Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[dapaterson]

Personnel production (front end) is attraction, selection, recruiting, basic common training, basic occupational training, and trained member posted to Trained Effective Establishment position. Fully informed by force structure requirements (mostly future looking).

Traditionally all of those have been disjointed at best silos, with "make the crude metrics" surges ensuring an oversupply of personnel in easy to recruit, low entry standard occupations, and recurring deficits in intake for occupations with higher enrolment standards.

 

[FSTO]

The issue with mandatory service is what if the person knows they don't want to do it? There is a non-zero percentage that know they don't want to be in uniform.

Yeah, some of them may change their minds once in, but we would need to essentially (maybe literally) police those who don't want to, and will do anything to get out of it.

We (GoC we) could make national service a myriad of choices, from conservation or elder care or youth mentorship or the military.

 

[Halifax Tar]

If anyone interested here is the recruiting page.

Naval Experience Program (NEP) | Canadian Armed Forces

The Naval Experience Program (NEP) will provide you with exposure to life in the Royal Canadian Navy and help you decide if life in the Navy is the right fit for you.

forces.ca

Q&A

Naval Experience Program | Questions and Answers - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I disagree. The program has been wildly successful, thus far, as we will exceed our expectations and capability for intake.

Ok so you've reported complete phase 1 of the operation, call me back when it's complete.

OFP isn't a fair measure as none of them will be OFP after a year, which isn't the goal. They will complete basic then NETP and go on to be employed in the fleet moving through departments and occupations to get a feel for life on ship and at sea, hopefully choosing an occupation to move into after the year is up.

If OFP isn't the measure, what exactly are we recruiting people for? The entire purpose of recruiting people is to train them to OFP so they can be employed on Military Operations.

If this program doesn't achieve that in a quicker time frame than traditional recruiting methods or if there is significantly more money spent for less juice at the end, then how can it be considered a success?

I also disagree with your assessment of the success on the others side. I think, and I have said this here for years, we should be embracing large volume short duration contracts/TOS. To me success will be 25- 30 who choose stay on, and the program growing to allow more intake the following year.

Also there hasn't been an initiative like this, for the RegF at least, since YTEP.

There have been a number of initiatives like this tried by a variety of services.

RMC tried bringing people in with no trades and reduced screening requirements, reduced BMQ, etc about a decade ago. Big flop and significantly increased the training time to reach OFP. The reduced screening also resulted in a large in take of personnel being brought in who were actually unsuitable for Military Service.

I had to personally deal with the fallout from that. The data captured, which was partially revealed during the SSAV to the College was fascinating.

It directly correlated to lower academic performance, significantly reduced physical fitness performance, etc.

The physical fitness numbers were fascinating. There had always been a small percentage of students unable to achieve RMC's expected standard of fitness by the end of 4th Year (a standard that is higher than the CAFs). The number was usually around 3-4%. With this particular class, it rose to almost 25%.


Another example of this type of programming failing is the numerous direct entry SOF programs that were tried in the United States.

The thinking was you could bring high performing athletes and talented individuals in right off the street and make them SOF Operators. It flopped massively and cost a lot of money for very little production output.

 

[Kirkhill]

True, but this way Canada remains a minor partner, that we can ignore when we chose.

So from an American standpoint, the current CAF works fine for us. That should bother Canadians, but it doesn’t as the majority prefer to have healthcare etc and moan on the sidelines.

Like an adult with a much younger sibling who’s still in diapers.

Denmark is probably a better partner for you. Alaska and Greenland give you all the coverage in the Arctic you really need. The soft, squishy bit in the middle can be covered - Unless we start importing Private Security Companies from China to secure their investments.

 

[Czech_pivo]

The CAF needs to reduce the size of the Regular Force, probably by 15-20k personnel and deep cuts need to be made to Senior Leadership/Administration.

It needs to consolidate everything from infrastructure, number of bases, to number of units and formations.

It needs to then appropriately fund what's left over. The 45k members that are left over should be of the highest standard of fitness and given the best equipment and training money can buy.

We are never going to produce mass so we should be aiming for maximum quality.

If we are going down this route, I'd much rather either roll the entire CAF directly into the US Armed Forces or simply fork over the 22 +/- billion a year we currently pay in defence spending to the US and publicly admit to the world that we are the US's bitch and have them completely take over our defence and make all CDN's eligible for the US draft in times of war.

If we continue to be this lackadaisical about spending money on defending our sovereignty, then I welcome the US (or the UK to come back) and do it for us.

Bring on the hate, lol!

 

[dimsum]

There have been a number of initiatives like this tried by a variety of services.

What I would really want to know is how the old YTEP did.

Yeah, not exactly current but it is literally what NEP is basing itself on. If YTEP worked, great. If YTEP didn't, why not?

 

[FJAG]

Just a reminder about how much more money we're talking here...

https://twitter.com/x/status/1534916447402700801

The problem with the GDP formula is that it's simplistic and simply measures $ inputs rather than operational outputs.

Canada is still blessed with a robust economy. We rank #9, just after France and Italy and just ahead of South Korea and Russia. In real dollar defence spending, we rank 13th, just after Australia and Italy and just before Iran and Israel.

That's actually pretty good from an expenditure point of view.

On the other hand, when you go to capability outputs, we lag tremendously. Just consider Italy and what their forces look like. Israel is interesting as well. Both countries spend close to what we do; have distinctly different service models but end up with twice the number of full timers, robust defence industries and very large and modern fleets of equipment.

Canada's military is punching under its weight for the money spent on it. Here's a little quote that I believe strongly in:

“There is too much focus on the ‘input’ (how much the member states spend) and too little focus on the ‘output’ (how much they get out of it),” says Magnus Petersson, the head of the Centre for Transatlantic Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. The Center for a New American Security argues that what matters is not just how much a nation spends on defense, but what it spends it on, and—critically—its willingness to use it.21 Jan Techau, former director of Carnegie Europe, says it all: “Spending at 2 percent says very little about a country’s actual military capabilities; its readiness, deployability, and sustainability levels; and the quality of the force that it can field. It also is mum about a country’s willingness to deploy forces and take risks once those forces are deployed. It does not assess whether a country spends its limited resources wisely.”[1]

---

[1] Dowdy, John, “More tooth, less tail: Getting beyond NATO’s 2% rule”. The World Turned Upsidedown: Maintaining American Leadership in a Dangerous Age Aspen Strategy Group, Nov 2017 More tooth, less tail: Getting beyond NATO’s 2 percent rule

IMHO, Canada does not spend its money wisely and it would be foolish to commit more funds under the wasteful system that exists. There needs to be a revolution in government policy to defence in general; the bureaucracy (and not just DND's) that impacts defence spending and procurement; Canada's defence industry; and last, but by no means least, Canada's military hierarchy.

Canada currently fails to measure outputs in a meaningful way. Our performance reports lack focus and use performance standards which take us away from real defence matters and emphasize soft issues. If we applied the measure of dollars spent as a comparison to the quality of the force Canada can field and its readiness, deployability and sustainability, and presented that in a clear way, I think both the politicians and the public would be shocked to the core.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Ok so you've reported complete phase 1 of the operation, call me back when it's complete.


If OFP isn't the measure, what exactly are we recruiting people for? The entire purpose of recruiting people is to train them to OFP so they can be employed on Military Operations.

If this program doesn't achieve that in a quicker time frame than traditional recruiting methods or if there is significantly more money spent for less juice at the end, then how can it be considered a success?


There have been a number of initiatives like this tried by a variety of services.

RMC tried bringing people in with no trades and reduced screening requirements, reduced BMQ, etc about a decade ago. Big flop and significantly increased the training time to reach OFP. The reduced screening also resulted in a large in take of personnel being brought in who were actually unsuitable for Military Service.

I had to personally deal with the fallout from that. The data captured, which was partially revealed during the SSAV to the College was fascinating.

It directly correlated to lower academic performance, significantly reduced physical fitness performance, etc.

The physical fitness numbers were fascinating. There had always been a small percentage of students unable to achieve RMC's expected standard of fitness by the end of 4th Year (a standard that is higher than the CAFs). The number was usually around 3-4%. With this particular class, it rose to almost 25%.


Another example of this type of programming failing is the numerous direct entry SOF programs that were tried in the United States.

The thinking was you could bring high performing athletes and talented individuals in right off the street and make them SOF Operators. It flopped massively and cost a lot of money for very little production output.

With respect, you need to understand the program isnt designed to create OFP sailors, and it has no application to officer intake at this time. Its designed to expose and excite (hopefully) and then upon completion the sailors can chose to continue in an occupation or leave.

Again YTEP is the closest family member to this initiative, and it hasn't been done since the 80s.

What I would really want to know is how the old YTEP did.

Yeah, not exactly current but it is literally what NEP is basing itself on. If YTEP worked, great. If YTEP didn't, why not?

YTEP was before my time, but anyone I know who did it or served around it raved about it. Mind you, they are the ones who chose to stay on.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

What I would really want to know is how the old YTEP did.

Yeah, not exactly current but it is literally what NEP is basing itself on. If YTEP worked, great. If YTEP didn't, why not?

Agreed, I think it's great they are trying something but the CAF needs to get out of the habit of pretending everything is a success, even when it isn't.

This initiative could flop massively and that's ok, at least they tried something.

The one thing I learned from the SSAV at RMC was entry standards should not be disregarded in favour of a short term bump.

I actually deal with these issues a lot in my current job. We are also a self-regulating profession like the CAF. We will not sacrifice standards to get more people in the door.

We will speed up hiring time by allocating additional instructors (we've hired a couple of dozen recently retired employees as full time instructors that we deploy all over the Country) but the standards will not be dropped. Our attrition rate in our training programs is 63% at the moment. Approximately 30% don't make it through the first two weeks of the courses.

 

[Kirkhill]

The problem with the GDP formula is that it's simplistic and simply measures $ inputs rather than operational outputs.

Canada is still blessed with a robust economy. We rank #9, just after France and Italy and just ahead of South Korea and Russia. In real dollar spending, we rank 13th, just after Australia and Italy and just before Iran and Israel.

That's actually pretty good from an expenditure point of view.

On the other hand, when you go to capability outputs, we lag tremendously. Just consider Italy and what their forces look like. Israel is interesting as well. Both countries spend close to what we do; have distinctly different service models but end up with twice the number of full timers, robust defence industries and very large and modern fleets of equipment.

Canada's military is punching under its weight for the money spent on it. Here's a little quote that I believe strongly in:



IMHO, Canada does not spend its money wisely and it would be foolish to commit more funds under the wasteful system that exists. There needs to be a revolution in government policy to defence in general; the bureaucracy (and not just DND's) that impacts defence spending and procurement; Canada's defence industry; and last, but by no means least, Canada's military hierarchy.

Canada currently fails to measure outputs in a meaningful way. Our performance reports lack focus and use performance standards which take us away from real defence matters and emphasize soft issues. If we applied the measure of dollars spent as a comparison to the quality of the force Canada can field and its readiness, deployability and sustainability, and presented that in a clear way, I think both the politicians and the public would be shocked to the core.

Mate - you are justifying.

2% is a tax on the nations of NATO. No matter which way you slice it we are a wealthy country, with a small population that is not under stress.

We can afford to contribute more to the pot.

And if we aren't going to exceed 1.3% of GDP then we should take the (equally nominal) Foreign Aid budget of 0.7% of GDP and allocate it to the Support of NATO.

 

[FJAG]

There are lots of things we could spend our 2% on that are not pieces of equipment for which we don't currently have the trained people to operate.

That's a fallacy and leads to a lack of vision. You always need to build a force concurrently. Plan for the equipment and manning you need together. Right now we have equipment for less than one half of the army because the reserve half is unequipped and looked at solely as a manpower pool. And that's not because individual reservists are bad but because the reserve system is designed to underperform.

Infrastructure.

Canada already has more infrastructure (by which I mean bases and buildings and runways) than it needs. More importantly we have much more bureaucratic overhead infrastructure than is necessary.

Maintenance of existing equipment. War stocks of munitions and parts. Key missing support weapons.

We violently agree on this.

Frankly I'd be more that willing to see the CAF cut back on it's current number of deployable units/ships/aircraft temporarily and spend money and PYs on building a training infrastructure that can handle future expansion.

I agree on the output but not the input. We definitely need to spend money on and PYs on the training infrastructure. I do not think that this needs to come from deployable units/ships/aircraft. There are other sources that must be addressed and reformed. Deployable units/ships/aircraft are the entities that need to grow.

The CAF is so broken currently that it needs a fundamental re-build right from the foundation IMHO.

Again, we violently agree.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed, I think it's great they are trying something but the CAF needs to get out of the habit of pretending everything is a success, even when it isn't.

This initiative could flop massively and that's ok, at least they tried something.

The one thing I learned from the SSAV at RMC was entry standards should not be disregarded in favour of a short term bump.

I actually deal with these issues a lot in my current job. We are also a self-regulating profession like the CAF. We will not sacrifice standards to get more people in the door.

We will speed up hiring time by allocating additional instructors (we've hired a couple of dozen recently retired employees as full time instructors that we deploy all over the Country) but the standards will not be dropped. Our attrition rate in our training programs is 63% at the moment. Approximately 30% don't make it through the first two weeks of the courses.

I approve of this policy

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

With respect, you need to understand the program isnt designed to create OFP sailors, and it has no application to officer intake at this time. Its designed to expose and excite (hopefully) and then upon completion the sailors can chose to continue in an occupation or leave.

Again YTEP is the closest family member to this initiative, and it hasn't been done since the 80s.

I just pointed out to similar programs to you, the program at RMC was similar in that it was supposed to give people exposure and they could leave after 1 year with no strings attached.

The CAF has also tried other programs like this with various Indigenous Entry Programs. None of them have produced that much. They have been running ALOY in Kingston for years. They enroll dozens of Indigenous students in it every year. Maybe a handful <3% have actually stayed and made careers in the CAF.

The ultimate goal of this is to increase intake numbers. Don't tell me it isn't, of course that's the point.

The Navy is in the dumpster in terms of numbers, it needs to try things to get people to join. I agree that this is a useful experiment but it can only be considered a success if it leads to a strengthening of actual trained personnel.

That will only be known in a few years.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I approve of this policy

View attachment 77338

Moi aussi, short and too the point. Don't waste peoples time.

 

[Gunplumber]

What I would really want to know is how the old YTEP did.

Yeah, not exactly current but it is literally what NEP is basing itself on. If YTEP worked, great. If YTEP didn't, why not?

I did YTEP in 83. It was good and it was really just like joining the Regs. I went to Cornwallis and did my trades training like all other Reg force people. At the end of the year, we all got tossed, as if the military kept anyone, they would have to pay back the Employment people who funded it. A few years later the military kept some troops. and sometimes it was just the first 30ish people alphabetically.

 

[FJAG]

Mate - you are justifying.

No I'm not. I'm saying that there is little sense in spending Nickel One until there is a realistic plan on reform using the right measures.

2% spending is wrong as a measure. A measure of one sustainable armoured brigade in Europe, another flyover mechanized brigade, a fleet of 5 frigates and two submarines, and three fighter/bomber squadrons, all fully sustainable, would be an example of an output based measure that would be far more meaningful than 2%.

2% is a tax on the nations of NATO. No matter which way you slice it we are a wealthy country, with a small population that is not under stress.

We can afford to contribute more to the pot.

That's the problem with taxes. They leave a level of discretion that favours bums in cubicles rather than in turrets or cockpits.

I fully agree that we can and should spend more. I'm just saying not until we get our rotten house in order.

And if we aren't going to exceed 1.3% of GDP then we should take the (equally nominal) Foreign Aid budget of 0.7% of GDP and allocate it to the Support of NATO.

That's just a meaningless tangent. Both programs are necessary. One may argue the ratios but its a mug's game at the best of times.

 

[Kirkhill]

No I'm not. I'm saying that there is little sense in spending Nickel One until there is a realistic plan on reform using the right measures.

2% spending is wrong as a measure. A measure of one sustainable armoured brigade in Europe, another flyover mechanized brigade, a fleet of 5 frigates and two submarines, and three fighter/bomber squadrons, all fully sustainable, would be an example of an output based measure that would be far more meaningful than 2%.

That's the problem with taxes. They leave a level of discretion that favours bums in cubicles rather than in turrets or cockpits.

I fully agree that we can and should spend more. I'm just saying not until we get our rotten house in order.

That's just a meaningless tangent. Both programs are necessary. One may argue the ratios but its a mug's game at the best of times.

Until that money comes out of the wallet and is actually spent there is no incentive to take it out of the wallet and spend it.

Giving the money for others to spend on ammunition and reconstruction would be a good and noble thing.

The we can go back to ancient arguments about if that is the right way to spend the money.

But it is much easier to discuss money you have than money you might have.

Spend the money on a worthy cause. Then carry on the argument.

 

[TacticalTea]

I’ve said it before here so I won’t beat a dead horse- longer than this post,

But there isn’t even really a pipeline to spend the money- if you buy “stuff” without people to use the stuff it’s not an intelligent use of the money. So I don’t believe the percentage is really a good basis for anything, it’s a good talking point- makes a nice clean number- but it doesn’t address the actual issues with procurement and troop development,

Which aren’t things that need blank cheques as much as the need for development and almost a complete rebuild of training capacity and force generation. A complete philosophical change.

I haven't come across a single person arguing for 2% spending starting TOMORROW.

So I'm curious as to why that's the strawman you chose to dismantle. Everyone understands that the R22P (road to 2 percent) would be incremental and holistic. We all saw what happened when Scholz dramatically announced a 100B euros for the 'Swehr: nothing.

The point of the 2% is that all NATO countries contribute their fair share to our collective security, based on what they can afford. I appreciate FJAG's focus on capabilities output. That said, even if it took less than 2% to produce the output he desires, I don't see that as a reason to stop there.

The gap can be used to improve working conditions for the troops, or build surplus capability in such domains that are of great benefit to our allies (especially those for whom 2% would not produce sufficient capabilities) such as strategic transport, intelligence gathering, stockpiling, etc.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I just pointed out to similar programs to you, the program at RMC was similar in that it was supposed to give people exposure and they could leave after 1 year with no strings attached.

The CAF has also tried other programs like this with various Indigenous Entry Programs. None of them have produced that much. They have been running ALOY in Kingston for years. They enroll dozens of Indigenous students in it every year. Maybe a handful <3% have actually stayed and made careers in the CAF.

The ultimate goal of this is to increase intake numbers. Don't tell me it isn't, of course that's the point.

The Navy is in the dumpster in terms of numbers, it needs to try things to get people to join. I agree that this is a useful experiment but it can only be considered a success if it leads to a strengthening of actual trained personnel.

That will only be known in a few years.

You're over expecting for the aboriginal programs. See link:

Programs for Indigenous Peoples | Canadian Armed Forces

Educational programs and entry plans for Indigenous peoples who are interested in working with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

forces.ca

They are 3 week and 6 week programs.

Remember NEP is NCM only.

The ultimate goal, I think, is to get people in and expose them to a life a sea, and provide some adventure. No one is expecting 100% rate of continuation, no one is even hoping for that. We will have kids who wash out and quit before completion and we will have kids who hate it and we will have kids who say thanks and move on and we will have kids who decide to go on to the CA and RCAF. Like I said before I think 20-30 continuing on after a year should be considered a success.

Our recruiting and retention issues wont be solved in 1 FY. This is a generation task, IMHO. And I think the NEP is one excellent approach to that.

Naval Experience Program | Questions and Answers - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca