Why Not Canadian Amphib/Marine Capability? (merged)

[Loachman]

You resurrected a thread that had been dormant for four and a half years to post that...?

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Simple, Canada doesn't have the infrastructure and the logistics to field marines and Canada doesn't need a large expeditonary amphibious assault force quite frankly. Although I do support a small expeditionary amphibious army.

Points already covered in the other 8.5 pages.
Thankyou Capt Obvious.

 

[Calvillo]

Hello,

Long time lurker, first post. I have question about the Army's capabilities.

From what I understand about how the Canadian Forces is organized, Canadian military can not have some kind of Marine or Naval Infantry forces (Marine as in Marine Corps, not Navy en français). Everything related to ground warfare is the responsibility of the Canadian Army. With that, does the Canadian Army have any amphibious  warfare capability at all? CMIIW, but looking at the inventory of Canadian Army equipment, I can not find amphibious assault or landing vehicles typically found on Marines units. Looking at the other end, on the Royal Canadian Navy side, I can not find any kind of active amphibious assault vessel.

If my question violates OPSEC, I apologize. I am asking just for general knowledge.

 

[ken.w2402]

Hello,

Long time lurker, first post. I have question about the Army's capabilities.

From what I understand about how the Canadian Forces is organized, Canadian military can not have some kind of Marine or Naval Infantry forces (Marine as in Marine Corps, not Navy en français). Everything related to ground warfare is the responsibility of the Canadian Army. With that, does the Canadian Army have any amphibious  warfare capability at all? CMIIW, but looking at the inventory of Canadian Army equipment, I can not find amphibious assault or landing vehicles typically found on Marines units. Looking at the other end, on the Royal Canadian Navy side, I can not find any kind of active amphibious assault vessel.

If my question violates OPSEC, I apologize. I am asking just for general knowledge.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=van-doos-keep-their-cool-in-brazilian-jungle-heat-at-unitas-2015/ijpbmxuz

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Had Canada ended up with the Mistral class, then we would have tasked units to maintain some of the skill sets. The Van Doo did recently exercise with the French Mistrals

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ0nZwXg6WI

 

[McG]

The Army regularly participates in RIMPAC aswell.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Had Canada ended up with the Mistral class, then we would have tasked units to maintain some of the skill sets. The Van Doo did recently exercise with the French Mistrals

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ0nZwXg6WI

The most important skill sets for amphibious operations are at the BGp level and higher and involve operational planning and logistics coordination that can be very tricky, to say the least e.g., coordinating a Bde Gp landing at night along a coastline with wicked tides, or in really bad weather, for example.

The troops? If you have a well trained Coy Gp/ BGp operating in a dismounted role you can bring them up to speed in 2 or 3 days. Again, it's mostly all about 'get on/ get off the landing craft/ helicopter without forgetting your rifle' kind of stuff.

That, and making sure that we give the navy and air force heart attacks and aneurisms as we miss timings, argue with them about trivial things in a way that makes it seem that we know more than they do about this stuff, and destroy their fragile and fancy equipment with our big rough hands

 

[a_majoor]

The Canadian Military Journal has an interesting article on the subject here:

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no1/page54-eng.asp

Of course the primary factor in understanding why we don't have this capability always boils down to $$$$ and how much/little the taxpayers are willing to spend.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Yes, we should, according to this from the NATO Association of Canada, shared IAW S.29 (Fair Dealing) of the Copyright Act ...

Member States that are part of both the G7 and NATO – namely the US, UK, Italy, France, Germany and Canada – share their military capabilities, including amphibious operations. These operations are crucial to offensive military assaults, and bring together air, army and navy branches of the armed forces to fight in a range of different hostile territories, beaches, mountains or defensive fortifications.

The G7-NATO member countries have a highly specialized, efficient, and skilled division within their militaries designed for such an offensive operation, known as the Marines. This special force are often deployed overseas, to conduct training exercises with partner countries, or during military offensives. In Afghanistan for instance, NATO established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), where in most cases, it was the Marines and other elite forces that were sent (PDF file) to tackle al-Qaeda and the Taliban. More recently, a small contingent force of approximately 400 US Marines, alongside other special forces, are being deployed in Syria to combat ISIS.

Canada does not have a similar amphibious force, but has sent experienced soldiers from its regular and reserve forces to Afghanistan and recently, with Operation IMPACT, against ISIS in Syria. However, over the past year, Canada has amended its priorities in the fight against ISIS, including withdrawing the six CFA18 aircrafts from the Syrian conflict. As a direct result, Canada was not invited to attend the anti-ISIS meeting (Paris, 2016) and former US Secretary of Defense Asthon Carter announced that the meeting was for the six nations which played a significant role in the battles against ISIS. Government opposition leaders, academic and previous CAF personnel have criticized the changed nature of Operation IMPACT, arguing the possible negative effect on Canada’s foreign policy, and the perception of being a less powerful political partner.

Canada is now engaged in training-support operations, increasing ground personnel to 600 and special forces to 69 soldiers; many deployed to Northern Iraq to support Kurdish Peshmerga with their battles against ISIS.  Even though CAF forces will still be very close to the line of fire, this type of training and support to local forces could have considerable advantages, including building trust with communities, and as a result could make Canadians both at home and abroad less of a target by Islamic extremists.

The disengagement from the conflict allows Canada an opportunity to strengthen the scope and potential of its military, including as suggested by Griffiths and Hansen, the development of a Canadian Marine Brigade (CMB). Canada has all the opportunities available to establish a small and specialized amphibious force. The CMB would hold the exact entitlements as other branches in the CAF, healthcare guarantees, higher education, competitive pay for NCOs and officers. Their expertise would be focused on guarding Canada’s national interests and borders, in addition to being engaged overseas. The US Marine Core Base Quantico, where decades of expertise, training and equipment could be potentially made available advice and train for a CMB force.

Deploying such a specialized force in support of operations conducted by NATO, by not only continuing to train local forces in advanced and modern tactics, but also engaging with them in the field, could give Canada greater clout during post-conflict negotiations.  In addition, the CMB can be the clear connecting muscle to current branches of the CAF would strengthen the capabilities of the CAF.

Canada’s First Defense Strategy in 2008, revealed the missing component in its army, as Hartwick highlights. Among the core missions established for the CAF, one clearly states the ability to respond quickly and efficiently against major terrorist attacks, whether domestic or abroad, which threaten the security and interests of Canada. Although Canada is prepared in many ways to protect its sovereignty and citizens, the lack of an amphibious force to respond overseas or within Canada is a vital setback. Protecting our allies and other nations is a shared responsibility, highlighted by MPs, and Canada should consider expanding its military with the establishment of a CMB to fully be part of all NATO’s missions globally, including the ones which require amphibious forces. Although this is a hypothetical idea, and yet to be realized, there are clear advantages to the creation of a CMB, offering the potential of becoming a stronger military partner of NATO-G7.

About the author ...

Ananda Narasimhan is originally from Switzerland and India and recently moved to Canada to study at the University of British Columbia. Earning a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History, focusing on South Asia and military history, he is now currently enrolled at the University of Leicester completing a Master of Arts in International Security Studies. Ananda has previously been involved in multiple humanitarian projects overseas. Ananda joined the internship program at the NATO association of Canada to help achieve a better insight into institutional activities promoting security within Canada. Ananda plans to continue to deepen his knowledge in international affairs through academia and apply what he has learnt, by getting involved with major organizations such as CSIS, OCHA or the Red Cross.

Pretty broad strokes, there ...

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Yes, we should, according to this from the NATO Association of Canada, shared IAW S.29 (Fair Dealing) of the Copyright Act ...About the author ...Pretty broad strokes, there ...

We tried this once, it was called the Standing Contingency Task Force.  The government and military loved it until the saw the price tag and it died just as quickly as it was stood up.

Royal Canadian Marine Corps
Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF)

Canada does not have a Marine Corps. Nor, unlike Australia, does Canada even have Army units that are preferentially tasked to conduct amphibious operations. Indeed, despite the fact that it has one of the world's most powerful navies, Canada has no amphibious capabilities whatsoever, not even the sort of modest maritime special operations capability such as maintained by a country such as Israel. The Canadian Army did participate in a number of amphibious operations in World War II, but since then the Canadian Forces have managed to get along without any discernable naval infantry capability. For a brief period in the 2005-2007 timeframe, the Canadian government flirted with establishing a Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) which would have implied the creation of a Naval Infantry, if not a Marine Corps. But as with so many other Canadian ambitions, nothing came of this brief excursion.

Under the British the original purpose of Marines was to provide an infantry force capable of protecting the ship and it's officers from the crew, and was very limited in it's offensive role, apart from sniping at enemy officers from the fighting tops. The whole ship's crew would often be used for offense, for example boarding a ship, or attacking a town or fort from the sea, as naval infantry. The Army's infantry was used for more serious land-based maneuvers, and could be ferried if possible, but not often used in a marine role.

LCdr L.N. Hartell writes " ... that Canada might be well served by adopting the USMC model and culture is highly suspect not only on doctrinal grounds but, as well, for cultural reasons. The idea that a CMC might have proved useful historically or might be favourably viewed within the framework of the current FSE is not contested; it is only the ability of the CF to adopt the accompanying alien technology that is in doubt." To many Canadia's Marines would look too much like war-making, not peace-keeping.

Canada has a long history of amphbious operations. On 19 August 1942, over 6,000 soldiers, primarily Canadians of the 2nd Infantry Division, waded ashore at Dieppe as part of Operation JUBILEE. The plan called for a raid-in-force by a closely coordinated joint attack of air, sea, and land forces. Planners anticipated that the joint operation would take only 15 hours for successful execution and withdrawal. Unfortunately, within 7 hours the raid on Dieppe ended in complete disaster. The losses were grim: 60 percent of the ground force was killed, wounded, or captured; 106 of 650 aircraft were destroyed; 33 of 179 landing craft were lost at sea or on the beaches; and one of eight destroyers was sunk. The raid on Dieppe was conceived as a coordinated joint plan of air, sea, and land battles. However, as planning progressed, it devolved into a complex and inflexible script in which synchronization was used to make up for operational shortfalls.

Inevitably, Clausewitzian friction affected the battle, and the inability to achieve operational objectives within carefully prescribed timelines meant that the pre-conditions for successive steps were not met. It was not any single event that led to the catastrophe at Dieppe, but rather a cascading series of events which began with the drafting of the plan and ended in the failure of the mission. Operation JUBILEE did not fail because of poor intelligence, a lack of preparation, or the loss of operational surprise. It failed because a plan that originally started out as a joint battle of air, land, and sea forces, had devolved into an overly complex, scripted event that had no possible chance for success.

The Normandy invasion took place 6 June 1944 in the Bay of the Seine, on the south side of the English Channel. The planned landing beaches covered about forty-five miles of the Bay's shoreline. Westernmost was "Utah" Area, stretching eight miles southward along the low-lying southeastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Directly to the east was "Omaha" Area, covering twelve miles of generally hilly terrain. United States forces were assigned to take both of those areas, with important assistance from the navies of Great Britain and other Allies. British and Canadian troops would assault the areas code-named "Gold", "Juno", and "Sword", which ran twenty miles eastward from "Omaha". The British and Canadian attacks, assisted by an air-dropped division on their eastern flank and a longer naval bombardment, generally went well.

Hartell notes that of 59 separate deployments and/or executed missions in the years 1945 through 1969, ten might be seen as not just opportunities to deploy amphibious forces, but opportunities that could not be fully exploited because no amphibious capability existed. Of these ten events, five involved the evacuation of Canadians from states that were failed and/or fragile: events in China (1959), Egypt (1952), St Lucia (1957), Haiti (1963) and Egypt again (1967). The period of 1970 to 2000 was as busy as the period of 1945 through 1969. A continuing need to plan and execute Evacuation Operations in coastal states was evident with separate events in West Pakistan (1971), Grenada (1974), Portugal (1974), Iran (1978/9), and twice in Haiti (1987/8, again in 1993).

In its Defence Policy Statement (DPS) of April 2005, titled Setting Our Course, the Canadian government announced a radical shift in the political direction that had guided the Departmentof National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) for decades. The Canadian government's Defence Policy Statement represented the defence policy component of the government's overarching - and reasonably (and surprisingly) integrated - International Policy Statement. The central thrust of the International Policy Statement, and its DPS component, was on the need to reinvest in Canada's international role. The changes were even greater than the post-Cold War 1994 Defence White Paper that continued the commitment of forces to overseas missions. The major change was the DPS requirement for a Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) of air, land and sea forces, to be available on 10 days notice to deploy on expeditionary operations.

Although the DPS did not say so explicitly, it was clear from comments made by the Minister of National Defence (MND) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), that the SCTF would have anamphibious capability. The need for a reinvestment in Canada's expeditionary military capabilities is given a particularly prominent place in the Defence Policy Statement. The sharp end of this capability would be the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), a joint military formation capable of operating in both Canada and abroad, and which would include an expanded Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2), alongside intelligence, aviation, maritime and land and other support capabilities.

Such a force would be ideal for rapid evacuation operations, as well as provide an enhanced combat and intelligence capability for the Canadian Force. According to reports, JTF-2 will be supported by a Light Force of fast-moving highly trained "ranger" troops. Comparisons have been made to the disbanded Canadian Airborne Regiment, though perhaps a better comparison would be the US Army Rangers - due to their key support role for US special forces. The Light Force would be used to secure an area, and to enable the JTF-2 force to conduct its smaller, surgical missions. According to the DPS, the SOTF will be joined by a Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF), a larger high readiness force made up of designated land, air, maritime and special operations forces. This force will be based on a strategic sealift capability.

The Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) of the Defence Policy Statement is also known as a Standing Contingency Force (SCF) or as Integrated Rapid Response (IRR). The SCTF - aside from providing a more significant support for special forces operations - was clearly designed to deal with the threat posed by failed and failing states, which are seen as planting "the seeds of threats to regional and global security," whether in the form of terrorist sanctuaries or refugee flows. Such low to medium-intensity "stability operations" require a significant and reasonably robust "boots on the ground" presence, and this need will likely be fulfilled with the expeditionary and more manpower- intensive SCTF.

What began as the SCTF, was redefined as the SCF, was trialed during the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) and was suspended due to competing priorities two years after the 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) was released. The navy led a 'proof-of-concept' exercise of the re-named Standing Contingency Force (SCF) in amphibious operations off the coast of North Carolina in November 2006. The navy conducted the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) with the participation of more than 1,000 CF members. Support was provided from the United States Navy, consisting of mentors and the participation of USS GUNSTON HALL and USS DOYLE. The ITEE helped the CF assess the challenges associated with developing a maritime expeditionary force.

On 30 January 2007, the Vancouver Sun reported that Department of National Defence (DND) would establish a 250-member Marine Commando Regiment at its base in Comox, BC. According to the Vancouver Sun, the new regiment would concentrate on maritime operations, be able to react to sea borne terrorist incidents and rescue Canadians trapped in war-torn nations that are accessible by sea. The regiment was to be part of the military reorganization that was also to see the Joint Task Force 2 counter-terrorism unit moved to Trenton, Ontario, from Dwyer Hill, outside of Ottawa. While it was expected to start with about 250 personnel, the military planned to expand the regiment over the years.

Due to operational and fiscal pressure, work on the SCF was stood down in early 2007.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/sctf.htm

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Canadian Military Journal has an interesting article on the subject here:

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no1/page54-eng.asp

Of course the primary factor in understanding why we don't have this capability always boils down to $$$$ and how much/little the taxpayers are willing to spend.

It would be tough for us to pay for, and even the Royal Marines are struggling to justify their existence.

Royal Marines cut by 200 as armed forces face staffing crisis 
https://www.ft.com/content/8a6e2752-1ec7-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c

 

[Kirkhill]

It would be tough for us to pay for, and even the Royal Marines are struggling to justify their existence.

Royal Marines cut by 200 as armed forces face staffing crisis 
https://www.ft.com/content/8a6e2752-1ec7-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c

On the other hand..... Currently available.  A 200 man cadre of individuals experienced in Marine operations.....  All that is missing is a budget.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

What is the cost differential of a marine vs army infantry?


M.

 

[dimsum]

We tried this once, it was called the Standing Contingency Task Force.  The government and military loved it until the saw the price tag and it died just as quickly as it was stood up.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/sctf.htm

Geez.  You know an article is getting old when they say that Canada has "one of the world's most powerful navies".  :-[

 

[daftandbarmy]

What is the cost differential of a marine vs army infantry?


M.

Seriously... a the pointy end, just take our Light Infantry Units and give them some training in getting on and off landing craft etc, and carry on. If you want, you can run some kind of Royal Marines type selection, but it's all just good old fashioned grunt work, mostly. It takes about a week to get pretty good at this stuff at the BGp level and below.

The expensive stuff is the equipment/ships (landing craft/ LCAC, aircraft/helicopter carriers  etc), integrated fire support (we don't do NGS in the Canadian Navy) and C&C infrastructure (think LPD type ships, Cormorants etc) required to make it all work together properly. There's also strategic recce, like SEALs/SBS, but we may be able to pull that together through JTF2 type resources.

However, we'll never, ever spend what is required to do that properly.

 

[Underway]

Seriously... a the pointy end, just take our Light Infantry Units and give them some training in getting on and off landing craft etc, and carry on. If you want, you can run some kind of Royal Marines type selection, but it's all just good old fashioned grunt work, mostly. It takes about a week to get pretty good at this stuff at the BGp level and below.

The expensive stuff is the equipment/ships (landing craft/ LCAC, aircraft/helicopter carriers  etc), integrated fire support (we don't do NGS in the Canadian Navy) and C&C infrastructure (think LPD type ships, Cormorants etc) required to make it all work together properly. There's also strategic recce, like SEALs/SBS, but we may be able to pull that together through JTF2 type resources.

However, we'll never, ever spend what is required to do that properly.

There was a push under Hiller to try it out and it was in the 2006 draft of the Canada First Defence Strategy.  They did a large study to see if amphibious operations were something that Canada wanted to try.  I worked with a number of sailors and soldiers who did the trials in South Carolina borrowing a US amphib ship (Gunston Hall IIRC).  Divers did the beach recce, MCDV's cleared lanes, and then the Vandoo's went ashore using US equipment.  There were a number of COA's examined.  It looked like they were going to do a Medium Battle Group type formation.  Company of Infantry, attached engineers, 3-6 guns, LAV's, MGS perhaps...  all in all about 200-350 pers depending.

There were visits to the USMC, UK Marines, Netherlands and Australia.  The report I read stated that it was going to take 10 years to get trained up and acquire all the equipment, along with the "Big Honkin Ship" to move it all.  But as per normal the price tag and internal CAF politics killed the idea.  CANSOFCOM got bigger, we bought Chinooks and C-17's and basically we spent all the money on air deployable instead.

Couple of articles that pretty much say what I said here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Commando_Regiment

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol3num2/vol3num2art4.pdf

*edit: Some of the Marine Commando Regiment proposed mandate has been taken over by the new Enhanced/Advance Boarding Party teams, and some of it still lies with JTF2.  However, the combat power concept of an MCR with artillery and armoured vehicles is not held by anyone.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There was a push under Hiller to try it out and it was in the 2006 draft of the Canada First Defence Strategy.  They did a large study to see if amphibious operations were something that Canada wanted to try.  I worked with a number of sailors and soldiers who did the trials in South Carolina borrowing a US amphib ship (Gunston Hall IIRC).  Divers did the beach recce, MCDV's cleared lanes, and then the Vandoo's went ashore using US equipment.  There were a number of COA's examined.  It looked like they were going to do a Medium Battle Group type formation.  Company of Infantry, attached engineers, 3-6 guns, LAV's, MGS perhaps...  all in all about 200-350 pers depending.

There were visits to the USMC, UK Marines, Netherlands and Australia.  The report I read stated that it was going to take 10 years to get trained up and acquire all the equipment, along with the "Big Honkin Ship" to move it all.  But as per normal the price tag and internal CAF politics killed the idea.  CANSOFCOM got bigger, we bought Chinooks and C-17's and basically we spent all the money on air deployable instead.

Couple of articles that pretty much say what I said here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Commando_Regiment

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol3num2/vol3num2art4.pdf

*edit: Some of the Marine Commando Regiment proposed mandate has been taken over by the new Enhanced/Advance Boarding Party teams, and some of it still lies with JTF2.  However, the combat power concept of an MCR with artillery and armoured vehicles is not held by anyone.

Of course, a lot of your organization, training and equipment will be driven by your doctrine, viz:

USMC Doctrine:? Kick in their front door and kill them in their living room as fast as possible with maximum violence. P.S., Wreck their house too.

UK Doctrine?: Land where and when they won't expect you, then sneak through their back door and stab them in the back while they're on the loo.

Not sure what our doctrine is, but whatever we do would likely look a little more British than 'murrican I would guess.

 

[FSTO]

My two cents.
Do we want to do Juno Beach or continue to use a rhib and zodiac deployed from a Frigate for all of our "Amphib" ops? For some strange reason we get in our heads that its all or nothing and we usually default to nothing. But we don't have to get an Iwo Jima class amphibious assault carrier to do what we as a maritime nation should be able to do at a minimum.
I say we just get an amphib capable ship(s) with these requirements; large flight deck, hangar, well deck, accommodations, C2 and a hospital. We start with baby steps and go from there. The Italians have a class of small amphibs that are about the size we could manage right now (get the drawings and build new). From there we could build our doctrine and capabilities that would make Canada more useful around the world. Like the C17's we will wonder how we operated without that capability.

Here is one built for the Algerians in 2012
<p><a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BDSL-474.png#/media/File:BDSL-474.png"><img src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8c/BDSL-474.png" alt="BDSL-474.png"></a>
By <a href="//commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Messaoud_Mesbouk&amp;action=edit&amp;redlink=1" class="new" title="User:Messaoud Mesbouk (page does not exist)">Messaoud Mesbouk</a> - <span class="int-own-work" lang="en">Own work</span>, <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0" title="Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0">CC BY-SA 4.0</a>, <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=48019494">Link</a></p>

 

[GR66]

Maybe we don't need a "Marine Corps" in the sense of an amphibious assault type force, but just the ability to transport a useful sized and equipped force from ship to shore.  Maybe a helicopter carrier to ferry troops to the shore with some landing craft to transport heavier supplies and a Ro-Ro manned by Naval (Reserve?) personnel is enough for what we need to do. 

 

[Infanteer]

I'll crib the notes I posted over on ER Campbell's blog.

I’ll argue for amphibious capability, but it doesn’t need to be an extravagant one like the US (and only the US) maintains. It can be something conventional like a mid-size landing platform dock (LPD), which countries like The Netherlands and Spain possess, or something a like a tender (“expeditionary sea base” in modern parlance) which is essentially a converted tanker that can push out and support amphibious forces – I think Davie is developing an ability at making use of tankers….

A few of these ships would require somewhere in the ballpark of 300-500 sailors. On top of this, there would be a requirement for some development in joint command and control, a process the Aussies are well into with the commissioning of their amphibious ships. Add another 100 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel or so for this.

The real investment needs to go into the ship-to-shore or ship-to-objective “connectors system”, which demands a few niche capabilities. First is the “combat cargo network” which is soldiers and sailors who understand how to pack ships for amphibious disembarkation. Next is the landing craft themselves, which can be crewed by Navy (US approach) or Army/Marine (UK approach) personnel. Next up is the beach party unit, which is the amphibious equivalent of a DZ controller, making sure beaches aren’t congested. Beachmasters control the surf to the end of the beach, and from the beach on is the domain of the shore party, which would be specially trained Army logisticians who get stuff off the beach and into a support area. The final piece would be some sort of aviation asset: perhaps cargo variants of the CH-148? So add another couple 200 or so RCAF personnel to increase our Maritime Helicopter capacity.

So, while a few extra platforms and a couple hundred sailors may get your amphibious force to an operational area, amphibious capability demands probably and extra 500 or so personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force – along with some specialized platforms and equipment – to run the connectors system.

All this is to say that, while I am a proponent of such capability, even a modest one will come at some cost.