Major-General Lewis MacKenzie CM, MSC, OOnt, CD

[Big Foot]

We are soldiers first, peacekeepers second, or at least thats the way it should be. As JL Granestein put it in "Who Killed the Canadian Military?", when the time comes to fight a war, soldiers will just end up saying "No, sorry, we don't do that anymore." Soldiers should be soldiers, trained to fight when the time comes, not trained to peacekeep then try and apply those skills in battle. Now I'm not saying we should give up our humanitarian pursuits, I'm just saying its important that when the time comes, we can do whats required of us.

 

[pbi]

Most Canadian soldiers would agree with you. And, I hope, you will be pleased to discover that despite all the many obstacles and distractions we face, we still try to train for war, because we know that the most effective way to keep the peace between hostile parties is with a force they are reluctant to mess with. Cheers.

 

[Spr.Earl]

After reading the above opinions,my gist of those are "The Military stays out of Civil Affair's but stays with it's traditional job of security and civil peace under Martial Law,which most U.N. mandates are but under the guise of U.N. Articles etc.."

So why have we set up CIMIC?

 

[pbi]

The primary purpose of CIMIC (or Civil Affairs=CA as the US calls it) is to establish good relations with local civil authorities, in order to contribute to mission success. CIMIC takes part in information operations (by gather information from the local population and by disseminating Info Ops messages), it contributes to Force Protection, and it reduces tensions by assisting with an improvement to living conditions for locals. CIMIC elements should not normally be "doing" humanitarian works themselves unless there is no civil agency (GO/NGO/IO) capable of doing so, but most CIMIC teams do get involved in at least some activities.

We are latecomers to the business of having designated CIMIC forces-the US have had CA battalions and HQs in the Army Reserve for years-here in Afghanistan they are responsible for establishing and "tech net" guidance to the PRTs that the US run (about twice to three times the size of the ISAF program), and CA types also run the CJ9 Branch of both Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF76)   the major subordinate command of CFC-A. The Brits, on the other hand, have no CIMIC branch and do not feel they need one. When it comes to CIMIC stuff, operational commanders just get on with it.

We have been doing "CIMIC" stuff for years, under different titles, but without a permanently established CIMIC org, and doing it quite well. Where CIMIC really got its launch was during Op ABACUS, when JTF ABACUS, the national-level TF led by MGen Jefferies, ordered the Regional TFs to adopt the term "CIMIC" for what up until then we had   called (and still call....) "Domestic Ops".

Since Op ABACUS, as an element of the LFRR process, CIMIC was identified as   something that was ideally suited to the Army Reserve, which is where we have our CIMIC assets now. The CIMIC teams in each LFA are focused on deployed ops but could be used for domestic ops in an emergency. Most CIMIC teams on int'l ops today are composed of Res soldiers. Cheers.

 

[bossi]

So why have we set up CIMIC?

In a nutshell ...
Civilians are a part of the battlefield, no matter whether it's high intensity conflict, peacemaking, or peacekeeping.  Always have been, always will be
(one school of thought is that they're increasingly a part of the modern operational environment ... I'll leave that up to the personal judgement of the readers, lest we go off on a tangent ...).

So, in order to accomplish our mission, we make sure we can deal with whatever obstacles we encounter
(whether we're talking about minefields, water obstacles, hordes of refugees blocking our MSR, guerilla insurgents aided and abetted by non-combatant villagers ... )

As an aside, when we first adopted the "continental staff system" (i.e. G1, G2, etc.) CIMIC was G5.
Thus, at one point in time, it was recognised that CIMIC was important enough to be part of "The Original Five" (hmmm ... ya don't suppose the "continentals" were particularly attuned to this, having firsthand experience with the effects upon their civilian populations during the First and Second World Wars ...?)

However, as with many symptoms of malaise with peacetime armies, lessons learned during war can sometimes become less pressing than ... things that seem more important ...

So, rather then allow military operations to become bogged down in complex civil-military environments, CIMIC has been resurrected as an "overlooked" capability (I say "overlooked", simply because here in Canada it fell by the wayside - for a while, we had an "ad hoc" approach to CIMIC - personnel selected were often those who commanders deemed incompetent to trust with "vital" appointments ... i.e. "We'll keep stupid Fatso Bloggins away from the troops by putting him in CIMIC" ... which perhaps wasn't the best approach ...)

Now, recognising that reservists sometimes have a civilian skillset not normally found in the military, our Army has given CIMIC to the Reserves in order to get "twice the bang for the buck".  Also, by clearly identifying CIMIC personnel and providing them with proper training well in advance of operations, it's a more professional approach.

While I'm on my soapbox, I'll dispell one myth:  CIMIC should not NORMALLY perform humantarian assistance tasks - that's the purview of the civilian organisations (e.g. CARE, MSF, Red Cross) - however, in a hostile environment where the civlians can't operate, military commanders can sometimes become obliged to conduct humantarian relief activities (for example, UNHCR ceased operations in Afghanistan at one point, when one of their workers was assassinated).  However, this is a topic that should be discussed at length ... but I won't bore all of you more than I already have ... chuckle!

Finally, I'd suggest CIMIC contributes to "situational awareness" in several ways - they get out there and talk ot the civilian population, sometimes hearing things that might otherwise be overlooked ...
And, in the context of arming our own troops with all the ammunition they need to win, CIMIC can also provide information to avoid making mistakes which then blow up in our faces (e.g. under the heading of "smooth move, Ex Lax" - some dunce thought it was a bright idea to name the operation in Iraq "Crusade" ... as opposed to being wary of doing something that would only inflame, and unite the ENTIRE population against the "infidel invaders" ...)

Sum up?
CIMIC is not anything new - if anything, it's a "forgotten art" and an example of "the indirect approach" to winning wars.
"pbi" nailed it on the head in his post, and I thank him profusely for doing so:

Although I don't always agree with everything he has said and written, I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.

However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions. I am not sure that he himself fully understood Yugoslavia before he went there, although he probably had a pretty good idea by the time he left.

Cheers.

P.S. (this is funny - in a display of "converging attacks", pbi posted while I was typing my verbose reply ... chuckle!)

 

[RDA]

A couple of questions from a civy trying to make sense of all of this:

1.   Is there a difference between the role of CIMIC and the role of Intelligence personnel in peacemaking operations, and if so, can one draw a clear line to separate the two roles, or is it more of a transition zone?
2.   Are Public Relations officers used in a CIMIC capacity in international operations, or do they strictly deal with the Canadian public?

Actually, perhaps a better question than the above two would simply be to ask who (trade-wise) delivers the CIMIC capability?

 

[bossi]

1.   Is there a difference between the role of CIMIC and the role of Intelligence personnel in peacemaking operations, and if so, can one draw a clear line to separate the two roles, or is it more of a transition zone?

1.A. Yes - there is a significant difference between CIMIC and Military Intelligence.   If you picture a Venn diagram, there is a small overlap between the two circles - however, the remainder of the two circles is much larger than the overlap.  Military Intelligence oversees the collection of information from many different sources (e.g. patrols, UAVs, satellites, EW, HUMINT), collates and analyses it, and transforms it into "intelligence" (e.g. estimates of enemy capability and predictions of intent).  CIMIC, on the other hand, focusses on the civil-military environment vice the enemy (hopefully my attempt to explain the difference between the two won't draw howls of protest from the Int community ... okay guys?)

Thus, the interaction between the two is that CIMIC often hears information and passes it on to Int, who then incorporates this info into the overall Int picture.  However, CIMIC deals with a broader sphere of activities in the civil-military environment, just as Int deals with a broader spectrum of sources, information and military intelligence.

CIMIC are NOT "spooks", and the ability of CIMIC to interact openly with and be trusted by the civilian population hinges upon this fact.

2.   Are Public Relations officers used in a CIMIC capacity in international operations, or do they strictly deal with the Canadian public?

2.A.   Public Information Officers also have a different role from CIMIC - to use civlianised terminology, they work in "external and internal communications" which includes "media relations".   To highlight the difference, PIOs do not normally become directly involved in CIMIC tasks such as liaison with civilian government, NGOs, and the populace.   And, while CIMIC might talk to the media/journalists, they do so with the advice and assistance of PIOs.  They stay in their separate, parallel "lanes" (even though they do cross from time to time).

CIMIC and PIOs do work together (along with Intand PSYOPS among others), in the context of Information Operations.  However, it's another Venn diagram - some overlap, but much more non-overlapping activity.
Again, the ability of CIMIC to be trusted hinges on their credibility - they must NOT be perceived as Int "spooks", PSYOPS, etc.

And, on a technicality, PIOs could in theory be employed as CIMIC, as explained below ...

Actually, perhaps a better question than the above two would simply be to ask who (trade-wise) delivers the CIMIC capability?

A.   There is no specific military trade for CIMIC.   Operators are primarily selected from the reserves, and can be any MOC (Military Occupation Code) as long as they've got the necessary soldier skills and appropriate people skills.   Sometimes Regular Force personnel are employed in CIMIC, too, in order to ensure that a destructive "us and them" situation doesn't evolve.

One aspect of this selection process is that civilian skillsets are considered - reservists normally have a civilian career in addition to their military experience - thus, it's "two for the price of one" - some of the CIMIC operators I've worked with included a P Eng, RN's, a workplace health and safety inspector, a banker with a Master's degree in law, a master's degree in communications, journalists, and others ...

CIMIC personnel can also be selected for their language skills - it really helps if you can, or at least try to speak a local language ... which most often is NOT English or French.  On one occasion in Kabul, a local mayor commented that this was the first time he had met a Canadian and he said "... you're just like us ..." - it was a treat to watch his jaw drop when the soldier replied in Farsi "Of course - what did you expect?"

Similarly, when going into a specific theatre of operations, CIMIC selection criteria can vary according to local cultural influence (e.g. in Afghanistan, facial hair is the norm for much of the civilian population - on one occasion, a taxi pulled up alongside a patrol and gave the "thumbs up" to a magnificent moustache ... chuckle!)  Sure - it may sound like a small thing, but ... when your bread and butter is to build and improve relationships with the local population ... it's the little things that count.  It's difficult to win hearts and minds if you're perceived as a barbarian ...

 

[RDA]

Thank you bossi for taking the time to answer my questions in such a clear and comprehensive manner!  

I just have a few follow up questions:

Public Information Officers [...] stay in their separate, parallel "lanes" (even though they do cross from time to time).

I presume Public Information Officers drive down a relatively narrow lane, and are expected to stick to the "official party line" in their communications.   I am wondering if the CIMIC lane is a little wider, i.e. are they given a little more room to manoeuvre so that they can be more effective in gaining support from the local leaders in day-to-day negotiations?   (Please feel free to opt-out of answering this question if you don't feel comfortable doing so.)

[CIMIC] operators are primarily selected from the reserves [...] sometimes Regular Force personnel are employed in CIMIC, too, in order to ensure that a destructive "us and them" situation doesn't evolve.

Does "us and them" reffer to the "reserves and regulars" or to the "locals and foreign troops"?

On one occasion in Kabul, a local mayor commented that this was the first time he had met a Canadian and he said "... you're just like us ..." - it was a treat to watch his jaw drop when the soldier replied in Farsi "Of course - what did you expect?"

No question here.   I just think that is a great anecdote... thanks for sharing!

Similarly, when going into a specific theatre of operations, CIMIC selection criteria can vary according to local cultural influence (e.g. in Afghanistan, facial hair is the norm for much of the civilian population - on one occasion, a taxi pulled up alongside a patrol and gave the "thumbs up" to a magnificent moustache ... chuckle!)  

Do you have any pictures of your moustache for us?  

Sure - it may sound like a small thing, but ... when your bread and butter is to build and improve relationships with the local population ... it's the little things that count.   It's difficult to win hearts and minds if you're perceived as a barbarian ...

Do CIMIC troops carry rifles?   I'm not saying I think they should or shouldn't, I'm just curious to know if they are charged with their own security or if that responsibility falls on a different group, for the sake of public perception?   (You'll have to forgive me if I am butchering the military lingo...)

 

[bossi]

I presume Public Information Officers drive down a relatively narrow lane, and are expected to stick to the "official party line" in their communications.   I am wondering if the CIMIC lane is a little wider, i.e. are they given a little more room to manoeuvre so that they can be more effective in gaining support from the local leaders in day-to-day negotiations?   (Please feel free to opt-out of answering this question if you don't feel comfortable doing so.)

To a certain degree, "the official party line" for CIMIC and PIO can sometimes be the same, or be "apples and anvils" (i.e. very different).   CIMIC depend on credibility and honesty in order to build trust, but so do PIOs.
And, using the example of Afghanistan where verbal agreements can become binding contracts under local religious law ... honesty is the best policy, and the CIMIC Golden Role remains "Make No Promises" (especially ones you can't keep ...).

Does "us and them" reffer to the "reserves and regulars" or to the "locals and foreign troops"?

When I wrote my reply, it was the former (i.e. Canadian Army reservists and regulars).
In the context of Canadian troops dealing with foreign civilians, reservist CIMIC troops have the option of being able to say "... back home I'm a ... (insert civilian occupation here)" - depending on the situation, this can help build relationships, empathy and credibility (e.g. visiting a school construction site with Norwegian CIMIC, it was extremely useful when negotiating with the local contractor ... especially when you could say "... when I build windows back home ..." - the contractor knew he couldn't pull the wool over our eyes, and had to putty the windows ... there might even be some photo's in the link below ...).

No question here.   I just think that is a great anecdote... thanks for sharing!

Do you have any pictures of your moustache for us?

You're welcome, and as Jim Durante would say "I've got a million of them"
(click here to see for yourself)

Do CIMIC troops carry rifles?   I'm not saying I think they should or shouldn't, I'm just curious to know if they are charged with their own security or if that responsibility falls on a different group, for the sake of public perception?   (You'll have to forgive me if I am butchering the military lingo...)

First and foremost, CIMIC troops remain soldiers - so, yes - they carry weapons (we carried both rifles and pistols, so that even at the negotiating table our pistols remained close at hand).   In the context of Afghanistan, we deliberately wanted to cultivate the "public perception" that it would be a very bad idea to attack well-armed, well-trained CIMIC troops ...

When the threat level is lower (e.g. when I visited Bosnia) some NGOs/IOs such as the Red Cross might object to overt displays of weapons in their meetings (but luckily our pistols fit into pockets) - in Afghanistan, however, nobody asked us to disarm ... ever.

Also, depending on the "threat level", there might also be additional troops assigned to escort CIMIC - it's very situational dependent (hope that doesn't sound like a "cop out" answer, but it's a simple fact).

 

[RDA]

Once again bossi, thank you for the very informative response.   Fascinating stuff!!  

Great pictures...   The "Welcome to Kabul" pic belongs in a regional geography textbook.
I also enjoyed the possum lodge... and yes, that is indeed a magnificent moustache!

Take care!


P.S. "I'm a man... But I can change... If I have to... I guess."

 

[bossi]

... and yes, that is indeed a magnificent moustache!

"if the women don't find you handsome, they should at least find you handy"

Quando Omni Flunkus Moritati

 

[Spr.Earl]

Thank's PBI and bossi for your answer's they are most welcome.
It's cleared up a few question's but here are some more.

But why is CIMIC limited to Sgt. and above?

As for me I'm a M/Cpl with 28yrs plus as a Field Eng.,also I'm a Marine Engineer on Civie St. but can't get into CIMIC because of my Rank ???

I think CIMIC should except on experience and qualifications on Civie St. and Military regardless of rank.

What are your thoughts on this?

 

[bossi]

But why is CIMIC limited to Sgt. and above?

As for me I'm a M/Cpl with 28yrs plus as a Field Eng.,also I'm a Marine Engineer on Civie St. but can't get into CIMIC because of my Rank ???

I think CIMIC should except on experience and qualifications on Civie St. and Military regardless of rank.

What are your thoughts on this?

Initially CIMIC was restricted to Sgts and above to try and ensure a certain degree of maturity, plus enough military training/experience/time in (so that CIMIC operators weren't "wet behind the ears").

Also, keep in mind that CIMIC often has to deal with civilian bureaucrats - and, one of the more universal personality traits of BUREAUCRATS is that they can be very rank conscious, in a petty way (i.e. sometimes they feel snubbed if the military representative isn't a high enough rank ... but, don't get me started ...)

As with anything, "rules are only guidelines" and there are exceptions to every rule ...
Based on your quick description of your background, you'd be a good candidate for making an exception to the rank rule (except, of course, for the fact that we already KNOW you from here ... JUST KIDDING!)

 

[ArmyRick]

I am a trained CIMIC operator and I never served a minute with LFCA CIMIC. I was fired in last minute for roto 13 bosnia.
Having said that here is WHAT CIMIC DOES and DOES NOT DO (Sorry far too many post and I have not read them all).
(1) Provide a civil military liasion in SUPPORT of the commanders mission (everything we must do must benefit the BG/contingent)
(2) Provide commanders with detailed local and area assessments (every bit of info concerning civil defence, infrastructure, religion, history, economy, ethnic breakdown, etc whatever makes the town tick)
(3) Facilitate projects IF they will  benefit the CF by raising popularity for our troops (psy ops stuff).
(4) Co-ordinate and link up with local governments, NGOs and IOs to find out who is doing what and where. They also look for where areas need the most help.
(5) Advise commanders on civil military relation issues based on their knowledge of the local area.

YES we are armed (most CIMIC is combat arms and they are best suited for the role)
NO we are not supposed to hand out teddy bears and bicycles
YES we work for the Coy/BG/contingent commander
NO our primary role is not to build nice things for the local people, it is much better to facilitate projects.

YES proper NATO CIMIC doctrine in the CF is new (we have had CIMIC around for years but not properly trained or employed)

NGO and IO are much better at re-building and handing out humanitarian aid. Armed troops are for security, peace implementation (getting the beligerents to behave according to conventions, accords, etc), gathering information.
We have wasted alot of money on FAILED projects in Bosnia (including ones where CF troops think they have succeeded but they don't realize the truth).
By the way, the NSE CIMIC on roto 13 paladium was not authorized and did operations that violated the BG (RCD) comd's AOR. This is an example of CF meaning well but causing harm.
WE MUST BEWARE of what the results of our actions will be.

 

[pbi]

WE MUST BEWARE of what the results of our actions will be.

Excellent point. Sometimes our well-meant Canadian intentions can cause problems, especially if they do not support the commander's intent for the mission, or fit into the local situation. In many of these locations we need to be careful about manging expectations. Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

Excellent thread.  Thanks for the good explanation, I must admit I was in the dark about how CIMIC fit into the big picture, thanks for filling us in Mark.

 

[bossi]

Glad to see LGen MacKenzie quoted again:

Admiral: Forces not in position to add recruits
Military needs new equipment, facilities, to boost full-time numbers by 5,000 people
By TERRY PEDWELL / The Canadian Press - Tuesday, December 7, 2004, The Halifax Herald Limited

OTTAWA - The military doesn't have the resources to deal with thousands of extra recruits due to join its ranks, says the second-in-command of Canada's armed forces.

"At the moment, no," Vice-Admiral Ron Buck told the Senate defence committee Monday when asked if the Canadian Forces has the facilities to house, train and equip another 5,000 troops.

Prime Minister Paul Martin promised during the spring election campaign to boost the military's ranks by 8,000 members, including 5,000 full-time soldiers and 3,000 reservists.

He also promised up to $3 billion over five years to enhance Canada's international stature, with most of the money going to defence.

Buck said any move aimed at increasing troop strength would have to include more spending.

"Any proposals to move forward for the 5,000 from our perspective include a resourcing element," he said.

"In other words, there is a bill that clearly needs to be paid in terms of personnel, equipment, training and housing."

The Liberals have maintained they want the military to concentrate on peacekeeping and nation-building initiatives to help failed states.

That's expected to be a focus of a new defence policy paper that has been in the works for months.

But Lewis Mackenzie, a retired general who commanded troops in some of the world's most dangerous places, warned that peacekeepers still need proper training and equipment to perform their duties.

Post-Cold War governments in Canada have pushed peacekeeping "because it was cheap," he told the committee.

Mackenzie said there's a public perception that peacekeeping is somehow less expensive, and even less dangerous, than combat.

"In actual fact, in most of the missions we've been in, the potential was there to have to fight your way out," he said.

He cited provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, being proposed for Afghanistan as a perfect example of the need to properly equip soldiers.

"If we send a modest force to protect (the PRT) . . . then we had better have a guarantee from ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan that they have the capability to rescue those people when a warlord really gets angry with them and decides to take them out."

Buck also told the committee that Canada needs to maintain its sovereignty in the North.

He suggested the Martin government consider increasing funding in a number of areas to enhance surveillance by air and sea.

"Ultimately, there probably would be a need for greater deployability in the Arctic," he added.

That would mean buying or leasing larger aircraft to move equipment long distances, something the Liberals have frowned on when it comes to defence spending.

 

[bossi]

Since this topic "strayed" slightly ...
(but, then again - the whole point was that peacemaking is very dangerous ...)

Here's an article I noticed today - the US Army counterpart of CIMIC is Civil Affairs (which is part of CAPOC - Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command - which, in turn, is part of SOCOM - Special Operations Command) - I only point this out in order to emphasize the importance the US Army has placed upon Civil Affairs (i.e. because I wish CERTAIN people in the Canadian Army would do so, too ...)

This story is particularly poignant for me, as I can remember "pulling the short straw" for CIMIC security details, too ...

http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/TorontoSun/News/2004/12/10/775915.html

News from a new front
U.S. SOLDIER WRITES FROM IRAQ, WHERE POLITICS HAVE NO MEANING, MARK BONOKOSKI DISCOVERS

By Mark Bonokoski - Toronto Sun, Fri, December 10, 2004

As American military deserter Jeremy Hinzman was presenting his case for asylum in Canada as a refugee, claiming the war in Iraq is an illegal war, retired Toronto cop Jim Kelly -- a Vietnam vet -- received a letter written by a soldier he had met years back while visiting an old Green Beret friend at Camp Drum in upper New York State. That soldier -- Major Brian Perazone -- is today serving as commander of the 43rd Civil Affairs Battalion in Iraq.

And this is what he wrote.

---

"We had an event here today at Camp Mancini, Baghdad, a little ceremony for one of our soldiers who was going home.

"Sgt. Bryan Freeman was leaving the unit, returning to his family and his hometown. He wasn't going to have to come back to Iraq, he won't have to deploy again, he won't have to leave his family and friends again.

"No one in this company wanted to see him go. They all said they would miss him. But they knew his family wanted him home. Not many soldiers get to go home this early in their tour. It takes special circumstances to go home.

"Sgt. Freeman didn't want to go home early. But he had to.

"You stand there and wonder. What would you do under the same circumstances? What would your family feel? How would they react? You can almost visualize the whole family being there waiting for you to come off the plane. The tears, the hugs. All of your family and friends know you are coming home. Will they be there to greet you? What will they say? What will they do?

"It will seem surreal, coming home from combat, not being able to explain what happened? Why you are back so soon? Will your buddies wonder? Will people talk? You want to tell them, you want them to understand. You wish you could explain it but you can't. There is no way to communicate.

GUNNED DOWN

"You see, Sgt. Freeman was killed in action last week by an Iraqi insurgent.

"He was pulling security while out on a mission and he was gunned down by some insurgent whom they never caught. Sgt. Freeman was a member of the U.S. Army's 443rd Civil Affairs Battalion. He was killed doing his duty. He was the third CA soldier killed in action from our rotation.

"Did he think about getting killed? I don't know but at some point we all do. But it won't stop us from doing our jobs.

"Will you read about this in the papers? Probably not, because an Iraqi wasn't abused or treated unfairly. You won't hear about Sgt. Freeman being treated unfairly by having his life and family taken from him at the age of 31.

"Where are the press, the war protesters, the opposition? Why don't they say anything? Oh, they talk about the war 'losses' and make political statements with 1,000 cardboard caskets in some park. Some peace-protester wonk will be interviewed by some talking head and they will speak in sombre tones of the 'tragic loss due to the misguided policies of the president' -- with emphasis on 'president.' But they do that for a political agenda, not because of some deeply profound respect for a soldier or soldiers who have done their duty and paid the ultimate price.

"Ask them if they know anything about the soldier. They will likely say no -- just that they died for some 'bankrupt U.S. foreign policy for oil.'

"Why don't they know who the soldier was? It's because they don't care. The soldier's death just furthers their agenda.

"Where are the protesters complaining about the government not having enough body armour for soldiers in combat? What about the inadequate number of up-armored vehicles? What about the shortages in parts and munitions?

"Where is the zealous pursuit of the truth in these matters by Tim Robbins, Dan Rather, and Alec Baldwin?

STOP THE TORTURE

"Always remember, when you hear of bad things being done to people throughout the world, it is the 19-year-old private, the 31-year-old father of three -- the soldiers -- who go out and stop the torture, the rape of a nation, the mutilation of living people, the destruction of a race or culture.

"It is not the press, the protesters and the critics. It is not Michael Moore or the Hollywood elite. Hope all is well, take care and be safe."

 

[ArmyRick]

Sgt. Bryan Freeman RIP.

 

[bossi]

Along the same lines as Lew MacKenzie's original point (i.e. peacemaking is a dangerous business, and we shouldn't be lulled into complacency vis-a-vis mistakenly thinking peackeeping is the be all and end all ...).

Here are a couple of articles on aid workers in nominally non-permissive environments, where they too have naively succumbed to the siren call of "warm and fuzzy" at the expense of situational awareness which could cost their lives ...

Also, once again the old saw surfaces about how the military shouldn't partake in humanitairan assistance ... which is tantamount to being "in denial" vis-a-vis these aid organisations shrilly decrying the military ... while at the same time bemoaning the fact that they're unable to operate in a hostile environment ... (which brings us right back to the military solution ... funny about that, eh?)

Also, as an aside - you'll note the author of the second article seems to be in this for profit ... which brings us back to another important point:  It's only natural that aid organisations are going to decry military involvement in humanitarian assistance - after all, it's a thriving industry when you remember that the overwhelming majority of monies donated by the public ends up being consumed by "administrative overhead" (... which includes salaries ... and it's only human nature to react when one's rice bowl is threatened ...)

http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/12/19/news/afghan.html

Aid groups in Afghanistan feel they are under siege
By Carlotta Gall and Amy Waldman The New York Times, Monday, December 20, 2004


KABUL During the Soviet occupation, the civil war that followed, the rule of the Taliban and its aftermath, aid groups like CARE and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan filled the gaps where a state had once been, providing education, health care and jobs to Afghans at home and in exile.

Today, as Afghanistan struggles to rebuild, the groups continue to support schools and clinics, provide clean drinking water and more, often carrying out projects for a government without the capacity to do so itself.

But many of the groups say they feel besieged as perhaps never before.

They cannot reach parts of the country because of security threats. They are being blamed by many Afghans for the slow pace of reconstruction. They are accused of squandering funds on expensive cars and homes, and high salaries. They are being confused with soldiers and private security contractors who carry weapons but wear civilian clothes. And they are being held accountable for the actions, or lack thereof, of numerous fly-by-night aid organizations seeking to cash in on Afghanistan's rebuilding.

There are now 335 international nongovernment organizations and 2,300 Afghan groups registered with the Ministry of Planning, whose outgoing chief, Ramazan Bachardoust, has led a personal crusade against the organizations. Recently, he announced that 1,935 of those groups would be dissolved for failing to work according to the law, causing alarm among international and Afghan employees, and embarrassing President Hamid Karzai, whose press spokesman played down the announcement as the minister's personal proposal. Bachardoust resigned Monday over the affair.

His announcement was the latest in a series of verbal attacks he has made against the aid groups in the eight months he has been minister. In one meeting with the groups he even suggested that they were as bad for the country as Al Qaeda.

"The majority of Afghan people hate the nongovernment organizations - they think they are all rubbish," he said in an interview in September.

Soon afterward, a mob attacked the offices of two aid groups in the northern city of Faizabad because of the suspected sexual assault of female workers, whose employment by aid groups is already a sensitive issue for many Afghans. Bachardoust told Agence France-Presse that such attacks on aid organizations in Afghanistan are "inevitable" because they are wasting money that should be spent for Afghans.

The aid groups say such talk is not only unfair, but may be encouraging attacks on them. At least 26 aid workers have been killed this year. A French group, Doctors Without Borders, withdrew from the country in July after 24 years here mainly because it said the government had done too little to bring to justice the killers of five of its workers. Aid workers said the failure to arrest or even name the killers, whose identity was widely known, sent a message that such attacks could be mounted with impunity.

In September, after the government dismissed Ismail Khan, the powerful governor of the western province of Herat, a move supported by the United Nations, a mob looted and burned 15 offices of United Nations and other agencies in the city of Herat. After the presidential elections Oct. 9, which were sponsored by the United Nations, three foreign election workers were kidnapped and held for three weeks by a Taliban splinter group.

Aid groups say Karzai has sent mixed messages, pledging support for "good" aid groups - and condemning the recent violence against them - but also allowing Bachardoust free rein. Some aid groups privately wonder whether the government sees in them a convenient diversion from its own reconstruction failures.

In Kabul, many Afghans see a mismatch between the numbers of foreigners and the resources available to them, and the results. The capital is packed with expatriates who work for aid groups as well as the United Nations and private contractors.

But this summer the city often had electricity only eight hours a day. It continues to suffer from a lack of hospital beds, sewage facilities, clean water and housing.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1220/p09s01-coop.htm

Security for aid workers - a missing link
By Edward Girardet

KABUL - The release last month of three kidnapped United Nations election monitors in Afghanistan does not mean that all is well for the international aid community operating in conflict and recovery situations worldwide. Nothing has really changed on the security front for aid workers.

Particularly in Kabul, many feared that the hostages would suffer the same gruesome fate as those executed by extremists in Iraq. This, in turn, might have prompted more aid agencies to leave Afghanistan just when the recovery is beginning to make headway.

Once again, the incident underlines how both the international aid community and governments are failing to grapple with the real issues at hand in "security" zones ranging from Afghanistan to Chechnya and Burma. Aid agencies need to begin providing appropriate security training for their representatives, but also better awareness of the situations in which they will operate.

And governments must recognize the urgency of establishing broadly recognized - neutral - "humanitarian spheres" without the involvement of the military in areas where where aid agencies can operate without fear of their workers being kidnapped or killed.

Key to protecting aid workers is the clear demarcation of the roles of the military and the aid organizations. Guns and humanitarian assistance simply do not go together. There is a dangerous blurring of the lines placing aid workers, private consultants - as well as journalists - in the same caldron as the security forces. For resistance or insurgent groups, there is increasingly little difference between the military, including government-employed mercenary groups, and the highly vulnerable relief volunteers or reporters operating in the same crisis zones. All are seen as legitimate targets.

The failure, too, of the UN to recognize the dangers of disregarding the Geneva Conventions or due process under international law - such as the illegal detention, treatment, torture, and deaths of alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners held at Guantánamo and Bagram - has set a disastrous precedent not only for soldiers captured by insurgents, but for civilians too. Militants have cited such abuse as reason for capturing or killing aid workers.

While the military may obtain good public relations by building bridges or schools, such initiatives double as intelligence-gathering operations. This makes the waters even murkier for those seeking to provide straightforward humanitarian assistance. For the taxpayer, too, military involvement in humanitarian aid makes little financial sense. The cost of deploying so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams is dramatically higher than having qualified aid agencies or contractors perform the same task.

At the same time, aid organizations, notably those run by the UN, urgently need to assume responsibility for improving workers' safety in the field. Frontline aid has become far more hazardous to operate in crisis zones today than during the '80s or '90s.

Whether in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia, aid groups are indeed stepping up security measures to protect workers. Employees are urged not to frequent exposed locations such as restaurants and markets, and to stay in well-protected compounds. Some, too, have had their vehicles repainted to look less obviously foreign.

Such measures remain deceptively cosmetic. They threaten to dangerously isolate aid workers from the very populations they aim to assist. Keeping in touch with one's surroundings is crucial for security. The US aid missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have almost completely cut themselves off, blockading themselves within compounds. Many leave only with heavily armed escorts.

The disturbing reality is that few humanitarian agencies have bothered to initiate even the most basic security awareness programs for staff prior to missions. Some deliberately subcontract dangerous jobs to consultants to avoid liability. Instead, aid organizations increasingly rely on security companies for employee protection.

Some risk specialists have long maintained that physical protection isn't enough. Aid groups, they argue, should refuse to send anyone into the field until they have received proper security training, including background political and cultural briefings enabling them to better understand their environments.

Too often, aid workers are sent out shockingly ignorant. Most get little more than 30-minute security briefings on arrival. Even though regularly updated by security advisers, few are taught how to cope with the hijackings, armed assaults, and abductions that they face in crisis zones. Sometimes the organizations concerned have covered up the lives lost as a direct result of negligence. Donors, too, have yet to make security awareness a funding prerequisite.

One of the few major agencies to take such matters seriously is the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Swiss humanitarian organization is well known for its mandatory two-week awareness courses. Disguised Swiss soldiers put candidates through highly realistic simulated guerrilla attacks. ICRC officials maintain that such training has probably saved the lives of numerous workers, despite horrendous attacks against its personnel in recent years. Also, as part of their insurance coverage, international journalists are having to undergo similar training prior to leaving for war zones.

The face of international aid is changing rapidly for the worse. Not only are security risks greater, but some governments are deliberately coercing aid groups by requiring them to come under military command in return for funding. If agencies are to perform their humanitarian duties properly, they must remove themselves from the political or military fray. In turn, donors need to accept that agencies aren't there to replace failed policies, but to provide humanitarian or recovery assistance where it's needed most.

"¢ Edward Girardet is a writer on humanitarian, conflict, and recovery issues. He is also editor of the Crosslines Essential Field Guide to Afghanistan.