Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

Okay, I still think Semi-Auto is a poor term.

Anyone with a Time Machine - I recommend going back to suggest:
Direct Input Corrected Guidance, Line of Sight - or DICGLOS

 

[Kirkhill]

 

[Weinie]

Okay, I still think Semi-Auto is a poor term.

Anyone with a Time Machine - I recommend going back to suggest:
Direct Input Corrected Guidance, Line of Sight - or DICGLOS

I recall a movie where DICGLOS was prominent. Skin Deep.

 

[Brad Sallows]

What are people's thoughts on the US pulling their Close Support Artillery Battalions from the Brigades and concentrating them in an Artillery Brigade?

A fine and proper thing.

 

[markppcli]

Anyone with a Time Machine - I recommend going back to suggest:
Direct Input Corrected Guidance, Line of Sight - or DICGLOS

At the risk of being constantly pedantic, it’s semi automatic in that the inputs are automated. Point of aim is chosen, but the adjustment of the missile into that point is automated.

 

[KevinB]

At the risk of being constantly pedantic, it’s semi automatic in that the inputs are automated. Point of aim is chosen, but the adjustment of the missile into that point is automated.

So Manual Aim, Automated Correction ?
My overly pedantic point is simply there is no reason to say semi-automatic.

I still like DICGLOS

 

[IKnowNothing]

Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in having 2-4 quasi-deployable "welterweight" (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions? Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well. 6x Inf gives 2 coy's, the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.

Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?

 

[KevinB]

Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in having 2-4 quasi-deployable "welterweight" (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions? Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well. 6x Inf gives 2 coy's, the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.

Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?

1) I would never use Arty for a Mortar Platoon - there are needs for Artillery AND needs for Mortars.
2) The PRes issue needs to be solved - I am not sure which is the Chicken and which is the Egg WRT to Future Force initiatives and the Regular and Reserve mix.

I'd argue the LAV is already the Mid weight - and going lighter without going Light is another fools errand in the believe of some sort of role for forces between Heavy and Light.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in having 2-4 quasi-deployable "welterweight" (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions? Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well. 6x Inf gives 2 coy's, the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.

Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?

I am enjoying your optimism with respect to militia capabilities, and the capacity of the CAF to support them effectively in that role.

The only realistic role for the militia is to augment the Reg F, as much as it is able, with individuals as and when required. Apart from that we can be trusted to mess around in our own little worlds, as we normally do, with occasional spots of fire/flood fighting to keep us relvant to the locals.

The thought that there would be from 2 to 4 'Militia Battalions' is horrifyingly risky, unnecessary, and unprecedented, ever, even during the World Wars.

To realize such a goal would probably require a 5-10 year ramp up, a heavy investment in Class B/C, and a militia rank ceiling of around Maj/MWO. Even then, you might think of them as 'vapour ware' as they'd probably dissassemble completely without a huge fire hose of recruits.

But keep up the good work. The militia ego needs dreams like that to keep the motivation up!

 

[markppcli]

Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in having 2-4 quasi-deployable "welterweight" (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions? Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well. 6x Inf gives 2 coy's, the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.

Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?

I’ve posted before about the idea of organizing the reserve Infantry and Cavalry regiments into Bns with attached Cavalry / mobility Sqns, at roughly a rate of 1 per Bde. Given limited training time having armour crew vehicles makes sense, and we have a vehicle that could fill that role in the TAPV. It’s not ideal but we have them, and they aren’t going anywhere.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I am enjoying your optimism with respect to militia capabilities, and the capacity of the CAF to support them effectively in that role.

The only realistic role for the militia is to augment the Reg F, as much as it is able, with individuals as and when required. Apart from that we can be trusted to mess around in our own little worlds, as we normally do, with occasional spots of fire/flood fighting to keep us relvant to the locals.

So this (admittedly uncited Wiki excerpt) is whimsical fancy?
"
Traditionally the militia has been subdivided into district garrisons, and this system is still used as units are grouped along geographic lines into brigades for the purposes of administration, training and operations. The deployable sub unit from each regiment are often operationally tasked and grouped together by the brigade to form a composite all-arms battle group of battalion strength known as Territorial Battalion Groups for combined arms training or defence of Canada tasks in the brigade area of operations.

The battle group is usually commanded by a lieutenant-colonel selected on a rotational basis from one of the brigade units. The order of battle will vary depending on the task and the available manpower but generally includes an artillery battery with 105 mm C3 Close Support Guns, several companies of truck-mounted light infantry with support weapons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron with G-Wagons equipped with GPMGs/LAW, and a combat engineer troop."

It was the basis of my thinking. But with that unit given equipment such that it can actually fill a role.
If that's insurmountable, why can other countries do what we can't?

I get we don't have near as compelling of use case for organized reserves as many allies and other comparators, but not doing it should be based on choice, not because it's impossible.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So this (admittedly uncited Wiki excerpt) is whimsical fancy?
"
Traditionally the militia has been subdivided into district garrisons, and this system is still used as units are grouped along geographic lines into brigades for the purposes of administration, training and operations. The deployable sub unit from each regiment are often operationally tasked and grouped together by the brigade to form a composite all-arms battle group of battalion strength known as Territorial Battalion Groups for combined arms training or defence of Canada tasks in the brigade area of operations.

The battle group is usually commanded by a lieutenant-colonel selected on a rotational basis from one of the brigade units. The order of battle will vary depending on the task and the available manpower but generally includes an artillery battery with 105 mm C3 Close Support Guns, several companies of truck-mounted light infantry with support weapons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron with G-Wagons equipped with GPMGs/LAW, and a combat engineer troop."

It was the basis of my thinking. But with that unit given equipment such that it can actually fill a role.
If that's insurmountable, why can other countries do what we can't?

I get we don't have near as compelling of use case for organized reserves as many allies and other comparators, but not doing it should be based on choice, not because it's impossible.

As I recall the TDBGs were a fantasy organization, developed a few years ago, to recognize the inability of a very heavily staffed CBG HQ to organize and lead anything meaningful by way of training. The Bde Comd merely delegates and disappears. I'm sure there was a sugar coated purpose of some kind floated on high, but that's how it appeared to me at the 'parapet level'.

There is nothing operationally or 'territorially defensive' about it, apart from guarding one's own turf of course.

At best, they can try to get everyone to the same location to do the same thing, or at least something by way of training in the same geographical area. There is never any attempt to act like a real brigade, with a commander, and an aim and shared resources aligned with a common plan. In any case just the 'getting together' part has rarely occurred as intended, if ever, AFAIK.

At worst indecision, arguing, infighting, confusion, and a lack of resourcing and adequate battle procedure causes the chaos and collapse of various aspirational plans.

That's been my experience of it at any rate, and others might differ of course

 

[IKnowNothing]

As I recall the TDBGs were a fantasy organization, developed a few years ago, to recognize the inability of a very heavily staffed CBG HQ to organize and lead anything meaningful by way of training. The Bde Comd merely delegates and disappears. I'm sure there was a sugar coated purpose of some kind floated on high, but that's how it appeared to me at the 'parapet level'.

So assuming the TBG's were a reality, and we had a functioning reserve system with driven leadership delivering bang for the buck- what's the right weight/equipment level for them to be given and role for them to be tasked with?
Stryker type to plug and play into COIN?
Bison/Pasi for domestic deployment, plug and play into Chapter 6?
Pure light/ truck motorized/ vehicle agnostic?
LAV 6's with a cadre of RegF maintenance support?

 

[daftandbarmy]

So assuming the TBG's were a reality, and we had a functioning reserve system with driven leadership delivering bang for the buck- what's the right weight/equipment level for them to be given and role for them to be tasked with?
Stryker type to plug and play into COIN?
Bison/Pasi for domestic deployment, plug and play into Chapter 6?
Pure light/ truck motorized/ vehicle agnostic?
LAV 6's with a cadre of RegF maintenance support?

IMHO....

I would disband the Reserve CBGs, cap rank levels at Major/MWO, and have units report directly to a 'Force Generation Officer'/desk, probably run by the 3 shop, at Div HQ. Perhaps have a (smaller, nimbler, more effective) regionally based 'coordination cell' that replaces the Bde HQ. I don't really know what I'm talking about here but just spit ballin'...

Reserve units would receive takings to 'FG a sub-unit by NLT XYZ date to accomplish ABC tasks' in the summer, and receive the Reg F/ FT training support to achieve those tasks during the training year (September to May). This would mean a Reg F/ FT training team for each Sub-Unit (Coy/Sqn etc) who would train the troops, and the Officers and NCOs who currrently get zero training, to successfully fulfill their roles during a summer exercise of some kind, the nature of which would be clearly rticulated in advance using the time tested orders/BP process. Find the money for this support from all the FT positions you booted out of the Reserve CBG HQs, maybe.

These sub-units would be given performance gateways to achieve throughout the training year in line with the Mission. In the summer, the sub-units would muster at a central training location, such as Wainwright, where they would marry up with Reg F CBGs and participate in FTXs designed to build up their capabilities in a reasonable, step by step fashion.

Over the course of three or four years you would likely see the capabilities of the reserve sub-units gradually increase to the point where you might see people emerge at the leadership level who could be qualified to command at a BGp level as opposed to, right now, the 'last man/woman standing', or the 'ambitious but dangerously unqualified'. Unit level admin/maintenance/logitics capabilities would also increase concurrently.

At that point, you could revisit the structure and perhaps stand up full units with well qualified leadership - and infrastructure - who could participate in increasingly complex summer FTXs...

...and then think about issuing out all the fancy schmancy kit/vehicles etc., and telling the Reserves 'you're on your own from here buddy'....

IMHO...

 

[IKnowNothing]

Thank-you very much @daftandbarmy

 

[daftandbarmy]

Thank-you very much @daftandbarmy

Avec plaisir!

 

[markppcli]

IMHO....

I would disband the Reserve CBGs, cap rank levels at Major/MWO, and have units report directly to a 'Force Generation Officer'/desk, probably run by the 3 shop, at Div HQ. Perhaps have a (smaller, nimbler, more effective) regionally based 'coordination cell' that replaces the Bde HQ. I don't really know what I'm talking about here but just spit ballin'...

Reserve units would receive takings to 'FG a sub-unit by NLT XYZ date to accomplish ABC tasks' in the summer, and receive the Reg F/ FT training support to achieve those tasks during the training year (September to May). This would mean a Reg F/ FT training team for each Sub-Unit (Coy/Sqn etc) who would train the troops, and the Officers and NCOs who currrently get zero training, to successfully fulfill their roles during a summer exercise of some kind, the nature of which would be clearly rticulated in advance using the time tested orders/BP process. Find the money for this support from all the FT positions you booted out of the Reserve CBG HQs, maybe.

These sub-units would be given performance gateways to achieve throughout the training year in line with the Mission. In the summer, the sub-units would muster at a central training location, such as Wainwright, where they would marry up with Reg F CBGs and participate in FTXs designed to build up their capabilities in a reasonable, step by step fashion.

Over the course of three or four years you would likely see the capabilities of the reserve sub-units gradually increase to the point where you might see people emerge at the leadership level who could be qualified to command at a BGp level as opposed to, right now, the 'last man/woman standing', or the 'ambitious but dangerously unqualified'. Unit level admin/maintenance/logitics capabilities would also increase concurrently.

At that point, you could revisit the structure and perhaps stand up full units with well qualified leadership - and infrastructure - who could participate in increasingly complex summer FTXs...

...and then think about issuing out all the fancy schmancy kit/vehicles etc., and telling the Reserves 'you're on your own from here buddy'....

IMHO...

I’d even go so far as to say the reserves in the one situation where I think there’s actually an argument for NCM service before a commission. Not because I think it “grounds them” or makes them better leaders, but simply because you then “hire” your potential officers as positions open as opposed to having an ill defined pool of officer cadets / LTs / captains searching for purpose.

 

[FJAG]

The only realistic role for the militia is to augment the Reg F, as much as it is able, with individuals as and when required.

As thing currently stand.

To realize such a goal would probably require a 5-10 year ramp up

Every journey starts with a single step... but I wouldn't go down a full Militia battalion either - hence the 30/70 battalions. The ResF can provide low cost manpower at the lower ranks if structured and trained correctly under RegF senior leadership in a system tailored to RegF capabilities.

I would disband the Reserve CBGs, cap rank levels at Major/MWO, and have units report directly to a 'Force Generation Officer'/desk, probably run by the 3 shop, at Div HQ

Disband the CBGs - yes. Report to an administrative structure - no. Form them into known, doctrinal tactical entities so that they can train fully.

This would mean a Reg F/ FT training team for each Sub-Unit (Coy/Sqn etc) who would train the troops, and the Officers and NCOs who currrently get zero training, to successfully fulfill their roles during a summer exercise of some kind

RegF/FT training team - no. RegF command, administration and training element - yes. Like you I do not believe that there is added value in ResF officers above the rank of major or NCMs above WO unless they have had the proper training AND experience for MWO and LCol and above rank which is highly unlikely for the vast majority of them. One might as well put ResF units under proper leadership from square one.

In the summer, the sub-units would muster at a central training location, such as Wainwright, where they would marry up with Reg F CBGs

Marry up with - no. Belong to and deploy on exercises with a RegF commanded and administered CBG - yes. Believe it or not, I actually think we need more brigade headquarters than the three that we have. The 10 existing CBGs are brigade headquarters in name only. Those ten should be reduced and amalgamated into maybe two manoeuvre brigades and three to four support brigades which also follow a 30/70 mix with the 30% RegF being the leaders, and administrators for the entire brigade.

The biggest problem with the ResF, at this time, has less to do with structure and much more to do with the "come play when you feel like it" model of reserve service. That's a neck that needs thorough wringing if we are ever to expect reservists to develop decent individual skills and units that include reservists to have decent collective skills. That's merely a regulatory change with a very minor NDA amendment but is a very large leap in how we structure individual training courses for reservists (which IMHO should parallel RegF courses at the DP1 and 2 level) and how we structure annual training for the ResF units so that it is "attendable", interesting and valuable.

Any and all restructuring of the ResF is the equivalent of building on shifting sands until we first address the fundamental foundation of ResF service. We continue to use a model that reaches back to the 1800s when an army was a collection of guys who could march together and generally shoot straight and could be relatively easily mobilized. Times have changed.

 

[markppcli]

As thing currently stand.

Every journey starts with a single step... but I wouldn't go down a full Militia battalion either - hence the 30/70 battalions. The ResF can provide low cost manpower at the lower ranks if structured and trained correctly under RegF senior leadership in a system tailored to RegF capabilities.

Disband the CBGs - yes. Report to an administrative structure - no. Form them into known, doctrinal tactical entities so that they can train fully.

RegF/FT training team - no. RegF command, administration and training element - yes. Like you I do not believe that there is added value in ResF officers above the rank of major or NCMs above WO unless they have had the proper training AND experience for MWO and LCol and above rank which is highly unlikely for the vast majority of them. One might as well put ResF units under proper leadership from square one.

Marry up with - no. Belong to and deploy on exercises with a RegF commanded and administered CBG - yes. Believe it or not, I actually think we need more brigade headquarters than the three that we have. The 10 existing CBGs are brigade headquarters in name only. Those ten should be reduced and amalgamated into maybe two manoeuvre brigades and three to four support brigades which also follow a 30/70 mix with the 30% RegF being the leaders, and administrators for the entire brigade.

The biggest problem with the ResF, at this time, has less to do with structure and much more to do with the "come play when you feel like it" model of reserve service. That's a neck that needs thorough wringing if we are ever to expect reservists to develop decent individual skills and units that include reservists to have decent collective skills. That's merely a regulatory change with a very minor NDA amendment but is a very large leap in how we structure individual training courses for reservists (which IMHO should parallel RegF courses at the DP1 and 2 level) and how we structure annual training for the ResF units so that it is "attendable", interesting and valuable.

Any and all restructuring of the ResF is the equivalent of building on shifting sands until we first address the fundamental foundation of ResF service. We continue to use a model that reaches back to the 1800s when an army was a collection of guys who could march together and generally shoot straight and could be relatively easily mobilized. Times have changed.

I actually think the new standards do go a long way in addressing that; IBTS covers a fair bit and can actually be manipulated a lot.

 

[GR66]

Part of the problem with any of these Force 2025 ideas is that we simply don't have enough positions being filled in the units we already have.

I think one key lesson we can take from the Russian experience in Ukraine is that it's suicide to deploy your forces at less than full establishment. They deployed BTG's at 70/30 readiness which resulted in fully crewed vehicles with almost no dismounts to support them. All the destroyed Russian tanks and IFVs from the first weeks of the war are proof of that peril.

These numbers are old (Force 2013 I think?) but I don't imagine they are radically different today:

Mechanized Infantry Battalion = 833 Establishment/593 Generation (x6 = 4998 Establishment/3558 Generation)
Light Infantry Battalion = 834 Establishment/560 Generation (x3 = 2502 Establishment/1680 Generation)
Total = 7500 Establishment/5238 Generation (i.e. 70/30)

In a conflict we may need to rapidly deploy our Reg Force without time to augment with Reserves.

Say for example we were to concentrate all of our LAVs/Tanks into a single Heavy(ish) 1st Mechanized Brigade with a full vehicle set in Edmonton and a full fly-over set in Latvia. We'd want to man this Brigade at 100% strength because due to their experience in Ukraine if Russia were to decide to attack NATO they would want to do it with strategic surprise so we don't have time to build up our forces.

We could then organize the balance of our forces around a total force three Brigade Light Division with each Brigade having one Battalion at 100% (giving us the ability to rotate a high-readiness Battle Group as a Rapid Response Force), one Battalion at 70/30 Reg/Reserve and a third Battalion at 30/70 Reg/Reserve.

For the Infantry that would require:
3 x 100% Strength Mech Battalions @ 833 = 2,499
3 x 100% Strength Light Battalions @ 834 = 2,502
3 x 70/30 Light Battalions @ 584 = 1,752
3 x 30/70 Light Battalions @ 250 = 750

Total Infantry Reg Force Requirements = 7,503

That's basically identical to our existing Establishment numbers but since our Generation numbers are only 5,238 that leaves us 2,265 Reg Force Infantry positions short of what we really should have in order to have a force that can reasonably be expected to deploy to a combat mission in a fast evolving crisis situation.

These numbers are just for the Infantry. I'm sure they are the same (or worse?) for the other trades as well.

So to my mind unless we look at increasing our manning levels we shouldn't be looking at growing the number of units in the Army because they will just be even more hollow than they are now. Without more numbers we might even be better off reducing the number of units to ensure that the ones we have are effective.