Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

…double-edged sword, KevinB. If the Canadian Army were (put back) in charge of funding green aviation, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the same thing happen to aviation as it did in the early-90s…hint: Starts with “Ch” and rhymes with “opped the Chinook D-model Upgrade Project and shut down the CFLUH (light [armed] helicopter) Project.”

I think (hope) that the Canadian Army has learned some valuable lessons from Afghanistan and Syria.
There are a lot of young (to us) bright officers who don't remember 4 CMBG or Reforger - and the stale idea of a peer battle in Germany - and have actual experience with combat operations.

 

[Good2Golf]

No disagreement there, but experience colors the lens everyone looks at solutions through.
I also freely admit there are things that AH cannot do, but in the grand scheme of what was better for the CF, I think the AH>Tank

Perhaps if the AH was marketed as an Armed Reconnaissance Unicorn Helper (ARUH)?

 

[KevinB]

You are a creative guy -- but I think PARROT - Partially Armored Reconnaissance Reserve Over Terrain would fly better
- That way there is no "Armed" reference - and the 'defensive capabilities' out to 20km or something can in fine print

 

[Kirkhill]

One needs to be realistic with the CF.
3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.

The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.

Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.

IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.

Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
As well as the Vandoo BN's. Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.

This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.

Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.

A further thought wrt this, and the need to be realistic.

Howzabout?

Retain the three brigades.

Retain two in their existing 1+2 LIB + LAV configurations.
Convert one to a 2+1 LIB + LAV configurations

Create 3 Lt Cav ISR regiments, one per existing brigade.

Collocate one of the 1+2 Brigades with a Divisional Tank Regiment Group (Tanks and Armd Engrs) and potentially the Div Arty Group. Keep the Combat Support Group of specialists separate.

You still end up with 5 LAV Battalions, a functional RCAC with a Tank Regiment, and 3 deployable Bde HQs.

But you also end up with a Bde HQ emphasising and acting as champion for the LIBs.

And that is the real LAV LIB problem. So much of the army is invested in the LAVs that the LIBs dont get the respect or consideration they deserve.

And that, in turn, has a detrimental effect on the LAV Bns because their GIBs dont get access to "the heavy / large caliber weapons" available to the footborne soldiers these days.

Instead of 3 LAV Bde Commanders, 6 LAV Bn Commanders and 3 LAV Bn Commanders without LAVs, the discussion group would be 2 LAV Bde Commanders with 5 LAV Bn Commanders and 1 LIB Bde Commander with 4 LIB Bn Commanders. A 7 on 5 discussion. In addition the LAV Commanders would have to cognizance of their GIBs needs.

 

[GR66]

One needs to be realistic with the CF.
3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.

The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.

Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.

IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.

Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
As well as the Vandoo BN's. Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.

This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.

Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.

and

Also like what was done for Somalia with the CAR - there is nothing stopping LI forces from being GUBs in a LAV if the mission requires.
JSOC assets in Iraq used Strykers for taxis to areas where dropping in with a help was ill-advised.

But LAV's are heavy and bulky - and to land them you need an airport - so a Para capability to seize an airfield is an absolute requirement.
At Min you want the ability to drop 4 coy of Paras - as while a company can control a small airport - it can't control a large one - and it can't overcome any sort of defensive position

Always interesting to get different viewpoints and ideas on how best to move forward. A couple of questions come to mind.

1) You suggest a lighter footprint force would be a capability gap that we could fill for our potential coalition partners. Do you believe that there is some inherent capability that a light infantry battalion specifically brings to the table that would make it valuable to our partners, or is it simply the fact that being light (and air deployable) it can be quickly deployed to meet a developing threat? If it's simply the rapid deployability that makes them desirable, are there other air mobile capabilities that might be even more valuable than a light infantry battalion? Engineers, ISR assets, precision fires, SHORAD, JTACs, light AT vehicles, EW capabilities, etc.?

2) Your suggestion is to concentrate the light battalions in Petawawa (1 & 3 RCR) and Edmonton (1 & 3 VP). Presumably, you'd rotate readiness between the battalions. Do you foresee any issues with the high-readiness battalion shifting geographically back and forth between two locations? Would you be better off having three light battalions consolidated in a single location (Petawawa) by having 2 RCR and RCD swapping locations? This could become your primary jump-capable force concentrated in a single location that is fairly close to the major air transportation base.

3) You suggest that armoured recce has been "overtaken by events". Do you see no useful role for the LAV Recce vehicle either as part of the LAV battalion CS company or as a Brigade Recce resource? Possibly combined with other assets like tube-launched UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles, EW vehicles, etc.? Is it the capability of the vehicle that you think is obsolete or that the vehicle itself is too heavy for the role and would be better suited to a lighter (air transportable?) platform.

4) You recommend that at minimum you'd want the ability to drop four parachute companies in order to take an airfield. Do you think that forced entry is a "must have" role for Canada, or is the capability more of a "like to have" that may or may not be worth the expense? If it's a capability we want to have, would it make sense to drop your proposed 4th LIB and instead have 3 x LIBs with four companies each to rotate readiness so you wouldn't have to patch together a large enough force from different units when it is required?

 

[CBH99]

For major capital acquisitions - given the size of the CF budget - looking at jumping on NATO country (okay the US And Uk only really) programs would offer a lot of savings -- but probably won't fly because it isn't Quebec related spending spree

I love drones - but a UAV isn't a replacement for an AH, even if you stick a CANSOF guy in with the drone 'pilot' to help interpret the ground - you do not get the same SA as being in the area - and AH can do very close support missions.

Oh I completely agree. But the Canadian public have to be some of the dumbest, most out of touch, unrealistic, “woke” societies on Earth when it comes to military matters.

Buying an attack helicopter won’t fly. Look at all the fuss to be had just over deploying Griffons…

An armed recce helicopter on the other hand? (Call it a recce helicopter that can be used to scan for enemy forces that may want to attack innocent civilians, and the weapons are purely to protect civilians from the bad guys. Boom, all of a sudden the public either supports or is indifferent to the purchase just by what we call it... )



I don’t remember the exact details of the Leo2 purchase, but I do remember some of them were acquired for dirt cheap as part of the deal we negotiated. ($100,000 is cheaper than what we paid for each G-Wagon.)

In my opinion it WAS the better option than going with the all LAV force as Hillier had mentioned, which included the 105mm MGS. Their thinking was ‘the tank is dead’ - thankfully the Leo2 came into the inventory when it did, as it offered protection from IEDs that the LAV simply couldn’t.

Does it make sense to keep them moving forwards? Debatable. But they did very much prove their worth at the time. (I believe it was just the USMC, the Dutch, and the CAF that deployed tanks to southern Afghanistan.)

Like FJAG said, those thick reinforced mud walls were tough as hell. Small arms weren’t getting through, and the 25mm would blast away through them in short order. A 120mm (??) round just took the party to a whole new level...time to recalculate what arc one is covering.



Would a fleet of standardized MBTs be nice to have, and fulfill a useful role given enough time to deploy? Absolutely.

Is it realistic for the CAF to deploy more than a dozen or two of them to an operation, even with a few weeks to a month notice? As currently set up, no. Sending MBTs across the pond would be much more efficiently done via ship than airplane, but even then they wouldn't be arriving quickly. They would also be arriving to reinforce a continent where most NATO countries have decent sized tank fleets.




Given the discussion about reorganizing the Army to make better use of the LAVs, or getting more capable LIBs - at the end of the day, it boils down to using our limited budgets wisely. Is having a fleet of tanks we won't ever deploy worth the cost of maintenance/upkeep, as a G7 country should have tanks? Or can we tangibly put that money elsewhere, and be more useful to a coalition deployment?

 

[KevinB]

Oh I completely agree. But the Canadian public have to be some of the dumbest, most out of touch, unrealistic, “woke” societies on Earth when it comes to military matters.

Buying an attack helicopter won’t fly. Look at all the fuss to be had just over deploying Griffons…

An armed recce helicopter on the other hand? (Call it a recce helicopter that can be used to scan for enemy forces that may want to attack innocent civilians, and the weapons are purely to protect civilians from the bad guys. Boom, all of a sudden the public either supports or is indifferent to the purchase just by what we call it... )



I don’t remember the exact details of the Leo2 purchase, but I do remember some of them were acquired for dirt cheap as part of the deal we negotiated. ($100,000 is cheaper than what we paid for each G-Wagon.)

Dont get me started on the G-Wagon

In my opinion it WAS the better option than going with the all LAV force as Hillier had mentioned, which included the 105mm MGS. Their thinking was ‘the tank is dead’ - thankfully the Leo2 came into the inventory when it did, as it offered protection from IEDs that the LAV simply couldn’t.

I've seen M1A2 Abrams taken out by IED's - the enemy can and will build a bigger bomb.
Tanks by themselves are really just targets - and the lack of a tracked IFV does reduce the interoperability = except in some terrain/and threat conditions

Does it make sense to keep them moving forwards? Debatable. But they did very much prove their worth at the time. (I believe it was just the USMC, the Dutch, and the CAF that deployed tanks to southern Afghanistan.)

Like FJAG said, those thick reinforced mud walls were tough as hell. Small arms weren’t getting through, and the 25mm would blast away through them in short order. A 120mm (??) round just took the party to a whole new level...time to recalculate what arc one is covering.

But a Hellfire from a Helo can take out things from above - as well as do gun and rocket runs

Would a fleet of standardized MBTs be nice to have, and fulfill a useful role given enough time to deploy? Absolutely.

Is it realistic for the CAF to deploy more than a dozen or two of them to an operation, even with a few weeks to a month notice? As currently set up, no. Sending MBTs across the pond would be much more efficiently done via ship than airplane, but even then they wouldn't be arriving quickly. They would also be arriving to reinforce a continent where most NATO countries have decent sized tank fleets.




Given the discussion about reorganizing the Army to make better use of the LAVs, or getting more capable LIBs - at the end of the day, it boils down to using our limited budgets wisely. Is having a fleet of tanks we won't ever deploy worth the cost of maintenance/upkeep, as a G7 country should have tanks? Or can we tangibly put that money elsewhere, and be more useful to a coalition deployment?

A further thought wrt this, and the need to be realistic.

Howzabout?

Retain the three brigades.

Retain two in their existing 1+2 LIB + LAV configurations.
Convert one to a 2+1 LIB + LAV configurations

Create 3 Lt Cav ISR regiments, one per existing brigade.

Why not give the Lt Cav ISR the LAV's -

Collocate one of the 1+2 Brigades with a Divisional Tank Regiment Group (Tanks and Armd Engrs) and potentially the Div Arty Group. Keep the Combat Support Group of specialists separate.

You still end up with 5 LAV Battalions, a functional RCAC with a Tank Regiment, and 3 deployable Bde HQs.

But you also end up with a Bde HQ emphasising and acting as champion for the LIBs.

And that is the real LAV LIB problem. So much of the army is invested in the LAVs that the LIBs dont get the respect or consideration they deserve.

Honestly in my 2+1 from above with the RCR and PPLCI, I would expect the Reservers to fill a 3rd LIB for prolonged issues - with the 3rd (well 2nd Bn) brought in for sustainment in longer missions that have a footprint and now can bring in heavier equipment.

And that, in turn, has a detrimental effect on the LAV Bns because their GIBs dont get access to "the heavy / large caliber weapons" available to the footborne soldiers these days.

Instead of 3 LAV Bde Commanders, 6 LAV Bn Commanders and 3 LAV Bn Commanders without LAVs, the discussion group would be 2 LAV Bde Commanders with 5 LAV Bn Commanders and 1 LIB Bde Commander with 4 LIB Bn Commanders. A 7 on 5 discussion. In addition the LAV Commanders would have to cognizance of their GIBs needs.

My believe is anyone can be a GIB - while a LAV crew that can actually work with dismounts is much harder to find.
But I don't think that LAV Bn's do a good job thinking out how to best retain and expand the skills of LI.

and

Always interesting to get different viewpoints and ideas on how best to move forward. A couple of questions come to mind.

1) You suggest a lighter footprint force would be a capability gap that we could fill for our potential coalition partners. Do you believe that there is some inherent capability that a light infantry battalion specifically brings to the table that would make it valuable to our partners, or is it simply the fact that being light (and air deployable) it can be quickly deployed to meet a developing threat? If it's simply the rapid deployability that makes them desirable, are there other air mobile capabilities that might be even more valuable than a light infantry battalion? Engineers, ISR assets, precision fires, SHORAD, JTACs, light AT vehicles, EW capabilities, etc.?

The US has a robust rapidly deployable force -- but few other allies other than the British -- I think Canada adding to a QRF/IRF coalition would reap a lot more benefit in bang for the buck - and foreign appreciation.
Troops on the ground are always appreciated - especially early on.
Engineers would be part of the LI-BDE Construct - the rest you mention is pretty much vapor ware in the CF - or lags behind allies.

2) Your suggestion is to concentrate the light battalions in Petawawa (1 & 3 RCR) and Edmonton (1 & 3 VP). Presumably, you'd rotate readiness between the battalions. Do you foresee any issues with the high-readiness battalion shifting geographically back and forth between two locations? Would you be better off having three light battalions consolidated in a single location (Petawawa) by having 2 RCR and RCD swapping locations? This could become your primary jump-capable force concentrated in a single location that is fairly close to the major air transportation base.

I don't see the need to colocate all - in fact I see a desire to have at least two staging areas.

3) You suggest that armoured recce has been "overtaken by events". Do you see no useful role for the LAV Recce vehicle either as part of the LAV battalion CS company or as a Brigade Recce resource? Possibly combined with other assets like tube-launched UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles, EW vehicles, etc.? Is it the capability of the vehicle that you think is obsolete or that the vehicle itself is too heavy for the role and would be better suited to a lighter (air transportable?) platform.

I simply see it doing nothing - they are heavy to move easily - to light to fight.
EW assets are better off either with a static protected position - or airborne for larger coverage and 'more survivability'.

4) You recommend that at minimum you'd want the ability to drop four parachute companies in order to take an airfield. Do you think that forced entry is a "must have" role for Canada, or is the capability more of a "like to have" that may or may not be worth the expense? If it's a capability we want to have, would it make sense to drop your proposed 4th LIB and instead have 3 x LIBs with four companies each to rotate readiness so you wouldn't have to patch together a large enough force from different units when it is required?

I think forced entry is a must for any nation that wants to be a credible international player - and look out for their own interests.
My belief is that 1 BN would be on IRF, the second of the Bde to be on standby - they would rotate then hand odd to the other Bde -- my belief if you are going to do an Airfield seizure you are probably going to send at least 1 Bn - with SOF, and perhaps the 2nd BN, and be spooling up the other two too follow.
I also expect the LIB's to have a Cbt Spt Coy, as well as attachments from a CER, Medics etc.

I didn't want to get too down in the weeds as it was just me throwing an idea out on what I felt was probably in Canadas best interest from both a Army, Nation, and Budget standpoint.

 

[GR66]

I don't see the need to colocate all - in fact I see a desire to have at least two staging areas.
Curious - what do you see as the benefits?

 

[CBH99]

Dont get me started on the G-Wagon

I've seen M1A2 Abrams taken out by IED's - the enemy can and will build a bigger bomb.
Tanks by themselves are really just targets - and the lack of a tracked IFV does reduce the interoperability = except in some terrain/and threat conditions

But a Hellfire from a Helo can take out things from above - as well as do gun and rocket runs


Why not give the Lt Cav ISR the LAV's -

Honestly in my 2+1 from above with the RCR and PPLCI, I would expect the Reservers to fill a 3rd LIB for prolonged issues - with the 3rd (well 2nd Bn) brought in for sustainment in longer missions that have a footprint and now can bring in heavier equipment.


My believe is anyone can be a GIB - while a LAV crew that can actually work with dismounts is much harder to find.
But I don't think that LAV Bn's do a good job thinking out how to best retain and expand the skills of LI.


The US has a robust rapidly deployable force -- but few other allies other than the British -- I think Canada adding to a QRF/IRF coalition would reap a lot more benefit in bang for the buck - and foreign appreciation.
Troops on the ground are always appreciated - especially early on.
Engineers would be part of the LI-BDE Construct - the rest you mention is pretty much vapor ware in the CF - or lags behind allies.


I don't see the need to colocate all - in fact I see a desire to have at least two staging areas.


I simply see it doing nothing - they are heavy to move easily - to light to fight.
EW assets are better off either with a static protected position - or airborne for larger coverage and 'more survivability'.

I think forced entry is a must for any nation that wants to be a credible international player - and look out for their own interests.
My belief is that 1 BN would be on IRF, the second of the Bde to be on standby - they would rotate then hand odd to the other Bde -- my belief if you are going to do an Airfield seizure you are probably going to send at least 1 Bn - with SOF, and perhaps the 2nd BN, and be spooling up the other two too follow.
I also expect the LIB's to have a Cbt Spt Coy, as well as attachments from a CER, Medics etc.

I didn't want to get too down in the weeds as it was just me throwing an idea out on what I felt was probably in Canadas best interest from both a Army, Nation, and Budget standpoint.

I think your idea is great and makes a lot of sense.

Sorry, I wasn’t trying to ask for specifics and bog down the convo. There were a few items in your suggestion I was just curious about. (ie, keep the tanks or no? Etc) Overall, your ideas/suggestions make a lot of sense, and would increase our output given the same relative budget.



I have suggested previously in this thread that given our military’s size, budget, and that we as a country have a pretty small population spread out over a huge landmass — we should decide what we want to contribute, and excel at ‘that’ thing. Whatever it may be.

We have discussed potential restructuring in a ton of different ways, including PYs, weapon systems, doctrine, future technologies, etc.

I enjoy reading the suggestions, especially as most of them have merit even if they are in total opposition of each other.


I do respectfully disagree with FJAG on having a light/medium/heavy brigade. Not that having those options wouldn’t be ideal - in an ideal world, having units that fit those criteria to choose from for a deployment would be great.

If budgets were bigger or could be spent more efficiently, and we could reduce the overhead and fill out some units with more people - that would be worth looking into if we restructured for the future.

However, given how things are right now — budgets, unable to spend that budget wisely, excessive overhead, etc. I think we should ask ourselves “What could we provide to a coalition that would be extremely helpful, is in demand, and helps checks the box for defending Canadian territory?”

Then be world class at that role.


0.02

 

[FJAG]

For those - what about the follow ons?

If memory serves me correctly, the deal went down like this:
a) we originally deployed a squadron of Leo C1s in 2006 and then arranged to borrow 20 Leo 2A6Ms and two recovery vehicles from Germany which were lightly Canadianized and then deployed mid 2007.
b) concurrently we bought 80 Leo 2A4s and 20 Leo 2A6s from the Netherlands.
c) the 20 Dutch Leo 2A6s were modified to Leo 2A6M standards and given directly to Germany in exchange for the borrowed 20 which we retained
d) Of the 80 Leo 2A4s, 20 were converted to Leo 2A4Ms; 42 converted to Leo 2A4+;
e) a further 15 Leo 2A4s were purchased from Germany for parts and a further 12 Leo 2A4s (Pz 87) were purchased from Switzerland
f) 30 of the Leo 2A4s were converted into 12 ARVs and 18 AEVs

All of these were bought with the $600 million (I've seen that figure as $460 million in some places- you know how government accountants can't keep their figures straight) which had been allocated for the purchase of 66 MGSs which were to replace the 116 Leo C1s that remained in service by the turn of the millennium.

Yes because no AH existed - tanks are absolutely terrible for most territory in Afghanistan - I'd argue while they where used effectively by the CF in Afghanistan - the desire for them was the fact that Infantry Officers in Canada had experience with tanks from the various development courses - and defaulted to TANK - as opposed to seeing the requirement was actually better met by AH's
*I say that as someone with both experience with both.

Canada did use attack helicopters in Afghanistan - basically US ones in early 2006 and subsequently, whenever available, Dutch ones. We also had access to Predator and US and Dutch tac air. In later years US resources again became more available under the surge. All Canadian artillery FOO dets deploying to Afghanistan had at least one trained and qualified JTAC to employ tac air and attack aviation.

I don't think anyone realistically ever considered that the air force would spring for attack helicopters. Love a duck - it took the 2008 Manley report to even get Chinooks back into the system.

No disagreement there, but experience colors the lens everyone looks at solutions through.
I also freely admit there are things that AH cannot do, but in the grand scheme of what was better for the CF, I think the AH>Tank

I think tanks and attack helicopters are complementary weapon systems - its hard to seize and hold ground with an attack helicopter and its hard to redeploy tanks quickly. In a real fight there are clear roles for both.

Again, the biggest impediment to Canada obtaining attack helicopters is the RCAF. I sometimes consider it a miracle that we even have transport aircraft seeing as they don't go zoom, zoom. ... And don't get me started about how long its been taking to get a MALE UAV.

 

[Good2Golf]

Again, the biggest impediment to Canada obtaining attack helicopters is the RCAF. I sometimes consider it a miracle that we even have transport aircraft seeing as they don't go zoom, zoom. ... And don't get me started about how long its been taking to get a MALE UAV.

…and I will continue to hold (even ex-)Army officers to account for sins past. Every significant decision that resulted in tactical aviation capabilities being cut or reduced was under the Aegis of the Canadian Army. FMC chose not to find MTH upgrade in 1990/1991 and to cease CFLH in 1993/1994. Vote 5 funding was FMC’s accountability, not Air Command’s. Even CFUTTH’s pivot from UH-60s (CADO’s DLA recommendation) to Bell 412’s in 1992 was endorsed in St-Hubert, NOT Winnipeg.

The Army is the Scorpion to Tactical Aviation’s Frog…

 

[FJAG]

…and I will continue to hold (even ex-)Army officers to account for sins past. Every significant decision that resulted in tactical aviation capabilities being cut or reduced was under the Aegis of the Canadian Army. FMC chose not to find MTH upgrade in 1990/1991 and to cease CFLH in 1993/1994. Vote 5 funding was FMC’s accountability, not Air Command’s. Even CFUTTH’s pivot from UH-60s (CADO’s DLA recommendation) to Bell 412’s in 1992 was endorsed in St-Hubert, NOT Winnipeg.

The Army is the Scorpion to Tactical Aviation’s Frog…

I noted your earlier comment to KevinB re "double-edged sword" and totally agree with you.

While the Army has always had funding restraints, its response to those over the last three decades has been to randomly shed capabilities. I know that there have been many people diligently at work doing the best they can but for some reason or other the Army has been struck by institutional ineptitude when it comes to its own equipment. I blame it all on a lack of any real doctrine and an attempt to cobble together what it considers to be the most relevant capabilities but along the way causes the shedding of what is truly necessary to be a "full-spectrum" force.

I can list a litany of lost/almost lost capabilities which includes armour, SP armoured artillery, anti-armour, mortar shuffling around, air defence, STA, IFVs ... one can go on and on.

One can argue the value of a full-spectrum heavy force vs a light or medium rapidly deployable force until the cows come home but we haven't been in Afghanistan as a combat force since 2011 while we have been in Latvia leading an international armoured battle group. We're not committed to any rapid deployment interventionist or air-field seizing missions (and after this week's events in Afghanistan we're not likely to be ever again except as special ops folks) but we are more and more being recommitted to Europe and we should be seriously thinking Pacific (there's even a comment recognizing that in the SSE notwithstanding our current Sino-loving regime)

I know that our glacial definition of land requirements and procurement system is working on things but I seriously doubt that the Army has a coherent forward looking strategy. So ... yup .... I agree .... putting aviation into the hands of the Army would not be a recipe for any greater success than where it is now. We would certainly not see anything as expensive to acquire and sustain as attack helicopters magically appear overnight. The question would be: what would the Army be prepared to give up for that? Two infantry battalions for one squadron? - hardly likely.

 

[Good2Golf]

I will in fairness point out that more recently, the Canadian Army did sacrifice an armoured recce squadron to give PYs to the Air Force to ensure that Chinooks would serve on an Army base, not an Air Force base…FJAG, over a good dunkleweisse, I’ll share the 3*-3* conversation backstory to the end state there.

cheers
G2G

 

[FJAG]

I will in fairness point out that more recently, the Canadian Army did sacrifice an armoured recce squadron to give PYs to the Air Force to ensure that Chinooks would serve on an Army base, not an Air Force base…FJAG, over a good dunkleweisse, I’ll share the 3*-3* conversation backstory to the end state there.

cheers
G2G

I'm a Reinheitsgebot Pilsner kind of guy, but I'm game.

 

[Kirkhill]

…and I will continue to hold (even ex-)Army officers to account for sins past. Every significant decision that resulted in tactical aviation capabilities being cut or reduced was under the Aegis of the Canadian Army. FMC chose not to find MTH upgrade in 1990/1991 and to cease CFLH in 1993/1994. Vote 5 funding was FMC’s accountability, not Air Command’s. Even CFUTTH’s pivot from UH-60s (CADO’s DLA recommendation) to Bell 412’s in 1992 was endorsed in St-Hubert, NOT Winnipeg.

The Army is the Scorpion to Tactical Aviation’s Frog…

Each brigade has a TacHel squadron co-located. What is the purpose of that squadron? Who pays for it? Who tasks it? Is there some doctrine associated with a brigade level asset and its 146/147 ratio?

Or is it an orphan? Like the LIBs?

 

[Good2Golf]

A hybrid across the country. 1 and 5 Bde are the only formations with a dedicated op 146 Sqn. CTC has a 146 Sqn in location, but its primary role as the OTU is 146 operational conversion and secondarily is support to CTC. 2 Bde has no dedicated 146 Sqn. 427 may support a 2 Bde request only after its primary role for CANSOF is fulfilled. 147 uniquely home bases in Petawawa, but to geographically centre amongst the brigades, not as a dedicated unit to 2 CMBG. The RCAF has essentially delegate day to day coord of TH assets to 1 Wing HQ in Kingston, which coords with respective G3 Avns at the Bdes and CTC to assign TH assets as required to support CA requests. More complex activities will rise both the green and light blue(ish) chains for planning and tasking. Discretion is also left to each Sqn CO to conduct local activity for collateral training where both the Army and the Sqn may benefit from collaboration.

There are some +/- to the above, but that’s the general gist of if.

Regards
G2G

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks for the usual education.

 

[Kirkhill]

"Events, dear boy, events." Attributed to former UK PM Harold MacMillan ca 1957.

Events. Disrupt and dictate. They create the environment in which governments operate. They define how governments are judged. They force governments to react.

One of the tools that a sovereign government is permitted is an armed force which it can deploy in any manner it sees fit. And at any time of its choosing.

Some governments choose to retain the ability to react rapidly, acting on the basis that some events are best countered with timely interventions.
Some governments choose to retain the ability to react deliberately, acting on the basis that some events are best countered coolly.
All governments always retain the ability to not react at all, to simply ignore events.

A well prepared government will, in my opinion, maintain all three capabilities: the ability to react rapidly, to react deliberately or to ignore.

My sense is that the majority of Canadian governments, especially since the Lester Pearson era, have limited, if not eliminated the ability of the government to used armed force rapidly. The emphasis has been on the deliberate response, and a limited deliberate response at that.

Politically that makes it easier for the government to pursue its preferred policy with respect to events: Ignore. Ignore and wait for them to pass over the political horizon, to be forgotten. And, in truth. it works. Events ignored are not allowed to disrupt, to dictate.

But sometimes events intrude that cannot be ignored.

Most of us here, on this site, believe in the need for the government to possess the ability to respond to events. Especially events that impact on the government's sovereign territory.

My personal appreciation is that most of Canada's sovereign territory is more easily accessed by air than by land, by helicopters and aeroplanes than by trucks, by ships and boats than by rail, by tracks than by wheels. And that wireless communications are a necessity. It is my belief that if the government is denied, or better, denies itself, the ability to operate in these modes, then it and its armed forces, are doing a disservice to the state and the people that pay taxes to have their sovereign government protect them and their interests.

It is well enough to believe that it is unlikely that we will be called on to defend ourselves either because of a lack of an intruder or because our neighbour will "mow our lawn for us".

But events keep showing us that the unlikely happens.

That is why I keep harping on the need for a force that can deploy and operate usefully, in a timely fashion, all across Canada's sovereign territories, by day or by night, regardless of season or terrain. That is why I continue to argue for a light force that can deploy by air and sea nationally. A light force that can operate seamlessly with the RCAF, the RCN and CANSOFCOM as well as Other Government Departments. A light force rendered as capable as possible with the best available technology compatible with rapid national deployment. A light force that can be internationally deployed if Canada's interests are appropriately served, if the operational environment is suitable and if events are deemed to require it. And can't be ignored.

We have created an army that does not meet my basic national objectives.

It is an army that permits the government to deploy deliberately, ponderously, infrequently. To ignore events.

But it is also one that is poorly equipped for its primary function, a function well managed by its sister services, the RCN and the RCAF who operate in the environment daily in peace and war, the defence of the homeland.


Helicopters make more sense than tanks.
UAS's make more sense than SP guns.
Bandvagons make more sense than LAVs.

Slainte.

 

[KevinB]

My personal appreciation is that most of Canada's sovereign territory is more easily accessed by air than by land, by helicopters and aeroplanes than by trucks, by ships and boats than by rail, by tracks than by wheels. And that wireless communications are a necessity. It is my belief that if the government is denied, or better, denies itself, the ability to operate in these modes, then it and its armed forces, are doing a disservice to the state and the people that pay taxes to have their sovereign government protect them and their interests.

I 110% agree

It is well enough to believe that it is unlikely that we will be called on to defend ourselves either because of a lack of an intruder or because our neighbour will "mow our lawn for us".

But events keep showing us that the unlikely happens.

That is why I keep harping on the need for a force that can deploy and operate usefully, in a timely fashion, all across Canada's sovereign territories, by day or by night, regardless of season or terrain. That is why I continue to argue for a light force that can deploy by air and sea nationally. A light force that can operate seamlessly with the RCAF, the RCN and CANSOFCOM as well as Other Government Departments. A light force rendered as capable as possible with the best available technology compatible with rapid national deployment. A light force that can be internationally deployed if Canada's interests are appropriately served, if the operational environment is suitable and if events are deemed to require it. And can't be ignored.

Same reasons that I see +1

We have created an army that does not meet my basic national objectives.

It is an army that permits the government to deploy deliberately, ponderously, infrequently. To ignore events.

But it is also one that is poorly equipped for its primary function, a function well managed by its sister services, the RCN and the RCAF who operate in the environment daily in peace and war, the defence of the homeland.

I think that is the basic premise that needs to be hammered home -- the current version of the Can Army is neither fish nor fowl, and entirely inedible.

Helicopters make more sense than tanks.
UAS's make more sense than SP guns.
Bandvagons make more sense than LAVs.

Slainte.

IF Canada was to triple its Defense budget - then one could argue for an Armored Brigade, with SP Guns, Deep Strike Missile system, a robust AA capacity.
However, the realistic view is it (you) won't - and thus need to be very astute with the force structure.

Since FJAG has clarified the costing for the Leo 2's, I'll accept that it was a reasonable choice at the time.

Canada did use attack helicopters in Afghanistan - basically US ones in early 2006 and subsequently, whenever available, Dutch ones. We also had access to Predator and US and Dutch tac air. In later years US resources again became more available under the surge. All Canadian artillery FOO dets deploying to Afghanistan had at least one trained and qualified JTAC to employ tac air and attack aviation.

Having assets in theatre to use if available outside their own national tasks, doesn't equal experience in employment.
Every phase course plays leap down the corridor in Gagetown - there is a big difference in the familiarity between using as a set piece part of doctrine - and adapting on the fly to employing attached assets.

I don't think anyone realistically ever considered that the air force would spring for attack helicopters. Love a duck - it took the 2008 Manley report to even get Chinooks back into the system.

I think tanks and attack helicopters are complementary weapon systems - its hard to seize and hold ground with an attack helicopter and its hard to redeploy tanks quickly. In a real fight there are clear roles for both.

I totally agree - I just think on a cost benefit analysis the AH gives a lot more to the CF (unless one got the tanks at a steal).

Again, the biggest impediment to Canada obtaining attack helicopters is the RCAF. I sometimes consider it a miracle that we even have transport aircraft seeing as they don't go zoom, zoom. ... And don't get me started about how long its been taking to get a MALE UAV.

Based on everything I have read here - and outside of here, the biggest impediment to the Canadian Army is itself.
What needs to happen is a totally new white paper - and doctrine written to best fulfill the needs of Canada - which I view is a Light centric force (as I sit in Virginia and understand that my opinion means nothing).

 

[Kirkhill]

Maybe we can resurrect Paul Hellyer's White Paper. He obviously pissed off a lot of people, especially those invested in kilts, but his fundamental operating assumptions weren't wrong.



The M113 loading into a C130. With ease.




The Bv206 loading into a CH-47D. With care.



The Wiesel loading into a CH-47.


How many Bandvagons and Wiesels in a C17?