Major-General Lewis MacKenzie CM, MSC, OOnt, CD

[Limpy]

"While I appreciate him standing up for our troops like that, what we really need is for CURRENT leaders to stand up to stuff like this."




The problem is today about speaking up is you run the risk of losing a promotion or your job. Then again some people are just gold diggers that will be yes men that will attempt to benefit themselves through never saying anything contradictory even though something is wrong.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

I love that man.  I hope the PC's get in and he is put in charge of the military.

 

[Gunner]

The last time the senior generals and admirals in this country stood up for doing the right thing was during the Cuban Missile crisis. Some admirals defied Diefenbaker's orders to do nothing, saw that the Soviets were deploying submarines to threaten shipping off the East Coast of North America, and put the Atlantic fleet on high alert. They even deployed a carrier battlegroup to protect the US East Coast.

Actually I would argue that the Admirals didn't defy Diefenbaker's orders rather they were implementing what they considered previously agreed upon alliance and treaty responsibilities.  While they did what they considered right...they were negligent in remembering that the government is the final authority in this regard.

  While I appreciate him standing up for our troops like that, what we really need is for CURRENT leaders to stand up to stuff like this. The quote about the soldiers not being trained for what was needed came from a defence spokesperson, probably a jr bureaucrat I would assume.

Gents, you have very short (and limited) memories of our past.  What about MGen Cam Ross resigning in 2003 due to policy differences with the Liberal government over CA deployment to Afghanistan (vice Iraq).  Before that was a plethora of Patricia Generals (Vernon, Mackenzie, et al) who pulled the pin due to the disbandment of the CAR.  Prior to that was General Anderson who resigned as CDS when the Liberals cancelled the EH 101 in 1993.  How about the famous Admirals revolt in the late 60s and early 70s.  If members of the military can't recall the sacrifices of our leadership, why would any civilians?  I believe it was Cretin or one of his lackeys that made fun of retired senior officers speaking out against government decisions.  Where was the outrage at the Liberals blatant disregard for an officer's loyalty?

Its easy to pass the buck onto senior leadership but what have you done?

 

[Tebo]

.....if Canadian soldiers are sent out into the countryside to hunt down the actual terrorists rather than patrolling Kabul neighborhoods, that the bodybags will start to pile up. No matter how few casualties that brings, the media would be all over it like a bee on honey. And when the media portrays something in a bad light, it tends to have the same effect on Canadians. When the coffins started coming home, the public would turn against the mission and I assume we would see protests telling the government to bring our troops home.

Do you seriously think the Canadian media would dishonour fallen Canadian soldiers defending the right for democratic election in Afghanistan by saying we should turn tail and run away?  Balance the death stories with our victories and coverage of the election.  If Canada does not have the will and stomach to let the military DO ITS JOB  why do we even bother deploying?

 

[Kirkhill]

In support of MGen MacKenzie's position of   the value of the structure of the Traditional   Infantry Battalion structure, and those that advocate the advantage offered by tanks I am posting this article from today's Sun in Britain.

Our Boys' unseen war



Target ... snipers on alert against a
rebel attack at British Army outpost
Pictures: DAN CHARITY






From TOM NEWTON DUNN
Defence Editor
at Camp Abu Naji, Iraq

THE first mortar bomb exploded with a loud clump as I tucked into my British Army fry-up for breakfast yesterday.
Everyone dived for cover in the tented canteen â ” as the second whistled over our heads and landed a few metres outside the base's northern wall.

â Å“Welcome to Camp Abu Naji,â ? quipped Sergeant Chris Broome, 35.

â Å“Now you know what it's really like up here.â ?

This is the most dangerous posting in the world for Brit forces.

And The Sun has joined the 1,000-strong Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment Battle Group, who are protecting the lawless badlands of Maysan province, 150 miles north of Basra.

For two months religious extremists have waged a war against the PWRR that is almost unseen by the British public.

Fighting is so intense, Our Boys have been attacked more times than any Army unit since the Korean War.

The men arrived on April 17 and have had an incredible 320 â Å“contactsâ ? with the enemy â ” around five a day.

These are anything from a single hand grenade tossed in front of a Land Rover to the three-day battle for the province's capital Al Amarah last month.

Our Boys have fired 30,000 rounds against the rebels. They have lost a dozen vehicles and had 28 soldiers wounded. But, incredibly, there have been no deaths.

At least 100 insurgents â ” from rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi army â ” have been killed.

Combat has ranged from Challenger II tanks firing high explosive shells to the first bayonet charge by British troops since the Falklands War.

Lt Col Matt Maer, commanding officer of the PWRR's 1st Battalion, said: â Å“My men have walked into a maelstrom of violence the like of which none of us has faced before.

â Å“But they have reacted superbly and faced hardship with astonishing courage, endurance and humour. They are true heroes.â ?

The CO added: â Å“Before we arrived, we weren't expecting two months of war.



Heavyweight ... tank crushes weapons



â Å“I told my men to expect a tour like no other, but I had very little idea how true that was going to be.

â Å“And it is a forgotten war. People back home have very little idea of what is going on here because we are so remote.â ?

It is the first taste of combat for many of these men from the PWRR, nicknamed The Tigers.

Coalition troops throughout Iraq battled al-Sadr's Shiite Muslim group during the April uprising. Fighting calmed after a few weeks, EXCEPT in desperately poor Maysan.

The hardcore Mehdi in the area number around 300, but ranks can be swelled up to 3,000.

Near misses occur with terrifying regularity.

Lance Corporal John Barr, 34, from A Company, poked his head out of his Warrior armoured vehicle â ” and nearly had it blown off by a rocket-propelled grenade.

The RPG missed his head by inches during a street ambush in Al Amarah.

L/Cpl Barr, from Chichester, Sussex, said: â Å“It's amazing we haven't lost anybody with the stuff they've chucked at us.

â Å“I thought this would be a simple peace keeping tour. But as soon as we got here it turned into something just like Black Hawk Down. It's been my first time under fire, but one of the things I take great pride in is that I've proved I can handle it.

â Å“The whole unit has. This regiment has a very proud history. Here in Iraq, we've been given a chance to show this generation is up to it too.

â Å“Everyone shares the risks and everyone's played their part.â ?

The soldiers who have seen the most action are from 8 platoon, C Company, led by 2nd Lt. Richard Deane, of Co Londonderry.

The subaltern has had 12 of his 25 men wounded in combat during a succession of ambushes.

Bullet holes and blast marks pock mark the platoon's Warriors.

Brave 2nd Lt. Deane, 22, has been wounded twice himself, once getting shrapnel in his face and another time ending up unconscious during an RPG strike on his Warrior turret.

He said: â Å“Before we came out, all the lads were really looking forward to getting stuck in. Now I think we'll all be delighted if we never see another round fired until we get home.

â Å“A lot of young blokes have been forced to grow up pretty quickly. I'm looking forward to getting home for some leave in nine days and seeing my three-year-old daughter again.â ?



Battle ground ... where Brits are fighting rebels



Maysan province's volatility is not new to British troops.

Just 20 miles down the road from Camp Abu Naji is Majar al Kabir, where a mob massacred six Royal Military Policemen.

Most men fly into the base by Chinook helicopter because the road from Basra is considered too dangerous for anything but large convoys supported by armour.

The Hercules flight Sun photographer Dan Charity and I arrived on four days ago was the most terrifying either of us has had.

The RAF transport plane veered violently from side to side on its final approach to make itself less of a target for an RPG attack.

Troops are also battling the blistering Iraqi summer and strong winds that kick up daily dust clouds.

They have seized huge caches of rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars and RPGs during raids.

These have been crushed under the tracks of a 60-tonne Challenger 2.

Fifteen miles outside the main camp is an outpost jokingly dubbed The Alamo because it has been attacked so often.

Y Company have been in fortified Cimic House in the heart of enemy territory in Al Amarah since the start of the tour.

Major Justin Featherstone's 130 men have had 180 mortar rounds fired at them and got into 73 gun fights with the Mehdi army.

Three snipers man the rooftop bunker at all times on the lookout for the next attack. Company Sergeant Major Dale Norman, of Gosport, Hants, said: â Å“I was mortared nine times and shot at twice on my 35th birthday here. I'll never forget it.â ?

Sergeant Dan Mills, 35, had a miracle escape when he was saved by his body armour during an ambush.

The soldier was shot in the upper back as he directed fire in Al Amarah.

Sgt Mills, from Middlesex, said: â Å“I was knocked on to my face by the bullet. It felt like being kicked by a horse and I knew I had been shot.

â Å“But when I felt for hot sticky blood, there was none. I couldn't understand it, so I got up and carried on with the contact.

â Å“It was only when we got back to base that a mate saw the hole in my body armour,

â Å“He had a dig around and pulled out a 7.62mm AK47 bullet. I am a very lucky boy.â ?


Baking shot



Chink of light ... baking tray
was mangled by mortar



LUCKY cook Alex Whitlam, 22, holds up a shrapnel-hit baking tray â ” after a mortar bomb smashed into his kitchen at â Å“The Alamoâ ? outpost in Al Amarah.

Lance Corporal Whitlam, from Norwich, walked out to fetch extra rations 20 SECONDS before the strike.

Two hours later he had cooked an evening meal for the men.

He said: â Å“I cleaned up and got on with my job. You have to, even if someone is trying to kill you.â ?

http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,5-2004301024,00.html

 

[Infanteer]

LUCKY cook Alex Whitlam, 22, holds up a shrapnel-hit baking tray â ” after a mortar bomb smashed into his kitchen at â Å“The Alamoâ ? outpost in Al Amarah.

Lance Corporal Whitlam, from Norwich, walked out to fetch extra rations 20 SECONDS before the strike.

Two hours later he had cooked an evening meal for the men.

He said: â Å“I cleaned up and got on with my job. You have to, even if someone is trying to kill you.â ?

Hey, what do you know, a combat cook.  Probably alot more efficient than locals hired and supervised by some civvie contractor taking at least Sergeants pay.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The Prince of Wales Regiment wasn't that Sharpes regiment?   ;D

 

[ags281]

"I thought this would be a simple peace keeping tour. But as soon as we got here it turned into something just like Black Hawk Down."

Hmm... so tell me again how taking the teeth out of our forces is justifiable for a focus on peacekeeping missions?

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Bayonet charge.  boy I bet there will be some well deserved stories coming from that incident.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ex-Dragoon wrote:

The Prince of Wales Regiment wasn't that Sharpes regiment? 

'Mazing what a good publicist can do for you, eh.b

 

[Kirkhill]

Further to the PWRR and the Bayonet attack.

"They are being attacked virtually every day and sometimes several times a day, usually with rockets or from mortars. They are tired, primarily because the attacks mean sleep is constantly interrupted, but their morale is high."

Two weeks ago, 28 men from the battalion took part in a rout of Iraqi gunmen who had been terrorising the Route 6 motorway which links Al Amarah to Basra. The troops had been ordered to rescue two vehicles and their occupants from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which was ambushed by a group of 50 Iraqis.

The battle, one of three separate attacks against British troops in the area on the same day, ended when the soldiers fixed bayonets and stormed a series of enemy positions dug-in by the road-side. About 30 Iraqis were killed, 12 were captured and a further dozen are believed to have fled from the battlefield.

After the action, Capt Justin Barry, a military spokesman, said: "The fighters engaged were basically terrorists and gangsters - people who are out to destabilise the area, drive out the Coalition and suck as much out of Iraq as they can.

"But at the end of the day, we got the better of them. The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment were engaged in very heavy hand-to-hand fighting and bayonets were fixed. There's a great sense of satisfaction among the men with the way this turned out."

http://www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/13/wirq113.xml


I can't find the other articles on this action, it was widely reported on BBC, the Sun and the Times, often with some confusion as to whether it was the Tigers or the Argylls that launched the charge.

From recollection the Argylls had been patrolliing the Highway in a pair of Land Rovers and had been bounced three times in the same day, if I remember rightly on one occasion an RPG round came in one window and out the other.

On the third attack they called for backup and a PWRR platoon in Warriors showed up to deal with the mob of smugglers and would-be Mehdists (al-Sadr's bunch).

They are apparently the ones that actually conducted the assault.

 

[Limpy]

"FIX BAYONETS!!!" OOOH, I love that command. At least in the movies.

 

[GGboy]

From Wednesday's National Post. Someone should nail this to the door of the PMO ...

Peacemaking is not social work

by Lewis MacKenzie
Last week Prime Minister Paul Martin departed on a 10-day foreign mission that includes a visit to the Sudan. On Sunday, Toronto Star columnist Graham Fraser suggested that General Roméo Dallaire's recent recommendations -- that soldiers who can both make peace and build civil society intervene in failed states -- were both timely and appropriate, considering Mr. Martin's impending stop in Sudan. Presumably, he was also suggesting that the Prime Minister should give them serious consideration. To do so would be a mistake.
Having been conditioned by a military culture that encourages one to disagree without being disagreeable, I must strongly do so with my old colleague and friend Roméo. Mr. Fraser suggests that past generals have wanted "clarity and simplicity" in their mandates and that "Dallaire learned the hard way that clear mandates and exit strategies don't fit the ragged chaos in a new spectrum of violence."
In fact the opposite is true. Dallaire learned the hard way that clarity and simplicity apply more today then during the relative simple peacekeeping missions of the Cold War. His mandate in Rwanda -- actually not his, but that of his boss on the ground, an incompetent UN diplomat, Cameroonian Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, representing the UN Secretary-General -- was to "establish an atmosphere of security." That was the problem. The mandate was far from precise and the resources to achieve all or part of it were not provided.
Mandates that flow from the deliberations of the UN Security Council are typically vague, and most are written in such broad terms as to defy interpretation. Add to this the fact that the resources, always inadequate, are provided by the member states of the General Assembly, and you have a recipe for chronic failure.
As a result of his sole disastrous experience with UN operations, General Dallaire is now convinced that new skills must be added to the old warrior skills of soldiering. Not so. Civilian personnel, well trained and educated in essential nation-building skills, such as judges, police officials, social workers and civil servants, have to be standing by to assist in rebuilding societies once the soldiers are successful in their primary task, which is to stop the killing. Soldiers are not social workers with guns. Both disciplines are important, but both will suffer if combined in one individual.
The case for the essential separation of security and nation-building tasks exists today in the Darfur Region of Sudan, where tens of thousands of innocents have been slaughtered at the hands of militias supported by the Sudanese government, which has tried to put down a four-year-long uprising in Western Sudan.
Colin Powell, among others, has stated that the killings perpetrated by the Sudanese-backed militias amount to genocide, yet the UN Security Council continues to debate if the slaughter actually qualifies as such. As with Rwanda in 1994, the important and simple task in Sudan is to stop the killing. But the soldiers who can do that have not been dispatched. Instead, aid agencies have been trying to stitch together the shredded social fabric in Darfur under atrocious and dangerous conditions.
If peacemakers are dispatched to stop the killing, the intervening soldier's role should be restricted to providing security to the innocents in the Darfur Region -- easily identified as most of them are in camps. Once security is assured, aid agencies could do what they are best at, while diplomacy could continue without the shadow of a daily body count of dead women and children.
Rwanda was not a complex problem. One group was attempting to annihilate the other. General Dallaire himself has stated that with 5,000 professional soldiers, properly equipped, he could have stopped the genocide. I believe him.
He didn't need a force led by officers educated in anthropology, psychology or philosophy who "understood" the sensitivities of what was going on in Rwanda, as he has more recently suggested. He needed leaders conventionally trained in the application of deadly force to stop the killing. Once that was achieved and 800,000 lives saved, the nation-builders could safely come in and start the rebuilding process.
The same is true in Sudan and will continue to be true in the future when brutal regimes set about killing innocents.
Many at the UN, on Parliament Hill and in capitals around the world don't want to believe this. "Never again" has lost all meaning to those political leaders who want to find a safe, no-risk way of stopping the bad guys. The result is needless debate in place of action that would prevent genocide.
While in Sudan, the Prime Minister would be wise to consider the immediate benefits of deploying a professional, multi-national military fighting force with the clear mandate to protect the victims of Sudan's bloody campaign in Darfur. Mr. Martin should not, however, place too much faith in the long promised deployment of an African Union intervention force. It will be slow getting there and will contain some national contingents that in the past have exacerbated problems they were supposed to resolve.
The military solution to Darfur could well rest with the G20 group of nations, which the Prime Minister wisely suggested might have a role to play in the application of "the responsibility to protect."

Maj-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, now retired, commanded UN troops during the Bosnian civil war of 1992.

 

[pbi]

Although I don't always agree with everything he has said and written, I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.

However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions. I am not sure that he himself fully understood Yugoslavia before he went there, although he probably had a pretty good idea by the time he left.

Cheers.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Although I don't always agree with everything he has said and written, I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.

However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions. I am not sure that he himself fully understood Yugoslavia before he went there, although he probably had a pretty good idea by the time he left.

Cheers.

I'm betting the original article by Fraser fits the Liberal Parties ideological 'bent' for the military to a T.  

"If we just have a nice calm decision over why they shouldn't be killing each other, I'm sure they'll all stop and we can build a school together."


Matthew.    :

 

[bossi]

... I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.

However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions.

Bang on!  The only "exception to the rule" is when the environment is too hostile for GOs/IOs/NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance - then, the military is the "option of last resort".

I've been told/shown/taught that the military starts meddling in humanitarian assitance when there's not enough peacemaking/peacekeeping to do, and commanders start looking for things to do ... (i.e. perhaps a useful litmus test for "when it's time to pull out" ... ?)

 

[pbi]

Also, a goodly number of IOs/NGOs/GOs are not too keen to have us in the humanitarian game in the first place, as some say it results in their workers being targeted. As well, IMHO, that field tends to attract some people with an anti-military bent. Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

pbi.... the problem I have is how does the situation get handled where you have: a suffering population that needs help; a body of nationalists/thugs (your choice) that does best when the populationi is unhappy and they can create instability; anti-military humanitarians that won't supply help in an insecure environment; and troops that need the population to be fed to combat the instability so that they can go after the thugs.

If that sounds like a circle it is.  But it seems to me that unless the Aid agencies are on side with the Security forces and also willing to accept risks then the Military is going to be forced into the delivery end of the game. 

And if the Aid agencies do seem to be onside then they are no longer neutral and become targets.  A pretty big circle to square.

(By the way on the subject of Aid agencies and Neutrality - anybody else see the references to the IC Red Crescent offices in Fallujah being used to store weapons and instructions to pick up fighters before civilians? -  I'll look for the source info).

 

[pbi]

Kirkhill: My answer would be that military should concentrate its efforts first on dealing with the security threat, next on facilitating those humanitarian organizations that are ready to act(but not doing it for them), and only finally and as a last resort actually do humanitarian tasks itself.

the Military is going to be forced into the delivery end of the game. 

The military can only be forced into something by its own government (or by the enemy). And this, IMHO, is where the problem lies, and we get things like DART which is to my mind a perfect example of what I am opposed to. We should not start out by building a unit for hum ops-we should focus on a mobile, capable joint combat force that, if tasked, can create the conditions for humanitarian agencies to work. The resources put into DART should have been plowed into the readiness capabilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Instead we start from the premise that it our job to do humanitarian work in foreign countries.  Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

pbi... I agree with you (and for a change there are no "Buts").

Cheers.