Gar Pardy . Hillier's legacy
Gar Pardy,
The Ottawa Citizen
Published: Wednesday, July 02, 2008
The Hillier comet has now faded from our Canadian skies. It was a comet of some brilliance and its brightness will be with us for some time to come.
For many, Gen. Rick Hillier's presence for the past three years as chief of the defence staff, ending officially today, has taken on an almost messianic colouration of things military and the importance of the Canadian soldier. Temporarily at least he created a closer bond and understanding between Canadians and their military.
Afghanistan is Gen. Hillier's war. While efforts have been made to label it Paul Martin's and/or Stephen Harper's war, the Kandahar deployment now stretching into 2011 and with serious talk that it needs to extend well into the next decade, is Gen. Hillier's more than anyone else. He put together the Canadian Afghan plan in 2005.
As such in no small measure the General's historical legacy is intimately tied to that war and its eventual outcome. The associated policies of the transformation of the Canadian Forces (which was to produce resources for other military deployments) and massive equipment purchases are bogged down in the normal Ottawa morass and will do nothing for the General's long-term image.
Every commentator, political and military leader who has spoken in recent weeks has concluded that Afghanistan is worse today than it was in 2005. This is not only in the south but in the east (attacks up 40 percent over the same time last year) and expectations are rife that it will include the northwest in the coming months. Even the Pentagon, not known for its pessimism on military matters, recently reported to Congress that there are no short-term or easy answers in Afghanistan and gloomily reported that the Taliban has "coalesced into a resilient insurgency." The Senlis Council in its usually breathless style is now telling us that there are too many young men in Afghanistan.
For all of those committed to the current military strategy, the only corrective action is deploying thousands of additional foreign troops and pushing further into the future the date when all of this will produce a peaceful Afghanistan. The American commander who has come recently to Afghanistan is now asking for more than 10,000 additional troops. Lyndon Johnson must be cursin' in his grave.
In the meantime, the spectre of the tribal areas of Pakistan providing support, sanctuary and militants for the Taliban has become more real with each passing day. The Pakistani Taliban has emerged from the shadows and is in open revolt against Islamabad and there are attacks in and near Peshawar. Pakistan's fledgling democracy with large expectations from the people and stubborn opposition from the military is in no condition to effectively control matters or effectively direct the future.
Rather it will stumble along with an effort to wean the tribals from the dual dangers of deepening fundamentalism and closer ties with the Afghan militants. In the meantime with weak governments in both Kabul and Islamabad their relations will become more acrimonious. Loose talk by western politicians for military action inside Pakistan will not help.
One can only hope that the west and NATO are learning a fundamental lesson in this debacle. NATO's ability to co-ordinate military action in Afghanistan is non-existent. Afghanistan is far too removed and the dangers it may have represented a few years ago no longer course through our bodies politic. Rather, other issues have come to the fore and there is a need to rethink how to deal with places like Afghanistan which will remain a regional trouble spot for decades to come. It no longer represents a danger to significant western interests and the sooner this manifests itself into a coherent non-interventionist military strategy then the sooner we can end the ramp ceremonies at Trenton.
When the Afghan mission was open for discussion in 2005, prime minister Paul Martin and his colleagues did not exercise due diligence; the discussion to the extent that it is known was not about Afghanistan but rather whether it might pre-empt other initiatives by the government in such places as Darfur, the Middle East or Haiti.
Even when, a year later, Prime Minister Harper wrapped himself and his government in the Hillier plan, there was no significant public discussion or careful consideration by either the prime minister or his ministers. When a further extension of the mandate was considered necessary, John Manley and his panellists rounded the edges and dulled the debate, ensuring that the Liberals and Conservatives merged their slight differences.
The surprising element in all of this is that the debate in Canada has had very little to do with Afghanistan. Rather it has much to do about Canada and Canadians and their never ending willingness to see themselves as they would like to be seen rather then how others may see us. Mr. Manley and his panel unintentionally expressed it best when they wrote "Canada's participation in the outcomes, will directly affect Canada's security, our reputation in the world, and our future ability to engage the international community in achieving objectives of peace, security and shared prosperity."
Modern local wars rarely provide desired outcomes or create conditions that we think are important to our well being. As with drunken drivers there are no straight lines. As we approach the eighth year of the Afghan war there are no signs that the outcome will add to the historical legacy of Gen. Hillier. Rather there will be proof that when you are smarter than the politicians who surround you, then you need to do the thinking for everyone.
Gar Pardy retired from the foreign service in 2003.
E-mail: garp@rogers.com
© The Ottawa Citizen 2008
Thank you, sir, for giving us back the respect of the country. 
