Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[dapaterson]

Who will fly and maintain them?

 

[Kirkhill]

Who will fly and maintain them?

Fair question.

To be answered with another.

Which has more general utility? 500 TAPVs? or 200 Griffons and Jet Rangers?

 

[Kirkhill]

And as for training pilots - what is the difference between training someone to sit outside a helicopter and flying it with a smartphone or training the same person, with the same smartphone, to sit inside the same helicopter?

 

[Good2Golf]

But what would the recoil do to the CH147?

Slow it down to the speed of a Griffon...

 

[dapaterson]

And as for training pilots - what is the difference between training someone to sit outside a helicopter and flying it with a smartphone or training the same person, with the same smartphone, to sit inside the same helicopter?

Exactly. You need the capacity to train pilots. Where are you getting that capacity from?

 

[Kirkhill]

Exactly. You need the capacity to train pilots. Where are you getting that capacity from?

The same place we are getting the capacity to train people to drive all this unmanned kit entering the inventory.

 

[Kirkhill]

We can look at the Northrop Grumman FireScout MQ8C and compare it to the Bell 407 and the Bell 206L-4 Long Ranger.

 

[Kirkhill]

Exactly. You need the capacity to train pilots. Where are you getting that capacity from?

The same place we are getting the capacity to train people to drive all this unmanned kit entering the inventory.

 

[dapaterson]

The same place we are getting the capacity to train people to drive all this unmanned kit entering the inventory.

Nice of you to assume that the RCAF has fixed their pilot training failings.

And there's a huge difference between a handful of MALE UAVs and one hundred new manned platforms.

 

[FJAG]

Exactly. You need the capacity to train pilots. Where are you getting that capacity from?

Not to sound too flippant, but we surged artillery training output in the mid seventies by utilizing the field regiments for that until the battle schools could catch up to a sustainment level.

I don't want to put pilot training on a par with turning out gunners, but simply want to say that when it's a matter of necessity AND priority then a solution is and the resources can be made available.

The ongoing pilot issue is an interesting point, however. It beggars the imagination that a profession as interesting to young people as flying jets and helicopters has problems retaining and training people especially with the money that's been thrown at that.

Essentially there must be a fundamental underlying deficiency there that needs to be discovered and have its back broken. Personally I'd start by seriously exploring the idea of getting rid of the requirement that all pilots be officers and waste four years of peak flying time in university. -- But that's a whole other thread where we've beaten that idea to death recently. My point is that many of the CFs capacity limitations are self imposed - the CF needs to seriously unblock much of its bureaucratically-based constipation in our recruiting, training and human resource management systems or it will always limp along the way it is now.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think I detect cynicism from DAP.



Actually I am thinking less about MALE (or female) programs and more the technology behind quadcopters and loitering munitions.

No pilot flies them, in the sense of keeping them in the air. AFAIK the pilot is more of a commander than a driver.

 

[dapaterson]

The problem space is well understood. Addressing it would require firing half the RCAF leadership, holding the rest to account, but would risk undermining the continual pilot caterwauling that they are underpaid... when most commercial pilots pay for their own training, and then both the pilots in the cockpit of a Q400 makes less than a mid-range RCAF pilot.

But because no one will ever hold GOFOs to account for systemic failure...

 

[Good2Golf]

Not to sound too flippant, but we surged artillery training output in the mid seventies by utilizing the field regiments for that until the battle schools could catch up to a sustainment level.

I don't want to put pilot training on a par with turning out gunners, but simply want to say that when it's a matter of necessity AND priority then a solution is and the resources can be made available.

The ongoing pilot issue is an interesting point, however. It beggars the imagination that a profession as interesting to young people as flying jets and helicopters has problems retaining and training people especially with the money that's been thrown at that.

Essentially there must be a fundamental underlying deficiency there that needs to be discovered and have its back broken. Personally I'd start by seriously exploring the idea of getting rid of the requirement that all pilots be officers and waste four years of peak flying time in university. -- But that's a whole other thread where we've beaten that idea to death recently. My point is that many of the CFs capacity limitations are self imposed - the CF needs to seriously unblock much of its bureaucratically-based constipation in our recruiting, training and human resource management systems or it will always limp along the way it is now.

FJAG, turns out the 90s’ panacea, ASD, isn’t so panaceic after all…we’ve probably spent more, and had consistently lower output after pilot training was substantively demilitarized and contracted out…

 

[Kirkhill]

Maybe the problem will solve itself by putting the "Air Force" back in the hands of its original owners - The Bombardiers: Firing Intelligent Loitering Munitions

 

[Kirkhill]

I think I detect cynicism from DAP.



Actually I am thinking less about MALE (or female) programs and more the technology behind quadcopters and loitering munitions.

No pilot flies them, in the sense of keeping them in the air. AFAIK the pilot is more of a commander than a driver.

Bell's Pilot Optional Uber.

 

[Navy_Pete]

The problem space is well understood. Addressing it would require firing half the RCAF leadership, holding the rest to account, but would risk undermining the continual pilot caterwauling that they are underpaid... when most commercial pilots pay for their own training, and then both the pilots in the cockpit of a Q400 makes less than a mid-range RCAF pilot.

But because no one will ever hold GOFOs to account for systemic failure...

I don't think pilots are complaining they are underpaid now with the big raise, but they still get treated like crap by some crappy "leaders", so I guess that goes with your first point. And they keep promoting crappy "leaders", so not really sure what their damage is as an institution.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG, turns out the 90s’ panacea, ASD, isn’t so panaceic after all…we’ve probably spent more, and had consistently lower output after pilot training was substantively demilitarized and contracted out…

I really know very little about the inner workings in the RCAF these days except what I hear here from the folks in it. Back in the early eighties, my brother in law (actually my sister in law's husband) who ran 2 CFFTS in Moose Jaw took me for a tour around and explained the air force training system which all seemed to make eminent sense at the time (mind you we still flew CF5s and Voodoos then).

I've never been a fan for privatizing anything. Hell, I think most civil servants should be traded in for uniformed personnel who can handle a rifle in a pinch. Contracted UAVs are anathema to me. For some reason I can't quite fathom, we've becomes a force that can't function without civilians and civilian contractors. I can't quite put my finger on it but it strikes me that there is something fundamentally wrong with that. Maybe it's just that this is another way of getting around PY limitations and using O&M funds for what are essentially personnel costs. It strikes me as a way of gaming the system.

I remember back in staff school, one of my syndicate mates was a Starfighter jockey who told me that when he finished his training on the CF 104 as one of the top candidates, he and a handful of the other top guys were kept on at the school to teach flying fundamental to new incoming serials for a year before being passed on to an operational squadron.

It strikes me that the whole training system has gone to heck in a handbag since we adopted managed readiness. It seems to drag things out for basically routine matters and reduces the number of people available to dedicate to the individual training system. Whenever I hear of folks sitting around for month after month waiting for basic trades training it makes my skin crawl. Every military training system should be designed to provide an efficient throughput of the numbers needed to fill the units on a continuing basis AND be capable of surging training when required. A military that can't surge their training system is doomed. We tend to reach into a paper thin reserve on occasion but it is a reserve that can only provide individual augmentees rather than vital equipment and functions.

IMHO the whole system is deeply flawed and not capable of major crisis response.

 

[Good2Golf]

FJAG, good points…let me add Managed Readimess to the Alternate Service Delivery non-panacea. Crappy ideas used to excuse proper and appropriate allocation of resources to provide what should have otherwise been a resilient force composition, training and currency/readiness standard…seems to have resulted in the CAF’s ability to “do less with more…”

 

[GR66]

How about if the Bv-Series/Bronco style vehicles were acquired for the Transport Platoons and the Transport Coys of the Service Battalions? As A-echelon "B" vehicles?

I would like to keep the F-echelon of the Light Infantry very light and heli-transportable. And in Canada heli-transportable means compatible with the Griffon, not the Chinook. That is why I am leaning more heavily towards Ultra Light platforms. I am not particularly bothered about operating in cold, wet environments with open vehicles. We have experience and we have existing technologies.

I'll respond to this here so as to not further derail the C3 Replacement thread.

I think that we differ on how we envision the role of the Light Battalions. You seem to see them as raiders swooping in unexpectedly to strike where least expected. For these roles the ultra-light vehicles, aircraft and weapons you propose make sense for these types of distributed operation. In my opinion that is the role of CSOR rather than the Light Battalions.

To me, the role of the Light Battalions is to provide a force that can respond more quickly than our our heavier forces, or can operate more effectively in complex terrain where our LAVs aren't effective. Yes the Light Battalions need to trade protection for mobility to achieve their goals but they also need to arrive with enough "weight" (ammo, support weapons, numbers) to be able to effectively defend against heavier enemy forces.

For me then I'd look instead for vehicles that can transport a Section with their gear (and be mounted with support weapons with enough ammo to fight a heavier enemy) rather than Fire-Team sized ultra-light vehicles. So to me I'd look at a Bv-series/Bronco or JLTV or Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) class of land vehicle and a Medium Lift Utility Helicopter along the lines of a UH-60, AW-101 or one of the FVL contenders rather then a swarm of Griffons or other light helicopters.

My philosophy would be to purchase a proven, reliable, relatively common vehicle/aircraft - preferably one in service with the US or our other major allies - that will effectively carry an infantry Section and their gear, can be customized to mount a variety of support weapons/roles (indirect fire, UAV/Loitering Munitions/ATGMs/SHORAD/Ambulance/Command/Cargo, etc.) and is relatively simple to maintain. Let CSOR focus on the ultra-light, raiding end of the spectrum which is better suited to Company Group operations likely anyway.

 

[MilEME09]

But what would the recoil do to the CH147?

Probably rip the hook from the under belly, totally fine if you only need one shot