Retired CC said:
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(1) I believe that the present specialties (Tpt, Sup, Fin, Maint, etc) must be retained in SOME form. I think there is a need for these specialists to act as advisors to the staff, as well as directing/supervising work by the associated NCM functions at the "coal face" (Jr Offr - Maj level).
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You'll forgive me, I hope, another gallop down
history lane but I think it is important to revisit the whys and wherefores of arms (and later service) advisers.
Until the mid 19th century military operations, especially British military operations, might be (very loosely) divided into two categories:
"¢ Amateur; and
"¢ Professional.
The
professional army consisted, in the main, of a few fortresses manned, mainly, by artillery batteries and a few
household or
body-guard units - now the Brigade of Guards, some engineers and some ordnance/armourer type folks. The bulk of the army was in
private hands - owned, literally by various dukes and barons and by e.g. the East India Company. It needs to be emphasized that the Royal Navy was quite different - it was totally
professional, including its Marines, and the dockyards at e.g. Chatham.
Most of the
combat arms were in the
amateur category. It was considered that the average country gentleman could master the necessary skills for leading a company, regiment or even brigade in combat before the age of 15. Those skills were very much learned on the
playing fields of Eton, etc. They involved toughness, discipline, loyalty and courage. The business of battlefield manoeuvre had been codified by Fredrick the Great and the
book would, early in the 19th century, be heavily revised by the Duke of Wellington (who would address the main issue which eluded Fredrick and Napoleon: how to get every musket into the fight, at the decisive time and place). The
business was not overly complicated except for three factors:
"¢ Where to place the guns;
"¢ How to supply the army - especially the guns;
"¢ How to build fortifications and, especially, roads and bridges to allow the army and its supply train, to deploy and manoeuvre.
A digression: logistics, until the end of the 19th century, was handled, for Britain, by something akin to today's
alternate service delivery; it was
contracted out to a mix of private contractors and the precursor of today's Union of National Defence Employees - the army commissariat department and the Royal Wagon Train which, gradually, over the entire 19th century
morphed from civil service (Treasure Department) to uniformed army corps. (See, also: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33346.0.html The UNDE thread here on army.ca. Maybe Gen. Hiller wants to go
back to the future.)
Commanders, great ones like Wellington, and dunderheads like Raglan alike, were, generally, adequately served by their
global logistics tail which was, in itself, a marvel of foresight and organization and, equally, often corrupt and inept in execution.
Given that there was little that commanders could do to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their logistics services they had little need for
advice on how to employ that tail - they just needed to know that it was there, working under its own standards and policies.
Artillery and the vexing problem of dumping artillery ammunition was another matter: commanders did have to make this work for themselves. The 19th century was full of shrugged shoulders and raised palms and
explanations like "the road (or bridge) collapsed under the weight of my ammunition wagons; that's why the guns never fired to support your attack!" Commanders
did need advice from their
professional artillery and engineer officers re: what orders to give to whom in order to get the support which these specialist corps could provide. It was then that the idea of the
arms advisor was born. It grew in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as technology - especially telegraphy, then aviation and finally radio - joined the army. Technology and
professional procedures now began to restrict commanders. They (commanders) learned that it was counter-productive to try to push the specialists (now called the supporting arms)
out of their lanes; it was easier, better, more effective to seek and take their advice.
World War II saw logistics come into its own. It is important to understand that modern military logistics (and in some respects modern industry and the 21st century
managed industrial society) was nurtured by a bunch of German, British and American army engineers. We tend to think of supply, transport and maintenance as one (or two or three) fairly independent functions but they are, generally,
managed as major
engineering endeavours - fuel, for example flows through pipelines and seaports etc before it finds its way, as if by magic, into a bowser or some jerry cans . Similarly,
supply begins at the factory (maybe at the mine) and the
things soldiers need must be designed, built, tested, purchased, warehoused, and moved over rail networks, etc. It is, all-in-all, a highly
organized or
engineered enterprise. Hence the domination of the Quartermaster General's staff by RE and RCE officers (in Britain and Canada, respectively) for most of the 20th century.
Modern mechanized battle meant that commanders had, finally, to
manage logistics, too. Many were not up to the task. They needed on the spot advice and the RCOC, RCASC and RCEME officers were given the same
advisor status previously reserved for artillery, engineer, signals, aviation and medical specialists.
It seems to me that, at least about 20 years ago, because we did not have
separate special staffs, we retained arms and service advisors, but:
"¢ The gunners are no longer
advisers - they are an integral part of the command team at unit and formation level because the fire plan, the manoeuvre plan and the
battle plan were so tightly integrated. I'm prepared to concede that this changes when we enter low intensity
combat operations where we have little, maybe no artillery;
"¢ Engineer
advice was and remains absolutely essential because combat engineering is still a fairly narrow
speciality which is inadequately understood by most other people;
"¢ Signals is
morphing away from being a speciality and towards extinction. Tactical (mobile) command and control systems (of which the signal system is just one subset) must still be designed by specialist engineers around radio networks (if it's mobile it needs radio, by definition) but it is not clear - not to me anyway - that we need specialist Signals officers and soldiers to install operate and maintain it.
(Maybe to install and maintain but not to operate - I suggest that almost all Signals people in the army, in the field, could be replaced by (trained) arms officers, NCOs and men without any significant loss of command and control system effectiveness.) That being said the fellow responsible for the operation and maintenance of the command and control system must still be an advisor to the commander;
"¢ Aviation is still a specialized function and the aviation commander must also be an advisor to the commander; and
"¢ Ditto medical.
On the other hand we do have a separate specialist CSS staff: the G1 and G4 branches. They - the G1 and G4 staff officers can seek technical details from the CSS officers and warrant officers in CSS units and then the G1 and G4 can advise the commander.
Thus, without a shred of apology for all those words: I believe we can dispense with the service advisor function.
