OldSolduer
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Jarnhamar said:
They haven't sent the letter yet telling the bad people the UN will get very angry.....
Royal Canadian Air Force headed to mission in Africa ‘very soon’: top general
- Thread starter Jarnhamar
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They haven't sent the letter yet telling the bad people the UN will get very angry.....
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Dolphin_Hunter said:
Yep, we definitely don't get a lot of bang for the buck, but we cover an exponential amount of area (infrastructure and tpt costs):
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=spain
Colin Parkinson
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PuckChaser said:
Due to our size and spread, we will always spend more, but for less bang for the buck. If you were able to measure effectiveness per dollar, that would be a better metric, but good luck defining those values, as "effectiveness" for war fighting will be different than home defense, domestic response, etc
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More tea leaves on where the deployment will be. Unfortunately, the government has lost the public affairs high ground, and the mission location will be leaked before they can get their crap together:
http://www.nationalpost.com/m/wp/news/canada/blog.html?b=news.nationalpost.com%2Fnews%2Fcanada%2Fjohn-ivison-canada-peacekeepers-seem-set-for-central-african-republic-deployment-before-end-of-year
http://www.nationalpost.com/m/wp/news/canada/blog.html?b=news.nationalpost.com%2Fnews%2Fcanada%2Fjohn-ivison-canada-peacekeepers-seem-set-for-central-african-republic-deployment-before-end-of-year
daftandbarmy
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PuckChaser said:
'Greatest impact with the lowest level of risk'.
Now there's a bold mission statement for you .... meh
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Chris Pook said:
With even less motivation, we don't even get mineral concessions at the end of it all ;D
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The more things change, the more they stay the same.
A report on peacekeeping in Africa written by none other than a certain Lt. Granatstein in 1966, marked "Secret", and then Unclass in 1986. The report concerns the Congo, but more importantly it details the utter confusion within the UN when they requested Canadian assistance, and the hand wringing and lip twisting of the Canadian government of the day- Mr. Diefenbaker.
However, it appears that the Canadian army was quite prepared to do some fighting and probably actually wanted (suggested?) to send 2BN R22R to the Congo (since this was the apparent ready duty force at the particular point in time, with an embedded and quite functional signals capability). However, so much dithering went on and about what to do, what to send, what the troop limits should be etc., that one might think there is not much difference between then and now....including purchasing, at the last minute, expensive equipment not even requested (Caribou aircraft for example) while the rest of the forces equipment were reaching end of life cycle, and then forcing DND to absorb unexpectedly high costs for other urgently needed equipment within the existing defence budget (communications equipment).
One more thing, then as now, the forces were desperately short of Jimmies to such an extent they were considering sending RCN personnel to assist in the jungle!
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cfhq/cfhq008.pdf
What is not stated in this report, because it was not within scope, is that the costs of the Avro Arrow program to the DND budget essentially bankrupted the rest of the armed forces at a time when there was a need for other more prudent capabilities such as transport aircraft, new armoured vehicles, trucks, secure radio, transport ships etc. At the time the Congo mission was starting, the 3 services were only just beginning to recover from the cost of the CF105 program.
A report on peacekeeping in Africa written by none other than a certain Lt. Granatstein in 1966, marked "Secret", and then Unclass in 1986. The report concerns the Congo, but more importantly it details the utter confusion within the UN when they requested Canadian assistance, and the hand wringing and lip twisting of the Canadian government of the day- Mr. Diefenbaker.
However, it appears that the Canadian army was quite prepared to do some fighting and probably actually wanted (suggested?) to send 2BN R22R to the Congo (since this was the apparent ready duty force at the particular point in time, with an embedded and quite functional signals capability). However, so much dithering went on and about what to do, what to send, what the troop limits should be etc., that one might think there is not much difference between then and now....including purchasing, at the last minute, expensive equipment not even requested (Caribou aircraft for example) while the rest of the forces equipment were reaching end of life cycle, and then forcing DND to absorb unexpectedly high costs for other urgently needed equipment within the existing defence budget (communications equipment).
One more thing, then as now, the forces were desperately short of Jimmies to such an extent they were considering sending RCN personnel to assist in the jungle!
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cfhq/cfhq008.pdf
What is not stated in this report, because it was not within scope, is that the costs of the Avro Arrow program to the DND budget essentially bankrupted the rest of the armed forces at a time when there was a need for other more prudent capabilities such as transport aircraft, new armoured vehicles, trucks, secure radio, transport ships etc. At the time the Congo mission was starting, the 3 services were only just beginning to recover from the cost of the CF105 program.
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Ultimately we have lost before we even depart these shores: there is no effective (or any) Stratcom in place to set the stage. What are the reasons we are going? How is this being communicated to Canadians? Prospective governments in the area(s) we are to deploy? The people of the region? NGO's and IO's that operate there? Enemy forces like Boko Harum, ISIS etc?
Without that sort of clear messaging, we will be constantly reacting to the messages of the other side(s), and whatever sort of support we might have expected from Canadians, foreign governments and the people in theater will either be non existent or drain rapidly away as we start encountering difficulties and take casualties.
Of course the rather venal message that "We are willing to spend blood and treasure for a symbolic UN seat" probably isn't going to sell very well either here or in Africa...
Without that sort of clear messaging, we will be constantly reacting to the messages of the other side(s), and whatever sort of support we might have expected from Canadians, foreign governments and the people in theater will either be non existent or drain rapidly away as we start encountering difficulties and take casualties.
Of course the rather venal message that "We are willing to spend blood and treasure for a symbolic UN seat" probably isn't going to sell very well either here or in Africa...
Altair
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I suppose it isn't prudent to wait to hear what our mission is, what our goals are before declaring it a failure.Thucydides said:
Although in all fairness it probably is faster this way.
I should email the CDS and MND this. At the presser just state the mission goals, declare that we as a armed forces and country have already failed and just move straight to tent sweeping on garrison.
medicineman
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I'm currently reading 'The Heroes of Jadotville"...after watching the movie "The Siege at Jadotville". The movie is very simplistic and a bit off due to artistic license, however the books on the subject are pretty on target with how the UN military/civilian interphase worked in the 60's and how they haven't really fixed themselves since. It's kind of like watching a brain damaged kid try to clap their hands and they continually miss. The UN really hasn't sorted itself out since it's ops in Congo/Katanga, CAR, Somalia, Sudan/Dharfur, Rwanda and even the Balkans. There are a lot of "Lessons Learned" from that battle that are being relearned frequently, since history has a habit of repeating itself when we don't actually pay attention to those lessons. I'd be worried about some of those things repeating themselves under UN control yet again. Fingers and toes crossed.
Altair - I went into my first tour much like you...despite the fact I'd like one more kick at the cat, I'd be really leery about one in Africa with Blue Helmet Drool, oops, Rule, since I really don't trust they have the wherewithal to do the right thing.
MM
Altair - I went into my first tour much like you...despite the fact I'd like one more kick at the cat, I'd be really leery about one in Africa with Blue Helmet Drool, oops, Rule, since I really don't trust they have the wherewithal to do the right thing.
MM
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The Central African Republic is a tinder pot too. The media has played up the fact that it's relatively benign atm but that can change in a heart beat.
The South African Army fought pitched battles in 2013 against Seleka rebels in who wanted them out of the country, losing 13 soldiers and 27 wounded in the process.
It was so bad at one point the South African Parachute Battalion in CAR was almost overrun. The South African Government had Gripens and Air Force jets on standby to conduct a fighting withdrawal out of the country; however, an agreement was reached before it was required.
The South African Army fought pitched battles in 2013 against Seleka rebels in who wanted them out of the country, losing 13 soldiers and 27 wounded in the process.
It was so bad at one point the South African Parachute Battalion in CAR was almost overrun. The South African Government had Gripens and Air Force jets on standby to conduct a fighting withdrawal out of the country; however, an agreement was reached before it was required.
medicineman
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A friend of mine was an MO on one of the tours in CAR in the late 90's...quietish, but she did have to go for her sidearm in a near mob scene. Of course her Egyptian bodyguard only had a puppy pounder IIRC.
MM
MM
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