I'll believe it when I see it.
What a fucking clown show.New Brewster article re procurement of the replacement LUVW.
I am Old enough to remember one of the first things Paul Martin did on becoming P.M. was move publically and quickly to advance the SeaKing replacement. Perhaps a new P.M. will focus some PMO attention on this file to set a tone.New Brewster article re procurement of the replacement LUVW.
It’s been like this for a while now despite having one of the most entitled corrupt governments ever.New Brewster article re procurement of the replacement LUVW.
Yes, yes it is. Indefensible really.What a fucking clown show.
In more ways than one…Indefensible
And host about 7 million meetings etc, all the while really doing nothing!No, but we are prepared to send a lot of people over ill equipped to make it look like we are...
I wonder what we would do differently if we were at war and needed to procure stuff right now. And I wonder how much of that could be done right now.
That would invoke the Urgent Operational Requirement process. It’s been used recently for Latvia and was used extensively in Afghanistan. Problem is that while it shortcuts procurement bureaucracy, we would still be at the mercy of immediately available or urgently expandable production.I wonder what we would do differently if we were at war and needed to procure stuff right now. And I wonder how much of that could be done right now.
- Modernize procurement practices so that they are simpler, less administratively burdensome, deploy modern comptrollership, and include practices that support our economic policy goals, including green and social procurement.
- Lead, with the support of the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, in bringing forward analyses and options for the creation of Defence Procurement Canada, to ensure that Canada’s biggest and most complex National Defence and Canadian Coast Guard procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency to Parliament. This priority is to be developed concurrently with ongoing procurement projects and existing timelines.
- Support the Minister of Public Services and Procurement to bring forward analyses and options for the creation of Defence Procurement Canada, to ensure that Canada’s biggest and most complex National Defence and Canadian Coast Guard procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency to Parliament. This priority is to be developed concurrently with ongoing procurement projects and existing timelines.
- Continue the modernization of procurement practices so they support Canada’s economic policy goals, including balanced procurement opportunities with Canada’s trading partners, provide value for money, are open and transparent and require suppliers of goods and services to apply the highest ethical and sustainability standards across their supply chains.
There are multiple compounding problems. The fact that DND cannot spend on schedule is a major factor to spending below budget, but setting the budget well below NATO targets is a much bigger factor in not meeting NATO commitments. Both of those things contribute to CAF not getting (or getting less than) what it needs.%GDP is moot point when we have a hard time procuring trucks
UOR don’t short-cut the process. They just jump to the front of the line for access to all the same decision boards & panels (effectively delaying other projects that were on track for those boards & panels).That would invoke the Urgent Operational Requirement process. It’s been used recently for Latvia and was used extensively in Afghanistan. Problem is that while it shortcuts procurement bureaucracy, we would still be at the mercy of immediately available or urgently expandable production.
There are multiple compounding problems. The fact that DND cannot spend on schedule is a major factor to spending below budget, but setting the budget well below NATO targets is a much bigger factor in not meeting NATO commitments. Both of those things contribute to CAF not getting (or getting less than) what it needs.
Most projects set initial scope quantities below CAF requirements to fit inside forecasted funding. The government can decide to fix that now.
UOR don’t short-cut the process. They just jump to the front of the line for access to all the same decision boards & panels (effectively delaying other projects that were on track for those boards & panels).
Defence Officials game the systems because, and I mean to disrespect, they are largely amateurs in their position temporarily desperately trying to avoid being saddled with one of our litany of procurement blunders. All of this starts the spiral of oversight until we’ve wasted 13 years, and 4 posting cycles, to buy a truck with some armour on it.New Brewster article re procurement of the replacement LUVW.
Exactly. Nor do they provide a step forward in the development of doctrine or the configuration of the CAF as a whole. They merely provide a quick solution to a specific operational need limited in both scope of acquisition and employment and limited in time and support.UOR don’t short-cut the process. They just jump to the front of the line for access to all the same decision boards & panels (effectively delaying other projects that were on track for those boards & panels).
why does the UOR have to be limited? Seems very stupid to do everything twice if we get around to it. If we have an UOR for a capability either because we have let it atrophy or just dont have it then its urgent right versus replacing things on a somewhat regular rate. Is it because everything is urgent?Exactly. Nor do they provide a step forward in the development of doctrine or the configuration of the CAF as a whole. They merely provide a quick solution to a specific operational need limited in both scope of acquisition and employment and limited in time and support.
It exacerbates the overarching problem that the procurement system does not equip the entire army as a whole but just that part that is currently operationally deployed with a minimal amount of additional equipment for training and a small holding of spares.
Officers who have no sense of the time value of money who propose solutions that are unaffordable that spend multiple years circling the drain can step forward.Defence Officials game the systems because, and I mean to disrespect, they are largely amateurs in their position temporarily desperately trying to avoid being saddled with one of our litany of procurement blunders. All of this starts the spiral of oversight until we’ve wasted 13 years, and 4 posting cycles, to buy a truck with some armour on it.
PSPC established, a year or so, an ADM to review defence procurement.It's interesting really. If you follow the Prime Minister's Mandate Letters to the Minister of national Defence, you will find no specific references to overhauling the procurement system in 2015 but you have this for the Minster of Public Services and Procurement:
That's repeated in the MPSP letter of 2016.
Then in 2019 you get this for the MPSP
and this for the MND
That disappears for both in the January 2021 mandates as Covid and equity seems to gather steam in priorities
Then in the 2021 reshuffle, the December 2021 mandate letters contain this
And this for Anand
The Anand letter has not been updated for Blair.
It doesn't take much reading between the lines that for a brief magical moment in 2019 someone realized that Defence Procurement Canada was a shit show and decided that an specific defence procurement agency was called for but that by 2021, Public Services had put paid to an initiative that would undermine their own fiefdom.
Maybe I'm reading too much into the mandate letters but since they specify overarching government priorities they can't be ignored. There certainly is a so-called Defence Procurement Strategy at work in the government departments but they continue to lag in the detailed planning of improvement. See: