Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

I thin it is a shit take regardless how it is sliced - as they attempt to shoehorn in specific issues of Ukraine to a larger picture.


1. Mass Matters. Attrition warfare is not dead. This mode of warfare emerges when neither side can achieve a clear asymmetric advantage. Standing armies are the only instrument nations can use to prevent, deter, and fight invading aggressors. Mass is required in a war of attrition. Funding and maintaining land power may seem like an expensive insurance policy but doing the opposite is to risk state collapse. Wars can only be won on the ground where nations exist, and people live. Land power is an indispensable capability, even in the Pacific.

A lack of appreciation for emerging threats over time has eroded land capabilities in the West. Power withers when it proves frail, and a perceived weakness invites aggression. Key capabilities such as armor, artillery, and engineers cannot be replaced by cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities. The Ukraine conflict proved they were less decisive than expected.
I actually agree with this. But this is a battle winning formula, not a war winning formula. The mass to fight land battles has to be provided by willing locals. Those locals do need support and they will need BOTH "armor, artillery and engineers" (and logistics) along with the C5ISR magic.

I am not yet convinced that armor is as high on the priority list as it used to be but perhaps that makes even more of a case of an armored expeditionary force geared towards supplying a capability that the locals can't afford themselves.

OTOH assembling mass results in rapid attrition. A slow drip is preferable to bleeding out.

I don't see a dearth of Key Capabilities in the US Military - other Militaries sure, but when you see the amount and power of US Divisions, I don't really see what they are tilting at, other than attempting to pull resources from the other services.
They also tend to ignore what AirPower has given to the Allies in and from WW2.
I dont see anywhere where there has been disagreement that mass matters for ground campaigns - but mass by itself isn't a solution.


2. Maritime Operations Are Vulnerable. Expensive naval forces are threatened by inexpensive weaponry. Ukrainian attacks have minimized the impact of the Russian Black Sea fleet and little by little the Russian Navy drifted further back toward the mainland.

Naval experts proclaim this is “an unmistakable warning — that today’s run-of-the-mill missiles and commercial data systems can knock even the world’s top warships out of a fight.” China seeks this competitive advantage in the Pacific with “carrier killer” missiles.

I don't see much objectionable in those statements.

I would just add that "Expensive land forces are threatened by inexpensive weaponry" just as much as naval forces.

This is where I think they start really pushing an agenda. I see this as a major push against the USN and USMC growth for the Pacific Pivot - and China. The Russian Black Sea Navy isn't a good example, as they had been allow to rust out significantly, and even then, they seen to forget the fact the the threat of Amphibious Invasion of Odesa kept several Brigades there as a garrison. The fact remains that unless one is fighting on ones own land, or is on the same continent as the conflict - that some Maritime operations will be needed.


3. Deep Attacks by Themselves Are Ineffective. There is a desire to employ rotary attack aircraft – and to some extent, fixed-wing aircraft - deep behind enemy lines for strategic effect. This tactic is practiced routinely in exercises, but it has been proven futile in past wars. In Ukraine, soldiers operating short range anti-aircraft defensive equipment and using small arms fire, have been taking out multi-million-dollar aircraft. Control of the air remains contested and this will be a continual feature of future conflict.

Neither side was able to use aviation in a game-changing role. Russian attack regiments had to change their tactics and use aircraft in a combat support role. Likewise, the Ukrainians had to do the same to preserve combat power and support ground maneuver forces.d

Rather than pursuing deep attacks, the West would benefit more from the development of counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) tactics and technologies. Additionally, decades of experience from combat and modern gaming finds “the output of an entire joint force is amplified when synergistic integration across components increases.” Joint capabilities must work together, and in an allied context, strategic lethality can be achieved with the improved integration and interoperability of battle networks.

Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Golden BBs still have their place - but again that is a local force requirement that requires wide dispersion and lots of locals keeping their eyes on the skies for the duration of the conflict. And maybe longer.

I guess they missed WW2's Bombing Campaign - any later conflict precision bombing campaigns?
It is a direct swipe at certain capabilities.
Ukraine doesn't have any deep strike capabilities into the Russian territory - Russia's strike assets seem to be being used oddly - as they had well attrited the Rail system and then went to focus on the Powergrid -- when you see the equipment and supplies coming into Ukraine, clearly the Railway is the more logistical strategic target.
I feel they just threw shit on the wall here.





4. Airborne and Amphibious Warfare Has Been Minimized. These modes of warfare have their place in specialized units but the conduct of these methods at a large-scale, using thousands of soldiers and marines, is resource intensive, high risk, and perhaps even anachronistic.

The Russian’s hesitance to execute an amphibious operation is for good reason. The potential gain from such operations is not worth the cost. This painful lesson was learned by Russia’s elite airborne forces, the VDV, at Hostomel airport last year. Their forces were decimated.

It might not be time to write an obituary for these types of operations but their use on a large-scale in peer warfighting is limited with contested air space and ubiquitous stand-off weaponry. It might be worth Western nations evaluating their efficacy and determining whether it is time to repurpose these types of units for a role that has increased survivability and lethality. This leads to the next lesson.

An airborne or marine division is going to be more effective widely dispersed as platoons and companies working in support of locals than it will be as a unitary formation working against the locals.

Picking an operation that went badly is hardly a case to say it doesn't or won't work.
The entire Russian advance the first few days was a disaster due to poor Intelligence and faulty premises.
I mentioned the threat of Amphibious landing near Odesa that frozen several UAF Brigades for months -- sometimes even having the capability and not using it is a force all in it's own.


5. Artificial Intelligence Has Arrived. It has been said that advanced algorithmic warfare systems equate to having a nuclear weapon. Ukrainian forces have compressed their “kill chains,” and used software engineers on the frontlines to calibrate algorithms for devastating effect.

A.I. is not tomorrow’s problem. This enabling technology is being used today and will be more and more prevalent tomorrow. Western nations will need to induce a greater rate of digital transformation to make use of their data and build battle-winning algorithms.

As someone building industrial solutions for over 40 years I can say that as far as I am concerned Artificial Intelligence is both real and overblown. I have been automating plants since I helped my father clip plastic cards for clockwork timers. Those plastic cards represented sub routines in logical programmes supporting predetermined courses of action. They were intended to reduce the operator's work load by rendering the plant a degree of autonomy. The programme decided many of the "next steps"

I have seen changes in technology that renders more complex solutions cheaper and faster. But I have seen very few real "game changers". Most of the processes in most modern plants would be understood by any engineer from the 1930s, and by good ones from the 1830s.

So after trashing on the

cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities.

They go on to point out those virtues...

If this is their agenda I support it.



Listening and learning is always a good thing, as is experimentation.

 

[Kirkhill]

1) I agree to an extent that as a distant island nation we can to a great extent rely on "willing locals" to provide the mass to fight the land battles far from our own shores, but there is a political element too where we need to share some of the burden (in blood if required) to support our allies. Alliances require reciprocity. If we're not willing to sacrifice on their behalf then why would we expect them to do so on ours? Due to our fortunate geographic location we may not need them to send soldiers to fight on our territory but we may need them to make serious economic sacrifices if say China tries to exert extreme political/economic pressure on us for example.

2) We tend to focus on the Army when we talk about mass. I'd argue that it's just as important for air and naval forces. Just as we've allowed the Army to seriously deteriorate, the RCAF and RCN are shadows of their former selves and likewise likely don't have the mass to be successful/impactful in a major conflict.

I agree on the need to share the burden. There is a diplomatic need to put forces in the field. The question is whether the need to be light, heavy or Ordnance (writ large). My bias is towards the light (see marine and airborne below coupled with Ordnance (to include the RCAF and the RCN along with the RRCA.

My sense is the even if the Army never gets its combat arms sorted out there is a lot of other opportunities in the SOF, Ordnance, C5ISr, Diplomatic and Economic fields for the Canadian Government to influence events.

The only place our army is local is here at home. And the army is convinced there is no need for it here.

There are certainly many lessons that can be taken from the Ukraine war for naval forces, but there are also many things about this particular war that are too unique to take as broad lessons. Agreed that the vulnerability of large, expensive vessels to (relatively) cheap and plentiful missiles may require a re-think about ship design and force structures. Also agree that USVs and UUVs will likely be new capabilities that may have significant impacts on future wars.

However, the Ukraine war does not really take into account submarine warfare and also does not really involve blockades and control of SLOCs. By international agreement the Russian naval blockade is allowing key Ukrainian food exports to continue and nobody is interfering with the major SLOCs. In a war with China for example all three of the above (submarine warfare, blockades and control of SLOCs) will likely be major factors in the outcome of the conflict. Just as the resource blockade and submarine campaign against Japan crippled their industrial capacity (and ability to replace lost naval and air units) in WWII, naval forces will still be key in future conflicts. If you stop thinking of warships as tanks that are vulnerable to ATGMs but rather think of them as floating HIMARS with integral GBAD then I think you'll agree that the lessons of Ukraine don't really apply to naval warfare more broadly.

Every war is particular. But the rules are general. The range of options are broad of the selection of those that are applicable can be quite limited and situational.

Agree that we (the West) definitely need to up our AD game against the full range of airborne targets from quad-copters to CRAM to hypersonic missiles, but I disagree that Deep Strikes are ineffective. Of course Deep Strikes are ineffective by themselves...but that can be said of any individual military capability.

The author says the same thing. " Deep Attacks by Themselves Are Ineffective." My take on it is that LAAA seriously deg rades the effectiveness of air support in all roles including Deep Attacks. Therefore LAAA is something that we need at home and abroad and we need to be aware that even our best technologies don't guarantee a sure cure.

Again I'd say that Ukraine isn't necessarily a great example for peer conflict writ large. While a pretty major conflict, it is still in many ways a limited conflict. Russian strategic deep strikes against Ukrainian power infrastructure are not having the desired effect, but that doesn't mean that deep strikes themselves are not potentially significantly effective. Imagine an unlimited conflict where railway bridges and marshalling yards in Russia proper were hit along with weapon/ammo storage depots and production sites, fuel refineries and pipelines, airfields, GBAD sites, etc. Could that not potentially have a significant strategic impact on the conflict?

To be honest I am starting to get concerned about how often I am hearing Yebbut. As in "Yebbut if the russians had done things differently, if the Ukrainians were better equipped then they wouldn't have had to change the rules of the game. We would do things properly."

The rules may not be changing but the rules that can be exploited might be.

Modern weapons are more complex and harder to replace than for example in WWII.

Partly true - There is very little that is more complex that an smart phone and they are manufactured in the 10s of millions for hundreds of dollars and universally distributed. Add a smartphone to any dumb bomb and it becomes smarter.

Similarly weapons are more precise than they were in the days of the strategic bombing campaigns over Germany. A modern strategic deep strike campaign could potentially be much more effective than campaigns in the past.

Agreed here - but the 1000 bomber raids from Norfolk to Berlin covered 1500 km round trip. The same trip could be covered by the Kratos UTAP22 without putting any flight crew at risk, with a more precise outcome and for a lot less cost and effort.

Airborne and amphibious operations have always been among the riskiest and most costly types of military operations. Some places however can only be reached by air or sea so they're capabilities that needs to be maintained. In some cases you're right and the situation may require smaller scale dispersed operations. Other situations may call for larger operations. Small forces may lack the mass required to be impactful in some situations and large forces have the risk of major loss. We should have the capability to conduct both types of operations when appropriate.

I can't foresee any circumstance where Canada would be willing to risk all its available expeditionary eggs in one basket - be they light or heavy. Canada will only commit a fraction of the forces in being and, if those expeditionary forces are primarily diplomatic in purpose they will never be either large or well supported by the government or the citizenry.

Agreed that AI is no magic bullet. It's another advanced tool but like any tool you have to know how to use it.

Thumbs up.

Again agreed. Warfare like anything else isn't static. We can't just pick a bunch of TTPs that suit today's understanding of conflict and reflect our current technologies and just practice and perfect them as an end goal. We should constantly be trying new methods and technologies and modifying our way of doing things in order to keep moving ahead of our potential enemies.

Again thumbs up.

Listen and learn, but also be wary that the lessons of one particular conflict don't necessarily apply to all future conflicts.

Beware of pollyanna and hoping that things will be different next time because we know what we're doing.

 

[Kirkhill]

I thin it is a shit take regardless how it is sliced - as they attempt to shoehorn in specific issues of Ukraine to a larger picture.


1. Mass Matters. Attrition warfare is not dead. This mode of warfare emerges when neither side can achieve a clear asymmetric advantage. Standing armies are the only instrument nations can use to prevent, deter, and fight invading aggressors. Mass is required in a war of attrition. Funding and maintaining land power may seem like an expensive insurance policy but doing the opposite is to risk state collapse. Wars can only be won on the ground where nations exist, and people live. Land power is an indispensable capability, even in the Pacific.

A lack of appreciation for emerging threats over time has eroded land capabilities in the West. Power withers when it proves frail, and a perceived weakness invites aggression. Key capabilities such as armor, artillery, and engineers cannot be replaced by cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities. The Ukraine conflict proved they were less decisive than expected.
I actually agree with this. But this is a battle winning formula, not a war winning formula. The mass to fight land battles has to be provided by willing locals. Those locals do need support and they will need BOTH "armor, artillery and engineers" (and logistics) along with the C5ISR magic.

I don't see a dearth of Key Capabilities in the US Military - other Militaries sure, but when you see the amount and power of US Divisions, I don't really see what they are tilting at, other than attempting to pull resources from the other services.
They also tend to ignore what AirPower has given to the Allies in and from WW2.
I dont see anywhere where there has been disagreement that mass matters for ground campaigns - but mass by itself isn't a solution.


2. Maritime Operations Are Vulnerable. Expensive naval forces are threatened by inexpensive weaponry. Ukrainian attacks have minimized the impact of the Russian Black Sea fleet and little by little the Russian Navy drifted further back toward the mainland.

Naval experts proclaim this is “an unmistakable warning — that today’s run-of-the-mill missiles and commercial data systems can knock even the world’s top warships out of a fight.” China seeks this competitive advantage in the Pacific with “carrier killer” missiles.

This is where I think they start really pushing an agenda. I see this as a major push against the USN and USMC growth for the Pacific Pivot - and China. The Russian Black Sea Navy isn't a good example, as they had been allow to rust out significantly, and even then, they seen to forget the fact the the threat of Amphibious Invasion of Odesa kept several Brigades there as a garrison. The fact remains that unless one is fighting on ones own land, or is on the same continent as the conflict - that some Maritime operations will be needed.


3. Deep Attacks by Themselves Are Ineffective. There is a desire to employ rotary attack aircraft – and to some extent, fixed-wing aircraft - deep behind enemy lines for strategic effect. This tactic is practiced routinely in exercises, but it has been proven futile in past wars. In Ukraine, soldiers operating short range anti-aircraft defensive equipment and using small arms fire, have been taking out multi-million-dollar aircraft. Control of the air remains contested and this will be a continual feature of future conflict.

Neither side was able to use aviation in a game-changing role. Russian attack regiments had to change their tactics and use aircraft in a combat support role. Likewise, the Ukrainians had to do the same to preserve combat power and support ground maneuver forces.d

Rather than pursuing deep attacks, the West would benefit more from the development of counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) tactics and technologies. Additionally, decades of experience from combat and modern gaming finds “the output of an entire joint force is amplified when synergistic integration across components increases.” Joint capabilities must work together, and in an allied context, strategic lethality can be achieved with the improved integration and interoperability of battle networks.


I guess they missed WW2's Bombing Campaign - any later conflict precision bombing campaigns?
It is a direct swipe at certain capabilities.
Ukraine doesn't have any deep strike capabilities into the Russian territory - Russia's strike assets seem to be being used oddly - as they had well attrited the Rail system and then went to focus on the Powergrid -- when you see the equipment and supplies coming into Ukraine, clearly the Railway is the more logistical strategic target.
I feel they just threw shit on the wall here.





4. Airborne and Amphibious Warfare Has Been Minimized. These modes of warfare have their place in specialized units but the conduct of these methods at a large-scale, using thousands of soldiers and marines, is resource intensive, high risk, and perhaps even anachronistic.

The Russian’s hesitance to execute an amphibious operation is for good reason. The potential gain from such operations is not worth the cost. This painful lesson was learned by Russia’s elite airborne forces, the VDV, at Hostomel airport last year. Their forces were decimated.

It might not be time to write an obituary for these types of operations but their use on a large-scale in peer warfighting is limited with contested air space and ubiquitous stand-off weaponry. It might be worth Western nations evaluating their efficacy and determining whether it is time to repurpose these types of units for a role that has increased survivability and lethality. This leads to the next lesson.



Picking an operation that went badly is hardly a case to say it doesn't or won't work.
The entire Russian advance the first few days was a disaster due to poor Intelligence and faulty premises.
I mentioned the threat of Amphibious landing near Odesa that frozen several UAF Brigades for months -- sometimes even having the capability and not using it is a force all in it's own.


5. Artificial Intelligence Has Arrived. It has been said that advanced algorithmic warfare systems equate to having a nuclear weapon. Ukrainian forces have compressed their “kill chains,” and used software engineers on the frontlines to calibrate algorithms for devastating effect.

A.I. is not tomorrow’s problem. This enabling technology is being used today and will be more and more prevalent tomorrow. Western nations will need to induce a greater rate of digital transformation to make use of their data and build battle-winning algorithms.

So after trashing on the

They go on to point out those virtues...

Ack. Will revert.

 

[KevinB]

Ack. Will revert.

I encourage everyone to read with an open mind, but also with some healthy skepticism — but then again I’m a cynic.
Very few GO/FO and senior officers offer opinions to the public without an agenda.

Additionally may not even see an unconscious bias in their reporting. The whole aspect of you have a hammer, all you see is nails.

My belief is that Mass is necessary, but not to the exclusion of other enablers.
A mix of forces is needed, least you be Ill prepared for the next issue, or someone decides to pick Rock against your Scissors…

Deep Strike: I would characterize that as strategic targeting, war manufacturing, higher command and control etc.

The same way I view Airborne, Airmobile, and Amphibious— it’s a strategic option to break the enemy or force a multi front conflict.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I encourage everyone to read with an open mind, but also with some healthy skepticism — but then again I’m a cynic.
Very few GO/FO and senior officers offer opinions to the public without an agenda.

Additionally may not even see an unconscious bias in their reporting. The whole aspect of you have a hammer, all you see is nails.

My belief is that Mass is necessary, but not to the exclusion of other enablers.
A mix of forces is needed, least you be Ill prepared for the next issue, or someone decides to pick Rock against your Scissors…

Deep Strike: I would characterize that as strategic targeting, war manufacturing, higher command and control etc.

The same way I view Airborne, Airmobile, and Amphibious— it’s a strategic option to break the enemy or force a multi front conflict.

The other key learning seems to be that Western Military forces, along the lines of NATO, are hugely more capable than Russian style militaries in both manpower and equipment quality.

We need to do some back patting for each other on this side of the old Berlin Wall...

 

[quadrapiper]

#islandofmisfittoyswithoutthedentist

Locally relevant: #paidmove #skiitodaysurftomorrow #retirementrecce #nevergoingeastagain

 

[OldSolduer]

I encourage everyone to read with an open mind, but also with some healthy skepticism — but then again I’m a cynic.
Very few GO/FO and senior officers offer opinions to the public without an agenda.

Additionally may not even see an unconscious bias in their reporting. The whole aspect of you have a hammer, all you see is nails.

My belief is that Mass is necessary, but not to the exclusion of other enablers.
A mix of forces is needed, least you be Ill prepared for the next issue, or someone decides to pick Rock against your Scissors…

Deep Strike: I would characterize that as strategic targeting, war manufacturing, higher command and control etc.

The same way I view Airborne, Airmobile, and Amphibious— it’s a strategic option to break the enemy or force a multi front conflict.

So what you are all saying to me (if I were PM) "a well rounded and trained military in peace time is required and can be tailored to events in war time" or words to that effect....

 

[daftandbarmy]

Locally relevant: #paidmove #skiitodaysurftomorrow #retirementrecce #nevergoingeastagain

Or the ever popular ... #hatemylifesoallwillsuffer

 

[Kirkhill]

So what you are all saying to me (if I were PM) "a well rounded and trained military in peace time is required and can be tailored to events in war time" or words to that effect....

.... if time allows.

I would add that the primary focus of National Defence in peace time should be Situational Awareness and the tools to maintain it. That means C5ISR as a priority.

The second priority is tools on hand to buy time to react and adapt. In my view that means well stocked warehouses with lots of, what was @dimsum's expression? warheads for foreheads? And lots of people on hand that can move the contents of the warehouses to the foreheads.
Here I agree with @FJAG. We may not agree on the mix of "toys" but I think we agree on the need for trained bodies in reserve with the tools and ammunition at hand. I would also stipulate that the means to blast the threat needs to be simple so that it can be easily mastered and learned by part timers and short service personnel. So lots of Ordnance manned by reservists.

The third priority is the standing force - small and highly skilled capable of defending the motherland and taking charge of the reserve.

Priority four - deploying and operating overseas with allied forces and local governments.

Edit to add - a volunteer body of reservists willing and able to deploy overseas, along with regular expeditionary force - both reserves and regs need to be all volunteers.

 

[Kirkhill]

I encourage everyone to read with an open mind, but also with some healthy skepticism — but then again I’m a cynic.
Very few GO/FO and senior officers offer opinions to the public without an agenda.

Additionally may not even see an unconscious bias in their reporting. The whole aspect of you have a hammer, all you see is nails.

My belief is that Mass is necessary, but not to the exclusion of other enablers.
A mix of forces is needed, least you be Ill prepared for the next issue, or someone decides to pick Rock against your Scissors…

Deep Strike: I would characterize that as strategic targeting, war manufacturing, higher command and control etc.

The same way I view Airborne, Airmobile, and Amphibious— it’s a strategic option to break the enemy or force a multi front conflict.

You have knowledge of the names and the players. I'm coming at this blind.

My wife, also a Food Scientist, is used to running both Blind and Expert Taste Panels. Both have their uses.

 

[Kirkhill]

.... if time allows.

I would add that the primary focus of National Defence in peace time should be Situational Awareness and the tools to maintain it. That means C5ISR as a priority.

The second priority is tools on hand to buy time to react and adapt. In my view that means well stocked warehouses with lots of, what was @dimsum's expression? warheads for foreheads? And lots of people on hand that can move the contents of the warehouses to the foreheads.
Here I agree with @FJAG. We may not agree on the mix of "toys" but I think we agree on the need for trained bodies in reserve with the tools and ammunition at hand. I would also stipulate that the means to blast the threat needs to be simple so that it can be easily mastered and learned by part timers and short service personnel. So lots of Ordnance manned by reservists.

The third priority is the standing force - small and highly skilled capable of defending the motherland and taking charge of the reserve.

Priority four - deploying and operating overseas with allied forces and local governments.

Edit to add - a volunteer body of reservists willing and able to deploy overseas, along with regular expeditionary force - both reserves and regs need to be all volunteers.

Doing a bit of a rethink here

.... if time allows.

I would add that the primary focus of National Defence in peace time should be Situational Awareness and the tools to maintain it. That means C5ISR as a priority.

Still priority one - C5ISR

The second priority is tools on hand to buy time to react and adapt. In my view that means well stocked warehouses with lots of, what was ity@dimsum's expression? warheads for foreheads? And lots of people on hand that can move the contents of the warehouses to the foreheads.
Here I agree with @FJAG. We may not agree on the mix of "toys" but I think we agree on the need for trained bodies in reserve with the tools and ammunition at hand. I would also stipulate that the means to blast the threat needs to be simple so that it can be easily mastered and learned by part timers and short service personnel. So lots of Ordnance manned by reservists.

The third priority is the standing force - small and highly skilled capable of defending the motherland and taking charge of the reserve.

Edit to add - a volunteer body of reservists willing and able to deploy overseas, along with regular expeditionary force - both reserves and regs need to be all volunteers.

Collectively these equate to priority two - Defence - and not just Canada's but allies' as well

Priority four - deploying and operating overseas with allied forces and local governments.

Thus priority four collapses down to priority three - Offence - in pursuit of diplomatic objectives and interests


So three priorities

C5ISR
Defence
Offence

Taking a look at C5ISR and dissecting the acronym I believe we end up with something like

Command
Control
Communications
Computations
Cyber
Intelligence
Surveillance
Reconnaissance



Command
Control
Communications
Computations

These are basic HQ functions - continuing in peace or war

I am not a fan of the Computations being include with the others a I feel that that, like AI, is not a department so much as an attribute of all systems and capabilities. And even Communications edges that way as well. Everything needs to communicate.

Cyber - I don't know what to make of that. Or even if it is a CAF function or is it more properly left to the likes of CSE?


My focus is on ISR

Intelligence - continuing review and analysis of the situation in peace and war - maintaining the Common Picture regardless of domain.

Surveillance - ongoing observation, gathering data and reporting it to Intelligence for review and analysis
Reconnaissance - targeted observation by assets capable of immediately reacting to, and eliminating, identified threats.

It strikes me that entirety of the operational CAF, or at least the majority of its assets could be seen as Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets.

That would include

Sigint
Radar
Satellites
RPAS
CP-140s / CMMA
CF-18s / F35s
CPFs / CSCs
MCDVs / AOPS
SSKs / UUVs / fixed sensors
CH-148s

It would also include ground troops and the means to move them to evaluate the local situation while capable of immediately reacting to, and eliminating, identified threats. Now those could be team or a brigade. In my opinion the defining characteristic of such a force is timeliness - the ability to move quickly to the threat and equally quickly away from the threat while retaining the ability to effectively engage and eliminate a broad range of threats.

ln my mind that means an air mobile force deployable by

CC-138
CC-130
CC-177
CC-150
CC-144

As well as by

CH-146
CH-147
CH-149 (in this telling SAR Techs a re a recce element - boots on the ground that can evaluate, act and extract)

Given all of that Canada's Armed Forces, in Zulu Impi terms can be seen as having quite well developed horns and head but it lacks the body and loins. It lacks mass. Both in terms of bodies and in terms of effects.

We have the ability to deploy the tools we have available but in small numbers for short durations. Maybe we should be building on those peacetime strengths. It would not, again, in my opinion, take much to commit to imp roving our Offence (Priority Three). That can build on the existing assets and we can self limit to the level of expense we choose.

The difficult bit is the bit in between - actual Defence.

 

[KevinB]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1636350857984851974

 

[Rifleman62]

Send the RUSI article to NDHQ where they can scoff at it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1636350857984851974

FWIW....

Having seen a both of both systems (albeit years ago) I'd say that Canada, through the RESO (and equivalent) program and the current suite of NCM development courses, is better prepared to integrate its Reserves into the Reg F than the UK, in many ways, at the more junior levels e.g. Coy/ Sqn level and below.

Should we decide to figure out our own 'mass mobilization' program I'd say we'd be in pretty good shape in some areas, from the personnel point of view anyways, as a result.

 

[Journeyman]

CH-149 (in this telling SAR Techs a re a recce element - boots on the ground that can evaluate, act and extract)

Tactical exclusion notice: May only be deployed to orange/red tulip gardens.

 

[Furniture]

Tactical exclusion notice: May only be deployed to orange/red tulip gardens.

SAR Techs for the Scheldt V2.0?

 

[Kirkhill]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1636350857984851974

The debate continues.

In 1910, Lord Esher, pro-conscription chairman of the London County Territorial Association, wrote in the National Review that the country would have to choose between an under-strength voluntary auxiliary and compulsory service.[44] In his opinion, the Territorial Force was the last chance for the volunteer tradition, and its failure would pave the way for conscription.[45] Advocacy for compulsory service was led by the National Service League (NSL), which regarded reliance on a naval defence against invasion as complacent and a strong home army as essential.[46] A bill sponsored by the NSL in 1909 proposed using the Territorial Force as the framework for a conscripted home army. When that failed, the league became increasingly antagonistic towards the auxiliary.[47] The force was denigrated for its excessive youth, inefficiency and consistently low numbers, and ridiculed in the popular press as the "Territorial Farce".[48][49] The NSL's president – the former Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, Lord Roberts – enlisted the support of serving officers in a campaign against it, and in 1913 the Army Council declared its support for conscription.[50][51] Even prominent members of the force itself favoured compulsory service, and by April 1913 ten County Territorial Associations had expressed support for it.[52][47]

The relationship between the County Territorial Associations and the War Office was often acrimonious. The associations frequently complained about excessive bureaucracy and inadequate finance. The military authorities begrudged the money that could have been spent on the regular army being wasted on what they perceived as an inefficient, amateur auxiliary.[53] Efforts to provide adequate facilities, for example, were undermined by slow responses from the War Office which, when finally forthcoming, often rejected the associations' plans outright or refused to allocate the full financing requested. In 1909, the Gloucestershire association complained that "most of our association are businessmen and are unable to understand why it takes ten weeks and upwards to reply" after waiting for a response to its proposed purchase of a site for a field ambulance unit.[54] Somerset lost three sites for a proposed new drill hall because the War Office took so long to approve plans, and Essex had to wait five years before it received approval for the construction of new rifle ranges.[55] Good facilities were regarded by the associations as important for efficiency, unit esprit de corps and recruitment, and the authorities' parsimony and apparent obstruction were seen as undermining these.[56]

The force failed to retain large numbers of men after their initial enlistment expired, and it consistently fell short of its established strength. It reached a peak of 268,000 men in 1909 when invasion scares prompted a surge in recruitment, but by 1913 numbers had declined to less than 246,000, and the officer corps was nearly 20 per cent under-subscribed.[57][58][59] In 1910, a third of the force had not completed the minimum level of musketry training. Only 155,000 territorials completed the full 15-day annual camp in 1912, and around 6,000 did not attend at all. In 1909, some 37 per cent of the rank and file were under 20 years old; in the opinion of the Inspector-General of the Home Forces, this proportion rendered the force too immature to be effective. In 1913, approximately 40,000 territorials were under 19 years old, the minimum age at which they could volunteer for service overseas. Barely seven per cent of the force had accepted the Imperial Service Obligation, seriously compromising its viability as a reinforcement for the Expeditionary Force.[60][61] Because the military authorities regarded the Territorial Force as weak and saw no value in an auxiliary that was not liable for foreign service, they prioritised expenditure on the regular army, leaving the force armed with obsolete weapons.[41]

Territorial Force - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Reading that it kind of, in my mind, puts Sam Hughes in a different light. It can be argued that he was not a Canadian Maverick acting against the Professional Experts so much as being very much part of a continuing tradition that had strong following in the UK.

The deployment of the Territorials seems to mirror the deployment of the CEF.

On 13 August 1914, Kitchener signalled a willingness to deploy overseas those territorial units in which 80 per cent of the men (reduced to 60 per cent at the end of the month) had accepted the Imperial Service Obligation.[68] Despite the low uptake before the war, 72 per cent of the rank and file volunteered for foreign service by the end of September.[69] The first full territorial divisions to be deployed overseas were used to free up imperial garrisons. The East Lancashire Division was sent to Egypt in September, and three territorial divisions had been deployed to India by January 1915.[70][e] Territorial battalions released regular troops stationed at Aden, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta. Five regular army divisions were created from the troops released by the territorials' deployments.[72] The extent to which territorials accepted the obligation varied considerably between battalions; some registered 90 per cent or more acceptance, others less than 50 per cent. The difficulties were not restricted to the rank and file, and many battalions sailed for foreign service with officers who had been newly promoted or recruited to replace those who had chosen to remain at home.[73]

As the territorials completed their training and the threat of invasion receded, complete divisions were deployed to combat theatres. The first to depart was the 46th (North Midland) Division, which arrived on the Western Front in March 1915. By July, all 14 first-line divisions had been deployed overseas.[94][81][89]

The Canadian Expeditionary Force was a special force, distinct from the Canadian Militia which mobilized in 1914 on a limited basis for home defence and to assist with the recruitment and training of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

the regiment's name was changed to The Royal Canadian Regiment. In 1914, the regiment was deployed to the Imperial fortress colony of Bermuda for garrison duties from September 1914 to August 1915 when it returned to Halifax and reattested for overseas service.

The Patricias first took their place in the trenches on January 6, 1915, at a location known to the British Army's soldiers as "Dickiebush".[c 3]

Early in 1915, it was evident that the Canadians would soon be going to France. The (1st) Division (CEF) paraded in drill order for an inspection by His Majesty King George V; thereafter, units boarded troop ships at Avonmouth and during mid-February the entire Division crossed the rough Channel to St. Nazaire. After a brief period in reserve near Hazebrouck, the Canadians relieved the 7th British Division in the Fleurbaix sector near Armentières on 1–3 March. General Alderson then became responsible for 6,400 yards of front line on the left flank of the First Army (General Sir Douglas Haig).

The division moved to the Ypres Salient in April, and faced its first real test during the defence of St. Julien beginning on 22 April.

The European Volunteer Corps referred to in the RUSI article are organized on Danish Home Guard lines. The Home Guard has equally struggled with their professional brethren - and that struggle goes to the heart of why the Home Guard was formed.

Created after World War II, the Danish Home Guard was inspired by the Danish Resistance Movement during the war. It was always implied (though never explicitly stated) that the primary objective was defence and guerrilla activity against a Soviet invasion.

When founded on 11 June 1945 in the city of Odense, the 250 representatives of resistance movements and those of the government, both had demands to the new Home Guard. The resistance movements were not interested in a people's army run by the government and the government was not interested in a people's army being independent and run solely by a military figure without parliament representation. Because of these bi-lateral demands, a simple solution to the problem was made. The Home Guard would have two chief executives: a Major General and a representative chosen by parliament.

Naturally, the organization would be funded by parliament, but organized directly under the Ministry of Defence, so that both sides had an overview of what the Home Guard was doing.

For some very simple reasons, the Danish Home Guard would ultimately owe its loyalty to the will of the people, and not the government. The reason for this was, that if a situation like that of World War II was ever to occur again, whether in peace or wartime, the Home Guard would be a guarantee brought by the people, for the people, that the organization do all in its power to protect the individual citizen from crimes against humanity. Among these would be persecution due to political and religious stands, direct oppression and genocide. It would above all ensure that democracy, or people's rule, would be enforced. The Home Guard was well respected among the public as many members were former resistance fighters; people who fought for and had an interest in the individual person, their families, friends and loved ones.

The precipitating action leading to the creation of the Home Guard was the decision of the Danish government to surrender to Germany after a two hour invasion and ordering the Government's army to stop opposing the invasion and lay down their arms.

Denmark would be under Gestapo and SS control for the next 4 years.

 

[FJAG]

Send the RUSI article to NDHQ where they can scoff at it.

Interestingly if you read the thing it seems to think that we're better off than the Brits. There are several examples where the author is quite clearly wrong when he talks about the Canadians.

I've come to the conclusion that amongst western powers (excluding some of the recent Soviet converts) the only viable reserve system is that of the Americans. Everyone else is missing the boat on developing mass with reservists.

 

[GR66]

Interestingly if you read the thing it seems to think that we're better off than the Brits. There are several examples where the author is quite clearly wrong when he talks about the Canadians.

I've come to the conclusion that amongst western powers (excluding some of the recent Soviet converts) the only viable reserve system is that of the Americans. Everyone else is missing the boat on developing mass with reservists.

Is that because nobody but the Americans have deployed enough in recent decades to actually NEED a viable Reserve force?

 

[dapaterson]

Within the CAF there are two primary obstacles to building an effective Reserve Force (and not one that is heavily committed day to day, like much of the status quo being "Reg F on the cheap").

Those two obstacles are the Regular Force in second place, but the primary obstacle to an effective Reserve Force is the Reserve Force itself.