North Korea (Superthread)

[Journeyman]

"Russian military experts are indicating the Americans may have a problem with a SEAL time operating inside North Korea on a recon mission, gone horribly wrong ..."

It could be even more nefarious..... rly:  The USS Michigan that supposedly deployed the SEALs, is the first US submarine...


....with FEMALE crew members!! 

Next, we'll see a G7 "spouses' photo" with a man in it...... oh wait.  Plagues?  Locusts?  Beiber?

END OF DAYS!!!!   anic:

 

[The Bread Guy]

North Korea continues to poke ...

• "North Korea fired a ballistic missile from its eastern coast early Monday morning, which flew about 450 kilometers, South Korea's military said.  The missile is believed to be a Scud type, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  It was launched eastward from the vicinity of Wonsan, Gangwon Province, at around 5:39 a.m., it said, adding South Korea and the United States are analyzing more information ..." (Yonhap - S.Korean news agency)
• "North Korea launches projectile from near Wonsan – JCS" (NK News, monitors of PRK news)
• "North Korea fires Scud-class ballistic missile, Japan protests" (Reuters)
• "North Korea tests short-range ballistic missile, US military says" (FOX News)
• "North Korea fires ballistic missile, South Korea says" (CNN)
• "North Korea Test-Fires What Appears To Be Another Ballistic Missile" (Huffington Post)

 

[The Bread Guy]

And one more time ...

• "North Korea missile test: Hwasong-14 hailed as ICBM" (BBC)
• "North Korea launches missile it claims is ICBM, likely hitting Japanese waters" (CNBC)
• "China reiterates opposition to North Korea’s latest missile test" (Global Times, CHN Communist Party media)
• "Trump tweets angry response to North Korean missile launch" (FOX News)
• More via Google News

 

[MilEME09]

The US has long maintained that a ICBM would be a red line that would not be acceptable, Trump has shown a willingness to pull the trigger. The UN will be powerless to do anything significant once again, so what it comes down to really is whether the US is willing to start a war over this.

 

[tomahawk6]

The reports are mixed as to how successful the launch really was. The launch has a gotten the attention of the Japanese and Koreans. The PRC and Russia are opposed to the presence of THAAD in the ROK. This may encourage the Koreans and Japanese to embrace THAAD.

 

[tomahawk6]

An interesting bit of intel in a published photo of the new ICBM/IRBM. Look at the nose cone experts say its actually a shroud. Which indicates the ability to disperse counter measures while in flight. This capability would make interception early in flight critical. Otherwise the interceptor would have to pick out the warhead or warheads amongst the chaff.

http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-icbm-shroud-detail-countermeasures-threat-2017-7

 

[jollyjacktar]

Anyway you look at it,  the NK are stepping up their game and are on the road to being a serious problem.  I wonder what will be the straw that breaks and whose back it will be.  "one of these days,  Alice..."

 

[tomahawk6]

The question becomes is it cheaper to add more interceptors at Ft Greely or launch a limited strike on North Korea to take out their missile/nuclear capability and key leadership ?
It would be nice if the PRC would do it for us,but I dont see that happening.

http://abcnews.go.com/US/alaskas-fort-greely-line-defense-north-korea-nukes/story?id=18941174

 

[jollyjacktar]

I'm sure POTUS isn't having much fun drinking from the firehose.  I don't envy that position's responsibility and demands.  I bet the water tastes like blackwater.  Be careful what you wish for.

 

[MilEME09]

I'm sure POTUS isn't having much fun drinking from the firehose.  I don't envy that position's responsibility and demands.  I bet the water tastes like blackwater.  Be careful what you wish for.

damned if you do, damned if you don't, if they sit back and play it defensively, they will look weak, play too aggressive and the second korean war will be on.

 

[a_majoor]

The question for the Trump Administration is with is the "least worst" alternative?

http://observer.com/2017/07/donald-trump-north-korea-options/

Trump Has 6 Options to Neutralize North Korea—but None Are Good
The carrot and the stick approach clearly failed
By Austin Bay • 07/11/17 6:30am
   
We don’t hear mere saber rattling on the Korean peninsula. Sabers are local, short-range weapons. The dreadful noise in east Asia is something far more potent: the provocative July 4 blast of a North Korean missile capable of striking North America.

South Korea’s Sunshine Policy to coax North Korea to end its nuclear quest? The Clinton Administration’s Agreed Framework of economic carrots and heavy oil to encourage regime moderation? Two decades (or more) of rational U.S. appeals to China to help curb the noxious Kim regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and to help terminate Pyongyang’s cyclic bouts of military attacks on South Korea?

These soft power gambits may have thrilled the editorial board of The New York Times, but they didn’t stop North Korea’s dictatorship. The Kim regime now has an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in its arsenal—one that threatens Anchorage, Alaska, and perhaps Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Eight years ago, on July 4, 2009, North Korea conducted a missile test. July 4 launches are clearly messages to America.

Alaska and Hawaii are minimalist interpretations of the 2017 missile’s range. Other experts fear the ICBM, a Hwasong-14, can reach the Canadian and U.S. west coasts.

Parts of Alaska (western Aleutians) have been within range of North Korean missiles for several years. So has Guam. There is an ongoing debate about the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile that was test-fired in February 2016. It may have had the range to hit northern California.

The July 4 launch doesn’t mean the North Koreans can handle operational targeting; it doesn’t mean they can mount an operational nuclear warhead on a missile; it doesn’t mean they have a warhead that can re-enter the atmosphere without breaking apart; it doesn’t mean they can detonate a warhead that can reach its target. It does, however, show they are hell bent on acquiring these capabilities and their accelerated development program is succeeding.

For the moment, the heat from North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test remains rhetorical and its fallout political. However, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program will eventually produce nuclear warheads for its boosters.

For almost four decades, the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang has promised to build nuclear weapons and ICBMs. Now the dictatorship’s dream is a real world nightmare.

Since the 1990s, there have been three general options for halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: enforce stiff economic and political sanctions to isolate the regime; follow a “wait and see” political and military strategy played with cautious economic carrots and sticks; and conduct a pre-emptive air or missile strike on North Korean nuclear research and development sites, weapons stores, missile and air bases, and command and control facilities.

Here are the current options for the U.S. to neutralize the Hermit Kingdom’s threat. Each entails grave risks.

1.) Yet another “do the right thing” bid to Beijing. China has vulnerabilities. China’s imperial territorial expansion in the South China Sea has produced adversarial reactions. China’s other borders are anything but problem-free, and Beijing’s bullying has intensified several disputes.

Chinese jockeying failed to shake the new government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in and force the withdrawal of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile (ABM) battery deployed in South Korea.

China threatened South Korean companies. It curtailed travel and cultural contacts. It threatened Seoul with political reprisals.

The THAAD tantrum failed, and China is still processing that failure. Moon was pegged as a “peace candidate” of the timorous political stripe Beijing and Pyongyang might manipulate. He performed a brief “review” of the THAAD deployment (which he promised he would do during his campaign), but after his meeting with President Donald Trump, he declared “a unified front” against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

South Korea knows THAAD provides protection. Japan also knows U.S. anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) provide protection.

Beijing has not yet adapted to South Korea’s and Japan’s new resolve. Moon is positioned to help Beijing adapt to 2017’s new reality and encourage China to finally squeeze the nukes out of the North.

Eighty-five percent of North Korea’s international trade is with China. North Korea’s miserable economy depends on China.

Some North Korean defectors argue tough sanctions—meaning an embargo and blockade with China participating—could cripple the Kim regime.

In April, Trump tweeted “a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better if they (China) solve the North Korean problem!” An economic payoff? Yes, but better than a shooting war.

2.) Coercive diplomacy directed at China. In March, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said “strategic patience” with North Korea was over and done.

Eventually strategic patience with Chinese posturing will also end.

China is attempting to portray itself as “the global adult” in the Trump Era and as the “go to nation” for the next Davos. However, backing North Korea utterly exposes this Chinese narrative as the sham it is. In February, Kim Jon Un’s assassins murdered his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam. The killers smeared him with a liquid nerve poison, persistent VX. In a missile warhead, VX is a weapon of mass destruction. Assassination as a geo-political advertisement that North Korea is an outlaw regime is an action no responsible nation would permit.

So coercive diplomacy starts with an information campaign challenging China’s pose.

It gets uglier. In the U.S.-China relationship, trade politics and geo-politics intersect. Business isn’t simply business when the promise of wealth keeps China’s Communist Party in power. The United States has the economic power to damage China. Trump knows it and so does Beijing. Trump has already talked trade barriers.

The U.S. is energy independent and China isn’t. The U.S. and its allies can restrict Chinese exports and access to raw materials.

Smaller but politically irritating sanctions like denying wealthy Chinese the ability to purchase real estate in the U.S. could have political effects among Chinese elites. In the upcoming party Congress scheduled for this fall, Chinese President Xi Jinping wants to solidify his control. However, he faces internal Communist Party opposition. The U.S. could exploit emerging factions in the party elite.

Coercive diplomacy stops when China forces North Korea to denuclearize.

Risky? Of course. It could spark a ruinous global trade war. But it is an option.

3.) The cynical trade and sell-out. The U.S., Japan and South Korea could acknowledge Chinese control of the South China Sea or they could give Taiwan to China in exchange for a denuclearized North Korea.

Outrageous? Yes. India would never accept it. Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore and Australia would go tilt.

I don’t think the U.S. and Japan would ever seriously contemplate it.

But it’s an option and likely the “appeasement” deal Beijing wants to make.

4.) Return of serve. This is an operation that could support several diplomatic options. The U.S., South Korea and Japan could use their ABMs to intercept every North Korean test launch. They might also employ cyber warfare to disrupt tests (perhaps they have already done so). The objective of “Return of Serve” is to stymie the test program and embarrass Kim Jong Un.

5.) Decapitation. What does Pyongyang want? The murder of Kim Jong Nam suggests one key objective: to retain Kim Jong Un’s control. Encouraging a North Korean Army coup sounds great, and if you know the faction who would do it, contact CIA immediately. Targeting Kim with a missile or aircraft-delivered munitions is extremely difficult. Moreover, his death may not lead to denuclearization and attacking him would be an act of war.

6.) Delayed reprisal and the war to denuclearize. Is a pre-emptive strike reckless? This asks another question: Just how responsible is a post-emptive strike?

The Korean War isn’t over.

Donald Trump is already a Korean War president—but so was Barack Obama and every other American president since Harry Truman.

Over the years, North Korea has committed atrocities throughout Asia. The regime has murdered and kidnapped South Koreans, Japanese and U.S. personnel. North Korea’s embedded belligerency defies the laws of war. The War to Denuclearize would be less of a pre-emptive strike than a delayed reprisal.

The U.S. and South Korea have exercised what they call a 4D strategy to “detect, defend, disrupt and destroy” North Korea’s missiles.

Weapons systems involved include various U.S. aircraft and a South Korean submarine with cruise missiles.

This is a bare sketch of some of the systems that would be employed in a “simultaneous strategic bombing strike” to knock out North Korean missiles, missile launchers, storage sites, nuclear and chemical weapons sites, command and control centers, communications systems and air-space defenses.

The U.S. and its allies in east Asia have the aircraft and missiles (cruise and ballistic) to deliver at least 2,000 (likely more) precision blockbuster-sized conventional weapons within a two to 10 minute time frame on North Korea’s critical targets. The April U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile attack on a Syrian Shayrat airbase provides an example.

The missiles were fired at a distance, but since they can “loiter,” the 59 missiles arrived near simultaneously. U.S. Air Force heavy bombers can drop smart bombs so that munitions dropped from different aircraft arrive near simultaneously.

A simultaneous strategic bombing strike seeks to surprise the enemy, destroy his strategic weapons systems and suppress his key defenses throughout the battle area.

That is asking a lot—perhaps too much.

Success depends on many things, but the first D—detect—is vital. Conducting a successful simultaneous strategic bombing strike requires very accurate, real-time intelligence. Allied ABMs must be ready to intercept any North Korean missiles that survive the attack.

That’s a sketch of the first 10 minutes. Over the next month subsequent strikes would occur, to make certain North Korea’s long-range missiles, chemical munitions, nuclear weapons stockpiles, missile manufacturing capabilities and nuclear weapons manufacturing capabilities are eliminated.

The U.S. and it allies must protect Seoul. North Korean artillery can bombard the northern reaches of South Korea’s capital. Military analysts debate the severity of the threat posed to Seoul by North Korean artillery deployed along the Demilitarized Zone. Some call it overrated. Perhaps, but best to suppress and destroy the artillery. North Korea’s tube and rocket artillery systems—even the ones in caves and bunkers—are vulnerable to weapons like the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb.

Smart bombs can close tunnel entrances.

This is a major war, and the risks are great. But so is exposing Los Angeles to the violent whims of a nuclear-armed Kim Jong Un.

 

[a_majoor]

This is bad news:

http://www.38north.org/2017/07/yongbyon071417/

North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons
BY: 38 NORTH
JULY 14, 2017SATELLITE IMAGERY
A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Mike Eley, Jack Liu and Frank V. Pabian.

Summary

Thermal imagery analysis of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that from September 2016 through June 2017:

The Radiochemical Laboratory operated intermittently and there have apparently been at least two unreported reprocessing campaigns to produce an undetermined amount of plutonium that can further increase North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile. This suggests batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor during the period of analysis.
Increased thermal activity was noted at the Uranium Enrichment Facility. It is unclear if this was the result of centrifuge operations or maintenance operations. Centrifuge operations would increase the North’s enriched uranium inventory; however, based on imagery alone, it is not possible to conclude whether the plant is producing low or highly enriched uranium.

The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistent, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. This means, the facility is likely not producing tritium, which is an essential isotope used in the production of boosted yield nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs.

From December 2016 through January 2017, the thermal pattern over the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) was elevated. While that might indicate that the reactor was operational, the likelihood is low since the pattern does not appear in subsequent imagery over the last six months. It is possible that there are alternative explanations for the elevated pattern, for example, short-term activity at the ELWR such as the heating of pipes to prevent freezing. Regardless, any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and bears continued monitoring.
The 5 MWe Reactor has either been intermittently operating at a low-level or not operating. The notable exception to this was during December 2016 and January 2017 when thermal patterns suggests a higher level of operations.

Analysis

While commercial satellite imagery is now widely used to analyze important developments overseas, including in North Korea, thermal imagery can provide additional important insights. Landsat 7 imagery from September 2016 through June 2017 was used for this analysis, although heavy cloud cover precluded the use of imagery from last November and no night-time imagery was available for the entire time period of this study.[1] A total of 19 images are available and of these, 10 were chosen with approximately one-month time intervals between them to provide a consistent periodicity for the analysis. Seven images were deemed too cloudy for analysis and thus weren’t considered.[2]

Developments noted at key Yongbyon installations were as follows:

Radiochemical Laboratory: Examination of the thermal patterns associated with the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing facility) show significant deviations from month to month. Concentrated heat patterns were observed with stronger temperature differences from the surrounding area between September to October of last year. The thermal patterns then returned to lower levels until March 2017, when a distinct increase in thermal activity is observed that has continued through last month. These intermittent surges in thermal activity suggest North Korea has conducted batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor. It is typical to allow the spent fuel rods to rest for a while in cooling ponds to both cool and allow less stable plutonium isotopes (PU-238, etc.) to bleed off. These reprocessing campaigns do not necessarily occur immediately after spent fuel rods are removed from the 5 MWe reactor. The June 2017 thermal activity coincides with an increase in activity noted in a March 2017 analysis based upon natural color imagery.

Uranium Enrichment Plant: The thermal patterns at the Uranium Enrichment Facility were elevated during September and October 2016, then decreased in November 2016 and remained low until March 2017 when it increased slightly. It is unclear if the period of elevated activity from September through November was related to centrifuge operations or the maintenance activity that was observed during this period.

Experimental Light Water Reactor: The same elevated thermal patterns over the 5 MWe Reactor observed in imagery during December 2016 and January 2017 also extended over the area of the ELWR. This was likely the result of steam being released into the air when the turbines adjacent to the 5 MWe Reactor were being run, operation of the 5 MWe Reactor itself, mid-winter heating of both structures, prevailing weather patterns, or some combination of the above. We cannot completely, however, eliminate the possibility that this elevated thermal pattern was the result of short-term activity at the ELWR itself—for example, heating the structure to prevent pipes from freezing, allowing ongoing internal construction work, or pre-startup testing.[3] It is important to note that no other significant patterns of thermal activity were observed over the ELWR throughout the study period. Importantly, the ELWR did not operate at all from February through June 2017. Any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and its operational status bears continued monitoring as it would be an indicator of North Korean ongoing intentions and capabilities.

5 MWe Reactor: The thermal patterns observed at the 5 MWe Reactor remain relatively consistent with those observed in the previous report indicating either intermittent low-level or no operation of the reactor. There was a notable deviation in the December 2016 and January 2017 images, suggesting a period of higher level reactor operation that lends support to a previous analysis based upon natural color imagery.

Isotope/Tritium Production Facility: The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistently low throughout the period under study, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level.

Satellite photos and footnotes at link

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You know it’s to bad that the US does not have operational lasers built into Sub masts. Just imagine all sorts of spontaneous fires mysteriously appearing along the coastal areas.

 

[7thghoul]

http://globalnews.ca/news/3634762/us-bombers-korean-peninsula-north-korea-missile-test/

In response to the latest test by NK of their Hwasong-14 ICBM. It seems like once a month these guys get up in everyone's face. I don't know if it's just me but I used to think NK was a bit of a joke (in high school, under Kim Jong-Il) as they were impoverished and incapable of actually hurting the mainland US or their allies (us, SK, Japan, etc.) either at all or without threat of complete retaliatory annihilation.

It would seem in the last 2 years the new Kim has managed to fund and direct this project to its conclusion now that they supposedly have a ICBM that can hit West Coast US (they are now saying LA) or Canada for that matter.

BRB I'm going to go buy a fallout shelter, anyone want in?

 

[tomahawk6]

There has been an increase in North Korean submarine activity. They seem to be testing their submarine launched missile. This might be all it would take to cause the US to take decisive action if the North Koreans can perfect this capability.

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/31/politics/north-korea-ejection-test-submarine-activity

Washington (CNN)The US military has detected "highly unusual and unprecedented levels" of North Korean submarine activity and evidence of an "ejection test" in the days following Pyongyang's second intercontinental ballistic missile launch this month, a defense official told CNN on Monday.

An ejection test examines a missile's "cold-launch system," which uses high pressure steam to propel a missile out of the launch canister into the air before its engines ignite. That helps prevent flames and heat from the engine from damaging either the submarine, submersible barge or any nearby equipment used to launch the missile.

 

[a_majoor]

Another look at how a new Korean War might play out. The inability of the DPRK to logistically support or sustain an attack has probably been both the sticking point for them (possibly for decades) and also the reason to attempt to make a "strategic breakout" with unconventional and nuclear forces. To what end and how successfully is the big question for all of us:

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/08/us-mini-nukes-and-an-analysis-of-a-second-korean-war.html#more-135303

US Mini-nukes and an analysis of a second Korean warbrian wang | August 4, 2017 |  

The Long Range stand off (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile program has been funded since 2013 and has received about $500 million in funding. The program will eventually cost $15-30 billion.

There have been calls to cancel it. The LRSO would have a variable-yield weapon using a modified W80 warhead. The Air Force wishes to procure: 1,000–1,100 LRSO. That looks like a significant increase in the number of air-launched cruise missiles available for bomber missions.

The Department of Energy is producing a new variant of the B61 gravity bomb that will be highly accurate and have a variable yield of 0.3 to 50 kilotons.

The existing (but to be retired) ALCM is believed to have a selectable yield of 5 KTs or 150 KTs. The lower yield is presumably for the boosted primary alone, and the larger yield for the two-stage weapon. The life-extension program for the W80 warhead, which will be carried by the LRSO missile, is expected to provide closer to a “dial-a-yield” option that would allow a number of yield options.

There is a debate that making the mini-nuclear weapons more capable and flexible would encourage their use in say a conflict with North Korea.

The US can destroy North Korea’s air defenses using conventional weapons in about a week just as the US destroyed Air Defenses of Iraq. The question of whether missiles have more stealth or whether there is selectable nuclear yield on 1000 or 2000 nuclear weapons in the US arsenal is not significant. This is because the US can wage more limited nuclear war with lower yield nuclear weapons already.

A 2012 military analysis of North Korea’s attack Seoul would be less damaging than more simplistic analysis.

Despite the thousands of artillery pieces, only 700 heavier guns and rocket launchers, plus the newer 300-millimeter MRLs, have the range to strike Seoul. Seoul has extensive air raid shelters for civilians that will quickly reduce the exposed population density. The North will struggle to keep these heavy artillery units supplied with shells, particularly with its aging supply system. Finally, U.S. and ROK forces will quickly begin hunting down units participating in the bombardment, causing their numbers to drop almost immediately.

North Korea occasionally threatens to “turn Seoul into a Sea of Fire”. The South Korean, U.S. and other international media often relay this statement, amplifying its effect. But can North Korea really do this? Does it matter if they can? The short answer is they can’t; but they can kill many tens of thousands of people, start a larger war and cause a tremendous amount of damage before ultimately losing their regime.

If the North Korean Peoples Army (KPA) were to start a doctrinal, conventional artillery barrage focused on South Korean forces, we could expect to see around three thousand casualties in the first few minutes, but the casualty rate would quickly drop as the surprise wears off and counter-battery fires slow down the North Korean rates of fire. If the KPA were to engage Seoul in a primarily counter-value fashion by firing into Seoul instead of primarily aiming at military targets, there would likely be around thirty-thousand casualties in a short amount of time. Statistically speaking, almost eight-hundred of those casualties would be foreigners given Seoul’s international demographic. Chinese make up almost seventy percent of foreigners in Seoul and its northern environs which means KPA might also kill six-hundred Chinese diplomats, multi-national corporation leaders, and ranking cadre children who are students in Seoul. Horrible, but nothing approaching “millions”. Three primary factors and three secondary factors account for the huge discrepancy between rhetoric and reality:

Note : The Nautilus analysis seems to imply that a US-South Korea first strike would blunt the initial North Korea damage rate and could limit early deaths to 10000 to 15000. There would be no initial rate of 3000 deaths in the first few minutes and there would be some pre-warning on the South Korea side to get people to shelters.

However, the protracted artillery and tank battle would still kill 80,000 in the first week. Overall deaths would be in the 100,000-150,000 range.

Three Primary Factors

* Range – Only about 1/3 of Seoul is presently in range from artillery along a DMZ trace. The northern reaches of Seoul within artillery range have much lower population densities than Seoul proper;
* Numbers – Even though KPA has a tremendous number of artillery pieces, only a certain number are emplaced to range Seoul. KPA can’t emplace every weapon near Seoul or the rest of North Korea’s expansive border would be unguarded and even more vulnerable. Moreover, an artillery tube immediately reveals its location as soon as it fires. Therefore only about two-thirds of artillery will open fire at a time. The rest are trying to remain hidden;
* Protection – Artillery shelters for twenty million people exist in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. After the initial surprise has worn off, there simply won’t be large numbers of exposed people. Even during the initial attack the vast majority of people will either be at work, at home, or in transit. Few people will be standing in the middle of an open field with no protection whatsoever available anywhere nearby.

Three Secondary Factors

* Dud rate – the only numbers available—to the DPRK as well as the rest of the world—indicate a dud rate of twenty-five percent. It’s like immediately taking every fourth artillery tube away.
* Counter-battery fires – shortly after the KPA artillery begins firing, and the political decision has been made, South Korean artillery, Air Forces, and others will begin destroying artillery at a historical rate of 1% per hour. South Korea has had approximately 50 years to figure out where North Korean artillery tubes are emplaced using every sense available to man and machine.
* Logistics – in order to move south from the DMZ trace and place the rest of Seoul at risk, KPA must expose approximately 2,500 thin-skinned vehicles each day along three well-defined transportation corridors. Otherwise, KPA grinds to an almost immediate halt without a way to transport fuel, ammunition and spare parts needed to continue moving south. Alternatively, KPA can scavenge from ROK fuel stores and depots if they have not been previously destroyed.

 

[Lumber]

Unless that first Salvo includes artillery fired nukes. That would change these predictions significantly.

 

[Old Sweat]

Unless that first Salvo includes artillery fired nukes. That would change these predictions significantly.

While I don't have any intelligence re the NK arsenal, artillery fired nukes - if they had any in the first place - are relatively low yield and operate under the same rules of physics as the non-nuke variety. Thus, as noted above, only the northern suburbs would be within range. Your point about the increase in casualties, however, is moot. The questions are (a) how many and (b) what can be done to protect the population?

 

[GR66]

Unless that first Salvo includes artillery fired nukes. That would change these predictions significantly.

That would actually simplify the US response.  One massive counter-strike and the war ends in hours.

 

[a_majoor]

The DPRK escalates rhetoric in response to the new round of sanctions:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/n-korea-vows-harsh-retaliation-against-fresh-un-sanctions/2017/08/07/7696ab76-7b3f-11e7-b2b1-aeba62854dfa_story.html?utm_term=.b471dd21cf45

North Korea vows harsh retaliation against new UN sanctions
By Hyung-Jin Kim | AP August 7 at 10:31 AM

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea vowed Monday to bolster its nuclear arsenal and gain revenge of a “thousand-fold” against the United States in response to tough U.N. sanctions imposed following its recent intercontinental ballistic missile tests.

The warning came two days after the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved new sanctions to punish North Korea, including a ban on coal and other exports worth over $1 billion. The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Nikki Haley, called the U.S.-drafted resolution “the single largest economic sanctions package ever leveled against” North Korea.

In a statement carried by the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s government said the sanctions were a “violent infringement of its sovereignty” that was caused by a “heinous U.S. plot to isolate and stifle” the country.

“We will make the U.S. pay by a thousand-fold for all the heinous crimes it commits against the state and people of this country,” the statement said.

The North said it would take an unspecified “resolute action of justice” and would never place its nuclear program on the negotiating table or “flinch an inch” from its push to strengthen its nuclear deterrence as long as U.S. hostility against North Korea persists.

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho made similar comments during an annual regional security conference in Manila on Monday.

South Korea’s government said the North would face stronger sanctions if it doesn’t stop its nuclear and missile provocation.

Lim Eul Chul, a North Korea expert at South Korea’s Kyungnam University, said the comments by the North demonstrate how angry it is over the U.N. sanctions, but that the country is not likely to launch a pre-emptive strike against the United States. He said the North could still carry out further missile tests or a sixth atomic bomb test in the coming months under its broader weapons development timetable.

North Korea test-launched two ICBMs last month as part of its efforts to possess a long-range missile capable of striking anywhere in the mainland U.S. Both missiles were fired at highly lofted angles, and analysts say the weapons could reach parts of the United States such as Alaska, Los Angeles or Chicago if fired at a normal, flattened trajectory.

The centerpiece of the U.N. sanctions is a ban on North Korean exports of coal, iron, lead and seafood products — and a ban on all countries importing those products, estimated to be worth over $1 billion a year in hard currency. The resolution also bans countries from giving any additional permits to North Korean laborers, another source of foreign currency for the North, and prohibits all new joint ventures with North Korean companies.

Analysts say that North Korea, already under numerous U.N. and other international sanctions, will feel some pain from the new sanctions but is not likely to return to disarmament negotiations anytime soon because of them.

Lim, the North Korea expert, said the North will probably squeeze its ordinary citizens to help finance its nuclear and missile programs. Shin Beomchul of the Seoul-based Korea National Diplomatic Academy said sanctions that can force a change from North Korea would include a ban on China’s annual, mostly free shipment of 500,000 tons of crude oil to North Korea and the deporting by U.N. member states of the tens of thousands of North Korean workers currently dispatched abroad.