Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[dimsum]

And that's part of the problem. Practicing and preparing to defend ones homeland should never be seen as a hobby.

It shouldn't, but for many trades, it doesn't need to be "Reg F or bust" either.

 

[Furniture]

Let me guess - an FNO-qualified NWO.

Surprisingly, not in that instance. I had a different "entertaining" encounter with a FNO qualified ORO though. It was a Nav Res NCIOP, because they did the Met observation on the MCDVs. The dumbed down for amateurs, and never correct Met observation...

 

[Furniture]

Believe me, based on watching RSS staff (embedded with ARes units) operate over the past few decades, the deep disrespect for the Reserves that seems ingrained into the Reg F can not be attributed to 'not having enough interactions'...

That's kind of exactly what I mean though. You see one member every two to three years, and judge the entire RegF CAF based on that person.

The entire RegF isn't infantry, isn't one guy who happened to be dumped into a job the RegF saw as not important to the regiment/CAF...

 

[daftandbarmy]

That's kind of exactly what I mean though. You see one member every two to three years, and judge the entire RegF CAF based on that person.

The entire RegF isn't infantry, isn't one guy who happened to be dumped into a job the RegF saw as not important to the regiment/CAF...

Well, I've seen a couple dozen over the years and, with few exceptions, the results were the same unfortunately.

 

[Furniture]

Well, I've seen a couple dozen over the years and, with few exceptions, the results were the same unfortunately.

That supports my second point though.

If the RegF doesn't see an advantage in putting their "rising stars" in RSS billets, you're likely to get the ones who are "marking time" until the next posting.

If the unit is 30%, or 70% RegF you're far more likely to get exposure to the ones who are the "rising stars" in their trade/regiment.

 

[KevinB]

Well, I've seen a couple dozen over the years and, with few exceptions, the results were the same unfortunately.

Honestly having seen some pretty amazing Captains go RSS with plans, and within a few months they are wanting to burn the establishment down.

A lot of PRes SrO’s seem to enjoy making a RSSO’s life a living hell.

There are a lot of vicious circles that go around.
One issue of Reg to Reg vicious circling is the rotation of RCAF folks trying to cook troops on arctic or at least longer winter kit jumps, so your soaking wet leaving the AC, and a block of ice before landing. So then the next time you’re getting the cooker routine, someone pisses in a helmet bag/flyers bag, (or worse takes a greasy dump in it). I’ve no idea who started the cycle - but it doesn’t do anyone any good.

I had the opportunity to fly down to the USMC’s MWTC in Bridgeport CA. Only 6 advanced party Patricia’s - and we got a lot of 1:1 time with the crew - who let us use their CBU type heater and let us rotate through flying the Herc. We chatted about the whole cook/piss routine - and agreed it was incredibly stupid, promising not to do it to each other again — and a few months later I saw the crew again, and sure enough someone had pissed in a kit bag - and so Cook-Freeze-Piss was back on in force.


Lots of other vicious circles exist.

 

[dimsum]

That's kind of exactly what I mean though. You see one member every two to three years, and judge the entire RegF CAF based on that person.

One of the more memorable outbursts from a MARS IV student (Reg F, but we trained both Reg and Res) was when they finished their sea phase and the ship was sailing back to home port, they triumphantly said "now I'll never have to take an order from a Reservist again!" in the Wardroom.

The CO, XO, NAVO, and I were there - all NAVRES officers at the time. You could almost hear the record screech and the instructor (Reg F) pull them aside. As it turns out, that person was also slagging Reservists throughout their sea phase so it wasn't badly-timed sarcasm.

I wonder how they're doing now.

 

[Furniture]

One of the more memorable outbursts from a MARS IV student (Reg F, but we trained both Reg and Res) was when they finished their sea phase and the ship was sailing back to home port, they triumphantly said "now I'll never have to take an order from a Reservist again!" in the Wardroom.

The CO, XO, NAVO, and I were there - all NAVRES officers at the time. You could almost hear the record screech and the instructor (Reg F) pull them aside. As it turns out, that person was also slagging Reservists throughout their sea phase so it wasn't badly-timed sarcasm.

I wonder how they're doing now.

I think the RCN did it right (eventually), by making MCDVs and CPFs a mix of Reg and Res. It goes back to what @KevinB suggested, the Reg and Res need more interaction, to see that we all bring something to the table.

From my perspective the ResF brings the enthusiasm, dedication, and "outside perspective", while the RegF brings the daily "in's-and-out's" knowledge that you can't get from one night a week, and one weekend a month.

 

[Halifax Tar]

It shouldn't, but for many trades, it doesn't need to be "Reg F or bust" either.

Cool story bro. But I didn't say the opposite.

I've also been pretty open of my support for reservists.

 

[Rifleman62]

Believe me, based on watching RSS staff (embedded with ARes units) operate over the past few decades, the deep disrespect for the Reserves that seems ingrained into the Reg F can not be attributed to 'not having enough interactions'...

I also have served for more than a few decades with RSS staff starting with the I Staff in the 60's. To some extent depends on what you and your unit brings to the table. The best seem to be RSS in Arty units. FJAG comes to mind, big time, and there were others both Offrs and WO's.

Yes there where a few duds, but we had duds also. You had to work around that realizing the known limitations of both. Overall I guess we were lucky with our RSS in 38 CBG and it's predecessors with some notable exceptions. Did not seem that we had a problem with RSS not going to the field.

The current CDS was RSS with the RWpgRif and it's on his Bio. Several RSS went on to BGen/Col, and some as LCol (RegF) commanding PRes units. Some, when they retired joined the PRes Unit. Old Soldier is one here.

For me personally the I Staff (Korean War Vets) when I joined at 15 YOA ( lied my age) who I served with for the first 3 years were actually my "fathers" which I didn't have. I owe a lot to those men.

 

[GR66]

So here's another paper napkin to toss in the green bin...

My assumptions are:

• Some money for missing key equipment will be available but not enough to change the basic make-up of the Army.
  • NO money to replace the LAVs with a tracked AFV
  • NO major expansion of the number of personnel available to the Reg Force (limited Reserve expansion possible)
  • NO money to mechanize the Reserves
  • YES to new SP Artillery to augment our current M777s
  • YES to existing tank fleet to be upgraded. Expansion desirable but unlikely
  • Yes to new GBAD systems...likely a LAV-based SHORAD system possibly augmented by a NASAM-type MRAD system.
  • YES (hopefully) to HIMARS (or similar) to augment our tube artillery
  • YES to new ATGMs and battlefield UAVs
• Canada will agree to leading an expanded NATO presence in Latvia (i.e. leading a Brigade Group) but will not want to significantly increase our actual deployed personnel beyond the minimum level necessary.

Key points:

• Light Battalions are grouped together in a single Brigade Group (2 Brigade)
• The two Mechanized Brigades (1 & 5) are reduced to three maneuver units to free up personnel for schools and Reserve unit leadership.
• Tanks are concentrated in LdSH while 12e RBC becomes a Cavalry Regiment and RCD a Light (Motorized) Cavalry Regiment
• The Artillery Regiments are grouped together into a single Artillery Brigade
• Reserve units within geographic proximity to Reg Force units will be amalgamated into those units as part-time augmentees. For example, the personnel of the King's Own Calgary Regiment, RCAC will be integrated directly into the Lord Strathcona's Horse as part-time members of the Regiment...in effect officially creating 70/30 units with integrated Reserve augmentation rather than the existing undermanned Reg Force units with ad hoc Reserve augmentation as required.
  • The exact form that this augmentation could be different for each type of unit. Artillery units may be able to use Reserve units as complete gun batteries, while Infantry units may use individual Reservists as extra GIBs to fill out the platoons, while Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions might use their part-time troops differently yet again.
• The remaining Reserve Infantry units that are not geographically close enough to integrate into an existing Reg Force Regiment are fortunately located in around the largest population centers in the country (Vancouver, Toronto, London/SW Ontario, Montreal and Halifax). These units will be amalgamated into five Reserve Light Infantry Battalions under a single Brigade HQ..
  • The Brigade HQ will be Reg Force and will be a deployable HQ in order to provide the Army with an additional deployable HQ group.
  • The Brigade itself will NOT be a deployable formation. The individual Battalions within the Brigade however would be deployable units that could be attached to one of the existing Reg Force Brigades in order to provide an additional Light Infantry maneuver element or to act as a Force Protection element for a deployed Brigade.
  • Alternately these Battalions could be used as a source of individual and/or sub-unit augmentees/replacement troops for Reg Force units during a major conflict/deployment.
  • The five Light Infantry Battalions would have Reg Force Leadership in the Battalion HQ and RSS leadership augmentation of the individual Company HQs.
• My thinking on the Reserve Armoured Regiments that do not get integrated into Reg Force units is that in any future conflict we are not only going to need a large number of UAVs but also the personnel trained to properly use them. These six Reserve Regiments could be amalgamated into two UAV Recce Regiments of three Squadrons each. These Squadrons (or individual Troops from each Squadron) could be attached as required to deployed units to provide the additional ISAR required during operations.
• There are also a total of 8 x Reserve Artillery units that are not included in integration into Reg Force Regiments. The 4 x Ontario units would be amalgamated into a Reserve AD Artillery Regiment while the 4 x Western units would be amalgamated into a HIMARS Regiment.
• In Latvia, Canada would take over leadership of a Multi-National Brigade Group with a Brigade HQ, the existing eFP Latvia Battalion and a Service Battalion element (manned at a level to support the above) being the permanently deployed elements of the Brigade.
  • The reduction of the 1 & 5 Brigade Infantry Regiments from 3 to 2 LAV Battalions would free up one Battalion worth of LAVs to be forward deployed in Latvia for a 2nd fly-over Battalion for the Brigade (the other Battalion worth of LAVs freed up would be used for conversion to additional CS vehicles for the remaining four Battalions...LAV-SHORAD, LAV-AT, LAV-Mortar, etc.)
  • Ideally Canada would expand our Tank fleet in order to also pre-position the vehicles for a Tank Regiment in Latvia to provide the 3rd maneuver unit for the Multi-National Brigade Group. In this case Canada would reach out to our NATO allies (ideally those national already part of eFP Latvia) to provide an Artillery Regiment and Engineer Regiment to fill out the balance of the Brigade.
  • If Canada does NOT purchase extra tanks to cover a pre-positioned Regiment in Latvia then I'd instead push for a pre-positioned Artillery Regiment and our Allies asked to provide the Tank and Engineer Regiments for the Brigade.

 

[KevinB]

Tracks…

https://twitter.com/x/status/1634854949376106497

 

[daftandbarmy]

That supports my second point though.

If the RegF doesn't see an advantage in putting their "rising stars" in RSS billets, you're likely to get the ones who are "marking time" until the next posting.

If the unit is 30%, or 70% RegF you're far more likely to get exposure to the ones who are the "rising stars" in their trade/regiment.

More often than not their next posting seems to be civvy street so, yes, I'm guessing the ARes has become the dumping ground/ soft kick out the door...

#islandofmisfittoyswithoutthedentist

 

[KevinB]

Anyone .....


Matthew Van Wagenen is a major general in the U.S. Army currently serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS) in the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Arnel P. David is a colonel in the U.S. Army completing a PhD at King’s College London. He is the cofounder of Fight Club International.

The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect any entity or organization of the U.S. Government or NATO.

And?
Regardless of one’s rank it does not mean that one is an expert or more importantly free of bias.
We’ve seen garbage from 3 and 4* as well.

That article has a very specific agenda, and I’d encourage everyone to think about how certain biases can be found that when reading it.

 

[Kirkhill]

And?
Regardless of one’s rank it does not mean that one is an expert or more importantly free of bias.
We’ve seen garbage from 3 and 4* as well.

That article has a very specific agenda, and I’d encourage everyone to think about how certain biases can be found that when reading it.

So you mean their credentials don't qualify them as commentators?

 

[KevinB]

So you mean their credentials don't qualify them as commentators?

I mean they are pushing an agenda.

 

[Kirkhill]

I mean they are pushing an agenda.

You mean they believe in a course of action and are working to see it succeed?

 

[Kirkhill]

This citation from the van Wagenen & David piece.

Reflections on the Continuities in War and Warfare | Small Wars Journal

Reflections on the Continuities in War and Warfare: SWJ Discussion with Major General H.R. McMaster

smallwarsjournal.com

An interview with McMaster stressing the importance of the quality/morale/cultural referenced by Yakovleff of France.




If I follow those thoughts the implication is that we can't fight other peoples' wars for them if they don't want us there and we can't make them fight wars that they don't want to fight.

The secondary implications are that patience is required - effectively the patience of the sniper - laying in the long grass picking our shots. Watch and shoot. Also an effective strategy can be based on full warehouses and adaptable factories to support those people fighting the wars we want them to win. Related to that is knowledge, also known as situational awareness and intelligence.

All of that suggests that money can be more usefully invested in CS, CSS and C4ISR than in large numbers of trigger pullers. The locals can supply those needs. To more lasting effect.

Foreigners can win battles. They struggle to win wars.

 

[Kirkhill]

1. Mass Matters. Attrition warfare is not dead. This mode of warfare emerges when neither side can achieve a clear asymmetric advantage. Standing armies are the only instrument nations can use to prevent, deter, and fight invading aggressors. Mass is required in a war of attrition. Funding and maintaining land power may seem like an expensive insurance policy but doing the opposite is to risk state collapse. Wars can only be won on the ground where nations exist, and people live. Land power is an indispensable capability, even in the Pacific.

A lack of appreciation for emerging threats over time has eroded land capabilities in the West. Power withers when it proves frail, and a perceived weakness invites aggression. Key capabilities such as armor, artillery, and engineers cannot be replaced by cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities. The Ukraine conflict proved they were less decisive than expected.

I actually agree with this. But this is a battle winning formula, not a war winning formula. The mass to fight land battles has to be provided by willing locals. Those locals do need support and they will need BOTH "armor, artillery and engineers" (and logistics) along with the C5ISR magic.
I am not yet convinced that armor is as high on the priority list as it used to be but perhaps that makes even more of a case of an armored expeditionary force geared towards supplying a capability that the locals can't afford themselves.

OTOH assembling mass results in rapid attrition. A slow drip is preferable to bleeding out.

2. Maritime Operations Are Vulnerable. Expensive naval forces are threatened by inexpensive weaponry. Ukrainian attacks have minimized the impact of the Russian Black Sea fleet and little by little the Russian Navy drifted further back toward the mainland.

Naval experts proclaim this is “an unmistakable warning — that today’s run-of-the-mill missiles and commercial data systems can knock even the world’s top warships out of a fight.” China seeks this competitive advantage in the Pacific with “carrier killer” missiles.

I don't see much objectionable in those statements.

I would just add that "Expensive land forces are threatened by inexpensive weaponry" just as much as naval forces.d

3. Deep Attacks by Themselves Are Ineffective. There is a desire to employ rotary attack aircraft – and to some extent, fixed-wing aircraft - deep behind enemy lines for strategic effect. This tactic is practiced routinely in exercises, but it has been proven futile in past wars. In Ukraine, soldiers operating short range anti-aircraft defensive equipment and using small arms fire, have been taking out multi-million-dollar aircraft. Control of the air remains contested and this will be a continual feature of future conflict.

Neither side was able to use aviation in a game-changing role. Russian attack regiments had to change their tactics and use aircraft in a combat support role. Likewise, the Ukrainians had to do the same to preserve combat power and support ground maneuver forces.d

Rather than pursuing deep attacks, the West would benefit more from the development of counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) tactics and technologies. Additionally, decades of experience from combat and modern gaming finds “the output of an entire joint force is amplified when synergistic integration across components increases.” Joint capabilities must work together, and in an allied context, strategic lethality can be achieved with the improved integration and interoperability of battle networks.

Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Golden BBs still have their place - but again that is a local force requirement that requires wide dispersion and lots of locals keeping their eyes on the skies for the duration of the conflict. And maybe longer.

4. Airborne and Amphibious Warfare Has Been Minimized. These modes of warfare have their place in specialized units but the conduct of these methods at a large-scale, using thousands of soldiers and marines, is resource intensive, high risk, and perhaps even anachronistic.

The Russian’s hesitance to execute an amphibious operation is for good reason. The potential gain from such operations is not worth the cost. This painful lesson was learned by Russia’s elite airborne forces, the VDV, at Hostomel airport last year. Their forces were decimated.

It might not be time to write an obituary for these types of operations but their use on a large-scale in peer warfighting is limited with contested air space and ubiquitous stand-off weaponry. It might be worth Western nations evaluating their efficacy and determining whether it is time to repurpose these types of units for a role that has increased survivability and lethality. This leads to the next lesson.

An airborne or marine division is going to be more effective widely dispersed as platoons and companies working in support of locals than it will be as a unitary formation working against the locals.

5. Artificial Intelligence Has Arrived. It has been said that advanced algorithmic warfare systems equate to having a nuclear weapon. Ukrainian forces have compressed their “kill chains,” and used software engineers on the frontlines to calibrate algorithms for devastating effect.

A.I. is not tomorrow’s problem. This enabling technology is being used today and will be more and more prevalent tomorrow. Western nations will need to induce a greater rate of digital transformation to make use of their data and build battle-winning algorithms.

As someone building industrial solutions for over 40 years I can say that as far as I am concerned Artificial Intelligence is both real and overblown. I have been automating plants since I helped my father clip plastic cards for clockwork timers. Those plastic cards represented sub routines in logical programmes supporting predetermined courses of action. They were intended to reduce the operator's work load by rendering the plant a degree of autonomy. The programme decided many of the "next steps"

I have seen changes in technology that renders more complex solutions cheaper and faster. But I have seen very few real "game changers". Most of the processes in most modern plants would be understood by any engineer from the 1930s, and by good ones from the 1830s.

U.S. Army Futures Command is forward thinking in this space. The commander, General Rainey, proposes “formation-based lethality.” The future is about integration. In a past RCD article on Project Convergence, we proposed this could be accelerated through the use of experimental units. The Army could profit from emulating past examples like the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) which gave birth to air assault operations. Could a present day experimental unit do the same with manned and unmanned systems teaming, leveraging A.I.? And by possibly adding software engineers to unit formations, could this spark greater collaboration, integration, and testing of concepts? These are the questions to ponder when examining lessons from Ukraine.

If this is their agenda I support it.

Conclusion​

The West can ignore these lessons at their own peril or use them to transform existing capabilities into future war-winning advantages. The danger of dominant military organizations is that, short of lessons learned in the unforgiving crucible of combat, they tend to fall back on comfortable assumptions and ignore any signals of change that contradict their most-cherished strategic beliefs. We can do worse than to listen and learn from the incredible innovation happening in the Ukraine.

Listening and learning is always a good thing, as is experimentation.

 

[GR66]

I actually agree with this. But this is a battle winning formula, not a war winning formula. The mass to fight land battles has to be provided by willing locals. Those locals do need support and they will need BOTH "armor, artillery and engineers" (and logistics) along with the C5ISR magic.
I am not yet convinced that armor is as high on the priority list as it used to be but perhaps that makes even more of a case of an armored expeditionary force geared towards supplying a capability that the locals can't afford themselves.

OTOH assembling mass results in rapid attrition. A slow drip is preferable to bleeding out.

1) I agree to an extent that as a distant island nation we can to a great extent rely on "willing locals" to provide the mass to fight the land battles far from our own shores, but there is a political element too where we need to share some of the burden (in blood if required) to support our allies. Alliances require reciprocity. If we're not willing to sacrifice on their behalf then why would we expect them to do so on ours? Due to our fortunate geographic location we may not need them to send soldiers to fight on our territory but we may need them to make serious economic sacrifices if say China tries to exert extreme political/economic pressure on us for example.

2) We tend to focus on the Army when we talk about mass. I'd argue that it's just as important for air and naval forces. Just as we've allowed the Army to seriously deteriorate, the RCAF and RCN are shadows of their former selves and likewise likely don't have the mass to be successful/impactful in a major conflict.

I don't see much objectionable in those statements.

I would just add that "Expensive land forces are threatened by inexpensive weaponry" just as much as naval forces.

There are certainly many lessons that can be taken from the Ukraine war for naval forces, but there are also many things about this particular war that are too unique to take as broad lessons. Agreed that the vulnerability of large, expensive vessels to (relatively) cheap and plentiful missiles may require a re-think about ship design and force structures. Also agree that USVs and UUVs will likely be new capabilities that may have significant impacts on future wars.

However, the Ukraine war does not really take into account submarine warfare and also does not really involve blockades and control of SLOCs. By international agreement the Russian naval blockade is allowing key Ukrainian food exports to continue and nobody is interfering with the major SLOCs. In a war with China for example all three of the above (submarine warfare, blockades and control of SLOCs) will likely be major factors in the outcome of the conflict. Just as the resource blockade and submarine campaign against Japan crippled their industrial capacity (and ability to replace lost naval and air units) in WWII, naval forces will still be key in future conflicts. If you stop thinking of warships as tanks that are vulnerable to ATGMs but rather think of them as floating HIMARS with integral GBAD then I think you'll agree that the lessons of Ukraine don't really apply to naval warfare more broadly.

Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Golden BBs still have their place - but again that is a local force requirement that requires wide dispersion and lots of locals keeping their eyes on the skies for the duration of the conflict. And maybe longer.

Agree that we (the West) definitely need to up our AD game against the full range of airborne targets from quad-copters to CRAM to hypersonic missiles, but I disagree that Deep Strikes are ineffective. Of course Deep Strikes are ineffective by themselves...but that can be said of any individual military capability.

Again I'd say that Ukraine isn't necessarily a great example for peer conflict writ large. While a pretty major conflict, it is still in many ways a limited conflict. Russian strategic deep strikes against Ukrainian power infrastructure are not having the desired effect, but that doesn't mean that deep strikes themselves are not potentially significantly effective. Imagine an unlimited conflict where railway bridges and marshalling yards in Russia proper were hit along with weapon/ammo storage depots and production sites, fuel refineries and pipelines, airfields, GBAD sites, etc. Could that not potentially have a significant strategic impact on the conflict?

Modern weapons are more complex and harder to replace than for example in WWII. Similarly weapons are more precise than they were in the days of the strategic bombing campaigns over Germany. A modern strategic deep strike campaign could potentially be much more effective than campaigns in the past.

An airborne or marine division is going to be more effective widely dispersed as platoons and companies working in support of locals than it will be as a unitary formation working against the locals.

Airborne and amphibious operations have always been among the riskiest and most costly types of military operations. Some places however can only be reached by air or sea so they're capabilities that needs to be maintained. In some cases you're right and the situation may require smaller scale dispersed operations. Other situations may call for larger operations. Small forces may lack the mass required to be impactful in some situations and large forces have the risk of major loss. We should have the capability to conduct both types of operations when appropriate.

As someone building industrial solutions for over 40 years I can say that as far as I am concerned Artificial Intelligence is both real and overblown. I have been automating plants since I helped my father clip plastic cards for clockwork timers. Those plastic cards represented sub routines in logical programmes supporting predetermined courses of action. They were intended to reduce the operator's work load by rendering the plant a degree of autonomy. The programme decided many of the "next steps"

I have seen changes in technology that renders more complex solutions cheaper and faster. But I have seen very few real "game changers". Most of the processes in most modern plants would be understood by any engineer from the 1930s, and by good ones from the 1830s.

Agreed that AI is no magic bullet. It's another advanced tool but like any tool you have to know how to use it.

If this is their agenda I support it.

Again agreed. Warfare like anything else isn't static. We can't just pick a bunch of TTPs that suit today's understanding of conflict and reflect our current technologies and just practice and perfect them as an end goal. We should constantly be trying new methods and technologies and modifying our way of doing things in order to keep moving ahead of our potential enemies.

Listening and learning is always a good thing, as is experimentation.

Listen and learn, but also be wary that the lessons of one particular conflict don't necessarily apply to all future conflicts.