out Al Qaida and the violent extremists within its borders. We will insist that action be taken, one way or another, when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.”
Hours later a reporter asked Richard Holbrooke: “Does that mean if the Pakistanis will act we will not, and if they do not, we will?” Holbrooke replied: “I just don’t think we can answer that question. It’s speculative, it’s hypothetical, and it would be deeply injurious to our national interest to speculate. But I appreciate the importance of the question, and that’s all we’re ready to say.”
The reporter pressed his luck: “Can you say something about what the President meant by that?” Holbrooke’s reply: “No.”