I've been rereading Kasorak's "A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army 1950-2000" and was particulalry struck by the repetition of one issue.
Canada war-gamed our European commitment several times in the late 1970s and 1980s with the same general results. For example Ex BRONZE TALON 3 made it clear that the critical arm in those exercises was both the Blue and Red force artillery (in those days we had four 6-gun M109 batteries there and were wargaming an MLRS battery as well) which inflicted 72% of the Red casualties and 83% of the Blue casualties respectively. The lesson learned from that was two-fold, we need plenty of artillery, and that we need to devote more counter battery resources to quieten Red artillery.
Conversely, the least effective arm in these evaluations was the infantry which at the time was in M113s (or the notional Canadian Infantry Fighting Vehicle) and did have some TOWs but no medium range ATGMs. Dismounted infantry rarely contributed to the fight. The recommendation from that was we needed a personnel carrier that could participate in the counter APC fight (the suggestion at the time was something BMPish) and that we needed medium range ATGMs desperately. The CIFV provided that BMPish fire support but would draw artillery fire onto the dug in infantry with it and was also susceptible to artillery fire.
The CIFV results are somewhat concerning about how to conduct the infantry defensive fight as the LAV falls somewhat into a comparable.
Tanks (and notional tank destroyers with 105 mm guns), incidentally, were found effective in all scenarios.
I'm sure that the newer weapon systems facing us today make pure rifle companies even less relevant now than before.
I'm not sure how much the Army wargames northern European scenarios these days. I presume that they still are and I would find their more recent studies particulalry useful in figuring out how to structure Force 2025. It seems to me that our predominantly infantry-centric army, as structured and equipped, is not suitable for many scenarios that it might encounter. While Kirkhill and I differ on structure, I think there is a clear necessity that much of our infantry force needs to be trained for and employed in roles other than the traditional rifle company (whether light or mech) roles which occupy much of their time now. Whether that's as a robust cavalry force or in composite combined arms battalions or as anti-armour companies needs to be trialed out but essentially most of the Army's PYs are in the infantry and they need to evolve. If the need is for more artillery and reconnaissance and anti-armour forces, the reserves can and should play a big role.
I do believe that there will always be a need for a fallback role to basic infantry skills for OOTW but they need to be redesigned and re-equipped for the higher end things. I think that can be done without breaking the bank. In large part of the war gaming points the way, doctrine can be developed and practiced even before the weapon systems arrive. The German Army developed its skills in plywood tanks long before the steel ones rolled off the production lines. The big thing is to get the doctrine going so that organizations and equipment acquisition will follow a cogent plan.
