Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

I'd argue that Canada needs the capability to rapidly respond with at least a Battle Group/Battalion sized force when required.

That to me suggests a fully-manned Light Brigade with the three Battalions rotating readiness (2,502 personnel or roughly half of the current 5,238 Reg Force Infantry positions assigned to the existing Battalions).

How the rest of the positions are allocated depends on what you want the rest of the Army to be able to do.

Depending on how you rotate readiness - I’d argue you probably don’t need the entire Brigade of Regular troops.
If you ran a Coy on 12 Hrs NTM and the rest of the Bn at 48hrs, you could run 6 month IRU rotations. Which would allow for at least one of those non IRU Bn’s to be a 70/30 reg/PRes formation.

Your Heavier formation could be on a 30 day and 90 Day NTM (respectively) and the readier portion could be 70/30 while the 90 day portion could be 50/50 or even 30/70.

Right now salaries for personnel take an enormous chunk out of the CAF budget - and in order to equip the Force for modern operations, something needs to give — I think the only reasonable option given the GoC seems loathe to make a meaningful increase in the budget that the size of the regular army needs to decline.

 

[GR66]

Depending on how you rotate readiness - I’d argue you probably don’t need the entire Brigade of Regular troops.
If you ran a Coy on 12 Hrs NTM and the rest of the Bn at 48hrs, you could run 6 month IRU rotations. Which would allow for at least one of those non IRU Bn’s to be a 70/30 reg/PRes formation.

Your Heavier formation could be on a 30 day and 90 Day NTM (respectively) and the readier portion could be 70/30 while the 90 day portion could be 50/50 or even 30/70.

Right now salaries for personnel take an enormous chunk out of the CAF budget - and in order to equip the Force for modern operations, something needs to give — I think the only reasonable option given the GoC seems loathe to make a meaningful increase in the budget that the size of the regular army needs to decline.

Something like this?

Battalion #1
Current IRU Battalion
100% Reg Force manning
1 Coy at 12hrs NTM and 2 Coy at 48hrs NTM

Battalion #2
Next in line as IRU Battalion. Work-up training.
100% Reg Force manning

Battalion #2
Just off IRU. Refit
70% manning (30% of personnel away on individual training, school assignments, etc.)
Reserves to provide 30% augmentation if unit is required to deploy.

So unlike a unit which has an actual 70/30 habitual establishment (like you might do in the heavier "break glass in case of fire" units) the Battalions in the IRU rotation would at times be at 100% manning and when in refit stage would have reduced manning with Reserve augmentation if required?

 

[Kirkhill]

With the cost of military hardware (vehicles, weapon systems, munitions, etc.) being so much higher today than in the lower-tech past I simply don't see Canada having the ability to significantly expand the size of the Army in time of war. In a serious peer conflict we will much more likely struggle to maintain the strength of our existing forces once deployed rather than be able to expand the Army.

Is that a valid assumption?

My sense is that while the cost of bullets and targets is increasing the net tendency seems to favour the defence over the offence. In other words the cost of the defence, and the ability to supply the defence, is greater than the cost of the offence and the ability to supply the offence.

The heavy weaponry necessary to conduct an effective offence is being supplied, on both sides, from inventory. New systems are not being produced as fast as they are being destroyed.

The same is also true of the missiles being used in the defence but I am inclined to believe that those 30 year old production lines that produced the NLAWs and Stingers, and that are producing the Javelins and Starstreaks, can be cranked up faster than the production lines for vehicles and guns. Missiles can be built from 3-D printed parts of plastic and aluminum and fitted with Cell Phone quality optics and logic. That is what is happening to the Stinger replacement.

1 Selection and maintenance of the aim;
2 maintenance of morale;
3 offensive action;
4 surprise;
5 security;
6 concentration of force;
7 economy of effort;
8 flexibility;
9 co-operation;
10 and administration.

Most of those principles are still paramount, especially numbers 1 and 2, but numbers 3, 4 and 6 are being seriously challenged and inhibited.

Offensive action is difficult. That is in large part because surprise is difficult. It is also difficult to concentrate force. And the overarching difficulty afflicting all of them is the difficulty of manoeuvering that result from constant observation and secure communications.

Another contributing factor is the increasing ability of small entities to operate effectively with higher degrees of autonomy. The area of interest and the area of influence of even a single vehicle are massive now with 5 km Javelins and 15 km UAS. And critically the ability of the individual element to place themselves in the field and communicate their position has moved the discussion well past the elbow dressing of Victoria's armies or even the 5 yard spacing and visual alignment of WW2 battle drills.

I am strongly convinced that a defensive army, armed with mass produced ATGMs and VSHORAD missiles, both man portable and light vehicle mounted, together with UAVs and good comms, as well as the WW1 vintage Emma Gees and mortars, would blunt any enemy offensive.

The key element in any defensive programme would be denying the enemy surprise. That means that in times of peace the most important part of defence is forward observation and constant vigilance so as to permit the time necessary for the forming of an effective defence.

Each country should be able to supply local defence to its own borders, lands, cities and citizens. If there is no immediate threat then those defensive assets that are surplus to the immediate requirement can be shared forwards with allies under threat, as is happening in Ukraine.

Those are the key elements of a local reserve. It is recruited locally, trained and equipped locally to act locally. It is not an expeditionary force.

Local defence forces are necessities. Expeditionary forces are discretionary.


Now, just because offence is difficult doesn't mean that offensive action can be ignored. It means that offensive troops need to be better trained and equipped. They need to be professionals. But because the offence has become more difficult it may mean a significant change in tactics. Less of the direct frontal assault and more of the corps envelopment, rapid movement to flanks, exploiting weaknesses and creating threats that the enemy must counter. Creating opportunities to fight defensive battles on preferred ground.

Canada has the skeleton of a professional expeditionary division. My preference is that that division be fully fleshed out so that it can be deployed domestically as a division should the need arise, but is also capable of sustaining, on a rotating basis one Brigade Group and also, on a rotating basis, take command of a Multi National Division while supplying the necessary support.

Canada's local defence should not depend on its professional expeditionary force. That expeditionary force should be freely deployable. It should also be a sponge. It should suck up information and expertise and pass the lessons it learns back to the National Defence Force.


Finally,

I think there is room for an additional, 11th, principle of war: the exploitation of technology.

 

[GR66]

Is that a valid assumption?

My sense is that while the cost of bullets and targets is increasing the net tendency seems to favour the defence over the offence. In other words the cost of the defence, and the ability to supply the defence, is greater than the cost of the offence and the ability to supply the offence.

Offence and Defence are different sides of the same coin. Unless your defence is so strong that you can prevent the enemy from taking any of your territory whatsoever you will require offensive capability to retake that territory.

The attacker has the choice of where to attack and the ability to concentrate their forces while the defender must either cover all possible parts of the front or accept that they may lose some territory at the start of the conflict and have offensive forces available to retake the lost territory or take the fight to the enemy's territory.

The heavy weaponry necessary to conduct an effective offence is being supplied, on both sides, from inventory. New systems are not being produced as fast as they are being destroyed.

Agreed. You need stocks of these items on hand at the start of a conflict to replenish losses or your force will degrade in capability as the conflict progresses. That means either greater peacetime spending to increase the number of platforms in stock or tailoring the size of your force to match the equipment levels you have based on your expected rates of loss.

The same is also true of the missiles being used in the defence but I am inclined to believe that those 30 year old production lines that produced the NLAWs and Stingers, and that are producing the Javelins and Starstreaks, can be cranked up faster than the production lines for vehicles and guns. Missiles can be built from 3-D printed parts of plastic and aluminum and fitted with Cell Phone quality optics and logic. That is what is happening to the Stinger replacement.

Agreed to a point. These are still far from being mass-produced items and should be supplemented by large volumes of less advanced "dumb" munitions.

1 Selection and maintenance of the aim;
2 maintenance of morale;
3 offensive action;
4 surprise;
5 security;
6 concentration of force;
7 economy of effort;
8 flexibility;
9 co-operation;
10 and administration.

Most of those principles are still paramount, especially numbers 1 and 2, but numbers 3, 4 and 6 are being seriously challenged and inhibited.

Offensive action is difficult. That is in large part because surprise is difficult. It is also difficult to concentrate force. And the overarching difficulty afflicting all of them is the difficulty of manoeuvering that result from constant observation and secure communications.

Agreed. The forces required for offensive action are expensive too which is why today's armies are smaller than during the World Wars and the Cold War. Today's armies are simply too small to take and occupy large areas of enemy territory. As a result (and also because of nuclear deterrence) I believe most military actions by major nations will fit into one of the following catagories:

1. Attacks with limited military objectives where they feel they can fairly quickly obtain their goal and either avoid an enemy response or be able to quickly shift to the defence so the enemy is forced to take the more costly offensive action.
2. Attack against an enemy that they feel is militarily inferior and can be defeated in battle by the forces available and expansion of the conflict to include other nations is unlikely and/or where they have reason to believe the local population may be at least somewhat supportive of the military action (Ukraine)
3. Situations where a nation feels an attack is a political imperative despite the cost that will have to be paid (Taiwan)
4. Brushfire wars and Insurgencies/Counter Insurgencies. Either supporting an allied government against insurgent forces or supporting insurgent forces against an opposing state.

Another contributing factor is the increasing ability of small entities to operate effectively with higher degrees of autonomy. The area of interest and the area of influence of even a single vehicle are massive now with 5 km Javelins and 15 km UAS. And critically the ability of the individual element to place themselves in the field and communicate their position has moved the discussion well past the elbow dressing of Victoria's armies or even the 5 yard spacing and visual alignment of WW2 battle drills.

I am strongly convinced that a defensive army, armed with mass produced ATGMs and VSHORAD missiles, both man portable and light vehicle mounted, together with UAVs and good comms, as well as the WW1 vintage Emma Gees and mortars, would blunt any enemy offensive.

The key element in any defensive programme would be denying the enemy surprise. That means that in times of peace the most important part of defence is forward observation and constant vigilance so as to permit the time necessary for the forming of an effective defence.

Again agreed. I'm very much in favour of expanding ISR capabilities as part of deterrence as well has Light forces that can rapidly be deployed for defence.

Each country should be able to supply local defence to its own borders, lands, cities and citizens. If there is no immediate threat then those defensive assets that are surplus to the immediate requirement can be shared forwards with allies under threat, as is happening in Ukraine.

Those are the key elements of a local reserve. It is recruited locally, trained and equipped locally to act locally. It is not an expeditionary force.

Local defence forces are necessities. Expeditionary forces are discretionary.

This is where we disagree when it comes to Canada. Beyond non-military disaster response, etc. I don't see where training and equipping the Grey & Simcoe Foresters in Owen Sound for the local defence of Owen Sound is the military necessity.

The military threats to Canada are external to our borders. No enemy nation has the military capability to invade and occupy us so our primary home defence requirements can typically be met by NORAD, the RCN, the RCAF and land based AD capabilities. Any need for land-based military forces will not likely be in the location they are based so will have to be effectively "expeditionary" in nature rather than "local".

Now, just because offence is difficult doesn't mean that offensive action can be ignored. It means that offensive troops need to be better trained and equipped. They need to be professionals. But because the offence has become more difficult it may mean a significant change in tactics. Less of the direct frontal assault and more of the corps envelopment, rapid movement to flanks, exploiting weaknesses and creating threats that the enemy must counter. Creating opportunities to fight defensive battles on preferred ground.

As the world is becoming more urbanized and many political goals are increasingly population-based as opposed to territorial-based we are likely to see more and more fighting in built up areas. That will require heavy forces.

Canada has the skeleton of a professional expeditionary division. My preference is that that division be fully fleshed out so that it can be deployed domestically as a division should the need arise, but is also capable of sustaining, on a rotating basis one Brigade Group and also, on a rotating basis, take command of a Multi National Division while supplying the necessary support.

Canada's local defence should not depend on its professional expeditionary force. That expeditionary force should be freely deployable. It should also be a sponge. It should suck up information and expertise and pass the lessons it learns back to the National Defence Force.


Finally,

I think there is room for an additional, 11th, principle of war: the exploitation of technology.

I question whether Canada really does have the capability for a sustainable Division currently. I think some tough choices need to be made as to what we want our military to actually be able to do in case of a major conflict...not just have a skeleton force that looks like a real Army.

 

[Kirkhill]

Offence and Defence are different sides of the same coin. Unless your defence is so strong that you can prevent the enemy from taking any of your territory whatsoever you will require offensive capability to retake that territory.

The attacker has the choice of where to attack and the ability to concentrate their forces while the defender must either cover all possible parts of the front or accept that they may lose some territory at the start of the conflict and have offensive forces available to retake the lost territory or take the fight to the enemy's territory.

Agreed. You need stocks of these items on hand at the start of a conflict to replenish losses or your force will degrade in capability as the conflict progresses. That means either greater peacetime spending to increase the number of platforms in stock or tailoring the size of your force to match the equipment levels you have based on your expected rates of loss.

Agreed to a point. These are still far from being mass-produced items and should be supplemented by large volumes of less advanced "dumb" munitions.

Agreed. The forces required for offensive action are expensive too which is why today's armies are smaller than during the World Wars and the Cold War. Today's armies are simply too small to take and occupy large areas of enemy territory. As a result (and also because of nuclear deterrence) I believe most military actions by major nations will fit into one of the following catagories:

1. Attacks with limited military objectives where they feel they can fairly quickly obtain their goal and either avoid an enemy response or be able to quickly shift to the defence so the enemy is forced to take the more costly offensive action.
2. Attack against an enemy that they feel is militarily inferior and can be defeated in battle by the forces available and expansion of the conflict to include other nations is unlikely and/or where they have reason to believe the local population may be at least somewhat supportive of the military action (Ukraine)
3. Situations where a nation feels an attack is a political imperative despite the cost that will have to be paid (Taiwan)
4. Brushfire wars and Insurgencies/Counter Insurgencies. Either supporting an allied government against insurgent forces or supporting insurgent forces against an opposing state.

Again agreed. I'm very much in favour of expanding ISR capabilities as part of deterrence as well has Light forces that can rapidly be deployed for defence.

We'll skip the points of agreement.

This is where we disagree when it comes to Canada. Beyond non-military disaster response, etc. I don't see where training and equipping the Grey & Simcoe Foresters in Owen Sound for the local defence of Owen Sound is the military necessity.

I would argue that the reserve function is to provide defence when there is a military necessity. If you wait until the necessity is obvious it is too late.

As to managing threats -

there are threats.

Those threats include civil and military threats and can include assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot.

The Foresters are needed, not just to support the Army in particular, or even the CAF in general, they are needed to support the police and other government departments when manpower is required. The question is what capabilities can they cheaply supply with minimal training. My sense is that security should be their primary focus. That means small arms, light vehicles and comms. It also could mean the provision of a significant arsenal of single shot wooden rounds. Machine Guns and Mortars are also relatively cheap.

My overarching need is for missile defence - everything from CRAM with strong EW and Directed Energy devices like lasers backed by kinetic weapons (guns) up through VSHORAD, SHORAD and MRAD to ABM defences. All of those could be mixed regular/reserve formations. With the Foresters providing security for the deployed systems.

The military threats to Canada are external to our borders. No enemy nation has the military capability to invade and occupy us so our primary home defence requirements can typically be met by NORAD, the RCN, the RCAF and land based AD capabilities. Any need for land-based military forces will not likely be in the location they are based so will have to be effectively "expeditionary" in nature rather than "local".

The "military" threats, in the sense of state actors in uniform, may be external to our borders but internally we present opportunities that external actors can exploit and exploit effectively by supplying hardware that would make our local malcontents a capable threat. At very least they could deny the government and commerce access to broad swathes of the country.

Oka on a large scale.

Managing that would be a police matter but we don't keep enough police on strength to manage those issues under all circumstances.

As the world is becoming more urbanized and many political goals are increasingly population-based as opposed to territorial-based we are likely to see more and more fighting in built up areas.

Yes.

That will require heavy forces.

No. Only if you plan on demolishing the cities. If you want to minimize the damage and focus on the insurgents then there is ample cover and concealment to permit light forces to operate effectively in the urban environment.

It's nice to have a tank to mousehole an apartment block but wouldn't a Carl Gustaf with the right warhead (or even an AT4) be just as effective, and more manoeuverable?

I question whether Canada really does have the capability for a sustainable Division currently. I think some tough choices need to be made as to what we want our military to actually be able to do in case of a major conflict...not just have a skeleton force that looks like a real Army.

I don't question the capability of Canada. It doesn't have a sustainable Division currently.

I think it has the skeleton of a Division. And I think that a Division, in conjunction with a well organized local reserve, is a reasonable scale of investment for Canada's national defence. I'm not particularly bothered about the nature of the expeditionary Division. I do like your Light Brigade structure but I am inclined to have that, like the SSF, as a National Defence entity. It may be better to separate that from Expeditionary Division and form it separately in the same way the Brits have formed their 16th Air Assault Brigade as a Global Response Force.


And the Institutional Army, the CADTC, they need to spend more effort figuring out how to turn civilians into a local defence force that can be filed for future reference.

 

[Kirkhill]

No comment offered.

Moreover – and what is often not readily recognized – is that the National Guard is able to perform its domestic support functions as expertly and as effectively as it does because it is a military service with combat training and technologies. The real secret to the National Guard’s effectiveness is that it brings a military mindset, focus, organizational approach, and specialized equipment to solve problems that may not be solely military in nature, but where a military solution can address those problems more swiftly and effectively.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/09/02/the_real_secret_to_the_national_guards_domestic_effectiveness_851473.html

 

[GR66]

Something like this?

Battalion #1
Current IRU Battalion
100% Reg Force manning
1 Coy at 12hrs NTM and 2 Coy at 48hrs NTM

Battalion #2
Next in line as IRU Battalion. Work-up training.
100% Reg Force manning

Battalion #3
Just off IRU. Refit
70% manning (30% of personnel away on individual training, school assignments, etc.)
Reserves to provide 30% augmentation if unit is required to deploy.

So unlike a unit which has an actual 70/30 habitual establishment (like you might do in the heavier "break glass in case of fire" units) the Battalions in the IRU rotation would at times be at 100% manning and when in refit stage would have reduced manning with Reserve augmentation if required?

@KevinB - You gave a "thumbs up" to my understanding of how you envisioned IRU Battalion manning. I'm assuming that means what I posted is roughly in line with your thinking. Minor point - While Battalion #3 (just off IRU) is only at 70% Reg Force manning at this stage of the rotation, the other 30% Reg Force positions still exist on the books but those Pers are just not available for deployment with the unit at that time and would require Reserve augmentation in order for the unit to deploy. All three Battalions would still technically have to be manned at 100% of Establishment by Reg Force positions.

 

[KevinB]

@KevinB - You gave a "thumbs up" to my understanding of how you envisioned IRU Battalion manning. I'm assuming that means what I posted is roughly in line with your thinking. Minor point - While Battalion #3 (just off IRU) is only at 70% Reg Force manning at this stage of the rotation, the other 30% Reg Force positions still exist on the books but those Pers are just not available for deployment with the unit at that time and would require Reserve augmentation in order for the unit to deploy. All three Battalions would still technically have to be manned at 100% of Establishment by Reg Force positions.

The thumbs up was for ‘that could work’.

I don’t necessarily think though that those positions need to be 100% RegF.

With a rotation system one could have Class C positions coming into those units from PRes units tasked to them. In theory all of the units could be 70/30 and the IRU unit is plussed up prior to rotation to 100% Manning with Class C augmented PRes personnel.

That way the IRU Bn is at 100% the oncoming IRU is starting to fill to 100% and the outgoing IRU Bn is starting to scale down.
It would generally cause issues with APS.
Perhaps a 4th LIB in rotation would make more sense for my method - as then annual posting wouldn’t occur in two of those BN’s
The current IRU and the incoming wouldn’t be affected that way - while the other two could have more flexibility for postings, long term courses etc.

 

[GR66]

The thumbs up was for ‘that could work’.

I don’t necessarily think though that those positions need to be 100% RegF.

With a rotation system one could have Class C positions coming into those units from PRes units tasked to them. In theory all of the units could be 70/30 and the IRU unit is plussed up prior to rotation to 100% Manning with Class C augmented PRes personnel.

That way the IRU Bn is at 100% the oncoming IRU is starting to fill to 100% and the outgoing IRU Bn is starting to scale down.
It would generally cause issues with APS.
Perhaps a 4th LIB in rotation would make more sense for my method - as then annual posting wouldn’t occur in two of those BN’s
The current IRU and the incoming wouldn’t be affected that way - while the other two could have more flexibility for postings, long term courses etc.

So for each IRU Battalion say you had two 100% Reg Force Companies and the 3rd Company having the Coy HQ Reg Force and the 3 x Platoons coming from Class C Reservists (or maybe more likely 1 x Platoon from each Company being Class C) and these Reserve positions are only filled for the current IRU Battalion and the oncoming IRU Battalion.

How large a Reserve catchment area would you need to be able to fill those positions? You're looking at 3 x Platoons for each of the two Battalions to be augmented, so around 120 x Class C positions each Battalion for 1 year postings (6 month work-up and 6 month IRU). Assuming you geographically spread the IRU Battalions so they are not drawing from the same Reserve recruiting base, would a single Reserve Infantry Brigade be able to reliably fill those positions?

 

[daftandbarmy]

The thumbs up was for ‘that could work’.

I don’t necessarily think though that those positions need to be 100% RegF.

With a rotation system one could have Class C positions coming into those units from PRes units tasked to them. In theory all of the units could be 70/30 and the IRU unit is plussed up prior to rotation to 100% Manning with Class C augmented PRes personnel.

That way the IRU Bn is at 100% the oncoming IRU is starting to fill to 100% and the outgoing IRU Bn is starting to scale down.
It would generally cause issues with APS.
Perhaps a 4th LIB in rotation would make more sense for my method - as then annual posting wouldn’t occur in two of those BN’s
The current IRU and the incoming wouldn’t be affected that way - while the other two could have more flexibility for postings, long term courses etc.

Be careful about Class C vs. Reg F.

Equivalent levels of Quality Control isn't necessarily a thing

 

[GR66]

We'll skip the points of agreement.


I would argue that the reserve function is to provide defence when there is a military necessity. If you wait until the necessity is obvious it is too late.

As to managing threats -

there are threats.

Those threats include civil and military threats and can include assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot.

The Foresters are needed, not just to support the Army in particular, or even the CAF in general, they are needed to support the police and other government departments when manpower is required. The question is what capabilities can they cheaply supply with minimal training. My sense is that security should be their primary focus. That means small arms, light vehicles and comms. It also could mean the provision of a significant arsenal of single shot wooden rounds. Machine Guns and Mortars are also relatively cheap.

I don't agree that the primary focus of the Reserves should be local security. "Assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot." should be the responsibility of law enforcement. The military's "primary focus" should not be defending the government against its own population or enforcing the law except in the most extreme circumstances where law enforcement simply doesn't have the capability to deal with the threat. And if it ever becomes the case where these "extreme circumstances" become common then I'd rather we expand the capabilities of our law enforcement agencies rather than use our Reserves as a para-military police force.

My overarching need is for missile defence - everything from CRAM with strong EW and Directed Energy devices like lasers backed by kinetic weapons (guns) up through VSHORAD, SHORAD and MRAD to ABM defences. All of those could be mixed regular/reserve formations. With the Foresters providing security for the deployed systems.

I agree that a range of missile defence capabilities should be a priority for Canada, both for domestic defence as well as for protection of our deployed expeditionary forces. High level threats against the nation (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, etc.) need to be available at least at some level 24/7 and would include the RCAF and RCN plus whatever new capabilities we get. These could be augmented by additional Reserve capabilities at times of heightened tensions or during major events (Olympics, G7 gatherings, etc.).

As for 24/7 local SHORAD/VSHORAD coverage all across Canada? Is there a demonstrated need for something like that? What would be the cost (and opportunity cost) of trying to implement that? So we have a SHORAD battery in Owen Sound protected by the G&SF. Is the AD battery active 24/7? Does it require a security force 24/7?

The "military" threats, in the sense of state actors in uniform, may be external to our borders but internally we present opportunities that external actors can exploit and exploit effectively by supplying hardware that would make our local malcontents a capable threat. At very least they could deny the government and commerce access to broad swathes of the country.

Oka on a large scale.

Managing that would be a police matter but we don't keep enough police on strength to manage those issues under all circumstances.

As I noted above, if these uncommon occurrences where law enforcement in not sufficient become regular events then we should increase our law enforcement capabilities rather then throw the military at the problem.

No. Only if you plan on demolishing the cities. If you want to minimize the damage and focus on the insurgents then there is ample cover and concealment to permit light forces to operate effectively in the urban environment.

It's nice to have a tank to mousehole an apartment block but wouldn't a Carl Gustaf with the right warhead (or even an AT4) be just as effective, and more manoeuverable?

Lots of historical and recent examples of urban combat show the importance of protected mobility. There are open spaces to be crossed between the areas of cover and concealment.

I don't question the capability of Canada. It doesn't have a sustainable Division currently.

I think it has the skeleton of a Division. And I think that a Division, in conjunction with a well organized local reserve, is a reasonable scale of investment for Canada's national defence. I'm not particularly bothered about the nature of the expeditionary Division. I do like your Light Brigade structure but I am inclined to have that, like the SSF, as a National Defence entity. It may be better to separate that from Expeditionary Division and form it separately in the same way the Brits have formed their 16th Air Assault Brigade as a Global Response Force.


And the Institutional Army, the CADTC, they need to spend more effort figuring out how to turn civilians into a local defence force that can be filed for future reference.

Again, I think our differences come down to a fundamental disagreement over the best way to defend Canada and its interests. I believe the battles to protect what we value are more likely to take happen in places like Riga or the South China Sea rather than in Owen Sound, ON or Yorkton, SK.

 

[KevinB]

So for each IRU Battalion say you had two 100% Reg Force Companies and the 3rd Company having the Coy HQ Reg Force and the 3 x Platoons coming from Class C Reservists (or maybe more likely 1 x Platoon from each Company being Class C) and these Reserve positions are only filled for the current IRU Battalion and the oncoming IRU Battalion.

How large a Reserve catchment area would you need to be able to fill those positions? You're looking at 3 x Platoons for each of the two Battalions to be augmented, so around 120 x Class C positions each Battalion for 1 year postings (6 month work-up and 6 month IRU). Assuming you geographically spread the IRU Battalions so they are not drawing from the same Reserve recruiting base, would a single Reserve Infantry Brigade be able to reliably fill those positions?

If I was King, I’d had two LI Bde’s
One East and one West
2 Bn from each 70/30 and one 30/70
It would spread the geography, and Run East -West-East etc for IRU.
It would leave troops for Internal deployment as well

Be careful about Class C vs. Reg F.

Equivalent levels of Quality Control isn't necessarily a thing

I think with a decent training program and a decent work schedule the Augmentation forces would be competitive

Initially most SNCO and Capt+ positions would be Reg. Then if you kept getting the same folks and they where usable for higher positions - you could end up with a fairly capable PRes as well that is getting regular higher end training and deployment.

 

[GR66]

Be careful about Class C vs. Reg F.

Equivalent levels of Quality Control isn't necessarily a thing

True, but with regularly scheduled annual Class C deployments would that delta possibly decrease over time?

 

[daftandbarmy]

True, but with regularly scheduled annual Class C deployments would that delta possibly decrease over time?

I doubt it.

Right now, IMHO, Class C is code for 'gravy train'. The bigger hogs will always tend to force their way to the front

 

[Kirkhill]

If I was King, I’d had two LI Bde’s
One East and one West
2 Bn from each 70/30 and one 30/70
It would spread the geography, and Run East -West-East etc for IRU.
It would leave troops for Internal deployment as well


I think with a decent training program and a decent work schedule the Augmentation forces would be competitive

Initially most SNCO and Capt+ positions would be Reg. Then if you kept getting the same folks and they where usable for higher positions - you could end up with a fairly capable PRes as well that is getting regular higher end training and deployment.

A nail has been hit on the head. Time is a key issue.

It will be difficult to change the PRes and the Regs. That will take time. There will be no flipping of switches. You are looking at something that will likely take a generation and adherence to a plan over that time. This is not a job for a 2 year GOFO.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't agree that the primary focus of the Reserves should be local security. "Assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot." should be the responsibility of law enforcement. The military's "primary focus" should not be defending the government against its own population or enforcing the law except in the most extreme circumstances where law enforcement simply doesn't have the capability to deal with the threat. And if it ever becomes the case where these "extreme circumstances" become common then I'd rather we expand the capabilities of our law enforcement agencies rather than use our Reserves as a para-military police force.

In my view that Reserves are like Taxpayers. There is only one of them. In fact the Taxpayers and the Reserves are the same person. The Reserve offers his labour in exchange for taxes. She is a citizen that comes to the aid of the government. She doesn't belong to the Army. Or the Navy or the Air Force. Nor should she belong to the RCMP.

The purpose of a Reserve is to allow the Government to deal effectively with infrequent catastrophes.

And that is why I like the US National Guard and Danish Home Guard models.

These are citizens organized in military fashion, with military training and a military culture. Within those groups of citizens there are those that are predisposed to supply support and those that are predisposed to supply security. And there are those that are predisposed to fight with guns and tanks, fly jets and helicopters and sail boats. The government is offered an array of opportunities to exploit in a crisis. And one of those crises can be a war overseas that threatens domestic interests.

But those are not the only crises government faces. And government needs manpower for them all.

The Army is not the only draw on labour.

And an expeditionary army is not a particularly popular concept in Canada.

I would sooner have a body of willing citizens adapted to military culture that can be drawn on when the need for an expeditionary army is obvious to them.

Security is an easy sell. Fighting foreign wars is a hard sell.

I agree that a range of missile defence capabilities should be a priority for Canada, both for domestic defence as well as for protection of our deployed expeditionary forces. High level threats against the nation (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, etc.) need to be available at least at some level 24/7 and would include the RCAF and RCN plus whatever new capabilities we get. These could be augmented by additional Reserve capabilities at times of heightened tensions or during major events (Olympics, G7 gatherings, etc.).

Agreement.

As for 24/7 local SHORAD/VSHORAD coverage all across Canada? Is there a demonstrated need for something like that? What would be the cost (and opportunity cost) of trying to implement that? So we have a SHORAD battery in Owen Sound protected by the G&SF. Is the AD battery active 24/7? Does it require a security force 24/7?

No. It doesn't require the entirety of the Foresters 24/7. It may require a detachment on an ongoing basis to secure the gear.

As to the need for local Air Defence.

We're accustomed to thinking of guns targeting planes, or missiles targeting missiles. Now we are looking at targeting drones which we liken to military planes.

But on the civil side of things drones fall into the same category as birds. Nuisances. And nuisances are dealt with as quietly and unobtrusively as possible so as to not frighten the locals as they go about their affairs.

Rheinmetall is already promoting their air defence systems to civilian ports for managing all threats - from birds, drones and intruders to MIRVs.

The sensor and command and control packages are similar if not identical. The choice of effectors varies.

The basic system could include acoustics to startle, or directed energy systems (lasers, microwaves and RF) to fry silently.

Those systems would be entirely civilian controlled and maintained.

But suppose the threat moved up the spectrum to the "military" and there was a need for adding guns and missiles to the array of effectors?

Rheinmetall high level peace time effector



Rheinmetall low level war time effector.



And they would or could be augmented by NASAMS launchers



Once those effectors were deployed, and even while they were in storage in the armouries, they will need guarding.

As I noted above, if these uncommon occurrences where law enforcement in not sufficient become regular events then we should increase our law enforcement capabilities rather then throw the military at the problem.

On this we both agree. Or we should change government.

Lots of historical and recent examples of urban combat show the importance of protected mobility. There are open spaces to be crossed between the areas of cover and concealment.

Also agreed. But how much protected mobility? Everybody armoured? Or a Brigade per Division? A Battalion? A Transport Company?

Again, I think our differences come down to a fundamental disagreement over the best way to defend Canada and its interests. I believe the battles to protect what we value are more likely to take happen in places like Riga or the South China Sea rather than in Owen Sound, ON or Yorkton, SK.

And my concern is engaging Canada's citizens so that they will respond to crises in both Owen Sound and the South China Sea when and as required.

I am not interested in keeping 4 CMBG happy in the Bierhalls. I am interested in raising Sam Hughes's CEF when necessary.

 

[GR66]

If I was King, I’d had two LI Bde’s
One East and one West
2 Bn from each 70/30 and one 30/70
It would spread the geography, and Run East -West-East etc for IRU.
It would leave troops for Internal deployment as well


I think with a decent training program and a decent work schedule the Augmentation forces would be competitive

Initially most SNCO and Capt+ positions would be Reg. Then if you kept getting the same folks and they where usable for higher positions - you could end up with a fairly capable PRes as well that is getting regular higher end training and deployment.

In this scenario would you only have the four 70/30 Battalions (two per Brigade) rotate the IRU tasking? Or how would you propose fitting a 30/70 Battalion into high readiness rotation?

You could possibly do two Light Brigades each with three 70/30 Battalions with the Western Brigade having Battalions in Edmonton (41 Bde and possibly central BC units from 39 Bde as the Reserve components), Shilo (with 38 Bde as the Reserve components) and Petawawa (33 Bde). The Eastern Brigade would have Battalions in Quebec (34 Bde), Valcartier (35 Bde) and Gagetown (37 Bde).

IRU could then be split between 6 units rather than 3 (or 4) somewhat easing the burden on each. IRU rotation could be Edmonton-Quebec-Shilo-Valcartier-Petawawa-Gagetown...repeat.

Reg Force manning for these two Light Brigades (6 x 70/30 Battalions) would be about 3,500 positions leaving 1,735 Reg Force Infantry positions left over for Mech forces. This could be 2 x 100% Battalions or 3 x Battalions at current (70%) manning levels.

 

[KevinB]

Reg Force manning for these two Light Brigades (6 x 70/30 Battalions) would be about 3,500 positions leaving 1,735 Reg Force Infantry positions left over for Mech forces. This could be 2 x 100% Battalions or 3 x Battalions at current (70%) manning levels.

Honestly I would have 1 x 70/30 Bn and 5 30/70 Bn of Mech forces.

That would provide 4-5 potential Bde of Infantry for the CA.

But all of that requires a significant change in the CA and specific the PRes from an employment standpoint - and a dedication to equipment and training that right now, I don’t see on any side (GoC, CA or PRes structures).

 

[Kirkhill]

In my view that Reserves are like Taxpayers. There is only one of them. In fact the Taxpayers and the Reserves are the same person. The Reserve offers his labour in exchange for taxes. She is a citizen that comes to the aid of the government. She doesn't belong to the Army. Or the Navy or the Air Force. Nor should she belong to the RCMP.

The purpose of a Reserve is to allow the Government to deal effectively with infrequent catastrophes.

And that is why I like the US National Guard and Danish Home Guard models.

These are citizens organized in military fashion, with military training and a military culture. Within those groups of citizens there are those that are predisposed to supply support and those that are predisposed to supply security. And there are those that are predisposed to fight with guns and tanks, fly jets and helicopters and sail boats. The government is offered an array of opportunities to exploit in a crisis. And one of those crises can be a war overseas that threatens domestic interests.

But those are not the only crises government faces. And government needs manpower for them all.

The Army is not the only draw on labour.

And an expeditionary army is not a particularly popular concept in Canada.

I would sooner have a body of willing citizens adapted to military culture that can be drawn on when the need for an expeditionary army is obvious to them.

Security is an easy sell. Fighting foreign wars is a hard sell.


Agreement.


No. It doesn't require the entirety of the Foresters 24/7. It may require a detachment on an ongoing basis to secure the gear.

As to the need for local Air Defence.

We're accustomed to thinking of guns targeting planes, or missiles targeting missiles. Now we are looking at targeting drones which we liken to military planes.

But on the civil side of things drones fall into the same category as birds. Nuisances. And nuisances are dealt with as quietly and unobtrusively as possible so as to not frighten the locals as they go about their affairs.

Rheinmetall is already promoting their air defence systems to civilian ports for managing all threats - from birds, drones and intruders to MIRVs.

The sensor and command and control packages are similar if not identical. The choice of effectors varies.

The basic system could include acoustics to startle, or directed energy systems (lasers, microwaves and RF) to fry silently.

Those systems would be entirely civilian controlled and maintained.

But suppose the threat moved up the spectrum to the "military" and there was a need for adding guns and missiles to the array of effectors?

Rheinmetall high level peace time effector

View attachment 73317

Rheinmetall low level war time effector.

View attachment 73318

And they would or could be augmented by NASAMS launchers

View attachment 73319

Once those effectors were deployed, and even while they were in storage in the armouries, they will need guarding.







On this we both agree. Or we should change government.



Also agreed. But how much protected mobility? Everybody armoured? Or a Brigade per Division? A Battalion? A Transport Company?



And my concern is engaging Canada's citizens so that they will respond to crises in both Owen Sound and the South China Sea when and as required.

I am not interested in keeping 4 CMBG happy in the Bierhalls. I am interested in raising Sam Hughes's CEF when necessary.

Further to my comments about the civil/military cross over on air defence. Rheinmetall graphic.

 

[GR66]

Further to the 2 x 70/30 Light Brigade Concept it could possibly look something like this:


Integrates Reserve Regiments directly into the Reg Force structure and "right sizes" them to Company establishment strength with generation requirements of roughly a Platoon (-) of Class C augmentees on a predictable rotating basis.