Jessica L ynch's units training

[pbi]

Kevin B: Right on. Pogue, REMF, whatever, it's the mentality we have to defeat.

Lance Wiebe: With you 100% on SAT. It's a great system that we are just not making use of to full potential. As you point out, it does not replace the act of live firing, but it can make that live firing alot more productive. It is also a excellent section/team tac trainer. I think the issue may be lack of fully trained operators. Cheers.

 

[Soleman]

pbi, lance

I will take your word that maybe I am to harsh on this system, but from a CSS stand point the only thing I have seen it used for is PWT level 1.  Soldiers go in spend 15mins shooting and leave.  If we are lucky the Bn will get 2 days a year on the SAT.  Just like ammo the SAT is affected by our CSS status.  Combat arms have priority. 

So the main point...changes have to start at the top if CSS units are going to change the way they train and adopt doctrine.

I spent two yrs in Coy Ops and Trg, This little, old, MCpl at the bottom has a sore melon from knocking heads with the upper ech trying to allocate more trg time on weapons and drills than sweeping floors and washing trucks.

Cheers.

 

[ackland]

I know this will not work in the regs but in the reserves it swhould be real simple. If the CSS at the unit are thrown into the Cmbt Arms postions on weekend training and made to do the job then they will learn. The Office staff at my unit does nothing on weekend that we deploy. Well get them in and start them doing basic soldier skills. They may not like it but TS. We have a Sigs Mcpl in the unit who is all gungho and trains as part of the Recce sqn as often as posible. he isn't Qualified to crew command, but he comes out adn does the rad op thing for a troop leader which then allows himself to take part in recce patrols from time to time. That should be the attitude of all CSS pers. trying to get in the game.

Why not make an orderly room act as a section in the infantry? Why not have your Ech work as a quick reaction force for a weekend.  :mg:

Get them out doing the basics not just sitting in there offices or machine shops pickin there noses.

 

[Quinn]

Private Lynch was part of a unit whose mission was to maintain the vehicles of the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which at the moment was pushing on to Baghdad at breakneak speed, bypassing serious points of resistance. One of these places was the town of Fallujah. As the advance elements of the 3rd Infantry Division approached the city, they found no resistance: the Iraqi army unit assigned to protect the town, like much of the Iraqi army, wisesly decided to desert their posts.

In their place came the Arab irregulars. There are many other words that can be used to describe them: holy warriors, jihadists, insurgents...terrorists. As the massive American division rollled by, a special US Marine force was assigned to clear the city. It was into this cauldron that Private Lynch and her unit drove into, instead of around.

It doesn't take a Caesar to ambush a convoy of "soft-skinned" vehicles, and the attacker in a situation like this has an obvious advantage. Private Lynch and her buddies were given the classic "Basic Training", emphasis on basic. While they knew how to fire their rifles, in their suceptibility to the element of surprise they were especially vulnerable for they did not receive, being mechanics, the intense training a combat soldier undergoes in the ability to recover from a shock and deal with the situation.

A short firefight ensued. Several of them were killed, many wounded. While the early reports of the plucky blonde American girl going down like Crocket at the Alamo were innacurate (she does not remember much if anything of the encounter, which may say something about her training, or lack thereof), they're still Americans with guns and so likely did not go quitely. Lynch was probably seriously wounded early on and lost consciousness.

Her attackers did not kill her out of hand likely because they realized she was more useful to their cause alive than dead. She was in critical condition, and so her captors took her to a clinic. The Iraqi doctor who saved her life, realizing her likely fate in the hands of her captors, bravely crossed the lines, so to speak, and got a message through to American forces.

Special forces were callled in, distracted the Arab fighters, nipped in and grabbed Lynch, as everyone got to see on TV.

So in short, the Army left an enemy to its rear for the Marines to deal with, Lynch and her buddies ran smack into those enemies, and they came second place in a firefight with those crazed zealots, their training and/or equipment not being sufficient to fend them off.

The training issue is a bit of a red herring though. It's not really practical to train your support troops up to the level of combat troops - unless you're a relatively small, specialized group like the US Marines - every person a rifleperson   Jessica Lynch was supposed to be protected by the almost indescribable speed and firepower of a American infantry division. If her unit was considered to be under threat, it would have protection, enough protection to make any attacker pause. The point has been made that they are still soldiers, and indeed they are. I seem to remember an episode during at Ypres in 1915 where the Prussian Guard, no less, was beaten off by the cooks and servants of a headquarters company.

Would a couple days of convoy ambush drills have helped Lynch and her friends? Perhaps. We'll never know, but more training is usually better than less.

 

[KevinB]

Quinn,

You have missed the point - the vast majority of these solider's weapons did not fire - either due to poor maintainance - or lack of will (read Col Grossman on this issue).

Now if your M2 .50 won't fire - you have not been workign on it for a long time - the bullshit about the sandstorms etc aside (yeah weapon get dirty but it is YOUR job to ensure they function.


The Brits recently did a bayoney charge at an IRAQI ambush - killed over 22 

They had the will to kill - sadly the Maintaineers did not.


That is what we need to change.

 

[Infanteer]

either due to poor maintainance - or lack of will

Bang on Kevin.  All soldiers have to be given the mentality that ensures they will not lay down and die - victims.  Simply handing off techniques to soldiers is no good if you do not give them the mental fortitude to execute their duties under the stress of combat.

The easiest and best way to do this.  Tough and realistic training from day 1.

Here is a good video example of how it is done:

http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/data/strength_ad.mp4

 

[pbi]

Quinn-you said:

unless you're a relatively small, specialized group like the US Marines

The USMC is at least three times the size of our entire Armed Forces, and contains all the MOCs (and a few more) that we have in our Army and most that we have in our Air Force. This argument does not wash. By contrast, we are a "relatively small, specialized group".

Jessica Lynch was supposed to be protected by the almost indescribable speed and firepower of a American infantry division. If her unit was considered to be under threat, it would have protection, enough protection to make any attacker pause.

I don't think this concept has much relevance on the modern battlefield-it might have on the stereotyped, neatly laid out AirLand battlespace we imagined for fighting Group of Soviet Forces Germany, but in places like Iraq (or here in Afgh..) there is no such protection. The Combat Arms are busy fighting, not shepherding CSS types around. CSS are an easy target for asymmetrical enemies and the more we do to give them a fighting chance, the better. Cheers.

 

[Quinn]

The USMC is and always has been a small and specialized force - in comparison to the rest of America's armed forces. The Corps can justify, being an elite formation, the need to have every one of its personnel trained to a minimum level of combat competency.

I maintain it is impractical, even impossible, in a regular army, to train support troops up to the level of combat infantry, much less to the level of a Marine rifleman.

That does not mean of course they should drive into a combat zone with crusty rifles and panic upon being ambushed. I agree that additional "warrior" type trainining should be made available to support units, especially if they are to be deployed in a 'hot zone'.
But not everyone is cut out to be a combat infantryman. If an army were to insist that they were, you would find, like I'm sure the Marines do every year, many recruits washing out of basic training, which here in Canada would only increase our recruitment worries.

I'd like to also reiterate the circumstances that lead them into that ambush the first place - in their mad dash to Baghdad, a decision was made for the 3rdInfDiv to bypass points of resistance. If the 3rd had taken a longer detour around Fallujah, or had paused to deal with the nest of fighters in the city, the ambush would have never taken place.

Even assuming that the jeeps and trucks of that unit were filled with Marine Sharpshooters, there is no guarantee of a different result. I'd liklely bet that they would have held their own, but with only their personal weapons and perhaps and a couple .50 cal's  mounted on soft skinned vehicles, they would still be at a disadvantage in the opening moments of an ambush.

Ultimately, what happend to Jessica Lynch can be explained by applying the concept of Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation is usually the correct one:

They took a wrong turn.

Perhaps what is needed for CSS types is not a refresher in marksmanship, but in navigation!

P.S. That was a nice commercial Infanteer, and it underlines my point: we cannot expect support troops of a maintenence company to have the toughness of the Royal Marines.

 

[dutchie]

The Corps can justify, being an elite formation. - As good as the Marines are, to characterize them as 'Elite' is wrong. The MEU is elite, but not the Marine Corps in general.

I maintain it is impractical, even impossible, in a regular army, to train support troops up to the level of combat infantry, much less to the level of a Marine rifleman. - the Marines have shown that it is possible to train all trades to be competant rifleman. As well, I am not sure what you mean by 'Combat Infantry'....is there any other kind? One of the strengths of the Canadian Army is the quality of our training, particularly at the basic soldier skills/infantry level. We have the capacity within our training system to turn out very good soldiers/infantrymen. It is not a stretch, and certainly not 'impossible' as you claim, to expect that we could train evry new recruit to a certain level, and MAINTAIN that level with regular, consistant, relavant, and above all intense field training, in addition to any regular trades-type training (both field and garrison).

That does not mean of course they should drive into a combat zone with crusty rifles and panic upon being ambushed. - that is what will happen if you do not train them to do otherwise.

I agree that additional "warrior" type trainining should be made available to support units, especially if they are to be deployed in a 'hot zone'. - by the time the warning order comes down re: deployment to 'hot zone', it is too late to train troops to fight like warriors. Keep in mind that any 'hot' deployment will almost certainly be on very little notice. You can't expect to break habits that have been developed over years of insufficient training by sending CSS   tradesmen to the field for a couple of weeks. If you have to bring up the quality of training in order to deploy, why let it slip in the first place?

But not everyone is cut out to be a combat infantryman. If an army were to insist that they were, you would find, like I'm sure the Marines do every year, many recruits washing out of basic training, which here in Canada would only increase our recruitment worries. - again, not sure what a 'non-combat infantryman' is, but whatever...
An infantry soldier should have more skill than a non-infantry rifleman. No-one is suggesting otherwise. But, the average (and I stress average) CSS soldier in the CF could not adequately defend themselves against even mediocre infantry soldiers. That is the crux of the issue. If that means more drop-outs of basic, and less incompetant riflemen, that's a good thing.

 

[Quinn]

In terms of "impractical" and "impossible" I am referring to the contraints placed on the Forces by the beancounters at NDHQ, and beancounters everywhere for that matter.

In use of the apparently oxymoronic "combat infantry" I am referring to the combat arms of the army, as distinct from the support forces, I apologize if I didnt make this clear.

Elite is a subjective term of course, but you are correct, as good as the Marines are, some are more highly trained than others.

It is sobering to hear however that our support units, even though, like the rest of the Forces, trained to a higher standard, may still find themselves in alot of trouble should a convoy ambush occur. Certainly more training needs to be done, but let's be realistic. There are limits as to what we can expect support troops to accomplish: they are not warriors.

"If victory is the flower, supply is the stem that gives it life"

Winston Churchill, "The River War".

 

[dutchie]

In terms of "impractical" and "impossible" I am referring to the contraints placed on the Forces by the beancounters at NDHQ, and beancounters everywhere for that matter. - Your original post didn't mention anything about the costs, NDHQ, beancounters, or anything else. To refresh your memory, you said, "I maintain it is impractical, even impossible, in a regular army, to train support troops up to the level of combat infantry, much less to the level of a Marine rifleman." - however, if you claim that it is fiscally impossible to train css types to the level of infantry, I will also disagree with you on that. I read an article today in the Vancouver Sun indicating that Infantry Bns are the cheapest type of unit. I'm sorry I don't have a link, but it is on the Global web page, but you need to be a suscriber to see it. The gist is that Infantry Bn's are cheap, cheap, cheap. Infantry training requires experienced NCOs/Officers, keen and fit troops, weapons, a training area, and time. None of these are in short supply in todays CF. You can write posts critical of NDHQ/Beancounters if you like (a popular opinion), but it does not cover for the fact that you claimed it 'impractical, even impossible' to train CSS troops to the level of Infantry. You are wrong, full stop.

There are limits as to what we can expect support troops to accomplish: they are not warriors. - then we should either accept that they will fail as warriors (and die), train them to be warriors (and live), or not place them in an area where enemy warriors are present(not a real option). All CF personnel who hold positions designed to be deployed should be capable of surviving deployment. It is unfair and immoral to all to do otherwise.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Having enough money in the yearly budget,to allow us to get on the range and actually handle a weapon more than once a year would help. ???

I see from your profile that you are a Reservist in LFAA. I can't comment on LFAA policies for ammo allocation, but I can (and will) on Army and LFCA policies.  Ammo is allocated for the conduct of MLOC (which includes PWT) for all units (not including schools, ASUs and HQs) - based on 85% of their strength.  In LFCA we had to shave that icecube slightly to allocate ammo for the ASFs and for ATC and CPC.  All of that to say that ammo was allocated to your Area, for your Unit.  You should have received enough to do MLOC.

 

[jfladeroute]

It is sobering to hear however that our support units, even though, like the rest of the Forces, trained to a higher standard, may still find themselves in alot of trouble should a convoy ambush occur. Certainly more training needs to be done, but let's be realistic. There are limits as to what we can expect support troops to accomplish: they are not warriors.

If not warriors, then what? In terms of the modern non-contiguous battle space, there is no expectation of a secure rear area - which, conversely, means that there is an expectation that any soldier may find themselves in contact during any operation.

Given that, what are the ethics of requiring a soldier to operate in such an environment without the training required to protect themselves? And why would anyone choose to be in a support trade if they realized it meant being both an attractive target and a weak one? I may be dedicated and loyal, but I'm not suicidal - and I can't say that I would be able, in good conscience, to expect that from my troops.

 

[Quinn]

Warriors with wrenches?

Seems to me you can be excellent at one or the other: not both. You can be a Class B rifleman and a Class A mechanic, like perhaps in the USMC, or you can be a Class A rifleman and a Class B mechanic. It's the classic case of falling between two stools. Furthermore, as that Royal Marine spot so excellently demonstrates, being a "warrior" is not for everybody.

Neverthless please don't misunderstand: CSS troops, while not being "warriors" in a classic sense - trained to aggressively close with and destroy the enemy - can and should be trained in the art of convoy defense, and certainly there is no excuse for having a rifle that won't fire. Perhaps the more, if you're forgive the phrase, gung-ho of CSS troopers, while still being experts in their trade, would be the ones to receive extra training and take point and/or man the support weapons on a "gun truck". But if we insist on a level of combat competency for all CSS troopers up to -  or even close to - the level of "line" troops, there will be a price to pay. Even if additional training would cost nothing, to intesnively train every CSS trooper in the art of defensive warfare would affect the recruiting pool: it may shrink further if an emphasis is placed on intensive combat training: more may wash out, and more may stay away entirely. 

We should prepare CSS troopers to face the kind of "eastern" style ambushes by irregulars with small arms, but we cannot expect them to resist serious attack and/or clear even lightly held positions without backup. And while its true that you can't always guarantee safety "behind the lines", you should certainly try your best not to create situations, like the 3rdInvDiv did, where your support troops may be exposed to perhaps unnecessary risk if unescorted. An exposed supply line hurt Lynch's unit as much as anything.

 

[dutchie]

You can be a Class B rifleman and a Class A mechanic, like perhaps in the USMC - that would be nice. Unfortunately, calling the average CSS soldier a rifleman is a serious stretch of the definition. We aren't even close to training our support troops to the level of the USMC, and quite frankly, were not even close to maintaining the skills that are taught on QL2/BMQ-SQ/GMT/Et to CSS troops. Lets start by demanding CSS troops maintain the skills they have been taught, then we can worry about raising the bar to the levl of the USMC support tradesmen.

Furthermore, as that Royal Marine spot so excellently demonstrates, being a "warrior" is not for everybody. - then I say, don't apply for a job that may require you to kill people. If you want to join the military but don't want to be in a position where you will have to defend your life (and your buddy's) by ending another's life in a violent and aggressive manner, then apply for a trade that isn't deployed to the field (Air Weapons Tech for one...I think).

if we insist on a level of combat competency for all CSS troopers up to -   or even close to - the level of the "line" troops, there will be a price to pay. - and that price is less incompetant riflemen, fewer dead canadian soldiers, and more dead enemy soldiers.

but the recruiting pool, already seemingly so slim, may shrink further if an emphasis is placed on intensive combat training - then so be it. Either train for it now, or die for it later, or as the saying goes, 'The more you seat in training, the less you bleed in battle.'.

We should prepare CSS troops to face the kind of "eastern" style ambushes by irregular troops with small arms, - the average CSS soldier (for the thrid time) cannot repel an attack by average Infantry soldiers.

you should certainly try your best not to create situations, like the 3rdInvDiv did, where your support troops may be exposed to perhaps unnecessary risk if unescorted. - the nature of the rear area is that front line troops aren't there. That is why it is called the rear area. Sadly, the combat arms troops are too busy destroying the enemy to escort every convoy in the rear area. In war, it is necessary for all soldiers in theatre to be able to defend themselves and others. Our CSS troops cannot do this.

 

[D-n-A]

To addon/echo to what others have said, regardless if your a Combat Arms or a CSS troop, your a soldier, an must know how to do that job. If you can't, you shoulden't be in the Army. CSS troops should know how to use their weapons, and how to fight/defend themselves, if they don't know how, then their going to get shot up and captured(like what happened to the 507th Maint Co).  Yes CSS should do more defensive training, but why not some offensive, why shoulden't they know how to take the fight to the enemy, Marine cooks did it in Afghanistan, why can't Canadian CSS troops be able to do the same, its part of their job as soldiers.

 

[Spc_Cameron]

I will summarize what happened to the esteemed PFC Lynch and ther buddies:

Rear ech troops driving in a war zone, took wrong turn , ran into enemy troops who were not rear ech.

Enemy troops do their job.

Rear ech troops try to do what SHOULD be their first job. Despite enourmous effort by some, their lack of training in how to destroy the enemy showed very quickly.

Re:what the Canadian Army is doing to prevent this.....

The Canadian Army cannot address the issue of teaching a lot of it's rear ech personel's inability to kill the enemy until they convince them to put the firing pins back in there weapons.

I agree ....such is not the case anymore though.... this is why the US army is instituting a new set of battle drills for support personell... to little too late if you ask me.

 

[pbi]

Seems to me you can be excellent at one or the other: not both. You can be a Class B rifleman and a Class A mechanic, like perhaps in the USMC, or you can be a Class A rifleman and a Class B mechanic. It's the classic case of falling between two stools. Furthermore, as that Royal Marine spot so excellently demonstrates, being a "warrior" is not for everybody.

Neverthless please don't misunderstand: CSS troops, while not being "warriors" in a classic sense - trained to aggressively close with and destroy the enemy - can and should be trained in the art of convoy defense, and certainly there is no excuse for having a rifle that won't fire. Perhaps the more, if you're forgive the phrase, gung-ho of CSS troopers, while still being experts in their trade, would be the ones to receive extra training and take point and/or man the support weapons on a "gun truck".

There are several misconceptions here, IMHO. First of all, let us not confuse "warrior" with "qualified DP1 Infantryman". All soldiers need to be warriors, regardless of MOC. Practically, not all can be trained as MOC-qualified Infantry, but this is not really required. IMHO we have created a military in which we have severed our support people from their operational environment, under some misguided 1960's idea of efficiency.

Second, "the art of convoy defense" represents a fairly comprehensive set of skills. Here are a few:

-Vehicle hardening using local materials;
-Tactical driving by day and night;
-Recognition and avoidance of likely ambush sites;
-improvised veh recovery methods incl under fire;
-enemy ambush practices to date (aval through AAR and ALLC reports);
-Immediate Action Drills on Ambush;
-navigation by day/night with/without GPS;
-voice procedure;
-employing "gun trucks" or other fire sp vehs so as not to blow away the cargo vehs;
-combat first aid/combat lifesaving;
-weapons handling incl CSW and grenades;
-handling PW's

I suggest to you that unless the support soldier is already starting from a solid base of combat skills, it will be difficult to develop a useful level of proficiency without extensive training. This, IMHO, goes directly to our wretched, non-operationally oriented and utterly outdated "Unified Tradesman" concept that teaches a person they are a technician first and a soldier second, whether this is imparted in a formal sense or by socialization and implication.

Third, you cannot confine the training of skills such as crewing a fire sp veh to "the more gung-ho" members of a support unit: what happens if they are absent/on leave/sick/dead? It has to be all hands.

But if we insist on a level of combat competency for all CSS troopers up to -  or even close to - the level of "line" troops, there will be a price to pay. Even if additional training would cost nothing, to intesnively train every CSS trooper in the art of defensive warfare would affect the recruiting pool: it may shrink further if an emphasis is placed on intensive combat training: more may wash out, and more may stay away entirely.

And I suggest to you that we may very well pay a much more tragic price if we do not raise them as warriors. Let us not be so foolish as to assume that because we have been lucky so far, we will always be so. If such training has a bad impact on recruiting (although I really doubt that it would: in fact I think it could be used to attract more of the right sort of person and less of the job seeker), then we need to ask ourselves just what sort of a military we have, if it is institutionally suited to today's operations and threats, and if we are projecting the right image of ourselves. Being killed because you don't know what to do in an emergency may have a rather negative effect on recruiting, too; not to mention retention.
 

And while its true that you can't always guarantee safety "behind the lines", you should certainly try your best not to create situations, like the 3rdInvDiv did, where your support troops may be exposed to perhaps unnecessary risk if unescorted. An exposed supply line hurt Lynch's unit as much as anything

But herein lies the entire problem. Warfare, especially in the many forms it assumes today, prevents us from making such tidy assumptions as the idea that we "should try not to create situations (etc)..". As well, it is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that a manoeuvre commander should make the safety of CSS a driving factor in the conduct of operations. CSS is vital, and already imposes an iron leash on some aspects of operations, but it must not become more of a burden than is absolutely necessary. Cheers.

 

[the 48th regulator]

what went wrong, dunno, no security, lack of in theatre prep (training),

ahh the heck with it, I willl just start the whole thread over again.

all I will say pbi very good post (geez too hard to specify) but on the last one, you were bang on.  Hey by the way can I asay what a small world, Mirajne of all places!!  You guys set up an amazing camp, sorry for knocking down the Krusty sign, remember painting rocks white was the priority!

tess

 

[gun plumber]

Please do not jump down my throat for this as it is not my intention to get into a game of pokey chest.
For starters I agree with all that has been posted here ref training standards for CSS troops.As has been said to me many a time "solider first ,tech second" but to play devils adcovate I must point out one thing:
the more combat arms related training that CSS troops take,the less time we have to do our primary task of serving those who serve.We all would like to see a set standard of training,but none of us would like to see a drop in the skills or service provided.
I would just like to say again that I do agree with improved training standards and I know that a little training goes a long way,but if it was you who had to carry a broomstick into battle because the weapons shop was gone on a 1 month SQ refresher course,would'nd you be a bit miffed?
        Just playing devils advocate