Why Not Canadian Amphib/Marine Capability? (merged)

[daftandbarmy]

You're absolutely correct.  Being part of the BLT means exposure to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MAGTF, which is only 1/4 of the amphibious team (which is only 1/2 of the Marine/Navy expeditionary team).  The first RIMPAC featured a Canadian sub-unit as part of a SPMAGTF commanded by 3rd Marine Regiment.  There were no battalions to plug into (they were in some phase of an OIF/OEF deployment), so the company essentially became the BLT and dealt directly with the MAGTF Command Element (CE).

The USMC has an entire element posted into amphibious ships that work for the XO - these guys deal with linking Navy support to the Marines.  As well, the MAGTF CE has an embarkation officer deals directly with the ships XO to get the amphibious forces into and around the ship.  The MAGTF Commander and his Navy counterpart conduct a unique form of Battle Procedure to launch an amphibious team.  The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Logistic Combat Element (LCE) also require liason to get the troops ashore via aviation and to sustain them ashore via LCAC delivery of stores (that are usually contained in quadcons on the ships - something quartermasters have to work with the LCE).

Although this work-up is very similar to an NCE/NSE/BG/Air Wing arrangement that we see in Afghanistan, the fact that it is done in an amphibious environment while working for the Navy means that an extensive degree of corporate knowledge is required to do it well.  Many Marines have commented how focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has minimized amphibious training time and that this was evident with the friction that manifested itself while trying to mount a MAGTF after so long.

They also need specialized ships to command these operations, which cost a fortune and means we are unlikely to ever purchase.

 

[FSTO]

They also need specialized ships to command these operations, which cost a fortune and means we are unlikely to ever purchase.

If you are looking at a WASP class amphib carrier (and the ancillary equip) yes. A Mistral, San Guisto, Dodko may be somewhat cheaper and more in our budget range.

 

[FSTO]

You're absolutely correct.  Being part of the BLT means exposure to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MAGTF, which is only 1/4 of the amphibious team (which is only 1/2 of the Marine/Navy expeditionary team).  The first RIMPAC featured a Canadian sub-unit as part of a SPMAGTF commanded by 3rd Marine Regiment.  There were no battalions to plug into (they were in some phase of an OIF/OEF deployment), so the company essentially became the BLT and dealt directly with the MAGTF Command Element (CE).

The USMC has an entire element posted into amphibious ships that work for the XO - these guys deal with linking Navy support to the Marines.  As well, the MAGTF CE has an embarkation officer deals directly with the ships XO to get the amphibious forces into and around the ship.  The MAGTF Commander and his Navy counterpart conduct a unique form of Battle Procedure to launch an amphibious team.  The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Logistic Combat Element (LCE) also require liason to get the troops ashore via aviation and to sustain them ashore via LCAC delivery of stores (that are usually contained in quadcons on the ships - something quartermasters have to work with the LCE).

Although this work-up is very similar to an NCE/NSE/BG/Air Wing arrangement that we see in Afghanistan, the fact that it is done in an amphibious environment while working for the Navy means that an extensive degree of corporate knowledge is required to do it well.  Many Marines have commented how focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has minimized amphibious training time and that this was evident with the friction that manifested itself while trying to mount a MAGTF after so long.

Agree completly, this would not be an outfit you cobble together for a couple of weeks a year.

 

[daftandbarmy]

If you are looking at a WASP class amphib carrier (and the ancillary equip) yes. A Mistral, San Guisto, Dodko may be somewhat cheaper and more in our budget range.

Too bad we didn't grab the Intrepid or Fearless before they made it to the breaker's yard. The again, they were pretty old:

http://www.clydesite.co.uk/clydebuilt/viewship.asp?id=2509

 

[FSTO]

Too bad we didn't grab the Intrepid or Fearless before they made it to the breaker's yard. The again, they were pretty old:

http://www.clydesite.co.uk/clydebuilt/viewship.asp?id=2509

No way....they were beyond salvagable. Would be like buying a 92 Hyundi Pony and paying 100,000 to make it drivable vice buying the 70,000 loaded BMW.

 

[jollyjacktar]

USS GUNSTON HALL or one of her Sisters would do just fine.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If, and it's a big IF, I have understood what I've been reading here (Army.ca and its muti-hued sisters), it seems that:

1. An amphibious capability, of some sort, is highly desirable; but

2. It is an expensive proposition requiring -

a. dedicated and highly trained naval units, and

b. trained and, at least, earmarked, army units; and

3. The business of crewing new amphibious ships and their necessary escorts would be very, very difficult impossible today.

 

[jollyjacktar]

Yup, and that is why the adults shut the project down a couple of years ago.  At least on the Navy side of the house here in Halifax.  Maybe one day it might be looked at again, but Mother Hubbard's cupboard is bare for all of that stuff.  Except for those Sailor's such as myself that would give their right one to get in on the concept.  We are still around although getting smaller in number as time goes on and we leave the CF.

 

[FSTO]

If, and it's a big IF, I have understood what I've been reading here (Army.ca and its muti-hued sisters), it seems that:

1. An amphibious capability, of some sort, is highly desirable; but

2. It is an expensive proposition requiring -

a. dedicated and highly trained naval units, and

b. trained and, at least, earmarked, army units; and

3. The business of crewing new amphibious ships and their necessary escorts would be very, very difficult impossible today.

Agree with 1 and 2 but what escorts are you talking about? New AOR's will be operational by the time this capability would come on-line and the current frigates and their proposed replacements would handle the rest.

 

[Kirkhill]

Perhaps, instead of focusing on the USMC, Tarawas, Harriers, Ospreys and EFVs, (all of which the US is questioning whether it can afford them) and concluding that we can`t afford that level of capability, we could backtrack and determine what level of capability we can afford.

Could we start from the position of ensuring that we have a suitable range of connectors to move STUFF, at any speed, from ship to shore?  We have 2 to 3 AORs in our future.  We have 6 to 8 AOPVs in our future.  All of which have the capability to move goods.  The current AORs have the capability to deploy Landing Craft.  The AOPV has had and on-again-off-again relationship with Landing Craft.  And I would continue to argue for at least some portion of the CSC fleet (2-4 out of the 12-16) to be configured in a manner similar to the Absalon so that it can launch Landing Craft.

You don`t need well-decks to launch a landing craft. You don`t even need dedicated davits.  A good multi-purpose crane and scrambling nets will still suffice for many applications.

Helicopters are brilliant but they are likely to be heavily engaged and not capable of moving everything.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

If, and it's a big IF, I have understood what I've been reading here (Army.ca and its muti-hued sisters), it seems that:

1. An amphibious capability, of some sort, is highly desirable; but

2. It is an expensive proposition requiring -

a. dedicated and highly trained naval units, and

b. trained and, at least, earmarked, army units; and

3. The business of crewing new amphibious ships and their necessary escorts would be very, very difficult impossible today.

I also agree with 1.

I have reservations about 2 (more on that below).

I disagree with 3.

First of all, and I can sympathize with Infanteer being impressed by the US Marines MAGTF concept of operation, the US Marines Model is not what is required in Canada. Remember that the USMC is not an amphibious force, its an expeditionary corps whose task is to basically be able to take and deploy a scalable force up to the size of the whole CF anywhere in the world and support it for months at the time, if not years. So, sure, they have their ACE, CLE, CE and so forth, but so do we when you look at the equivalent whole CF. Our CE element is called Canada Command, or CEFCOM and is completed by a local appropriate HQ where deployed, our CLE is made up of our purple trades and CANOSCOM, our ACE is the Air Force, and so forth. So we need not reinvent the wheel, just use and adapt what we already have to one more situation.

Its not that complex or expensive.

Moreover, we are talking about a much smaller scale, probably in the same order as the French, Italian, Spanish and most comparable Australian scale: one or two ships capable of landing and supporting between 600 and 900 soldiers and their equipment and carrying about a dozen tactical helicopters.

The knowledge base and organizational structure to do that already exists in the CF, especially now, after years of deployed combat in Afghanistan.

Addressing now the "dedicated and highly trained naval units".

First of all, "A ship is a ship" (dixit Admiral -then busted to captain- Kirk). From a naval point of view, there is no more difference between operating an amphibious ship vice a frigate that there is between operating an AOR vice a destroyer. Each type of ship in the Navy has a dedicated crew: That is, the crewmen qualified in individual trade first, then trained individually to type on the class of ship they serve on and then, the whole crew trains to operational standards on all the specific tasks and operations of their individual ship to pass their readiness qualification. There is no difficulty for the Navy in learning the specifics within the time frame that would be provided between the time we decide to purchase amphibious ships and the time the ship is turned over to the Navy from the builders.

As for  the expensive part generally, the most likely types of amphibious ship Canada would get are ships like the French Mistral, the Korean Dodko, the Spanish Juan Carlos I or its Australian derivative Canberra. These ships cost about the same as a frigate and are crewed by smaller Navy crew than a frigate. The cost differential  is a wash.

Finally, I disagree completely with point three. The Australian Defence Forces will soon man and operate two LHA's of the Canberra class, about a dozen destroyers and frigates plus a slew of mine warfare crafts and patrol boats with a Navy that is smaller than ours.

In my opinion, the element that would have the greatest learning curve is probably the Tactical Helicopter squadron to be embarked - not because the pilots would have to fly differently, but because contrary to their Maritime Helo brethren, the "ground" crew of those squadrons would have to learn to work and operate in the very tight confines and within the restrictions of a ship before they could become as effective as they would like to be.

This is just MHO, but I would love the opportunity to put together the Navy crew that would prove me right, if Ottawa calls ...   

 

[Infanteer]

First of all, and I can sympathize with Infanteer being impressed by the US Marines MAGTF concept of operation, the US Marines Model is not what is required in Canada. Remember that the USMC is not an amphibious force, its an expeditionary corps whose task is to basically be able to take and deploy a scalable force up to the size of the whole CF anywhere in the world and support it for months at the time, if not years.

If we developed any capability like this for Canada, it would be expeditionary as well.

So, sure, they have their ACE, CLE, CE and so forth, but so do we when you look at the equivalent whole CF. Our CE element is called Canada Command, or CEFCOM and is completed by a local appropriate HQ where deployed, our CLE is made up of our purple trades and CANOSCOM, our ACE is the Air Force, and so forth. So we need not reinvent the wheel, just use and adapt what we already have to one more situation.

Wrong.  the components of a MAGTF are various task force elements, similar in design with our Task Force NCE/NSE/BG construct, not our national force generation/employment organizations.

My description of the various fucntions and links of a MAGTF wasn't to point out that we didn't have anything like them (I alluded that we do); it was only to show how complex employing a unit of soldiers in an amphibious environment is.  As Old Sweat said, it isn't simply a matter of loading bayonets in boats and sending them to shore - there is a great amount of unique planning and logistics that requires a degree of corporate knowledge.  This isn't something that comes immediately following the purchase of an amphibious vessel.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

If we developed any capability like this for Canada, it would be expeditionary as well.

I apologize for being unclear.

Of course any Battle Group, air element and ships that would be deployed in any Canadian amphibious force would be out on an expedition. In the case of the Marine Corps, I was referring to the fact that the totality of the Corps (all 200 thousand or so and 40 thousand reservists) is entirely dedicated to being deployed as an expeditionary force. The MAGTF is the structure they use to do this. It is scalable and, while you appear to have seen it at the Battalion Landing Team level, I do not know in which scale you saw it. The Marines can deploy a MAGTF that is only at the Expeditionary Unit level [MEU(SOC)] of approx. 2500 all the way up to a Expeditionary Force of approx. 100,000 based on multiple Marine Divisions. When a Marine Division ships out, you are hard pressed to find anyone left in uniform on the base. And being an integrated force, they carry and control internally to the Corps their stores, administration, air support, armour and artillery, etc.

This is where my comparison to the whole CF came from: The Corps need not look outside its own structure for anything as it is already integrated. Even the ships of the "Gator" Navy are by their nature already separated from the main fleet and assigned to support the Marines on an ongoing basis. The only thing left out, but which in any event does not require specific amphibious training, is the provision where circumstances warrant of escort vessels to the Marine force being deployed.

Purely on a side note here, as I don't know if this was the case in the Army or Air Force before Afghanistan, in the Navy, we have been working under the TF/TG/TU/TE system ever since the end of the cold war - so the corporate knowledge of such organizational structure is well entrenched by now.

there is a great amount of unique planning and logistics that requires a degree of corporate knowledge.  This isn't something that comes immediately following the purchase of an amphibious vessel.

First here, between the time we "purchase" any such ship and it hits the water and become available to the Navy, we are talking four to five years. I can guarantee you we can develop the knowledge required in that time frame. The Australians are doing it, so are the Italians and the Spaniards. I'd like to think our military is just as smart and professional.

Second of all, we must include concept of operation in here and distinguish (again) from the Americans. The US has a "forward deployed" policy for its armed forces. As such, the US Marines have, at any given moment, between four and eight MEU(SOC) deployed around the world onboard amphibious groups. The Marines on those ships live onboard for months at a time without a specific mission or tasking and the stores they carry must last them that long plus "combat" consumption rate even if hostility start on the last day. These stores must be carried with the amphibious group and, without knowing the exact order in which they will be required, must be easily reachable usually in reverse order they are required (least likely used buried at the back, most likely used in front).

In Canada, we do not permanently forward deploy, and just like the French, Italian, British and Australians, the natural state of any amphibious ship would be alongside Halifax or Esquimalt except for short sailings on training and exercises. The soldiers would not be embarked unless they were being sailed to a specific exercise or actual operation, for which they would have trained in advance. The Army's logistics personnel would have planned their projection for consumption of stores in both quantities and order of consumption. They would then meet with their Navy counterpart who would be responsible for storing the items onboard the amphibious ship in reverse order of expected use.  At that point it becomes a cargo handling exercise and the Navy already knows how to do that. Moreover, by the time we get phibs, many Sea logistics officers and MARS officers can be run through the US Marines Combat Logistics Officer course or the Amphibious Assault Staff Officer course. When I retired ten years ago, the Navy regularly sent officers on those courses, even reserve officers, and we did not even envisaged having phibs in those days. They were just considered "good to know" courses - just in case.

So, on the small scale that would exist in Canada, and with the more limited embarked time for Canadian soldiers only for specific exercises or operation, many of the complexities that  attach to the US Marines methods would not be required. When US Marines deploy, without specific task, for four to six months, they become part of the ship's crew, thus the need to come under the XO, and must take part in constant drills and phys. ed. training to keep their edge, and their command element must , when tasked while at sea, do its own planning of the operation.

Canadians embarked only to and from their landing area on a specific mission would be acting more like passengers (though liaison between the Adjutant and the Coxn's staff and Regulating PO  would be necessary for the maintenance of good order and safety of the soldiers) and their command element would be sailing with its mission plan already "in the pocket".

In fact, with ships like the Mistral or Canberra that are equipped with "plug-and-play" ready Embarked Force HQ and ops room for a staff of about 100, the likely organization of a Canadian  amphibious operation would likely see an embarked Task Force Commander (either a Commodore or a Brigadier General) and her staff in overall command, with the Battle Group as one Task Group, the amphibious ship another Task Group, the air element as another TG, the integrated logistics group another and finally, any escort ships as a final TG.

We already have all the knowledge to organize something like that. We just need to practice it from time to time (just like a "Division HQ", I guess).

I note your interesting tag line, infanteer. And I bid all here to think of the same for any Canadian amphibious capability: Don't overcomplicate it.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Agree with 1 and 2 but what escorts are you talking about? New AOR's will be operational by the time this capability would come on-line and the current frigates and their proposed replacements would handle the rest.

My appreciation is that IF one has, because one needs, an important and vulnerable ship like a major amphibious ship then it needs escorts that must be manned and ready to sail with it.  understand that hey already exist but it means, to me, that enough people must be available to crew all those ships, almost all the time.

I am not suggesting new, additional frigates.

 

[Edward Campbell]

While a ship may, indeed, be just a ship, an amphibious force is another thing. The force commander is, conventionally, the naval commander, and, as Old Sweat suggested, he has a great deal of responsibility, including the messy business of fighting and winning the "battle on the beach." He, the naval commander, does not, generally, give the army commander free reign until after the landing has succeeded. This might be the major land "battle" of an operation and it is a naval officer's job to fight and win it, from the bridge if his ship. This is a sort of military operations that requires specialized training- which is (or was 20ish years ago) provided to UK and US naval officers selected for amphibious forces.

 

[ArmyRick]

I would like to jump back into this one. Points to ponder.

1. I said it before and I say it again. The biggest hurdle (from a soldier's perspective) on doing amphibious ops is a LEADERSHIP issue. We do lack expirience in that regard. For the soldiers, it is a simple matter of learning ship drills, disembarking/embarking onto a landing craft/assault boat/helicopter/hovercraft, etc. Soldiers I find pick this up really fast.

But the commanders (at all levels) would have to become drilled and profficient in planning and executing ampbibious operations. The service support and the lift annexes would be considerable (I am imagining a CSM and PL WOs hashing out the loading manifest of troops, equipment and supplies as well as prisoner/civilian/casualty extraction loading plans). FOOs would be probably very busy coordinating all aspects of fire support (air, artillery, naval, etc). Coy and Battalion commanders would have to really hash out their COAs for whatever mission they are undertaking.

2. What is the most realistic amphibious operations we as canadians would do?
-NEO Extraction (Canadians stuck in the middle east in 2006 perfect example)
-Participating in larger amphibious operation (alongside big brother America and Britain) this would be the ONLY way I fore see us doing a large scale amphibious op
-Warmer months of the year, soverein ops in the North (From ship and working with the Rangers)
-Smaller scale intervention missions
-Maybe Counter piracy ops (Pursuing pirates in Somalia and taking them down on the water or on land)

3. We will definately need new technology, but I will let the experts bark about that (Hint Landing Craft for troops is something we could get and start training on in very short time and not much cost)

4. Where would we load these forces up? Halifax or Esquimalt or would it be mission dependant?

My thoughts, cheers.

 

[jollyjacktar]

Rick, for #4.  Prior to it being jagged in the plan was to have an Amphibian Unit based out of Shearwater.  Pongo's in Battalion strength IRRC, and the BHS.  Something similar in Esquimault.  They were going to be intended as a rapid deployment force to go wherever needed on short notice.  With humanitarian missions foremost in mind ala OP Hestia in Haiti.  At least this was how it was explained on our end.  They went so far as to stand up a small starter Det of Sailors who were to form the nucleus of the crew for the BHS.  When we "borrowed" USS GUNSTON HALL these guys sailed on her for shadowing purposes and more was to come from it.  When the project was shelved, all the guys came back to the fleet.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well, if we're looking for something meaningful for the TDBGs to do that is both 'territorial' and 'defensive', perhaps we should find a way to inter-operate with the Coast Guard's fleet. They got a bunch of ships that might be useful in their Ice Fleet, for example. Of course, I'm well out of my depth here (pun intended):

http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/CCG/Ice_Fleet

Heavy Icebreakers

•CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent
•CCGS Terry Fox

Medium Icebreakers

•CCGS Amundsen (dedicated to Science in the summer)
•CCGS Des Groseilliers
•CCGS Henry Larsen
•CCGS Pierre Radisson

Light Icebreakers

High Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels

•CCGS Ann Harvey
•CCGS Edward Cornwallis
•CCGS Georges R. Pearkes
•CCGS Griffon
•CCGS Martha L. Black
•CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier
•CCGS Sir William Alexander

Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels

•CCGS Earl Grey
•CCGS Samuel Risley
•CCGS Tracy

Air Cushioned Vehicles

•CCGS Mamilossa
•CCGS Sipu Muin

 

[chrisf]

If you're suggesting any sort of arming, or militarization of those vessels, it's been discussed before, I can assure you, it wouldn't work very well.

That being said, a great deal of coast guard employees are nearing retirement age, if you started slipping things in slowly, as they were replaced, you might get away with it.

My suggestion would be to include mounts for light armament on all new vessels (Mounts, just mounts, not the weapons), as well as a multi-use compartment large enough to uncomfortably embark a platoon of troops, plus stores. Option to use for embarked RCMP/DFO/Sea Cadets/Cargo as required, on replacements for the 1100/1200/1300 class ice breakers.

Down the road, embark start conducting arctic soverignty ops from the CCG vessels that head north for the summer. Simple stuff, plant flags, visit northern communities.

Would be a good excuse to operate at least one vessel in the north in the winter as well, I'm guessing you'd have multiple scientific organizations more then willing to back such winter operations as well.

As the coast guard becomes more comfortable with the idea of working with the military, you can start arming the vessels as required when troops are embarked, weapons to be operated by embarked troops.

Several of the vessels listed carry "barges" for operations in the arctic. Not suitable for any sort of opposed landing, by any means, but more than sufficient to land a platoon with kit on an arctic island.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

If you're suggesting any sort of arming, or militarization of those vessels, it's been discussed before, I can assure you, it wouldn't work very well.

That being said, a great deal of coast guard employees are nearing retirement age, if you started slipping things in slowly, as they were replaced, you might get away with it.

My suggestion would be to include mounts for light armament on all new vessels (Mounts, just mounts, not the weapons), as well as a multi-use compartment large enough to uncomfortably embark a platoon of troops, plus stores. Option to use for embarked RCMP/DFO/Sea Cadets/Cargo as required, on replacements for the 1100/1200/1300 class ice breakers.

Down the road, embark start conducting arctic soverignty ops from the CCG vessels that head north for the winter. Simple stuff, plant flags, visit northern communities.

As the coast guard becomes more comfortable with the idea of working with the military, you can start arming the vessels as required when troops are embarked, weapons to be operated by embarked troops.

So what would you use the large compartment for when you don't have troops embarked? You cannot just put something like that in a new built ship and just save it. There is no such thing as wasted space onboard ship and when you put said platoon onboard with gear where does the gear that was stored or other personnel go?

And I would continue to argue for at least some portion of the CSC fleet (2-4 out of the 12-16) to be configured in a manner similar to the Absalon so that it can launch Landing Craft.

Then you would have a frigate that can only do both roles at best adequately. If we are serious about amphib ops lets be serious about getting them at least an LPD and lets not bastardize other warships and support vessels for the job. You won't be doing the Navy nor the Army any favours.