supply system?

[aesop081]

2 GS Battalion is going to merge with 2 Svc BN here in Petawawa next summer.   So it'll be just one big support unit.   I don't know how much things are going to change in reality though.  

Just going back to the way it was when i joined.  Go figure !!

 

[BITTER PPLCI CPL]

When buddy said it can be worse outside at an airforce base, I couldn't help but think at some point they get TO GO INSIDE! However when it's raining and were doing section attacks all day, patrolling, the inside we see is that of a bivy bag. No matter how much the Air Force tries to justify why it need's Gore-tex cadpat rain gear, you'll never pursuade or convince the good ole' Canadian (reg force!) Infantryman you deserve it! Now before anyone say's that's enough on this subject, I'm not going to comment on this anymore.

​

 

[aesop081]

When buddy said it can be worse outside at an airforce base, I couldn't help but think at some point they get TO GO INSIDE! However when it's raining and were doing section attacks all day, patrolling, the inside we see is that of a bivy bag. No matter how much the Air Force tries to justify why it need's Gore-tex cadpat rain gear, you'll never pursuade or convince the good ole' Canadian (reg force!) Infantryman you deserve it! Now before anyone say's that's enough on this subject, I'm not going to comment on this anymore.

​

Not the airforce's fault....the army decided it was going to be Tac vest now, rain gear later..........

 

[Roy Harding]

2 GS Battalion is going to merge with 2 Svc BN here in Petawawa next summer.  So it'll be just one big support unit.  I don't know how much things are going to change in reality though. 

I've HEARD (and cannot independently verify) that the same will be happenning with 1 Svc and 1 GS as well - I think one can assume that the abortions known as GS Bns may (finally) be on their way out.

This will ONLY solve the problem stated earlier if Bases (or ASUs - whatever you want to call them - the folks responsible for STATIC support to soldiers) have their own establishment, properly staffed, and don't rely upon the Svc Bns to provide those services.  This is EXACTLY the situation which existed PRIOR to the birth of the GS Bns, and which the GS Bns were originally intended to fix.

Although I didn't go into it in my earlier post, my wife's Platoon when she was serving in 1 Svc Bn was lucky in that it wasn't "double hatted".  Services to CFB Calgary such as Base Tpt, Base Maint, Clothing Stores, etcetera were provided by personnel on strength of 1 Svc Bn.  Concurrent to her experience in Sup Coy, I was CC Tpt Coy of the same Battalion.  We had a separate Platoon (I do believe it was Charley Platoon - any old truckers out there feel free to correct me) which provided the Base Tpt function.  The folks in this Pl were not SUPPOSED to deploy to the field, and indeed C Pl never did.  HOWEVER, it was (sometimes) used as a "holding pl" for injured or otherwise non-deployable troops.  And when one of the other Pls was undermanned (for whatever reason) prior to a major exercise, C Pl was regularly stripped of its' deployable troops, with very little notice.

Another oft overlooked problem with this set up was personnel support to the troops on strength of C Pl.  When the Bde, and consequently the Bn, deployed the Coy OR went with them (complete)- The Ord Rm functioned as C/S 1 CP staff.  Who now supported the troops left behind in C Pl??  And don't forget - this was Base Tpt, these were drivers (military AND civvie) - MTECs, TD Claims, etcetera were a daily occurrence.  (Not to mention, C Pl was often, not always, manned with folks who were non-deployable for compassionate personal reasons - those soldiers who usually require the MOST administrative support).  During my tenure as CC, and undoubtedly during OTHER's tenure in the same post, arrangements were made - but these arrangements were always ad hoc and "field expedient" - they shouldn't have been.

There's no doubt in my mind that similar problems existed in Maint and Sup Coys - but I can't speak to those problems with anything resembling authority.

These problems existed because, unlike Air bases (and I assume Naval ones - although I don't know) which are staffed by people whose ONLY role is to fill that STATIC role and are on strength of an official unit (complete with a CFOO, REMAR and everything) called CFB SOMEWHERE.  The Army, for whatever misguided reason, decided that a field deployable unit (Svc Bn) could provide both STATIC (Base) functions AND deploy when required (at least in Calgary and Petawawa - can't speak for Valcartier).

I can't remember exactly what year 1 GS Bn stood up - but it would have been around '97, or '98.  As stated earlier, it was designed to address the problems I superficially outlined above.  It's now seven or eight years later (less than a DECADE!!!) and we (the collective we) have managed to screw it up.  Apparently, we are now dissolving them as they quickly devolved into the same "split personality" situation they were designed to alleviate!!!

Jesus Wept!!  The mind (at least mine) boggles!!!

Now - in fairness to our senior CF leadership, I am aware that the ASG/ASU concept has been growing up during the same time period the GS Bns have been in existence.  If those STATIC functions (Base Tpt, Base Maint, Clothing Stores, MSA, etcetera) are transferred lock, stock, and barrel to units (call them ASUs if you want - call them Bases if you want) which have their OWN CFOO, REMAR, Commander, etcetera, then it might work.  But DON'T place these STATIC functions under command of a gentlemen or lady who is ALSO responsible for providing deployable support to the manoeuvre units.  If you do, in less than a decades time you'll be able to use the "search" function on this forum and re-use these comments, because the situation will be EXACTLY the same.

As much as it hurts me personally to say this, I strongly recommend that the Army look at how the Air Force staffs their Bases vis a vis support functions - it seems to be something they nailed perfectly.  (Those of you personally acquainted with me should now take deep cleansing breaths - BREATH, dammit  - YES, "The CC" said something complimentary about the Air Force - and I do believe there may be a cold front rapidly moving towards Hell  )

Rant ends (for now).

 

[aesop081]

I've HEARD (and cannot independently verify) that the same will be happenning with 1 Svc and 1 GS as well - I think one can assume that the abortions known as GS Bns may (finally) be on their way out.

My ex-wife is a bin rat at 1 GS and that is what she told me...GS BN is going the way of the dodo bird.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Like I said on another thread, Things got lumped together for fiscal reasons. Not a bad thing.

As to GS vs Svc Btn? If what I've seen from the Leaders, it won't work. I had a Capt, language speaker for Op Athena, working in CIMIC. I have no compunction of saying what I think here, because he sent out an email to members of the military, on the DNET. On this open email, he questioned my credibility, my command, decisions and my integrity. I didn't go home early, he did. From what I understand, he's now the LOG O for the RCD. Has a Aribic name. He hates Reservists, even though that's where he came from. He is toatally career orientated from the point he's not worried about where he's from but where he's going. Nor who he has to trash to make an impression, with the highers. Spent most of his time sucking ass and licking boots to the Maj.This is the type of idiot that sends orders to the guys at the desk. If a Private says "You can't have it", it's likely because an idiot like this Sup O that said "Don't fuck up my inventory...............and PER".

 

[Roy Harding]

Like I said on another thread, Things got lumped together for fiscal reasons. Not a bad thing.

As to GS vs Svc Btn? If what I've seen from the Leaders, it won't work. I had a Capt, language speaker for Op Athena, working in CIMIC. I have no compunction of saying what I think here, because he sent out an email to members of the military, on the DNET. On this open email, he questioned my credibility, my command, decisions and my integrity. I didn't go home early, he did. From what I understand, he's now the LOG O for the RCD. Has a Aribic name. He hates Reservists, even though that's where he came from. He is toatally career orientated from the point he's not worried about where he's from but where he's going. Nor who he has to trash to make an impression, with the highers. Spent most of his time sucking ass and licking boots to the Maj.This is the type of idiot that sends orders to the guys at the desk. If a Private says "You can't have it", it's likely because an idiot like this Sup O that said "Don't fuck up my inventory...............and PER".

There are jerks in every Branch, recceguy.  There are also outstanding leaders in every Branch/Corps.  Most fall somewhere in between, although I would say that during my time in - most seasoned (ie - not on their first engagement) leaders in the CF tended toward the upper end of that particular scale.

When I was serving in 1 Svc Bn, I came to the conclusion (and I still believe) that these Bns should be Commanded by a Cbt Arms LCol, assisted by a Cbt Arms RSM.  This would place the DCO, OCs,  and CSMs in a perhaps uncomfortable position at times, but would, I think tend to "focus" the Bn on operations a bit more.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Retired CC,

I agree 100%. We've got lot's of savvy Chiefs and Maj, in the Cbt Arms. For most, release is a medical and time thing.

They are more than capable of moving over to something like a CSS job. It's not rocket science. Command of a Unit is the same, no matter what the Unit is. Your job is to ensure discipline and ensure the people under you do their job. Most RSM's and MWO's in th Cbt Arms have done the RQ, SQ or CQ jobs. It's just a little larger scale.

At least they'd know what's required for the Cbt Arms or Tac Av, and treat the soldiers accordingly.

I must admit though, in all my time, with an explanaition and some time spent on idle chit chat and pleasantries, I've yet to leave stores with less than I went for. Mostly, more than I went for.

 

[Roy Harding]

Retired CC,

I agree 100%. We've got lot's of savvy Chiefs and Maj, in the Cbt Arms. For most, release is a medical and time thing.

They are more than capable of moving over to something like a CSS job. It's not rocket science. Command of a Unit is the same, no matter what the Unit is. Your job is to ensure discipline and ensure the people under you do their job. Most RSM's and MWO's in th Cbt Arms have done the RQ, SQ or CQ jobs. It's just a little larger scale.

At least they'd know what's required for the Cbt Arms or Tac Av, and treat the soldiers accordingly.

I forgot to add Fd Ambs as another unit which should be commanded by Cbt Arms.

I must admit though, in all my time, with an explanaition and some time spent on idle chit chat and pleasantries, I've yet to leave stores with less than I went for. Mostly, more than I went for.

My experience as well - even BEFORE I started sleeping with a Sup Tech!!

 

[sigtech]

There are jerks in every Branch, recceguy.   There are also outstanding leaders in every Branch/Corps.  

I posted this not to bash sup techs but the system they work in.......
Yes there are jerks in all trades and branchs
I find there are sup techs that are great (mostly if there are at a unit not base side) you walk in and hey insert name here how are things what do you need?
then there are jerks , why do you need that ,why should I give you that
Then like in all trades the guys that are by the book and would never leave that. Your unit isn't intitled to that so no matter what you need you can't have it.

My point is this the supply system is flawed and needs to be fixed , how do we do this from the lower end ? I don't know and can it be done ? again I don't know

 

[Eowyn]

When I was serving in 1 Svc Bn, I came to the conclusion (and I still believe) that these Bns should be Commanded by a Cbt Arms LCol, assisted by a Cbt Arms RSM.   This would place the DCO, OCs,   and CSMs in a perhaps uncomfortable position at times, but would, I think tend to "focus" the Bn on operations a bit more.

My only concern with a Cbt Arms LCol commanding the Svc Bn is the Svc Bn CO is supposed to be (IIRC) the CSS advisor to the Brigade Commander.  My opinion is that CSS is easy to pick up but hard to master.

 

[Roy Harding]

My only concern with a Cbt Arms LCol commanding the Svc Bn is the Svc Bn CO is supposed to be (IIRC) the CSS advisor to the Brigade Commander.   My opinion is that CSS is easy to pick up but hard to master.

CSS advisor may be one of the roles picked up over the years - but if that's the case, why bother having all those G4 wizards in Bde HQ?

You're right about "hard to master" - but CO's in Svc Bn's aren't practicing "mastery" at anything except Commanding troops.  The same goes, to some extent, for the OCs of the functional Coys.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Many moons ago the CSS advisers to brigade, division and corps commanders were the ordnance, supply & transport and maintenance, etc company, battalion and, sometimes even brigade (equivalent) commanders.   The administrative and logistics staff officers (then referred to as A and Q staff officers (for Adjutant General and Quartermaster General)) were, almost always arms officers who had graduated from the staff college.   Thus the S4 of a brigade group (of 6,500 soldiers) was a major, likely infantry, armoured, artillery, engineers or signals - almost never, ever ordnance or service corps or RCEME.   The BRASCO, for example, (Brigade Army Service Corps Officer) was the S&T 'adviser' to the brigadier but he was very chary about using his access to disagree with the DAA&QMG (the ultra-impressive abbreviation for the S4's title) because the S4 might, usually was, 'pushing' the truckers and maintainers and all and sundry to (but rarely beyond) the safe limits in order to effectuate the brigade commander's plan.   (One could, usually, be reasonable certain that if the RCASC truck drivers were being asked (told) to work to or just past the 'limits' then the infantry and tankers had already been doing that for a day or two.)

I would agree that a combat arms officer could command a service battalion but I would rather that:

"¢ The Log and EME branches were merged and the officers were retrained to be much more generalist - with a strong operations support ethic;

"¢ The overall number of the new, merged (EME/Log) branch officer was substantially reduced, with a concomitant increase in the number of MWOs to command platoons in CSS units (but not to command the Logistics and Maintenance platoons in e.g. the infantry battalions - that should remain a (new) Logistics officer function, for education and training if nothing else);

"¢ CSS (or whatever) battalions should be commanded by the (new) CSS officers; but

"¢ Logistic (J4/G4/S4) staff officers should, normally (not exclusively), be operators (pilots, gunners, engineers, infantry officers, etc).

Somewhat off topic but I have one exception to this: I believe that tactical SIGINT, tactical intelligence and some (unspecified by me - due to ignorance) recce JSTARS type operations should be grouped (not merged) into a single unit at brigade level (with detachable, composite sub-units) and these units (and sub units) should be commanded by arms officers (including signals and intelligence in that mix, for this purpose, as they used to be) with platoons being commanded by specialist officers - signals, intelligence, etc.

 

[Roy Harding]

Many moons ago the CSS advisers to brigade, division and corps commanders were the ordnance, supply & transport and maintenance, etc company, battalion and, sometimes even brigade (equivalent) commanders.  The administrative and logistics staff officers (then referred to as A and Q staff officers (for Adjutant General and Quartermaster General)) were, almost always arms officers who had graduated from the staff college.  Thus the S4 of a brigade group (of 6,500 soldiers) was a major, likely infantry, armoured, artillery, engineers or signals - almost never, ever ordnance or service corps or RCEME.  The BRASCO, for example, (Brigade Army Service Corps Officer) was the S&T 'adviser' to the brigadier but he was very chary about using his access to disagree with the DAA&QMG (the ultra-impressive abbreviation for the S4's title) because the S4 might, usually was, 'pushing' the truckers and maintainers and all and sundry to (but rarely beyond) the safe limits in order to effectuate the brigade commander's plan.  (One could, usually, be reasonable certain that if the RCASC truck drivers were being asked (told) to work to or just past the 'limits' then the infantry and tankers had already been doing that for a day or two.)

I would agree that a combat arms officer could command a service battalion but I would rather that:

"¢ The Log and EME branches were merged and the officers were retrained to be much more generalist - with a strong operations support ethic;

"¢ The overall number of the new, merged (EME/Log) branch officer was substantially reduced, with a concomitant increase in the number of MWOs to command platoons in CSS units (but not to command the Logistics and Maintenance platoons in e.g. the infantry battalions - that should remain a (new) Logistics officer function, for education and training if nothing else);

"¢ CSS (or whatever) battalions should be commanded by the (new) CSS officers; but

"¢ Logistic (J4/G4/S4) staff officers should, normally (not exclusively), be operators (pilots, gunners, engineers, infantry officers, etc).

Somewhat off topic but I have one exception to this: I believe that tactical SIGINT, tactical intelligence and some (unspecified by me - due to ignorance) recce JSTARS type operations should be grouped (not merged) into a single unit at brigade level (with detachable, composite sub-units) and these units (and sub units) should be commanded by arms officers (including signals and intelligence in that mix, for this purpose, as they used to be) with platoons being commanded by specialist officers - signals, intelligence, etc.

Thanks for the reminder of the Staff system as it existed in the early part of my career - I had forgotten some of it.

I am in general agreement with your suggestion(s), with the following exceptions:

(1)  I believe that the present specialties (Tpt, Sup, Fin, Maint, etc) must be retained in SOME form.  I think there is a need for these specialists to act as advisors to the staff, as well as directing/supervising work by the associated NCM functions at the "coal face" (Jr Offr - Maj level).  Perhaps a career stream for these officers, accompanied by appropriate training, naturally, which would see these specialists become your proposed "CSS Generalists" at, say, the LCol rank?  (Similar to the practice of Rad Ops/Tel Ops becoming Comm Ops at the WO level); and

(2)  Leaving aside the issue of "CSS Generalists" for the moment, I fail to see why it is desirable to have "operators" fill the various "CSS" staff positions, but NOT command the CSS Support Unit, and vice versa.  There seems to be a contradiction there, unless I missed some subtlety.

Regards,

Retired CC

 

[Edward Campbell]

The G1 and G4 staff work - planning for the use of and allocation of CSS resources â “ is part of the commander's planning process; the output forms the basis for the commander's orders to his own CSS units.  The actual staff work (remember, please, the primary duties of the staff are to relieve the commander of the details of command and to help units execute their tasks) is part of the commander's battle procedure.

The G1 and G4 staff work needs to be accomplished by officers who are operational specialists.  The actual execution of the assigned CSS tasks should be left in the hands of skilled, operationally oriented CSS officers.

In my experience few, way too few CSS officers have a well defined sense of how logistics drives operations â “ despite the efforts of the staff college.  Equally, but easier rectified, I think, too few arms officers understand the intricacies of the logistics business.  The staff college can and should rectify the latter failure.  A look, a fair few years back I hasten to admit, at the Toronto staff college programme left me depressed: way to much Ottawa oriented governmental bumph, way too little Joint operational logistics analysis and planning.  There has to be some Ottawa oriented drivel (10% seems reasonable because so many, many graduates will â “ within five years â “ end up in NDHQ) but the balance needs to be weighted more heavily (than it was in any event) in favour of joint operations management which is, very largely, a study of how to manage logistics.  (Oh well, that's another rant.)

In my (time expired, I know) experience there is too little time for CSS officers to learn enough to be effective operational staff officers in the G1 and G4 branches â “ even with many field postings and staff colleges.  Arms officers can â “ and should â “ be taught logistics planning, in detail, at almost every step on their career path.  (An infantry or armoured lieutenant who does not know how a DP works is an amateur.)  Operational planning (and G1 and G4 staff work is just that) is done by operational (arms) officers; the execution of the CSS tasks is the domain of the CSS officers and their CSS soldiers â “ and they are, all, soldiers.

Hope that explains my opinion. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
(1)  I believe that the present specialties (Tpt, Sup, Fin, Maint, etc) must be retained in SOME form.  I think there is a need for these specialists to act as advisors to the staff, as well as directing/supervising work by the associated NCM functions at the "coal face" (Jr Offr - Maj level).  Perhaps a career stream for these officers, accompanied by appropriate training, naturally, which would see these specialists become your proposed "CSS Generalists" at, say, the LCol rank?  (Similar to the practice of Rad Ops/Tel Ops becoming Comm Ops at the WO level); and
...
Regards,

Retired CC

That's a weakness in my proposal; I'm thinking on that.

My initial argument would be that others armies - especially the Europeans, seem to manage.  The Germans, circa 1940, had a wonderfully well managed logistics system â “ planned by operators and 'driven' by, largely, specialist NCOs working under generalist officers.

 

[sigtech]

wow these posts really take a life and direction of there own don't they

 

[Roy Harding]

wow these posts really take a life and direction of there own don't they

Yeah - ain't it great!!

 

[Gunner98]

I forgot to add Fd Ambs as another unit which should be commanded by Cbt Arms.

Retired CC - your wish is a reality...Many Fd Ambs and even the Fd Hosp have and/or will be commanded by former Cbt Arms officers, who took OT and are now HSOs.   19 Aug 05 will mark a former RCR taking over the Fd Hosp and his DCO is a former Arty Offr.   Another former Inf Offr is the CO at 1 Fd Amb now.

BGen Devlin was formerly a COS of the former CFMGHQ.    There was even speculation that the last change of CFHS command might have been to a Cbt Arms-type, not so this time.

 

[Roy Harding]

Retired CC - your wish is a reality...Many Fd Ambs and even the Fd Hosp have and/or will be commanded by former Cbt Arms officers, who took OT and are now HSOs.  19 Aug 05 will mark a former RCR taking over the Fd Hosp and his DCO is a former Arty Offr.  Another former Inf Offr is the CO at 1 Fd Amb now.

BGen Devlin was formerly a COS of the former CFMGHQ.  There was even speculation that the last change of CFHS command might have been to a Cbt Arms-type, not so this time.

Outstanding.

However (there's always a damned "but", with me, isn't there!?): although these appointments may actually provide "living proof" of the concept, they have occurred through happy happenstance, not deliberate design.

I'd be interested to know if their respective units become more "operationally" focused, and if they (the former Cbt Arms officers themselves) are afforded more credibility by their Cbt Arms peers and superiors.  I'd also be curious what the men under their command noticed regarding the focus of effort - if anything.

Thanks for letting me know this, Gunner98.