I'll believe it when I see it.
Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending
- Thread starter Maxman1
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10 maybe 15 years ago, I would have agreed with you but I have seen the quality (and quantity) of training go consistently down. Part of it is due to amalgamation that forced people to lose the depth of training they would get in one trade and instead get a surface level understanding of 2 or more trades. Part of it is the declining standards every time the government finds itself short of bodies, which has been the case for most of the last 20 years. Part of it is the unavailability of advanced course that used to be common place.
Most of it is because we can't seem to get out of our own way. No matter how many times they say they want to fll the schools with the best of the best, you still see them resemble the island of the misfit toys because "operation are more important" even if the operation is really just getting aircraft ready for PPF.
Another issue we are running into in the RCAF is businesses restricting their IP from the RCAF and poorly written training/support contracts. Important information is withheld because they aren't required to give it by the contract. It lowers a students understanding of the system and increases the time it takes to fix aircraft. In some cases, that lack of understanding of the system can have dangerous consequences.
We also have a massive drain of experience. The people who were highly trained are all nearing retirement age and that's the ones that stayed. The ones that replace dont have the depth of knowledge or the opportunities to learn their trades thatbused to. We get repeated flight safeties that includes some version of the words "the technician had only down job once before and that was 5 years ago". A lack of expertise is a documented fact in the RCAF.
Finally, and apologize for the long response, I have seen far too many examples of the CAF assembling a group of experts, asking their opinions and then doing whatever the hell they were going to do anyway. When your experts tell you something is wrong listen to them even if, especially if, it contradicts your plan. If your experts tell you people are showing up to the units ill prepared don't cut more of their training in an attempt to get them to the units faster. If people tell your simulator doesn't give the same value as live training don't shrug and say its cheaper. I could probably list examples all day and I'm sure most of you can think of your own.
To sum up. I have seen our level of training fall and the level of skill compared to our peers fall. I no longer think we are the best trained military in the world despite heroic efforts by some people in the training system. I do agree that we tinker far too much. Whether it is training troops or a change of command it seems like it is the first time we have ever done it, every time.
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Defence, sovereignty & modern threats
This doesn't help, but he is a Diplomate and being diplomatic.
CAREFUL DIPLOMACY ABOUT CANADA’S DEFENCE DEFICIENCIES
- National Post - 21 Jul 2023 - JOHN IVISON Comment
When David Cohen talks about Canada’s defence spending, it brings to mind Edmund Burke’s comments about prudence in diplomacy; that diplomats employ “an economy of truth ... a sort of temperance by which a man can speak truth with measure that he may speak it longer.”
Washington’s man in Ottawa speaks the truth but clearly considers it counterproductive to tell the whole truth.
Defence is the top of the agenda in the Canada-US relationship. But Cohen says he does not see it as his job to join the chorus of criticism that claims lack of spending over many years has turned the Canadian Armed Forces into a hollow shell.
“Every country makes its own assessment and it is not my role to substitute my assessment for the Canadian government’s judgment,” the U.S. ambassador said in an interview with National Post. Cohen even professes a level of optimism that few outside Liberal circles would voice.
He said too much emphasis has been placed on the military-spending target of two per cent of GDP that Justin Trudeau reaffirmed at the NATO summit in Lithuania last week — an objective that would require billions of dollars more than are currently allocated.
“I have said that you can’t measure the adequacy of defence by any single metric ... I want to tie investment to the projected threat level, not a budgetary process,” he said.
That doesn’t mean he thinks Canada is necessarily prepared for what he calls “21st century threats.”
“I don’t think Canada is where it wants to be and it certainly is not at two per cent (of GDP),” he said.
But he said he is not worried. “When I look at the other metrics and other ways of measuring the Canadian commitment to defence, I am comforted.” He said in the 18 months he has been in Ottawa, the trajectory on military spending has been upward, with an additional $8 billion earmarked for the Forces in the last budget. He also pointed to the defence policy review that is underway and is likely to lead to more military spending.
Finally, he said there is the North American Aerospace Defence Command (Norad) modernization plan, released earlier this year, that he said “exceeded expectations.”
“Some people thought it would be a press release or a vague statement but it’s a plan underlined by a series of tactical spending commitments,” he said. “There were a couple of issues of concern related to the timing of expenditures, but we cleaned them up during the president’s visit (to Ottawa, in March) by putting more specific timelines on over-the-horizon radar and around infrastructure for Norad modernization.”
Under the plan, Canada has committed to spending $38.6 billion over two decades, paying for two of six Arctic radar installations, and funding infrastructure like hangars and runways to allow Canada’s F-35 fighter jets to operate in the Arctic.
Critics of Canada’s defence policy point out that past promises have fizzled because of lack of a firm timelines. Cohen said the agenda this time is specific so that big dollar items start becoming operational this decade, when the first F-35s are delivered, rather than at some undefined date in the 2030s.
“Canada’s military procurement has not always been as timely as the Canadian military would like it to be, and that’s why we are spending time working with a first-of-its-kind technical working group, to make sure Canada’s commitments are delivered in a timely fashion,” he said.
Contrary to the impression created by a Pentagon leak that “widespread defence shortfalls have hindered Canada’s capabilities, while straining partner relationships and alliance contributions,” Cohen said that “there is a full and enthusiastic, energized partnership.”
Canada’s exclusion from emerging alliances like the Quad (Australia, Japan, India and the U.S.) or AUKUS (Australia, U.K. and U.S.) does not mean Canada has become strategically irrelevant to Washington, U.S. officials say.
But zeal for the partnership was not enhanced when President Joe Biden visited Ottawa and Canada refused to lead a multinational force in Haiti, which has descended into criminal gang-dominated anarchy.
Cohen said that the U.S. was in favour of a multinational force to help stabilize the tortured Caribbean nation. The view in Washington is that the U.S. is stretched around the globe and it wants regional allies to share the burden.
“Canada’s response was that ‘we have concerns about a multinational force, we’re not sure they have a track record of working globally, or in Haiti in particular’,” he said.
That is an odd reaction from a government that was elected in 2015 on a promise to make Canada a great peacekeeper again. The Trudeau government’s solution was to commit to spending $100 million to improve the capacity of the Haitian police force.
Cohen’s interpretation of Canada’s refusal is generous. “It wasn’t because they don’t want to help or spend money. It’s about a very strong philosophy that, ultimately, a Haiti solution by Haitians has a greater chance of success.”
Recent United Nations concerns about famine in Haiti means that conversations are still alive, he said. “Haiti remains a work in process.”
Cohen said the U.S. hasn’t written off Canada as a partner in that exercise.
“Canada is a sovereign country and is allowed to have a difference of opinion and a difference of approach. It’s not something we get angry or resentful about,” he said.
But the simple truth is that even in its own backyard, Canada would have been hard-pressed to lead such a mission. The leaked Pentagon assessment suggested that Canada could not mount a major operation, while simultaneously maintaining its NATO battle group leadership in Latvia and providing aid to Ukraine.
That assessment said that even the Haitian government, which has requested direct assistance, is frustrated at Ottawa’s reluctance to lead a multinational security mission.
In 1996, Canada led a 750-member peacekeeping mission in Haiti, at the same time as it committed 1,000 troops to the former Yugoslavia to enforce the Dayton Accords. With a shortfall of an estimated 10,000 soldiers, the Canadian Army does not have the resources to sustain that feat again.
The land forces lack the capability to defend themselves against tanks, drones or aircraft. The Navy faces a shortfall of around 1,300 sailors; it lacks the frigates required to live up to its NATO and Indo-pacific strategy commitments; and its four Victoria-class submarines are 40 years old, and rarely at sea. Meanwhile, the Air Force’s CF-18 jets are also 40 years old and, despite being upgraded, are operationally obsolete.
The chief of the defence staff, Wayne Eyre, recently ordered all non-essential activities to cease, as the Forces attempt to reach a higher state of readiness. Yet the demands of the federal government for the military’s assistance in fighting any number of domestic troubles, including wildfires, show no signs of abating.
Canada’s conceited view of itself is not matched by its military resources.
There is clearly a great deal of exasperation in Washington about the tendency of successive Canadian governments to disappear to the washroom when the bill for collective security comes due.
But Cohen, a cautious lawyer by profession, does not see it as his role to bully the Trudeau government. “I’m a glass half-full kind of guy. I do believe in civility and am optimistic that if you treat people well, and make your case in a compelling fashion, then in the end, things will work out.”
markppcli
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We absolutely do not have the best trained personnel. We graduate artillery men off DP 1 without them being qualified on a howitzer. We’re grossly out of shape, fitness is training, and are starting to get people to Bns from schools that are obese… after DP1. We don’t shoot often, our training simulators are so dated it’s not even funny. We focus heavily on collective training at the expense of individual training, and that collective training is often a high enough level that the audience is maybe 10 percent of the participants at best. The rest just go through motions. We are certainly better than some, but best trained ? Not at al.
Fabius
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To add on this, for a variety of reasons to include retention, promotion rates and the gutting and constant churn in what courses are delivered when and with what content; the CA NCO corps is a shadow of its former self.
Overall technical expertise and experience levels have nose dived and there needs to be some serious introspection on how we are going to fix it.
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Skirts, long multihued hair etc!
Offer a real trades training system like "Boy Soldiers".
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Meh, by the time they finish training (given how slow we are) they'll probably be 21 anyways
quadrapiper
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Still, how long does it take to go from attested to DP1, perhaps with a few other standalone courses?
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We need to figure out and standardize what the hell "DP1" is first.
I have worked long enough in the Trg system to know we don't have the first fucking clue. There Isa massivr cognitive dissonance within the CAF, a d its usually between a training system feeling "well you will learn in more detail once you're at your unit" is an OFP, and the Field Force feeling "It's Day One at the unit, you can be fully integrated into operations" is OFP.
The answer is somewhere on the middle, but CMP (CFRG & CDA) and the L1 HQs set the tempo for training duration; while the Field Force (usually L3 and below) also claim they do t have time to train folks on the job and that it's the Training system that needs to produce a better product.
Until there is more give and take, we run I to the same log jam: "train better candidates, but don't make training longer, but also don't expect it to happen at Bn...."
Haggis
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Years ago I was a member of the writing board for the NCM GS. Two of the overarching goals were to reduce training time and redundancies. When the Environmental Chiefs asked their schools what could be cut to reduce training time, the answer was "nothing". Every topic was important to the environments. So, we asked what content could be moved from the environmental schools to CFLRS. Again, the answer was "nothing". They didn't trust CFLRS to do it right so they wanted to do it over. We asked CFLRS what they could cut or push to the environments and, again, the answer was "nothing". In fact, the Cmdt at the time was adding training to BMQ without having done a training needs analysis.
It was a long and frustrating exercise.
WLSC
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I fell your pain. I did part of the new NCMGS and the switch to competencies. Some TDO were on board, most not, some element wanted a check in the box kinda course, other more solide courses most did not understand that what they were searching was well inside their authorities. And some even wanted their Mcpl level to be formally train as full fledge mentor... The beer was so good at the end of the day.
CypressSplit
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Canada’s miserly defence spending is increasingly embarrassing
Even after the invasion of Ukraine, the country doles out just 1.22% of GDP
Good article in the Economist. Nothing particularly new to anyone who's been paying attention, but hits the nail on the head and happy to see Canada getting called out in a generalist publication like this.
Quirky
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I see no value in giving DND more money when it can't efficiently spend the budget it already has. You can buy all the tanks, planes and boats you want, but they'll be worthless if your bases are falling apart and have no housing for your already depleted ranks. We are short 15-20k people, where is the CAF planning on housing them if they meet those manning targets?
Halifax Tar
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Agreed. Our people need to be our first reinvestment, which includes infrastructure.
Followed very closely on by equipment.
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It honestly needs to be both at the same time, gradually.
Part of the reason we are short people is because your target recruiting audience doesn't want to use kit their parents or grandparents used decades prior. You cannot expect someone to jump forward to serve using kit that's falling to pieces.
The same can be said of infrastructure, but no one goes to the recruiting centre because they see the new accomodations being built at CFB Gagetown.
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McG
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“The CAF should not get more money until it spends all the money it currently gets” is premised on an over simplification of the problem.
When we talk major projects (equipment or infrastructure), there is a chicken and egg dynamic. There is not enough money in the forecasted cash flows, so projects underscope to fit available funds. Growth potential costs money, so a new building will not be designed with floors and doors to support the next generation of vehicles (even if we can spec that now due to the vehicles being in service with allies). There will not be showers, bug-out lockers, offices, or classroom space for sub-units (or sub-sub units) that are not permanently established but which we know are stood-up for every deployment. We will buy too few armoured fighting vehicles (and we will buy some without weapons or radios) and no operational stock to support battle damage replacement. We will ignore our own policies that stipulate permanent single quartes should provide every member a private room with their own kitchenette. We will cut all sorts of corners to fit the project scope into what is affordable from the anticipated money flow.
The CAF does not have capacity to substantially increase the number of projects that it pushes, nor the rate at which those projects move. But we could spend substantially more money if existing projects were not pushing truncated scopes. The project overhead to buy sufficient RWS to support only a fraction of TAPV or ACSV is the same as the overhead to buy RWS for the full fleets.
When we talk major projects (equipment or infrastructure), there is a chicken and egg dynamic. There is not enough money in the forecasted cash flows, so projects underscope to fit available funds. Growth potential costs money, so a new building will not be designed with floors and doors to support the next generation of vehicles (even if we can spec that now due to the vehicles being in service with allies). There will not be showers, bug-out lockers, offices, or classroom space for sub-units (or sub-sub units) that are not permanently established but which we know are stood-up for every deployment. We will buy too few armoured fighting vehicles (and we will buy some without weapons or radios) and no operational stock to support battle damage replacement. We will ignore our own policies that stipulate permanent single quartes should provide every member a private room with their own kitchenette. We will cut all sorts of corners to fit the project scope into what is affordable from the anticipated money flow.
The CAF does not have capacity to substantially increase the number of projects that it pushes, nor the rate at which those projects move. But we could spend substantially more money if existing projects were not pushing truncated scopes. The project overhead to buy sufficient RWS to support only a fraction of TAPV or ACSV is the same as the overhead to buy RWS for the full fleets.
Halifax Tar
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Its a vicious cycle. They are all interdependent.
No, but they do go tell all their friends how awesome their new digs are. And how happy they are at work.
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