Jessica L ynch's units training

[x westie]

All recruiting ads never mention anything about CS trades as a soldier first, tradesmen second, i think alot of people join with this mindset, CF RC should quit been so politically correct and instill this when people go down to join the CF

 

[D-n-A]

Yea, CFRC doesn't always tell people that their gonna be a soldier first(an train as one) and a tradesmen second, because of that 3 people quit my basic course, two were joining as supply techs, the other was a Clerk.

 

[Gayson]

I met a recruit in the reg force during the summer at wasaga beach during leave.  He was to be a Vtech and was on his SQ. 

I was impressed to hear from them that their field ex was suppose to be 3 weeks long, unlike my small 1 week field ex for my reservist sq.

 

[ghazise]

The 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company is the Army equivalent of my old unit Ordnance Maintenance Company (Re designated CSSB-18, Maint Co for OIF)  I'm not one to criticise another unit but remember there were absolutely terrible sand storms in late March 2003.

Some very easy things to improve CSS units would be:
- Disseminate Movement Orders / 5 Paragraph Orders / Frag Orders throughout the convoy,
- Land Nav,  ensuring NCO's/Officers really know how to navigate and work GPS
- Keeping the convoys as small as possible, distribute gun trucks evenly,
- Have a quasi recce units within the convoy,
- ensure drivers have NVG's and interconvoy communication
- sandbag your vehicles and cargo

Also, my unit had to give up two M88A2 for one M88A1 and we lost both our AAVR7, plus plenty of machine guns to Division units, while in country we did manage to pick up AT-4 for recovery missions.  

The most important part is to keep a convoy moving, a quasi recce unit could help avoid ambushes.
Active Marine CSS Units get billets for all sorts of infantry courses,  we had Infantry Instructors, MOUT Instructors, Mountain Warfare Instructors, HRST Instructors, and I even have 0352 as a secondary MOS (Anti-tank Missileman), but not allot of this does allot of good in a CSS unit.  My point, smart proactive CPL and SGTs can do allot more with their CSS platoons to prepare for CSS missions (Convoy, Recovery and CSS Compound Defence), not infantry missions, you do not need a Force Protection Billet (Sorry Matt, Every NCO is responsible for leading their unit in combat)

 

[Jarnhamar]

You know what REALLY doesn't help?
is the attitude of our recruiters (among others)
We've even seen it mentioned on the boards here plenty of times.

Someone goes into the recruiting office and says 'I wanna be in the infantry' and the recruiter says "ahh geee damn why do tyou wanna do that, you don't want infantry, you qualify for so many other things, take my advice don't go infantry"

What a bad message to send.

 

[jfladeroute]

With respect to the issue of SQ, can somebody refresh me as to whether or not Regular Force CSS support MOCs go through that? I know that Reservists do, but I'm not certain about RegF. I rather think most RegF CSS MOCs go from BMQ to MOC trg, which would help to explain part of the problem.

I think you may be misremembering the fact that CSS soldiers can do their SQ and MOC courses in any order, while the combat arms must take the SQ first.

Like others on this thread I have seen and had the pleasure to command some pretty impressive CSS soldiers. In Croatia, I had a cook who regularly went out on night patrols, and a clerk who volunteered to double as a sniper spotter. Thse guys were great and the o31s thought highly of them. But, IMHO they were great in spite of the unified system, not because of it. What we want is all CSS soldiers to be just like that. Cheers.

I'd be hard pressed to disagree, however that attitude has to be encouraged from the top (particularly from the senior CSS types). I've been accused of being "too army", which can make it quite difficult to effect any change.

 

[jfladeroute]

You know what REALLY doesn't help?
is the attitude of our recruiters (among others)
We've even seen it mentioned on the boards here plenty of times.

Someone goes into the recruiting office and says 'I wanna be in the infantry' and the recruiter says "ahh geee damn why do tyou wanna do that, you don't want infantry, you qualify for so many other things, take my advice don't go infantry"

What a bad message to send.

We have quite the opposite problem with Reserve recruiting locally. Candidates coming through the door have either watched every episode of "Band of Brothers" (twice) and want to be infanteers, or have seen every rerun of M*A*S*H* a thousand times and want to be medics. Encouraging any other trade option is like pulling teeth.

 

[the 48th regulator]

48 Regulator: was it in Sector South, en rte to the Kenyan OP? Your last name seems familiar. Cheers.

yes that was me.

we we left the Kenyan o.p and was head back to Charles coy camp.

cheers

 

[the 48th regulator]

Just out of interest, where were you ambushed and how did you survive?

I believe that the facts of  the 507th ambush are much worse than what you are suggesting. I have heard from US types here that the members of the coy did not have magazines in their weapons and in some cases were not able to operate weapons such as the SAWS (=our C9). These sad facts, as well as high level of concern about the low combat skill levels of their CSS types (esecially ARES CSS) has led the US Army to go into the crash combat training program I referred to above. Perhaps you may not feel that such training will make much difference, but evidently the US Army, who have all the facts of the 507 incident, do feel that it is needed. Survival in an ambush, to the extent that survival is possible, is IMHO a product of preparation, as is survival in combat in general. While I agree with you that a well-laid ambush will probably kill or injure a large number of its victims, I can also tell you that the Coalition forces here commonly experience ambushes laid with varying degrees of skill, and because of training and preparation their casualties are usually minimized.

You seem to suggest that there is no way for CSS units to avoid ambushes, nor to minimize their effects. I disagree completely, and I back up my position with the most recent "Lessons Learned" publication from the US Army here in Afgh. They have learned many ways to achieve both of these things.
But, lessons learned are just so much useless history if they are not put into effect through realistic and demanding training, and this is the issue in the 507 situation: they were apparently not properly trained for combat. Our CSS folks are vital: if they die, we fail. Therefore we must train and equip them to survive. The approach of the USMC is that "every Marine is a rifleman" (NOT, they hasten to point out, every Marine an infantryman...) and this ensures that even Marine CSS units can give a good account of  themselves in combat.

Quite apart from the physical skills and drills, there is the mental outlook that is a product of proper training. Awarness, alertness, immediate reaction, self-confidence and determination are products of good combat training. IMHO, these are needed by anybody who may be faced with enemy contact, whether it be ambush, raid on a CSS hide, etc. Cheers.

To answer the first question it was the former Yugoslavia, Southwest sector of Croatia, UNPROFOR ROTO 5, 31/12/1994.  We were returning from escorting a convoy of engineers who were setting up the power and lights to an O.P that we had to reconstruct.  The Local belligerents had threatened to attack the o.p due to the fact that we Confiscated U.N equipment sold to them by the former peacekeepers who dwelled there.  We attempted to detain some of their personnel, confiscated weapons and equipment, and ended up in a "Mexican standoff" with them for a period of time.  When cooler heads prevailed our platoon escorted them off the grounds of the o.p, all the time hearing these belligerents threaten to kill in both English and Serbo Croation. (My response was exactly as follows "ON YER BIKE). 

We left behind the Pioneer section of our company (which was a section of our platoon) and returned to our company camp with some of the weapons and equipment to be bagged and tagged.  A decision was made that since it was New Years eve the Locals would be restless and it was determined that we needed to get power and light up the area of the o.p pronto.  My Buddy (Phil Badanai) was assigned as the driver of the lead vehicle and was told to find a volunteer to ride shotgun.  He went to his I.S.O trailer which was close to ours, poked his head in mine told me what he was up to and I said I would go with him, as I still had most of my gear on.

We headed to the town of Benkovac, hooked up with our convoy (about 2-3 vehicles) of engineers, and headed back to the o.p with minor incidences of children throwing firecrackers at us, or some drunken fool stumbling on the side of the road with firearm slung (you name it they had it, both new and old). We arrived at the o.p dropped off our engineer brothers, and declined an invitation to stay. We wanted to head back to the mess for a hot meal and some pints.

Off we went in our ILTIS (God bless it . . . he he) and headed back.  It was dark now and the party was now full under way.  The most surreal scene that I have ever witnessed.  Constant sound of small arm bursts and the gentle arcs of green tracer were lighting the air.  The radio crackled and we were all told to keep the shot reps to a minimum, and to report only visual threats that would need investigation from the Recce PLT or the QRF. 

We then rounded a corner and there was a group of about 25-30 guys on the right side of the road.  I un-racked my weapon, but decided to lay the weapon across my lap as not to agitate them  (can you tell I had just finished reading Bravo Two Zero?), as we expected they would let us pass and fire in the air just to let us know who was in charge.  Ya we could have turned around, but at this close proximity (about less than 30 M) I would rather have drove pass them than receive the token cowards' bullet in the back, plus aren't we taught to charge into the direction of enemy fire when in an ambush, might as well start to move in that direction when you know they are there. (yes yes I know not enemy, B E L I G E R E N T I sometimes forget my pre training)

They poured onto the road to stop us, I told Phil not to stop, and he slowed down slightly so we would not hit anyone.  They made a break in the crowd; we gunned the gas and went for that break.  This startled and pissed them off.  They caulked their weapons and opened fire; I could have reached out and grabbed their rifels if I wanted to.  As per my training instincts, I caulked my weapon (yep we were not allowed to have a round up the spout) and before I could return fire I was knocked out.... You can read more about the extent of my injuries on the 48th website and all about my time afterwards.

Whew hoped that answered the first one PBI

As for whether I seem to suggest that there is no way for CSS units to avoid ambushes or survive, nope, I suggest that we should not kid our selves into believing that just because troops that constantly practice ambush drills In meaford or Pet against the Fantasian horde will fair better than those that don't, as I think that's hooey

Until we learn how the enemy acts and feel will we be able to beat them at their game, mind you we will still need to practice and borrow from previous engagements, we can only do proper training in theatre, you should know this as that what was being done even in Khandahar.  But, face it an ambush is meant to surprise you, keep you off your momentum and win by beating while your still trying to figure out what's happening.

That's what I meant.  Sorry for the long ramble mates (man I love this web site, glad I found it)

Tess.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Glad you made it through and are able to contribute to the site.

Long posts make for good reads

 

[dutchie]

That's what I meant.  Sorry for the long ramble mates (man I love this web site, glad I found it)

You weren't rambling, and thanks for the good read.

Welcome.

 

[Infanteer]

I feel the Regulator and others are correct in many points.

Instilling combat drills in CS and CSS troops on a routine basis will not make necessarily make them more effective fighters.   As some have pointed out, there may be unintended consequences of this.   As well, as Regulator pointed out, these troops fell into an ambush.   The bad guys are smart and know what their doing.   I think what we are lamenting is the fact that many of our support guys may face a situation mentally unprepared for the situation; a perfect example is not having their firing pin in or treating their weapon gently for fear of an ND.

Changing gears abit, perhaps the goal should be to install the correct mindset into all soldiers.   In another spot, I discussed my philosophy on people; there are two types of people in life; people of action or people who are victims.

People of action will react and seize any opportunity to take their fate into their own hand, even if, in the end, they go down fighting.

People who are victims are passive to threats for many reasons (panic, unsure of what to do, fear); they become victims to people of action.   A good example is these poor guys getting their heads lopped off by militant terrorists.   They are just kneeling on the ground passively while a terrorist cuts their head off.

I am not saying all CSS are victims and all Infanteers are action takers, but I feel the difference in mentality weights each to each side.   This comes in part from my personal experience.   I remember the NSE in Velika Kladusa as seeming to be "out of sync" with the companies in the battlegroup.   To many of them, the focus was on bingo night, Sunday routine, and the next mess party.   In my company, we seemed keyed to physical fitness (the gym was never empty on our small camp), playing around with all things military (kit, etc) and preparing for the next op (Ok, it was a PSO, but we were keen to get our boots muddy).   Things like physical fitness (confidence), musketry (capability), and a very active ops or training tempo (morale and sense of mission) were all important to the fostering of a soldiering mentality.   I just didn't see it to the same degree in the NSE.

The goal of basic training (and of Army training in general) should be to turn every soldier in a person of action.   Whether it means fixing a vehicle under fire, fighting a fire in a ship while engaged by a hostile force, or fighting off an ambush and maybe dieing in the effort to do so, at least these people are mentally prepared to meet their fate "with their boots on", as my Grandfather like to say.   I believe the fundamental nature of a fighting soldier is that he is a man of action; good soldiers understand that the chaos of war may fling a bad situation their way, but they refuse to be victims.

How to do this will take alot more then just teaching Support trades "Ambush Left" drills.   It is something that needs to be expounded on from day 1 in recruit school and continually reinforced throughout the Army at all levels.   We should do our best to weed out victims, people who are apt to stand by and let circumstance completely overwhelm them, whether they are a clerk on a convoy who won't put the firing pin in or a company commander who is indecisive in stressful combat situations; having victims in the army can be a danger to those that serve around them.   As well, Matt's proposition of the "Force Protection NCO" in all units is a step in the right direction; it helps to develop the idea that we are all responsible in the field of battle for our lives and for the mission, regardless of what our trade is.

Any thoughts on this approach to looking at things?   I hope this doesn't appear to be "bravado", because that is not the intent.   I realize that not everybody in the Army can be a hardcore Airborne trooper, but I firmly believe we should do our best to mentally prepare every soldier for the rigors of battle.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Gayson]

Great post Infanteer! 

 

[LowRider]

Having enough money in the yearly budget,to allow us to get on the range and actually handle a weapon more than once a year would help. ???

 

[Soleman]

Training...this topic is one that the brass in Ottawa should be making a post on.  A saying that means alot now-a-days is Train to fight, Fight like you train.  Being and becoming a proficient soldier is not just the army's job to train you it is also the individuals job to want to improve themselves.  To often I have seen people going on the range once a year striving just to make the bare minimum for a pass.  What is worse is the cuts in budget and ammo that prevent ranges from taking place in CSS units.  Most of them get to do MLOC on the SAT range.  I find this piece of equipment useless for developing and maintaining any marksman skills. They should have taken the money spent on that, it's yearly upkeep cost and put it towards ammo. 

If you are not comfortable with your weapon in training you will be useless in a firefight.  The army needs to break away from conventional ranges, 100,200,300m prone, kneeling etc.  They need to concentrate on CQB and train for unconventional warfare.

:warstory: I was on the 25m range in Julien practising CQB drills with the Slovs.  During our fire and movement/transition drill between C8 and pistol, a Strat officer who was waiting to use the range after us came up to talk to our RNCO and proceeded to tell him that you can't do that it is unsafe range practise.  I didn't realise a firefight was safe?

Another situation...Going on a live fire range and being told by the Log O that we can remove our TV and helmet because they will be constricting during this scenario.  I refused to remove my kit, and was then told that everyone will dress the same or I won't take part in this range. 
Until people get used to the idea of not being scared of their weapon, knowing what state it is in and how to use it properly it doesn't matter what MOC you are an ambush will get you killed.  Granted Infanteers this is your bread and butter so don't think this is directed towards you.  Being a loggie I know exactly what the previous posts are talking about. 

That said, how is the guy with the foot doing?

For what it's worth...

 

[Infanteer]

Well, I must say Soleman, you are a breath of fresh air.  Good post.

 

[pbi]

Any thoughts on this approach to looking at things?  I hope this doesn't appear to be "bravado", because that is not the intent.  I realize that not everybody in the Army can be a hardcore Airborne trooper, but I firmly believe we should do our best to mentally prepare every soldier for the rigors of battle.

In the end, I'll settle for this being the lesson of this thread. Cheers.

 

[pbi]

48Regulator: Thanks for your story.

What happened to you that night can be laid, to a great extent, at the feet of the Kenyan Battalion (KENBAT) who held that OP before your bn took it over. I was OC C Coy (Gornje Miranje-Kamp Krusty) on the Roto you guys took over from. I handed over to Maj Robinson. I was (prior to the AO shift) the left flank of  CANBAT, so I was responsible to try and keep liaison with KENBAT.

The first time I met the Kenyan commander was at a conference being held at the HQ of the SVK Bde just between Kamp Krusty and Sopot on the Benkovac road. I told him that I wanted to start running contact patrols to his right flank. He seemed very concerned, then said: "Well-I'll have to ask the Serb Brigade Commander". I asked him what the Serb Bde Comd had to do with it, and he replied: "Oh, well-he told me that if the Canadians are going to come into my area I have to ask his permission first." This was my first clear indication of how utterly useless they were.

When we started the patrols, they reported that the Kenyans were doing absolutely nothing. They had not even fortified their OP (we had to send NCOs to teach them how.,..) and were often asleep. As well, we heard that the Kenyans were not really in control of their own OP. Finally, they were completely corrupt: we had standing orders in the bn to stop any of their vehicles we met on the road in our AO and find out where they were going, because they were selling POL, etc to the Serbs. We were often asked by locals why we wouldn't sell POL to them.

When you guys took over that area, you disturbed a relationship that the Kenyans had fostered because they did not want to do their jobs (if they even had the faintest idea what that was...). The Serbs were not keen to see the CANBAT approach spreading into the KENBAT area, because it might have made life more difficult for them. When you guys turfed them out of the OP, that was probably the last straw. Cheers.

 

[KevinB]

http://lightfighter.net/eve/ubb.x?q=Y&a=tpc&s=7336015661&f=7206084761&m=2356046934&p=12

Food for thought...

You aren't going to turn your weapon in if it's dirty. I'm not your mom, so you're going to clean it.

If you break it, or let it rust shut, and the enemy is on your ass, I'm not going to lend you another one to f_ it up.

Clean your weapon or die. The front leaning rest should be the least of your worries.

Sure, they might make one that's easier to clean, or easier to take apart. Non-combat folks need to get it through their thick skulls that the enemy doesn't care what their MOS might be. If it looks vaguely like an American, they're going to shoot at it.

IMHO, I've found delayed roller lock weapons easier to disassemble and clean. But they still get dirty. And, the recoil operated stuff like the M2 stays really clean, but is more complicated to disassemble.

This "I don't want to clean my weapon" stuff really amazes me. Makes you wonder if someone says, "I didn't wipe my ass, because I was too busy repairing trucks. I wish the Army would issue me a teflon sphincter."

and

Let me ask you a question, when you were a pogue, wandering around, ignorantly banging your weapon on everything, lazily throwing it on the ground, and too busy playing cards or grab-ass to clean it, did you really realize you were a pogue?"

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Soleman wrote:

Most of them get to do MLOC on the SAT range.  I find this piece of equipment useless for developing and maintaining any marksman skills.

I would have to suggest that either you were not briefed/debriefed properly, and/or your SAT operator did not know what he was doing.

The SAT, while it cannot, and should not, replace live firing, is an excellent tool to teach basic markmanship (developing), and in displaying many of the bad habits shooters sometimes develop.  Once a month on the SAT range is a great aid for maintaining skills, with the proper coaches.  If I had my way, everyone would shoot MLOC on the SAT monthly, and open range practices of shoot to live quarterly.