Royal Canadian Air Force headed to mission in Africa ‘very soon’: top general

[a_majoor]

More damning evidence that the entire idea of "Peacekeeping" or even "Peacemaking". "Peace Support Operations" and other such nostrums are dead on arrival. It is war over there, and the lessons, manpower and firepower that we *should* bring if we are there to make a real difference is a 1500 man battlegroup in the manner of Afghanistan (Given the logistical realities we will need a much bigger tail to support the battlegroup). I feel much more secure putting my name in for OP IMPACT (some positions have opened) since we know what we are going into and are equipped and have ROE's which reflect the situation. Maybe a "six pack" of CF-18s would make the job even easier....

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/23/malis-president-at-the-un-weve-still-got-a-colossal-jihadist-problem/

JIHADISM IN AFRICA
Mali’s President at the UN: We’ve Still Got a Colossal Jihadist Problem

This week at the UN General Assembly, Mali’s president was the bearer of bad news: the jihadists the French military crushed to much fanfare a few years back have returned with a vengeance, and they’re undermining a peace accord. Reuters:

Mali President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita warned the United Nations on Friday that the failure to fully implement a nationwide peace accord was helping al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups spread their influence in the country.

U.N. peacekeepers are deployed across northern Mali to try to stabilize the vast region, which was occupied by separatist Tuareg rebels and al Qaeda-linked Islamist militants in 2012 before France intervened in 2013. Tit-for-tat violence between rival armed groups has distracted Mali from fighting Islamist militants and the country has become the deadliest place for U.N. peacekeepers to serve. […]

Keita said Islamist militants were using the slow implementation of peace accords to “manipulate” and “destroy” links between different ethnic groups in Mali.

A clash in the north this week between pro-government Gatia militia and the Tuareg separatist Coordination of Azawad Movements highlighted the fragility of a U.N.-backed deal signed last year between the government and northern armed groups meant to end a cycle of uprisings.

UN peacekeepers’ incentives are just as perverse as those of the condottieri, the Italian mercenaries Machiavelli once wrote off as “useless and dangerous.” Like the condottieri of old, UN peacekeepers are paid for an input measure—a fee per soldier—not for an output measure, such as actually keeping the peace. The UN reimburses peacekeeping at a rate of $1,332 per soldier per month, making peacekeeping a lucrative endeavor for major contributors like Bangladesh where soldiers are paid roughly 1/20th that amount. Well-paid, professional militaries like those of the U.S. and the U.K. commit far fewer forces to peacekeeping; for those they do contribute, the UN reimbursement does not come close to covering the cost.

Professional militaries have a difficult time implementing counter-insurgency strategy (COIN) effectively, so it’s no surprise that UN peacekeepers are struggling against the jihadist onslaught. As we’re seeing in South Sudan—where peacekeepers are turning a blind eye to mass rapes and otherwise failing to protect the civilians—the peacekeepers’ main objective is to avoid casualties, not to complete the mission.

Keeping ISIS and Al Qaeda at bay in Mali requires détente between two historically opposed forces: the Malian central government in Bamako and the nomadic Tuareg people, who fiercely defend their independence and cross Mali’s porous Saharan borders with ease. These “blue men of the desert” are known for their indigo turbans and their spirited resistance against central authorities—first the French and then the Malians. Even if the Malian state will never win the love the Tuareg, it must work to placate them and to isolate Islamist Tuareg militias like Ansar Dine, driving a wedge between apolitical Tuaregs and jihadist groups that might otherwise be inclined to join together against the state under the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Here’s the thing about terrorists in Mali: we’ll hear nothing about them and nothing about them and then suddenly everything will be about them. The geography of the Sahara makes it possible for groups to lie in wait, regroup, and plan their next moves. UN peacekeepers are useless against them. Jihadists in Mali don’t just complicate the regional security situation—they threaten European security as well. We ignore Mali’s terror problem at our peril.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Leadership 101: Never contradict your chain of command in front of your troops/publicly. Own their mission as your own mission. Gen Vance would be a poor leader if he let fly anything other than government policy, and he's not a poor leader. He'd also absolutely destroy the morale of the CAF members deploying if he disagreed with why we were going, and told them as such.

While I don't disagree, there are times where leaders and given absolutely retarded orders to 'own and champion'. Subordinates recognize how insane it is and look to the leader to protect them. When the leader owns the order they end up looking like idiots or yes men.  I can't help but feel like the MND is being put in this position and forced to speak political-talk and cheerlead the Africa mission when on the inside he realizes what a shit show it will be.

 

[PuckChaser]

While I don't disagree, there are times where leaders and given absolutely retarded orders to 'own and champion'. Subordinates recognize how insane it is and look to the leader to protect them. When the leader owns the order they end up looking like idiots or yes men.  I can't help but feel like the MND is being put in this position and forced to speak political-talk and cheerlead the Africa mission when on the inside he realizes what a crap show it will be.

Absolutely. He's in a Catch-22. Disrespect the PM and lose his job, champion a mission with unclear or dubious end-state/objectives, or say no comment and get torched on both fronts. The PM and thrown the MND and CDS to the wolves, and is happy to do so. All this talk without substance just digs the hole deeper.

I have a feeling Vance might pull a Thibault on the way out, he's too protective of his troops not to.

 

[Altair]

More damning evidence that the entire idea of "Peacekeeping" or even "Peacemaking". "Peace Support Operations" and other such nostrums are dead on arrival. It is war over there, and the lessons, manpower and firepower that we *should* bring if we are there to make a real difference is a 1500 man battlegroup in the manner of Afghanistan (Given the logistical realities we will need a much bigger tail to support the battlegroup). I feel much more secure putting my name in for OP IMPACT (some positions have opened) since we know what we are going into and are equipped and have ROE's which reflect the situation. Maybe a "six pack" of CF-18s would make the job even easier....

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/23/malis-president-at-the-un-weve-still-got-a-colossal-jihadist-problem/

is it possible to muster up 1500 soldiers for that with obligations in Latvia,  Ukraine, and Iraq?

 

[George Wallace]

Absolutely. He's in a Catch-22. Disrespect the PM and lose his job, champion a mission with unclear or dubious end-state/objectives, or say no comment and get torched on both fronts. The PM and thrown the MND and CDS to the wolves, and is happy to do so. All this talk without substance just digs the hole deeper.

I have a feeling Vance might pull a Thibault on the way out, he's too protective of his troops not to.

However, those watching and a little in the know, will see this and it indeed will reflect more on the PM and his Government, than on the CDS.  People have to realize that "THE BUCK STOPS HERE" does not stop at the CDS, but at his political masters.

 

[a_majoor]

is it possible to muster up 1500 soldiers for that with obligations in Latvia,  Ukraine, and Iraq?

You know, or should know, the actual answer to that is "not a chance". Indeed, looking at the global situation, where is the reserve of manpower and resources to deal with the nuclear situation in the DPRK, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, the drug war and resulting instability in Mexico or other issues which have real impact on Canada and Canadian interests?

OP Impact and OP REASSURANCE at least touch on Canadian interests, and *could* be better resourced, or at least some consolidation could take place between Poland Latvia and Western Ukraine for economy of effort. Drawing 650 troops out of the kitty for some nebulous purpose means they are not available for Iraq or Eastern Europe, much less any flashpoint which require some sort of Canadian response.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

You know, or should know, the actual answer to that is "not a chance". Indeed, looking at the global situation, where is the reserve of manpower and resources to deal with the nuclear situation in the DPRK, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, the drug war and resulting instability in Mexico or other issues which have real impact on Canada and Canadian interests?

OP Impact and OP REASSURANCE at least touch on Canadian interests, and *could* be better resourced, or at least some consolidation could take place between Poland Latvia and Western Ukraine for economy of effort. Drawing 650 troops out of the kitty for some nebulous purpose means they are not available for Iraq or Eastern Europe, much less any flashpoint which require some sort of Canadian response.

A good indication of the "tooth to tail" and funding problems we face daily.  We're in trouble, I'm afraid.

 

[MilEME09]

A good indication of the "tooth to tail" and funding problems we face daily.  We're in trouble, I'm afraid.

Well maybe it's just coincidence but we recently saw more spots being allocated to the PRes for these ops which is telling me they are having a harder time keeping up

 

[MJP]

Well maybe it's just coincidence but we recently saw more spots being allocated to the PRes for these ops which is telling me they are having a harder time keeping up

In certain trades with specific skill sets yes.  However, a good deal of what gets pushed to the Res Force are the "anyone" can fill posns that aren't vital, allowing the Reg Force to fill the posns that have unique or in demand quals.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

In certain trades with specific skill sets yes.  However, a good deal of what gets pushed to the Res Force are the "anyone" can fill posns that aren't vital, allowing the Reg Force to fill the posns that have unique or in demand quals.

You also used to see a lot of PRes folks on small missions, like UNMO or working for DMTC because the Reg Force just didn't care about filling them.  When I was in Jamaica in 2012 for six months with DMTC, 5 of the 8 folks there were Class B or C folks at DMTC.  The Regular Force just doesn't care about those jobs which is why it was so hard to get on Rotos for Op ATTENTION, the Congo, etc... If it ain't about pumping out Battlegroups for the Army or ATFs for the Air Force, as a Reg Force member, forget about it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Meanwhile, in South Sudan....

The Disgraceful UN Peacekeeping Force

https://www.sofmag.com/the-disgraceful-un-peacekeeping-force/

 

[Altair]

Meanwhile, in South Sudan....

The Disgraceful UN Peacekeeping Force

https://www.sofmag.com/the-disgraceful-un-peacekeeping-force/

a perfect example of how a well train professional army such as the CAF could have come in handy as opposed to troops their because their government gets to collect 1300 a month per soldier.

 

[Lightguns]

a perfect example of how a well train professional army such as the CAF could have come in handy as opposed to troops their because their government gets to collect 1300 a month per soldier.

There's a few ghosts in Srebrenica that may give you an argument. I would have to know the ROE these UN troops are operating under before I could fully comment. 

 

[PuckChaser]

a perfect example of how a well train professional army such as the CAF could have come in handy as opposed to troops their because their government gets to collect 1300 a month per soldier.

600 western troops won't change the culture of 14,000 third world troops paid less than we get for incidentals a day.

 

[a_majoor]

Well, so much for Columbia as a viable alternative to Africa. While Columbia is indeed far more relevant to Canada's National Interests, the idea that there is a peace deal between the Columbian government and FARC, and that we *could* go in on a real peacekeeping DDR mission turns out to be as illusionary as a peacekeeping mission in Africa:

http://www.wsj.com/articles/santos-sets-a-trap-for-colombians-1474841797

Santos Sets a Trap for Colombians
Even if voters approve the tainted bargain with narco-terrorists, it won’t bring peace.
By MARY ANASTASIA O’GRADY
Sept. 25, 2016 6:16 p.m. ET
27 COMMENTS

The paradox of Obama foreign policy is that its compromises with enemies of liberty in the interest of peace are leaving the world more violent, polarized and dangerous. This is especially true in Latin America.

On Oct. 2, Colombia will hold a plebiscite to ask the nation to approve or reject an Obama-backed agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), designated by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organization. The deal gives the FARC amnesty for its war crimes, which include the recruitment of thousands of child soldiers, massacres of villages, political executions, bombings and kidnappings.

Under the agreement, negotiated and signed in Havana, the FARC will also get unelected seats in Congress and special welfare benefits. It will be given dozens of radio stations—so that it can disseminate its propaganda, a privilege no other political party has.

The agreement does not require the FARC to pay any financial reparations to its victims, even though the narco-terrorist kingpins have wealth estimated in the billions. Reparations will be paid by law-abiding citizens via sharp tax increases. The FARC says it will not disarm until it’s good and ready to. Meanwhile it will be given weapons and training to enforce the agreement.

What could possibly go wrong?

Ask Cubans who are enduring the fallout from another Obama legacy project: the 2014 decision to normalize relations with the military dictatorship and increase American economic engagement with the island. Repression in Cuba has since spiked, and Havana has become bolder in its joint activities with dangerous states like North Korea.

Venezuela also is more brutal since Mr. Obama first tried to warm relations with Hugo Chávez in 2009. More recently the State Department has spent months dithering over “dialogue” between the beleaguered opposition and the country’s Cuban-backed military regime, when the U.S. could have been building international pressure for a return to democracy.

Mr. Obama’s support for the Colombia-FARC deal completes his Latin trifecta. In 2009 Colombia was united against the FARC and celebrating its near-defeat on the battlefield led by President Álvaro Uribe.

Now the country is being torn apart by the signed agreement, which is practically a surrender, and by vicious government intimidation tactics designed to silence dissenters and jam the accord down the throats of Colombians. President Juan Manuel Santos is openly buying votes by promising local populations around the country that if they vote “yes” he will direct government funds their way. He may have enough electoral tricks up his sleeve to produce an official declaration of victory. But only a fool would believe that it could produce peace.

Colombians don’t trust Mr. Santos because he has trouble keeping his word, telling the truth and obeying the law. I have observed this firsthand.

I spoke to him by telephone in September 2012, just after media leaks had forced him to admit that he had been negotiating with the FARC in Cuba for almost a year. He had been promising publicly that he would never negotiate until the FARC disarmed.

In our phone conversation he said that any FARC agreement would be put to Colombians in a referendum. A referendum, as defined in Colombia, would have consisted of multiple questions to allow the electorate to reject aspects of the agreement.

But when the president realized that if Colombians were given that power over their own destiny, they would not accept FARC demands, he went back on his word. He announced he would instead hold a plebiscite with only one question for or against the totality of the agreement.

Given his widespread unpopularity, it was unlikely that Mr. Santos’s plebiscite would get the 50% turnout necessary to be valid. So he pulled another trick by getting Colombia’s Congress to lower the turnout threshold to 13%.

The constitutional court, which leans left, allowed all of that. But it also said that the plebiscite question could not be worded in terms of voting for or against peace. Mr. Santos responded by saying that he could ask the question however he pleases.

The agreement is 297 pages and it is not wild speculation to suggest that few Colombians will read it. Instead, they will be asked whether they “support the final agreement to end the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace.” As former Colombian vice minister of justice Rafael Nieto has observed, this wording directly violates the high court’s order. It also avoids mentioning either the hated FARC or the unpopular Santos government. Perhaps most egregiously, it misleads the public about the prospects for peace because dissenters in FARC, its criminal partners in drug running and the other guerrilla group, ELN, will remain active.

The Castro crime family badly wants this deal, which may be the only way to explain why Mr. Obama is putting the U.S. seal of approval on it.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

 

[mariomike]

Well, so much for Columbia as a viable alternative to Africa. While Columbia is indeed far more relevant to Canada's National Interests, the idea that there is a peace deal between the Columbian government and FARC,

 

[The Bread Guy]

Another reminder - highlights mine...

A soldier who served with Lt.-Gen. Roméo Dallaire during the Rwandan genocide is deeply worried the Trudeau government is about to embark on another UN peacekeeping quagmire in Africa that could have grave consequences for the mental health of troops sent there.

“We have historically made the same mistakes again and again,” says Stéphane Grenier, who founded Mental Health Innovations Consulting after retiring from the Canadian Forces four years ago as a lieutenant-colonel. His retirement followed deployments to Rwanda, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Kuwait, Lebanon and Haiti.

“History will repeat itself because people will not be properly prepared to go overseas,” Grenier predicted.

Compounding the problem in past doomed missions was that the UN did not provide strong support for troops in the field, he added.

“Is there any indication the UN is better equipped today to govern military forces trying to implement what are impossible mandates?” he asked. “I don’t think so. Until that is fixed, history will repeat itself.” ...

 

[jollyjacktar]

And maybe not heading for Africa after all...

Africa peacekeeping mission is just an assumption, says country's top soldier

Canada's top soldier says an expectation that this country's military will be deploying to Africa is premature.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance said an analysis of where the Armed Forces may go should there be a future deployment is still underway.

"Right now, I'll tell you, honestly, there is no such thing as an Africa mission," Vance told The Daily Gleaner in an interview. "It's been over reported based on peoples' own assessments in the media, in my view, that if you look at the world, it's going to be an African mission. It's an assumption."

It's been widely reported that Canada will commit up to 600 troops to at least one still-unannounced peacekeeping venture.

Speculation is high that it could be Africa, possibly Mali, a landlocked country located in the western part of the continent, where French peacekeepers are currently leading a United Nations mission.

There has been unrest in the country since French soldiers ended an al-Qaeda occupation in 2012, making the mission one of the most dangerous anywhere.

Aside from al-Qaeda, peacekeepers in the northern part of the country face challenges from other groups with an interest in the area.

"I can honestly tell you that we have not yet finished the analysis of where it is that we might go," Vance said. "We are working through a first principles assessment as to where we might best contribute, globally, in UN peace operations."

The Chief of Defence Staff did, however, acknowledge there are different parts of Africa ... that are potential candidates.

But stressed the ongoing evaluation will "ultimately determine where the military can best contribute, how and why."

Vance said any such missions have yet to be brought to government for decision making.

On the weekend, Vance told The Canadian Press that the military was not recommending any missions that would stretch it too thin. He also said he was comfortable the military could conduct a peacekeeping mission in Africa while operating in the Middle East and Latvia.

Vance said with regard to how fast the military could respond to a deployment request would depend on the nature of it.

"Some, we can move on fairly quickly, within weeks and months," he said. "Others would take significantly longer to get ready for."

Vance said Canada has military commitments in many areas of the world, including this country.

The Second Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR) at Base Gagetown, meanwhile, is currently engaged in high readiness training.

In a recent interview, 2RCR commander Lt.-Col. Shane Murphy, said his soldiers will be the Canadian Army's next high readiness formation and will be set to answer the call by July 1.

"The battalion, as part of Task Force Tomahawk, will go through some of the best training the Canadian Army has to offer throughout the next year," Murphy said. "That entails a lot of collective training, working in a combined arms teams environment. The battalion will be working with armoured units, artillery units to form these combined arms packages and really develop our skill sets in that regard, from a collective training perspective."

The last deployment for 2RCR saw soldiers from the battalion travel to the Middle East to assist with Syrian refugee preparation for Canada.

Vance, who commanded 2RCR from 2001 to 2003, said the army's "force generation plan" and its production of "high readiness units" is intended to fill and support all missions that are underway with a look to the future.

Vance said the army commander generates a high readiness capability in anticipation of known missions while maintaining an ability to deal with the unknown.

"I don't know right now where 2RCR fits in his thinking about what forces he would assign to what mission."

But if 2RCR were to be called upon, Vance described the infantry battalion as an exceptionally talented unit with capabilities that are the best in the world.

He said it possesses the people, the equipment and the necessary training to operate the needed equipment effectively and efficiently.

"I am confident that any mission that is given to 2RCR - if they're given one - whether it's in Canada or external to Canada, will be done exceptionally well, as we have come to expect."

COPYRIGHT:  © 2016 Telegraph-Journal (New Brunswick) 

http://media.mil.ca/show-voir-eng.asp?URL=/clips/national/160929/f00471CD.htm

 

[dimsum]

And maybe not heading for Africa after all...

What's that line about things not being official until they've been officially denied?  >

 

[Journeyman]

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance said an analysis of where the Armed Forces may go should there be a future deployment is  still underway.

.....Murphy, said his soldiers ....will be set to answer the call by July 1.

Timely responsiveness?