Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

How about this

Scary. How long would an allied 'coalition of the willing', let's say a NATO division of some kind, be able to sustain casualties like that I wonder.

What if the Canadian contribution 'only' suffered about 4-500 dead and wounded in 6 weeks... how would we react? It gives us a good starting point to plan from anyways.

It is said that the Spanish Civil War was a good warning about what might be just around the corner for the Great Powers. We'd ignore the lessons from this nasty little war at our peril, I would say.

 

[GR66]

I wonder if a variation of the new British Deep Recce Strike Brigade might have a useful role. I don't necessarily see it as taking on the role of "deep strike" but rather as a direct counter to Russian indirect fires strength.

A Recce element (ground vehicle and UAVs) to identify enemy Recce elements/Radar emitters. A SHORAD element optimized for UAV-type threats (guns and plentiful, cheap missiles vs. expensive heavy missiles) to keep their Battalion Tactical Group/Brigade-level UAV assets away from our maneuver units. Larger air threats (helicopters, fast air, high altitude UAVs, etc. from their Divisional levels and above) can be left to heavier AD units and our own fast air.

The Strike element could come in two layers. One group with Non-LOS missiles/loitering munitions/anti-radiation missiles to take out enemy Recce, EW and AD vehicles, etc. and a second group with HIMARS to provide counter-battery fire against their artillery.

All these units are less manpower intensive than infantry Battalions and the types of systems they would use are the type that could be mounted on light vehicles which make them suitable for Reserve units as well.

We could still maintain two traditional Brigade Groups and a significant portion of our Reserves could be dedicated to providing the required infantry replacements that a major conflict would require.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If we're going to take massive casualties, I'm willing to bet the other side of the fight has done the same calculation and come up with similar numbers. Seems curiously like the MAD principles of nuclear weapons: As long as you have sufficient numbers of technologically similar weapons on both sides, only lunatics with limited value for their own troops would push for that type of engagement. Then you get the "little green men" and grey space conflicts that have dominated recently.

We need a big enough military with the right tools to be a deterrent, or else when the other guy constantly running his math equation finally comes up favourable to his side due to our cuts from key equipment (guns, tanks, atgms, EW) or an over reliance on reserves then we end up in a hurt locker pretty quick. Unfortunately it'll be a constant battle to maintain the funding required for that equilibrium, because the short sighted masses see no conflicts (due to conventional MAD) and think that means there's no more need for the military...

Except that the other sides (the plural really matters to me because I do NOT believe that China and Russia are anything more than fair weather friends) have different social values that we do in the US led West. Both have taken horrendous casualties before because both have cultures that place the needs of the Motherland higher than the needs, even the lives, of any and all individuals.

 

[Kirkhill]

And that's for a fairly short 'Six Week War', as some have called it, with a relatively limited scope between a couple of nations we would regard as 'second world countries'.

What would a mere 'few months' of a war like that, with a slightly broader scope between first world peers, look like in terms of casualties?

We might need to reconnect with why all those dozens of WW1 era armouries are dotted across our country: to facilitate rapid, mass recruitment.

We can't forget that the effort in WWI was largely a cultural effort. It was born of the British Diaspora of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, a diaspora that had an outsized influence in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Rhodesias, as well as India.

To many of those Brits in the CEF, I believe, they saw themselves first as Brits and subjects of the King, and secondly as Canadians - in the same sense that Highlanders and Lowlanders, Irish and Welsh, Devon men and Geordies, Lancastrians and Kentish men identified as Brits with regional identities.

Those people were tied to the Crown and moved by the same cultural impulses. They were also tied to the same religious framework with a strong belief in an afterlife, a belief reinforced by a life that was regularly cut short by disease, violence, hunger and poor diet, and high risk working conditions.

None of that applies to our comfortable Canadian (or OECD) life style.

The only way I perceive motivating the masses enough to support mass mobilization and developing a toleration for the mass casualties you are envisaging is if the hordes arrive in Toronto. And by that time it will be too late.

The only reasonable counter is to keep the hordes at bay by breaking them up before they get here. And doing it with short, rapid, low cost thrusts.

We are fencing. Not building shield walls.

I see CANSOFCOM, Light Brigades and Deep Strike Brigades as part of an avoidance strategy - avoidance of having to fight the hordes in Toronto with mass casualties.

Not just adding another shield to another army's shield wall in a foreign country.

Of the first contingent formed at Valcartier, Quebec in 1914, about two-thirds were men who had been born in the United Kingdom. By the end of the war in 1918, at least half of the soldiers were British-born....

... Many British nationals from the United Kingdom or other territories who were resident in Canada and the United States also joined the CEF. A sizeable percentage of Bermuda's volunteers who served in the war joined the CEF,

Canadian Expeditionary Force - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[FJAG]

Scary. How long would an allied 'coalition of the willing', let's say a NATO division of some kind, be able to sustain casualties like that I wonder.

What if the Canadian contribution 'only' suffered about 4-500 dead and wounded in 6 weeks... how would we react? It gives us a good starting point to plan from anyways.

It is said that the Spanish Civil War was a good warning about what might be just around the corner for the Great Powers. We'd ignore the lessons from this nasty little war at our peril, I would say.

I know that there are always two views on the issue of strengthening the forces: on the one hand you want to pose a credible deterrent and on the other if you pose a genuine threat then your opponent may react to it. Russia and China are both good cases on point. Both are bellicose, both have intentions to expand and grow.

For me the tipping point is that both will exploit signs of weakness. With Russia it's the foray into former Eastern Block countries that over the last half century have established a significant Russian population within their borders. Historically this reminds me of Germany's 1930s objectives to unify with ethnic German societies across Europe. Russia wants buffers made up of other people than its own. China, on the other hand seeks to control both territory, such as the South China Sea, populations (Taiwan), and economies.

In all these cases western society has yet to draw a bright line in the sand. IMHO, every success either Russia or China have encourages them to take the next step.

Insofar as Europe is concerned, the problem is that while Russia has turned towards a new model of warfare, NATO maintains a cobbled together alliance of mostly ineffectives with a Cold War character to it. Only the UK and France have any nuclear deterrent and it's not large by and of itself. Their commitment to mutual defence is fragmented and only apparent in the Forward Presence forces which, by and of themselves, have little actual combat power. A few, directly threatened, countries like Poland are doing more to solidify and uparm their forces than the traditional big powers like the US, UK and even Canada.

I'm a firm believer that world peace comes from a credible deterrent force that makes an opponent think twice before committing hostile acts. Canada's Forces don't meet that definition. Anyone with even the most rudimentary intelligence and analysis would find that Canada, particulalry its army, despite its current defence spending, is the very definition of "the emperor has no clothes". Yes, we can dabble in defence and international politics but we do so without clout amongst our opponents and our peers.

I think our Navy is probably doing the best it can although there is always room for improvement. The Air Force is IMHO out to lunch with it's continued focus on new fighter jets to the exclusion of long range unmanned strike and ground based air defence capabilities. It's aviation role continues to limp along while transport is probably doing the best it can as well. The Army is totally out to lunch with a schizophrenic organization that tries to, and fails to, be everything for everyone at the same time. A modular plug and play army without the components to plug and play with is of limited value.

Canada's Army has little to worry about with respect to suffering casualties when being sent into a serious conflict. When our military leaders have to advise their political masters of what the Army's true capabilities are in a time of crisis, it won't get sent or will get plugged into some minor roles in the far and distant rear.

$.02

 

[MilEME09]

I think a good indication of where our doctrine is shifting is in the change of armoured recce units becoming Cavalry Regiments dedicated to recce in force and counter recce. A much more in your face and direct force role. Given what NATO has requested of us, I think we very much are shifting to confront a near peer enemy.

 

[dapaterson]

Canada's Army has little to worry about with respect to suffering casualties when being sent into a serious conflict. When our military leaders have to advise their political masters of what the Army's true capabilities are in a time of crisis, it won't get sent or will get plugged into some minor roles in the far and distant rear.

Like Hong Kong?

 

[Kirkhill]

Insofar as Europe is concerned, the problem is that while Russia has turned towards a new model of warfare, NATO maintains a cobbled together alliance of mostly ineffectives with a Cold War character to it.

Extrapolating on my shield wall analogy I believe Russia has abandoned the field entirely while NATO is still trying to maintain a strategy based on an ineffective shield wall, hoping that the other side will see the error of its ways and return to proper soldiering. Fight fair.

Ukraine, although the definition is contested, has traditionally been thought of as The Borderlands. Borderlands, like Ukraine, the NW Frontier, Derry, the Welsh Marches and "The Borders" have always been ripe for playing "Great Games". Russia has previous form on the NW Frontier of India playing with the British Raj. The French intervened in the Anglo-Scots Borders for 500 years. The Ukraine spawned the Cossacks. The Anglo-Scots Border spawned the Moss Troopers. Both were mounted. Both acted independently. Both could be bought. Both formed the bases for Government riders dedicated to "pacifying" and "keeping the peace" on the borders. Often brutally. The British variants were curbed by the rule of law to a greater extent than their Russian counterparts but nobody ever developed a fondness for "The Dragoons" - especially when used to break up strikes and demonstrations as at Peterloo.

Russia is playing a version of the Great Game. It has abandoned the field, aside from some gestures of which Potemkin would be proud, and has transferred its efforts to borderlands and behind their opponents shield wall. Its agents are more akin to the Counter-Reformation Jesuits in Britain and the Societe des Missions Etrangeres in Acadia. They exploit the rules of the societies of the OECD to foment disorder and weaken the shield wall, even as they outflank, bypass and ignore it.

Our Medium Force Dragoons have some utility in the borderlands maintaining the peace. But that maintenance is a never ending task. Those troops are better garrisoned as an enduring presence in low intensity trouble spots. Like Afghanistan. I think the outcome in Afghanistan might have been different if the OECD had telegraphed a willingness to stay for the long haul by building bases with permanent walls and glittering marble arches. Not camping like another bunch of nomadic raiders from the desert. Raiders that would come and go.

But to be able to Fence, to employ foil, epee and sabre effectively, it is necessary to be well equipped, well trained, be observant and light on ones feet - willing to not only attack rapidly and decisively and with precision when the opportunity presents itself, but also to be able to deflect the enemy's strikes and retire rapidly to set up the next thrust.

The Medium Force is not agile. It is an enduring presence. It is best deployed outside of Canada in garrison.

A Canadian based force must, first and foremost, be agile. And it needs reach. And it needs precision. And it needs to be deadly.

But, most importantly, it needs a society willing to use it.

 

[MilEME09]

Like Hong Kong?

Which by the end of the war turned into a Canadian Force landing in Tokyo Harbour during phase 2 of Operation downfall. Imagine those casualties for a second.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm a firm believer that World Peace is an illusion. Just like a lawn free of dandelions.

 

[FJAG]

... But to be able to Fence, to employ foil, epee and sabre effectively, it is necessary to be well equipped, well trained, be observant and light on ones feet - willing to not only attack rapidly and decisively and with precision when the opportunity presents itself, but also to be able to deflect the enemy's strikes and retire rapidly to set up the next thrust.

The Medium Force is not agile. It is an enduring presence. It is best deployed outside of Canada in garrison.

A Canadian based force must, first and foremost, be agile. And it needs reach. And it needs precision. And it needs to be deadly.

But, most importantly, it needs a society willing to use it.

Ever since Trudeau the Greater, Canadian governments have been looking for that light, agile quick reaction force while the Army, until the turn of the century, had been working hard to maintain a heavy Cold War model. I think that in large measure this is because, until the turn of the century, the Army recognized instinctively that a light, agile force would be quickly ground up if it faced a serious challenge.

So the Army changed. And will need to change again. And there is a role for lighter, more lethal, forces so long as we do not throw out some of the more reliable and necessary weapon systems. There will always be a role for heavy forces if for nothing else but to seize key terrain in the face of heavy opposition. There will always be a need for much artillery if for nothing else than to provide a reliable, all weather capability to blunt or neutralize the enemy's artillery.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ever since Trudeau the Greater, Canadian governments have been looking for that light, agile quick reaction force while the Army, until the turn of the century, had been working hard to maintain a heavy Cold War model. I think that in large measure this is because, until the turn of the century, the Army recognized instinctively that a light, agile force would be quickly ground up if it faced a serious challenge.

So the Army changed. And will need to change again. And there is a role for lighter, more lethal, forces so long as we do not throw out some of the more reliable and necessary weapon systems. There will always be a role for heavy forces if for nothing else but to seize key terrain in the face of heavy opposition. There will always be a need for much artillery if for nothing else than to provide a reliable, all weather capability to blunt or neutralize the enemy's artillery.

The key element in fencing is the ability to retire, rapidly and gracefully while maintaining balance. The art is in not waiting around long enough to be ground up. You are not trying to beat the other guy into submission. You are attempting to keep him on the back foot and off balance.

Hence the need for a mobile base afloat to which a deployed force can retire expeditiously.

I can understand why an army with no way home might be disinclined to deploy unless it was guaranteed of victory. And the supply of heavy weapons.

Light and Special forces are not about attriting the enemy's armies. They are about changing the enemy's opinions.

PS - I took fencing long enough to learn the art and discover I was a better rugby player.

 

[Kirkhill]

Further thoughts

If the Army has been focusing on the heavy "shield wall" then it has been committing the Canadian Government to the role of a junior partner in an alliance. Canada doesn't have the numbers to build a long enough shield wall on its own to secure its flanks in a linear fight. It will always need allies and will usually be a minor component.

Alternately the fencing model, based on not holding ground but thrusts designed to disrupt, and rapid withdrawal when the situation requires, permits a more independent foreign policy - permitting the rapid support of interests when the government chooses, and the equally rapid withdrawal of support, again, when the government chooses.

The key is to make sure that any allies we choose to support notice our presence and our absence. That means we have to be able to affect the course of events in the field when we are there.

 

[FJAG]

Further thoughts

If the Army has been focusing on the heavy "shield wall" then it has been committing the Canadian Government to the role of a junior partner in an alliance. Canada doesn't have the numbers to build a long enough shield wall on its own to secure its flanks in a linear fight. It will always need allies and will usually be a minor component.

Alternately the fencing model, based on not holding ground but thrusts designed to disrupt, and rapid withdrawal when the situation requires, permits a more independent foreign policy - permitting the rapid support of interests when the government chooses, and the equally rapid withdrawal of support, again, when the government chooses.

The key is to make sure that any allies we choose to support notice our presence and our absence. That means we have to be able to affect the course of events in the field when we are there.

Your fencing analogy is more parry than thrust.

The shield wall versus mobile defence was always recognized as an issue during the Cold War. The mobile defence concept unfortunately trades space for survival. That's not a viable option when the other guys' sole objective is to seize and hold as much of your space as they can. That was always the issue with Germany where every foot lost was a foot of Germany and resulted in forming as much of a shield wall defence as possible.

The objective in a European defence was always to hold a line while striking deep to destroy the follow-on echelons before they could deploy. That's why NATO had tactical nuclear weapons and a policy to use them.

The point of a more modern defence wouldn't change that much except for the fact that there may be more scope for using more advanced non-nuclear and non-aircraft-delivered weapon systems to strike deep.

The general tactic here though is 1) absorb the attack as far forward as possible; 2) strike deep and destroy the follow-on forces; and 3) counterattack to retake what was lost during 1). While 1) and 2) can be done in different ways, 3) will always rely on a heavy force. The question is how well can you keep that heavy force intact and how quickly can you bring it to bear.

 

[Kirkhill]

The general tactic here though is 1) absorb the attack as far forward as possible; 2) strike deep and destroy the follow-on forces; and 3) counterattack to retake what was lost during 1). While 1) and 2) can be done in different ways, 3) will always rely on a heavy force. The question is how well can you keep that heavy force intact and how quickly can you bring it to bear.

Or

You can, as you suggest, parry. Sidestep the initial engagement and deflect. Wait until the enemy is extended (April 1918 after the German offensive lost impetus or late May 1940) and then thrust.

The deep strike doesn't have to be a ground strike. It can be an aerial strike and these days that doesn't necessarily mean fighter bombers with 500 km combat radii. It could just as easily be a 1500 km missile barrage.

As for retaking ground, first deny the enemy the opportunity to hold the ground by disrupting its supply lines and letting it wither. As far as the locals are concerned which is a better outcome? Occupation? Or Caen 1944?

 

[Kirkhill]

Army’s ground combat center is developing new methods, formations for the next war

The job of figuring out where new technological advances, doctrine and tactics meet is at the epicenter of innovations in ground combat — the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

www.armytimes.com

Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades

From more artillery to electronic warfare and engineers, the formation will change.

www.armytimes.com

 

[Kirkhill]

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf

19 January 2021 FM 3-96

SECTION I – INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-1. The IBCT is an expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted operations in
complex terrain—a geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or
more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space (ATP 3-34.80). The
IBCT can conduct entry operations by ground, airland, air assault, or amphibious assault into austere areas
of operations with little or no advanced notice. Airborne IBCTs can conduct vertical envelopment by
parachute assault. The IBCT’s dismounted capability in complex terrain separates it from other functional
brigades and maneuver BCTs.

1-2. Mission variables, categories of specific information needed to conduct operations, help to determine
the task organization and required augmentation for the IBCT. For example, if additional tactical mobility—
the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative to the enemy
(ADP 3-90)—is required, the higher tactical headquarters can temporarily augment the IBCT with aviation
assets to conduct air movements or air assault operations (see FM 3-99). Augmentation can include wheeled
assets such as the mine-resistant ambush protected family of vehicles (see ATP 3-21.10).

1-3. The role of the IBCT is to close with the enemy by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture
enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas,
including populations and resources. Fire and movement is the concept of applying fires from all sources
to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy, and the tactical movement of combat forces in relation
to the enemy (as components of maneuver applicable at all echelons). At the squad level, fire and
movement entails a team placing suppressive fire on the enemy as another team moves against or
around the enemy.

1-4. The IBCT performs complementary missions to SBCTs and ABCTs. The IBCT optimizes for the
offense against conventional, hybrid, and irregular threats in severely restrictive terrain. The IBCT performs
missions such as reducing fortified areas, infiltrating and seizing objectives in the enemy’s rear, eliminating
enemy force remnants in restricted terrain, and securing key facilities and activities. The IBCT conducts
stability operations tasks in the wake of maneuvering forces.

1-5. IBCTs configure for area defense and as the fixing force component of a mobile defense. The IBCT’s
lack of heavy combat vehicles reduces its logistic requirements. Not having heavy combat vehicles gives
higher commanders greater flexibility when adapting various transportation modes to move or maneuver the
IBCT. Airborne IBCTs conduct airborne assault-specific missions. All IBCTs can conduct air assault
operations. (See FM 3-99 for information on airborne and air assault operations.)

1-6. The IBCT is a combined arms force organized around dismounted Infantry. Cavalry, field artillery,
engineer, intelligence, signal, sustainment, and CBRN reconnaissance units are organic to the IBCT (see
figure 1-1). Unique to the IBCT is the weapons company in each Infantry battalion, composed of four
mounted assault platoons and provides those battalions with the capability to defeat light enemy armor threats
with organic mounted tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided/wireless guided Improved Target
Acquisition System, M2 series heavy machine gun, and MK-19 40-millimeter (mm) grenade machine gun
weapon systems (see paragraph 1-9). Higher commanders augment the IBCT for a specific mission with
additional capabilities. Augmentation can include aviation, Armor, field artillery, air defense, military police,
civil affairs, a tactical PSYOP element, engineers, CBRN, and additional information systems assets. Three
Infantry battalions and the Cavalry squadron serve as the IBCT’s primary maneuver forces.

1-7. The Infantry battalions organize with a headquarters and headquarters company, three Infantry rifle
companies, and a weapons company (see figure 1-2 on page 1-4). The headquarters and headquarters
company provides planning and intelligence, signal, and fire support to the battalion. The headquarters
company has a battalion command section, a battalion staff section, a company headquarters, battalion
medical, scout, and mortar platoons, a signal section, and a sniper squad. The headquarters company mortar
platoon is equipped with 120-mm mortars (trailer towed) and 81-mm mortars (ground mounted). The
battalion receives a forward support company (FSC) for sustainment purposes (see chapter 9), normally in a
direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information.)

1-8. Infantry rifle companies have three Infantry rifle platoons, a mortar section, a Raven unmanned aircraft
system (UAS) team, and a headquarters section. Each rifle platoon has three Infantry rifle squads and a
weapons squad. The mortar section has two squads, each with a 60-mm mortar. Habitual attachments to the
Infantry rifle company include a fire support team at the company level and forward observer teams at the
platoon level, medics assigned to the rifle platoons, and a senior medic at the company level. (See
ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.8 for additional information.)

1-9. The Infantry weapons company has a company headquarters and four assault platoons. Each assault
platoon has two sections of two squads and a leader’s vehicle. Each squad contains four Soldiers and a vehicle
mounting the heavy weapons. The heavy weapons can be tailored to a mission based on the commander’s
mission analysis. Infantry weapons companies are equipped with the following weapons: the tube launched,
optically tracked, wire guided/wireless guided Improved Target Acquisition System, the MK19, the M2, and
the M240 series machine gun. While all of the weapons vehicles can mount the MK19 and the M2, only two
vehicles per platoon are equipped to mount the Improved Target Acquisition System. Habitual attachments
for the weapons company include a fire support team at the company level and medics. (See ATP 3-21.20,
appendix D for additional information.)

Note. The Infantry battalion scout platoon and IBCT Cavalry squadron organize, train, and equip
to conduct reconnaissance, security operations, and surveillance. However, reconnaissance,
security operations, and surveillance remain a core competency of the Infantry rifle company,
platoon, and squad.

1-10. The IBCT Cavalry squadron’s mission focuses on information requirements—in intelligence usage,
those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment
that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander
(JP 2-0)—tied to the execution of tactical missions (normally reconnaissance, security operations, and
surveillance). The squadron’s information collection effort answers the commander’s priority intelligence
requirements. Information acquired during collection activities about the threat and the area of interest allows
the IBCT commander to focus combat power, execute current operations, and prepare for future operations
simultaneously.

1-11. The Cavalry squadron (see figure 1-3) has four troops: a headquarters and headquarters troop, two
mounted Cavalry troops, and one dismounted Cavalry troop. (See ATP 3-20.96.) The headquarters troop
organization includes a command section, the troop headquarters section, the squadron primary staff, a
medical section, a sniper section, a retransmission (known as RETRANS) section, an attached fire support
cell, and a tactical air control party (TACP). The two mounted Cavalry troops (three scout platoons each) are
equipped with wheeled vehicles (each with a crew and scout team for dismounted operations), tube launched,
optically tracked, wire guided/wireless guided Improved Target Acquisition Systems, the Long-Range
Advance Scout Surveillance Systems, a mortar section (120-mm trailer towed), and a Raven UAS team. The
dismounted Cavalry troop (two dismounted scout platoons each) enables dismounted infiltration and
rotary-wing aircraft insertion and has a mortar section (60-mm ground mounted), a Raven UAS team, and a
sniper squad. Habitual attachments to the Cavalry troop include a fire support team at the troop level and
forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics assigned to each platoon, and a senior medic at the troop
level. (See ATP 3-20.97 and ATP 3-20.98.) The squadron receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see
chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship.

1-12. The IBCT field artillery battalion has four batteries: a headquarters and headquarters battery, two
105-mm firing batteries (six-gun M119 series towed howitzer battery), and one 155-mm firing battery
(six-gun M777 series towed howitzer battery). The firing batteries in a battalion have two 3-gun firing
platoons. The field artillery battalion provides massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets
with precision, near precision, and area fires to support IBCT operations. The IBCT field artillery battalion
has a target acquisition platoon (counterbattery and countermortar radars) organized and equipped to quickly
detect, and accurately locate, classify, and report indirect fire from enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets to
permit their immediate engagement with counterfire. The information provided includes the point of origin,
predicted point of impact, radar cross section, and velocity. The battalion receives an FSC for sustainment
purposes, normally in a direct support relationship. The battalion receives an FSC for sustainment purposes
(see chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-11.23 for additional information.)

More to follow re SBCT and ABCT.

 

[Kirkhill]

SECTION II – STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-28. The SBCT is an expeditionary combined arms force organized around mounted Infantry. SBCT units
operate effectively in most terrain and weather conditions. The role of the SBCT is to close with the enemy
by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close
combat, and counterattack to control land areas, including populations and resources. The SBCT can gain the
initiative early, seize and retain key terrain—an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords
a marked advantage to either combatant (ADP 3-90), and conduct massed fire—fire from a number of
weapons directed at a single point or small area (JP 3-02), to stop the enemy.

1-29. The SBCT is task organized to meet specific mission requirements. All SBCTs include maneuver, field
artillery, intelligence, signal, engineer, CBRN, and sustainment capabilities (see figure 1-8 on page 1-12).
This organizational flexibility enables SBCTs to function across the range of military operations. Unique to
the SBCT is the weapons troop (with three antitank guided missile (ATGM) platoons and three mobile gun
system (known as MGS) platoons) that provides the SBCT the ability to defeat light-skinned enemy armor
or task organize those assets to maneuver battalions based on mission requirements (see paragraph 1-33).
Higher commanders augment the SBCT for a specific mission with additional capabilities such as aviation,
Armor, field artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, a tactical PSYOP element, engineers, CBRN,
and information systems assets.

1-30. SBCTs balance combined arms capabilities with significant mobility. The SBCT primarily fights as a
dismounted Infantry formation that includes three SBCT Infantry battalions. The SBCT Infantry battalion
has a headquarters and headquarters company, and three SBCT Infantry rifle companies each with three
SBCT Infantry rifle platoons (see figure 1-9). The headquarters and headquarters company provides planning
and intelligence, signal, and fire support to the battalion. The headquarters company has a battalion command
section, a battalion staff section, a company headquarters, battalion medical, scout, and mortar platoons, a
signal section, and a sniper squad. The headquarters company mortar platoon is equipped with 120-mm
Stryker mortar carrier vehicles that have an 81-mm mortar dismounted capability. Each SBCT Infantry rifle
company has a section of organic 120-mm Stryker mortar carrier vehicles that have a 60-mm mortar
dismounted capability and a Raven UAS team. Habitual attachments to the SBCT Infantry rifle company
include a fire support team at the company level and forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics
assigned to the rifle platoons, and a senior medic at the company level. The battalion receives an FSC for
sustainment purposes (see chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-21.21 and
ATP 3-21.11 for additional information.)

1-31. The Cavalry squadron of the SBCT is extremely mobile. The Cavalry squadron is composed of five
troops, one headquarters and headquarters troop, three Cavalry troops equipped with Stryker reconnaissance
vehicles, and weapons troop equipped with Stryker ATGM vehicles and Stryker MGS vehicles (see
figure 1-10 on page 1-14). The headquarters troop organization includes a command section, the troop
headquarters section, the squadron primary staff, a medical section, a sniper section, a RETRANS section,
an attached fire support cell, and a TACP. The squadron receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see
chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-20.96.)

1-32. Each Cavalry troop includes headquarters section, two scout platoons, a Raven UAS team, and a mortar
section. The two scout platoons contain four reconnaissance vehicles, each with a crew and scout team for
dismounted operations. The mortar section consists of two 120-mm mounted mortar carrier vehicles led by
a sergeant first class. Habitual attachments to the Cavalry troop include a fire support team at the troop level
and forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics assigned to each platoon, and a senior medic at the
troop level. (See ATP 3-20.97 and ATP 3-20.98.)

1-33. The weapons troop combat power resides within its three ATGM platoons and three MGS platoons. It
has a headquarters section with an assigned Infantry carrier vehicle. The ATGM platoon engages the enemy
by means of long-range antiarmor fires and maneuvers to destroy or to repel the enemy’s assaults by fire,
and counterattack. The platoon consists of three ATGM vehicles. The MGS platoon provides precise
long-range direct fire to destroy or suppress hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun positions, sniper
positions, and long-range threats. It also creates Infantry breach points in urban, restricted, and open rolling
terrain. The MGS 105-mm main gun provides the platoon with limited antiarmor, self-defense capabilities.
The platoon consists of four MGS vehicles. Attachments include a fires support team with a fire support
vehicle from the field artillery battalion to support with fires and medics with a medical support vehicle from
the medical platoon of the headquarters and headquarters troop of the Cavalry squadron. (See ATP 3-21.91
for additional information.)

1-34. The SBCT field artillery battalion has four batteries: a headquarters and headquarters battery and three
six-gun lightweight M777-series 155-mm towed howitzer batteries. The SBCT field artillery battalion
organizes each howitzer battery with two firing platoons of three guns each. The battalion supports SBCT
operations with precision, near precision, and area fires. The field artillery battalion has two AN/TPQ-53
counterfire radars and four AN/TPQ-50 lightweight countermortar radars for target acquisition. (See
ATP 3-09.42 for additional information.)

 

[Kirkhill]

SECTION III – ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-36. The ABCT’s role is to close with the enemy by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture
enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas,
including populations and resources. The ABCT organizes to concentrate overwhelming combat power.
Mobility, protection, and firepower enable the ABCT to conduct offensive operations with great precision
and speed. The ABCT performs complementary missions to the IBCT and SBCT.

1-37. The ABCT conducts offensive operations to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The ABCT
conducts defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, and develop favorable
conditions for offensive actions. During stability, the ABCT’s commitment of time, resources, and forces
establish and reinforce diplomatic and military resolve to achieve a safe, secure environment and a
sustainable peace.

1-38. The ABCT conducts sustained and large-scale combat operations within the foundations of unified
land operations through decisive action. The ABCT seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative while
synchronizing its actions to achieve the best effects possible. During combat operations, the ABCT can fight
without additional combat power but can be task organized to meet the precise needs of its missions. The
ABCT conducts expeditionary deployments and integrates its efforts with unified action partners.

1-39. The ABCT (figure 1-11 on page 1-16) is a combined arms organization consisting of three combined
arms battalions of Armor and mechanized Infantry companies. Cavalry, field artillery, engineer, intelligence,
signal, sustainment, TUAS, and CBRN reconnaissance units are organic to the ABCT. Higher commanders
augment the ABCT for a specific mission with additional capabilities. Augmentation can include aviation,
Infantry, field artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, tactical PSYOP element, engineers, CBRN,
and additional information systems assets.

1-40. Three combined arms battalions are the ABCT’s primary maneuver force. Each combined arms
battalion conducts sustained combined arms and close combat operations as an essential part of the ABCT
formation. The combined arms battalions of the ABCT serve as a deterrent to armed conflict; they can deploy
worldwide in the conduct of decisive action. Combined arms battalions execute operations within their
assigned areas of operations in support of the commander’s scheme of maneuver. The combined arms
battalion receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship.

1-41. Combined arms battalions combine the efforts of their Armor companies and mechanized Infantry
companies along with their headquarters and headquarters company to execute tactical missions as part of a
combined arms operation. Within the ABCT, two combined arms battalions (see figure 1-12) have two Armor
companies (each with three tank platoons and a headquarters section) and one mechanized Infantry company
(with three mechanized Infantry platoons, a headquarters section, and a Raven UAS team); and one combined
arms battalion has two mechanized Infantry companies (each with three mechanized Infantry platoons, a
headquarters section, and a Raven UAS team) and one Armor company (with three tank platoons and a
headquarters section). The headquarters and headquarters company of each combined arms battalion provides
planning and intelligence, signal, and fire support to the battalion. Each headquarters company has a battalion
command section, a battalion staff section, a company headquarters, battalion medical, scout, and mortar
platoons, a signal section, and a sniper squad. The headquarters company mortar platoon is equipped with
120-mm mortar carrier vehicles that have a 120-mm mortar dismounted capability. Habitual attachments to
the maneuver companies include a fire support team at the company level and forward observer teams at the
platoon level, medics assigned to the rifle platoons, and a senior medic at the company level. (See ATP 3-90.5
and ATP 3-90.1 for additional information.)

1-42. The fundamental purpose of the Cavalry squadron is to perform reconnaissance and security operations
in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations, often in conjunction with fighting for information
to support the ABCT commander. The conduct of security operations by the squadron provides an economy
of force while allowing the ABCT commander the flexibility to conserve combat power for engagements
where better desired.

1-43. The Cavalry squadron has a headquarters and headquarters troop, three ground Cavalry troops, and an
Armor company (see figure 1-13 on page 1-18). The headquarters troop organization includes a command
group, the troop headquarters section, the squadron primary staff that is; personnel, intelligence, operations,
logistics, signal, the medical platoon, an attached fire support cell, and a TACP. The squadron has 120-mm
self-propelled mortars (see ATP 3-20.96). The squadron receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see
chapter 4), normally in a direct support relationship. The ground Cavalry troops have two platoons with six
Bradley fighting vehicles and a Raven UAS team. The Armor company has three platoons with four M1
Abrams main battle tanks. Habitual attachments to the Cavalry troop tank and company include a fire support
team at the troop/company level and forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics assigned to each
platoon, and a senior medic at the troop/company level. (See ATP 3-20.15, ATP 3-20.97, and ATP 3-20.98.)

1-44. The ABCT field artillery battalion has four batteries, a headquarters and headquarters battery and three
batteries of six M109 (family of vehicles) Paladin self-propelled 155-mm howitzers. The batteries are manned
and equipped to operate as two separate firing platoons of three guns. The field artillery battalion provides
massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets with precision, near precision, and area fires to
support ABCT operations. The field artillery battalion has two AN/TPQ-53 counterfire radars and four
AN/TPQ-50 lightweight countermortar radars for target acquisition. (See ATP 3-09.42 for additional
information.)


So? Are we close to matching any of the above?

 

[FJAG]

I've posted this before but I'll do it again. The Congressional Budget Office periodically publishes a Primer for the members of Congress as to the basics behind the US Military and some of the cost factors involved in operating them. It shows some very granular visuals of what the component parts are. For the Army, the structures of the three BCTs start at page 17.

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf

In answer to your question Kirkhill: No! We are not matching them. In the beginning as we started our turn of the century Army Transformation processes we were designing something similar to the Interim Brigade Combat Team (which would become the Stryker BCT).

We were close albeit our structure had several deficiencies principally lack of artillery, lack of mortars, an eventual lack of direct fire systems (albeit we serendipitously rectified that in part with Leo 2s), lack of ATGMs, and a lack of the divisional level and above enablers (rockets, more artillery, air defence, sustainment and mobility enablers, ABCT follow up forces etc)