Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[CBH99]

A Light Heavy Weapon? Is that a Medium?

I’m sorry but I’m sitting here with some tea while I wait for dinner in the oven, and I almost snorted it when I read that

 

[CBH99]

Un armoured or light armoured heavy weapons, light vehicles with TOW, HMGs, or if we ever went down that route again pac howitzers

I think we really should start looking at some of the latest advancements in anti-armour weapons, medium to heavy machine guns, mortars, etc etc.

Either when it’s time to replace the C9A2, or if we get serious and revamp/reorganize overall. Plenty of newer materials being used that offer lighter weight, durability, can be 3D printed as needed, that are more reliable, and can fire an entire belt without the barrel overheating

TOW, even the latest versions, while capable - are outdated. The missiles are slow, electronic systems outdated in terms of employment in the next conflict, etc. (Not saying TOW is useless at all, but there are plenty of modern systems which are lighter, easier to transport & mount, easier to carry and use if dismounted, with missiles that fly much faster, can be fire & forget, etc)


If we went with the LIB idea above and divested them of the LAV’s to pool them elsewhere, having those LIBs equipped with more lethal, lighter weight, and more reliable weapons would add to the game change in ways that are orders of magnitude bigger than their price tag.

0.02

 

[KevinB]

I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.

Loachman would like that. A twofer. UASs and he gets his Kiowa back.

 

[CBH99]

I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.

Haven’t you heard, we have armed UAVs coming soon. Right around the corner actually. JUSTAS is already funded, and the government is as eager to get moving on it as they are any other file in defence.

Just a few steps left. Like analyzing which options are available to us (MALE type, armed, and compatible with allies…pretty much narrows it down, but heaven forbid we just say what we want and buy it) - making sure Public Works is on board, Industry Canada is on board, the IRB’s are satisfactory, Treasury Board approves, and the lawsuits from all of the companies that didn’t win are dismissed.

We should have armed drones providing real time ISR and armed overwatch to the LIBs any day now.



An armed light helicopter? I mean, the CH-146 is fairly light. And they are now armed… what else could you have in mind?

(I’ve heard of this Loachman fellow, and that he may have flown in a helicopter like once or twice…)

 

[CBH99]

One needs to be realistic with the CF.
3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.

The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.

Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.

IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.

Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
As well as the Vandoo BN's. Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.

This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.

Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.

We had some discussion earlier in this thread (at least I think it was this thread) about whether heavy armour was really a practical capability for Canada to have. (See Leopard 2A4 & A6)

The arguments for keeping heavy armour were along the lines of heavy armour still has a very important role on the modern battlefield, especially against a peer enemy. Even in Afghanistan, tanks proved extremely helpful & capable in many ways.

The arguments for getting rid of that capability were that at most, we would only be deploying maybe a dozen or two tanks at most, and they would arrive in theatre too late to really change much. Even within Canada, just upgrading them all to the same standard and moving them by rail to a port would be slow and time consuming, even if the Army acted fast. (We won’t always have the luxury of a decade long COIN operation to deploy this, acquire that, etc)



Where do you see heavy armour fitting in with your proposal above, if it fits at all?

 

[KevinB]

Haven’t you heard, we have armed UAVs coming soon. Right around the corner actually. JUSTAS is already funded, and the government is as eager to get moving on it as they are any other file in defence.

Just a few steps left. Like analyzing which options are available to us (MALE type, armed, and compatible with allies…pretty much narrows it down, but heaven forbid we just say what we want and buy it) - making sure Public Works is on board, Industry Canada is on board, the IRB’s are satisfactory, Treasury Board approves, and the lawsuits from all of the companies that didn’t win are dismissed.

We should have armed drones providing real time ISR and armed overwatch to the LIBs any day now.



An armed light helicopter? I mean, the CH-146 is fairly light. And they are now armed… what else could you have in mind?

(I’ve heard of this Loachman fellow, and that he may have flown in a helicopter like once or twice…)

Honestly the fact the 146 is still operational surprises me. I would suggest the CF needs at least 3 types of Helicopter - the 47's are back, a medium utility - think Blackhawk - or (as I honestly expected the 146 airframe to be near end of life) the US Blackhawk replacement is coming up - and I think that would be a solid option depending on what is selected.
As much as I am a Little Bird fan - I think the AH-6/MH-6 only really fits to SOF - and something like an AH-1Z Super Cobra would probably be the best option for the CF - they are significantly lighter, and cheaper than the Apaches.

We had some discussion earlier in this thread (at least I think it was this thread) about whether heavy armour was really a practical capability for Canada to have. (See Leopard 2A4 & A6)

The arguments for keeping heavy armour were along the lines of heavy armour still has a very important role on the modern battlefield, especially against a peer enemy. Even in Afghanistan, tanks proved extremely helpful & capable in many ways.

The arguments for getting rid of that capability were that at most, we would only be deploying maybe a dozen or two tanks at most, and they would arrive in theatre too late to really change much. Even within Canada, just upgrading them all to the same standard and moving them by rail to a port would be slow and time consuming, even if the Army acted fast. (We won’t always have the luxury of a decade long COIN operation to deploy this, acquire that, etc)



Where do you see heavy armour fitting in with your proposal above, if it fits at all?

Heavy Armor is sustainment role.
I think in the ideal world Canada would have a forward deployed Heavy Bde like 4 CMBG was "back in the day" - some sort of tracked IFV - and the Leo's -- with some Leo 2 retained at CTC Gagetown for training.

Heavy Forces take absolutely forever to get into a fight - unless you have it prepositioned - or ready to roll to either a RO-RO fleet or a metric butt ton of C-17's -- the whole 1 tank / AC is an extremely impractical way to deliver forces - as you can jump a company with support weapons and sustainment equipment or take 1 tank (not a hard choice) and if you are not jumping - you can get 2 Coy worth of troops and gear (it can take creative loading - but the C-17 has the space and weight to do it easily).

I think Canada's decision to acquire the Leo's was an absolutely imbecilic idea - while they could do operations in limited areas of Afghanistan - it just smacked of rampant careerism on behalf of the Armored Corp Flag Officers - and a great deal more capability could have been acquired for the price tag of an insignificant amount of tanks.

 

[CBH99]

Honestly the fact the 146 is still operational surprises me. I would suggest the CF needs at least 3 types of Helicopter - the 47's are back, a medium utility - think Blackhawk - or (as I honestly expected the 146 airframe to be near end of life) the US Blackhawk replacement is coming up - and I think that would be a solid option depending on what is selected.
As much as I am a Little Bird fan - I think the AH-6/MH-6 only really fits to SOF - and something like an AH-1Z Super Cobra would probably be the best option for the CF - they are significantly lighter, and cheaper than the Apaches.


Heavy Armor is sustainment role.
I think in the ideal world Canada would have a forward deployed Heavy Bde like 4 CMBG was "back in the day" - some sort of tracked IFV - and the Leo's -- with some Leo 2 retained at CTC Gagetown for training.

Heavy Forces take absolutely forever to get into a fight - unless you have it prepositioned - or ready to roll to either a RO-RO fleet or a metric butt ton of C-17's -- the whole 1 tank / AC is an extremely impractical way to deliver forces - as you can jump a company with support weapons and sustainment equipment or take 1 tank (not a hard choice) and if you are not jumping - you can get 2 Coy worth of troops and gear (it can take creative loading - but the C-17 has the space and weight to do it easily).

I think Canada's decision to acquire the Leo's was an absolutely imbecilic idea - while they could do operations in limited areas of Afghanistan - it just smacked of rampant careerism on behalf of the Armored Corp Flag Officers - and a great deal more capability could have been acquired for the price tag of an insignificant amount of tanks.

I thought the CH-146 was getting long in the tooth also, as they are going on 30 years old next year. For 30 year old airframes they actually look pretty darn good, in my opinion.

I was chatting with some guys here at 408 Sqn and they explained that with the type of maintenance the RCAF provides the Griffon fleet, they are constantly being refreshed into near new condition. (For example, replacing whole sections of the aircraft, like the tail section/rotor on a somewhat regular basis.)

With the upgrade program now made official and including some modest, yet useful upgrades - I can see the government waiting to see what aircraft the US chooses, and basing a decision off of that. (Especially if Bell ends up being a big player.)

Agreed both on the MH-6 family and the Cobra family.



In an ideal world, having a heavy (Chinook), a medium (Black Hawk), and a light (armed recce helo? Utility w/ weapons available for mounting?) would be great. I would even go so far as to expand our tactical helicopter fleet just a wee bit, but that is a discussion for another thread/post.

Realistically, however, I do hope that someone with some brainpower & authority will keep it simple, buy from Bell if the design is valid & proven, and we aren’t the sole operator. (Even better if the US chooses the Bell design.)

Chinook for a heavy helo, and a fleet of NGVL to replace the Griffon - with versatile enough weapons mounts that it can be used for armed overwatch/recce if need be.

One thing the CAF could really benefit from as a whole, would be to keep things as simple as possible when it comes to what equipment we run. (I was all for the C-27 Spartan because of its commonality with C-130J, and going with the AW-101 family for our maritime helicopter, replacing the EH-101 fleet with them when the time comes. Keep spare parts and manufacturer support simple and helpful.)



anyways I’m getting off track…

I don’t see us going back to having 3 helo types anytime soon - especially when JUSTAS comes online.

 

[KevinB]

One thing the CAF could really benefit from as a whole, would be to keep things as simple as possible when it comes to what equipment we run. (I was all for the C-27 Spartan because of its commonality with C-130J, and going with the AW-101 family for our maritime helicopter, replacing the EH-101 fleet with them when the time comes. Keep spare parts and manufacturer support simple and helpful.)

For major capital acquisitions - given the size of the CF budget - looking at jumping on NATO country (okay the US And Uk only really) programs would offer a lot of savings -- but probably won't fly because it isn't Quebec related spending spree

anyways I’m getting off track…

I don’t see us going back to having 3 helo types anytime soon - especially when JUSTAS comes online.

I love drones - but a UAV isn't a replacement for an AH, even if you stick a CANSOF guy in with the drone 'pilot' to help interpret the ground - you do not get the same SA as being in the area - and AH can do very close support missions.

 

[FJAG]

...
I think Canada's decision to acquire the Leo's was an absolutely imbecilic idea - while they could do operations in limited areas of Afghanistan - it just smacked of rampant careerism on behalf of the Armored Corp Flag Officers - and a great deal more capability could have been acquired for the price tag of an insignificant amount of tanks.

You're cost issue is a red herring in this case. We procured the Leos at a dirt cheap rate from the Netherlands of roughly $100,000 per vehicle. Even with the upgrading costs it was far, far below market rate. The budget used for that acquisition was the budget which had already been approved for the fewer Mobile Gun System (MGS) version of the LAV3s that the armoured corps had on their drawing board.

On top of that the boss of the Army at the time was a gunner who listened to the infantry who had been on TF 1-06 and especially TF 3-06 during Op Medusa who pleaded that they desperately needed an armoured direct fire capability to defeat the various, almost impregnable, structures that the Taliban were using as strong points. (There were issues with collateral damage using 155mm artillery and US air resources were not consistently available)

The careerist armored officers at the time-folks like Hillier-were arguing for and designing their direct-fire capabilities using the LAV MGS, LAV under armour and adaption of the air defence ADATS systems to their ground-to-ground anti-tank capability and had already given up their Leo1s for disposal. I tend to agree that the armoured careerists at the time were out-to-lunch with their transformation plans, but acquiring the Leo 2s wasn't of their making. (Similarly the artillery of the time had given up their M109s without any concrete plan for replacement other than the Indirect Fire Capability project which had a ten year horizon and would have left the artillery with noting but older 105mm guns. - the M777s came out of left field as a UER purchase when we committed to Kandahar). Essentially at the time the Leo2s were bought, the Army's hierarchy (albeit with some opposition) was intent on rebuilding the Canadian Army into what would essentially be anemic Stryker brigades (essentially with two rather than three mechanized battalions, no artillery worth speaking and no substantial enablers all designed to be deployed as plug and play battle groups)

 

[Good2Golf]

I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.

MUM-T

 

[FJAG]

MUM-T

Don't get me wrong, I'd love to see the Griffons finally have role that would allow them to do useful recce and attack roles by way of unmanned surrogate systems, but unless the UAVs are light and small enough to be launched from the helicopter (and recovered?) why do you even need the helicopter? Wouldn't a ground based launch, control and recovery system be easier and cheaper to operate? If its line of sight data linkage, couldn't you just do that through rebroadcast drones?

I can appreciate how coupling a drone to an attack helicopter can extend the capabilities of the attack helicopter but a drone like the Shadow still needs a ground crew anyway. Since we don't have attack helicopters to start with, why not just cut the helicopter out of the loop entirely in favour of a ground launched missile guided by way of the drone or through suicide drones?

 

[suffolkowner]

Helicopters have to be really at risk doing CAS if planes like the A-10 are considered unsurvivable do they not? It seems like a mission for UAS for the risk adverse.

HELICOPTERS, AS THEY SHOULD BE

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While I'm not sure I agree 100% with the above I think we missed the boat on our helicopter structure and Afghanistan and the at the time failed Cyclone project was a missed opportunity.

With respect to tanks/IFV/APC and getting them to Europe/Asia in a hurry I feel like there will in all probability be lots lying around once the shooting starts it will be the personnel that will be short, if the past is any indication. For a long slow burn like Afghanistan redux it's a different story

 

[Good2Golf]

FJAG, fully agree with the overall capability requirement. MUM-T shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, for the same reason that uniquely RPAS Ops shouldn’t be discounted either. Particularly in an A2AD environment, one may not have the luxury of long-haul control and datalink back to the City of Sin. Localized connectivity may be the best you can get, and having an expanded Tac ISR ecosystem isn’t to be under appreciated.

 

[Kirkhill]

FJAG, fully agree with the overall capability requirement. MUM-T shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, for the same reason that uniquely RPAS Ops shouldn’t be discounted either. Particularly in an A2AD environment, one may not have the luxury of long-haul control and datalink back to the City of Sin. Localized connectivity may be the best you can get, and having an expanded Tac ISR ecosystem isn’t to be under appreciated.

Is there any room in the Griffon plan for the USMC Yankee/Zulu upgrade? How about "upgrading" some of the Griffons to Vipers?

 

[Good2Golf]

Is there any room in the Griffon plan for the USMC Yankee/Zulu upgrade? How about "upgrading" some of the Griffons to Vipers?

Kirkhill, I think that ship sailed a long time ago when DND kicked the Griffon mid-life project down the road in a watered-down form (Griffon Limited Life-Extension - GLLE) so far that it displaced the planned capital program for the Tactical Reconnaissance and Utility Helicopter (TRUH).

TRUH last existed as a planned (and costed) capital program in 2016. Defence Acquisition Guide 2016 (Archived) - Tactical Reconnaissance Utility Helicopter project page refers. Note the 2026-2036 implementation time frame…then. TRUH no longer exists in the publicly-available Defence Services Program capital acquisition plan, the Defence Capabilities Blueprint (DCB). DND’s DCB page, filtered for RCAF-sponsored projects, refers.

Since 2016, GLLE has been pushed right and watered down to the point where it publicly seems to be limited to a minor avionics and engine turbine and fuel control upgrade. This means nothing anywhere close to the USMC’s UH-1Y ‘upgrade’ program, certainly neither new T-700 engines, nor upgraded rotor/transmission for increased AUW. GLLE now has a delivery schedule (for now) of 2027-2028 (DCB web page for the GLLE Project refers). Assuming conservatively that GLLE’d Griffons will fly for at least 10-12 years, that puts them operational until 2040. Perhaps that’s why we no longer see any trace of TRUH to replace Griffon (orig. ‘UTTH’)?

And then the issue of doctrinal AH? While I’m not normally one to say ‘Never’, I think I can say fairly confidently that Canada will NEVER get Attack Helicopters (AH-64/AH-1/Tigre/etc.)

$0.02

G2G

 

[Kirkhill]

Kirkhill, I think that ship sailed a long time ago when DND kicked the Griffon mid-life project down the road in a watered-down form (Griffon Limited Life-Extension - GLLE) so far that it displaced the planned capital program for the Tactical Reconnaissance and Utility Helicopter (TRUH).

TRUH last existed as a planned (and costed) capital program in 2016. Defence Acquisition Guide 2016 (Archived) - Tactical Reconnaissance Utility Helicopter project page refers. Note the 2026-2036 implementation time frame…then. TRUH no longer exists in the publicly-available Defence Services Program capital acquisition plan, the Defence Capabilities Blueprint (DCB). DND’s DCB page, filtered for RCAF-sponsored projects, refers.

Since 2016, GLLE has been pushed right and watered down to the point where it publicly seems to be limited to a minor avionics and engine turbine and fuel control upgrade. This means nothing anywhere close to the USMC’s UH-1Y ‘upgrade’ program, certainly neither new T-700 engines, nor upgraded rotor/transmission for increased AUW. GLLE now has a delivery schedule (for now) of 2027-2028 (DCB web page for the GLLE Project refers). Assuming conservatively that GLLE’d Griffons will fly for at least 10-12 years, that puts them operational until 2040. Perhaps that’s why we no longer see any trace of TRUH to replace Griffon (orig. ‘UTTH’)?

And then the issue of doctrinal AH? While I’m not normally one to say ‘Never’, I think I can say fairly confidently that Canada will NEVER get Attack Helicopters (AH-64/AH-1/Tigre/etc.)

$0.02

G2G

Ah well. It is to dream.

 

[KevinB]

And then the issue of doctrinal AH? While I’m not normally one to say ‘Never’, I think I can say fairly confidently that Canada will NEVER get Attack Helicopters (AH-64/AH-1/Tigre/etc.)

$0.02

G2G

If only we knew a TacHel guy or two who are intelligent and experienced enough to create a doctrine for one...
Now the silliness of the RCAF, and it's distain towards "Army" Rotary Wing if different.

Frankly I think CANSOFCOM should control Rotary Wing in Canada - Cleary it's Special since the RCAF wants to minimize it as much as it can.

I honestly think the US Army, USMC, and USN did it right with Rotary Wing - the fix wing folks have no love for it - so it should go to the supported commands/elements anyway.

 

[Good2Golf]

…double-edged sword, KevinB. If the Canadian Army were (put back) in charge of funding green aviation, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the same thing happen to aviation as it did in the early-90s…hint: Starts with “Ch” and rhymes with “opped the Chinook D-model Upgrade Project and shut down the CFLUH (light [armed] helicopter) Project.”

It would be no more than a shoulder shrug and a footnote in the list of things “we just can’t do.”

 

[KevinB]

You're cost issue is a red herring in this case. We procured the Leos at a dirt cheap rate from the Netherlands of roughly $100,000 per vehicle. Even with the upgrading costs it was far, far below market rate. The budget used for that acquisition was the budget which had already been approved for the fewer Mobile Gun System (MGS) version of the LAV3s that the armoured corps had on their drawing board.

For those - what about the follow ons?

On top of that the boss of the Army at the time was a gunner who listened to the infantry who had been on TF 1-06 and especially TF 3-06 during Op Medusa who pleaded that they desperately needed an armoured direct fire capability to defeat the various, almost impregnable, structures that the Taliban were using as strong points. (There were issues with collateral damage using 155mm artillery and US air resources were not consistently available)

Yes because no AH existed - tanks are absolutely terrible for most territory in Afghanistan - I'd argue while they where used effectively by the CF in Afghanistan - the desire for them was the fact that Infantry Officers in Canada had experience with tanks from the various development courses - and defaulted to TANK - as opposed to seeing the requirement was actually better met by AH's
*I say that as someone with both experience with both.

The careerist armored officers at the time-folks like Hillier-were arguing for and designing their direct-fire capabilities using the LAV MGS, LAV under armour and adaption of the air defence ADATS systems to their ground-to-ground anti-tank capability and had already given up their Leo1s for disposal. I tend to agree that the armoured careerists at the time were out-to-lunch with their transformation plans, but acquiring the Leo 2s wasn't of their making. (Similarly the artillery of the time had given up their M109s without any concrete plan for replacement other than the Indirect Fire Capability project which had a ten year horizon and would have left the artillery with noting but older 105mm guns. - the M777s came out of left field as a UER purchase when we committed to Kandahar). Essentially at the time the Leo2s were bought, the Army's hierarchy (albeit with some opposition) was intent on rebuilding the Canadian Army into what would essentially be anemic Stryker brigades (essentially with two rather than three mechanized battalions, no artillery worth speaking and no substantial enablers all designed to be deployed as plug and play battle groups)

No disagreement there, but experience colors the lens everyone looks at solutions through.
I also freely admit there are things that AH cannot do, but in the grand scheme of what was better for the CF, I think the AH>Tank