Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Your points are all very valid.

I diverge on the idea of having 3 x Mech and 3 x Light battalions at 100% strength for one reason and only one reason.

The way I see 70/30 battalions and 30/70 battalions being employed is by way of loosely twinned brigades - one brigade predominantly RegF the other predominantly ResF. In each brigade the battalions have either two companies (for the 70/30) or one company (for the 30/70) that are at 100% RegF strength. The remaining one and two companies are at 5% RegF / 95% ResF. The purpose of this is to be able to create a force of roughly twice the size of the three current RegF brigades and which are all fully under RegF leadership. In other words the structures purpose is to enable the ResF to rise up in capability by having RegF leadership and equipment available throughout all their training. Effectively one CO is responsible for collective training of his RegF personnel during Sept to April and of his ResF members during a weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. Depot battalions would be responsible for the bulk of individual training for both RegF and ResF. Having 6 battalions at 100% Reg F strength severely reduces that capability to the point of impossibility.

IMHO, we rarely deploy battalions at 100% strength anyway. The BG in Latvia has one company and CS and CSS. Essentially any 30/70 or 70/30 battalion could do the current eFP Latvia task with minor augmentation from its ResF elements. The same with our training mission in Ukraine.

In the rare eventuality where a 100% battalion-sized rapid force is required then a 70/30 battalion could deploy with its two 100% RegF companies and one additional 100% RegF company (with its equipment) from another battalion (like we frequently did for Afghanistan). In the same way, the battalion HQ and CS and CSS would be rounded out by predesignated RegF pers from another 70/30 or 30/70 battalion. Quite clearly a rapid reaction standby force would need predesignating so that a rapid assembly becomes possible.

With time, once the ResF components become viable, it would be easier to have a list of stand-by volunteer ResF members to round out or even be "activated" for a rapid deployment.

My suggestion is not the only one. Other ways of doing this are possible, but to truly bring about lasting change we need a system whereby ResF personnel receive the benefit of proper leadership and training within the framework of of a proper part-time system. In short we need to make them a properly trained and led part-time reserve, not merely a lesser semi-qualified alternate force.

 

[KevinB]

I’d strongly recommend that at least 1 Light Bn be 100% strength.
If it deploys then one of the 70/30 units goes to 100% with Class C augmented forces.

If Canada had the means to quickly project a Mech Force I’d suggest that one of those be 100% too, but by the time Canada was able to deploy a Mech Bn, to any OA outside of North America, they could have augmented to 300% strength anyway...

 

[FJAG]

I’d strongly recommend that at least 1 Light Bn be 100% strength.
If it deploys then one of the 70/30 units goes to 100% with Class C augmented forces.

If Canada had the means to quickly project a Mech Force I’d suggest that one of those be 100% too, but by the time Canada was able to deploy a Mech Bn, to any OA outside of North America, they could have augmented to 300% strength anyway...

I think that I actually did that with my last napkin 2 Div.



In fact two of them - 2 RCR (stationed in Edmonton) in 39 Light Bde (West coast rapid reaction) and 1 RCR (stationed in Petawawa) in 2 Light Bde (East coast rapid reaction)

The US found out it couldn't rapid reaction the Stryker Brigades with all the air lift that they have. I sincerely doubt that we can do a mech battalion but we might be able to augment a light battalion with the better part of a LAV company (of which there are six in 2 Div.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The kind of battlefield the Res F is going to step onto in the event of mobilization will be a very dangerous one. At this point, militia capability has degraded so much that it would be a pointless waste of life to put mobilized reservists into anything other than a Reg F framework.

 

[FJAG]

The kind of battlefield the Res F is going to step onto in the event of mobilization will be a very dangerous one. At this point, militia capability has degraded so much that it would be a pointless waste of life to put mobilized reservists into anything other than a Reg F framework.

I think the first thing that one has to realize is that the mass of forces fighting in Ukraine right now, on both sides, are troops with considerably less training and less capable equipment than the US or Brit RegF and to a large extent our RegF. ResFs there are holding the line. In Afghanistan our ResF made up from 15 to 25% of the units' strength. So let's not dismiss ResFs out of hand based on what we currently have.

Step 1 is to stop and reverse the decline. To do that Canada needs to train reservists to the same individual standards at DP1 and 2 as the RegF. That's doable with the full summer employment model.

To properly create and maintain that individual standard as well as to create and maintain a collective training capability the ResF must absolutely be put into a RegF framework but for peacetime training as well as operational deployment.

The problem with a pure ResF augmentation to the RegF model is that it does not provide adequate individual training for reservists nor a viable framework for growing the total force beyond the three existing RegF brigades without massively deconstructing those brigades and reassembling them in a time of crisis. We need a peacetime total force framework that provides and meets Canada's current peacetime army needs as well as a mobilizable structure for reasonably contemplated emergencies.

 

[GR66]

I think that I actually did that with my last napkin 2 Div.

View attachment 72866

In fact two of them - 2 RCR (stationed in Edmonton) in 39 Light Bde (West coast rapid reaction) and 1 RCR (stationed in Petawawa) in 2 Light Bde (East coast rapid reaction)

The US found out it couldn't rapid reaction the Stryker Brigades with all the air lift that they have. I sincerely doubt that we can do a mech battalion but we might be able to augment a light battalion with the better part of a LAV company (of which there are six in 2 Div.

I'm assuming that you're only showing two Infantry Battalions in each Brigade simply because we don't have the density of Reserve units to provide enough Reserve Infantry Companies in most of Canada (Ontario being the possible exemption)?

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the first thing that one has to realize is that the mass of forces fighting in Ukraine right now, on both sides, are troops with considerably less training and less capable equipment than the US or Brit RegF and to a large extent our RegF. ResFs there are holding the line. In Afghanistan our ResF made up from 15 to 25% of the units' strength. So let's not dismiss ResFs out of hand based on what we currently have.

Step 1 is to stop and reverse the decline. To do that Canada needs to train reservists to the same individual standards at DP1 and 2 as the RegF. That's doable with the full summer employment model.

To properly create and maintain that individual standard as well as to create and maintain a collective training capability the ResF must absolutely be put into a RegF framework but for peacetime training as well as operational deployment.

The problem with a pure ResF augmentation to the RegF model is that it does not provide adequate individual training for reservists nor a viable framework for growing the total force beyond the three existing RegF brigades without massively deconstructing those brigades and reassembling them in a time of crisis. We need a peacetime total force framework that provides and meets Canada's current peacetime army needs as well as a mobilizable structure for reasonably contemplated emergencies.

Where is this vast reserve army going to be employed?

I am regularly told there is no foreseeable domestic requirement.

So am I to assume we are going to enroll every fighting age man and woman to go to the defence of Latvia? Or Taiwan?

The forward defence notion doesn't work if the population of Canada is sacrificed defending another country.

 

[GR66]

Where is this vast reserve army going to be employed?

I am regularly told there is no foreseeable domestic requirement.

So am I to assume we are going to enroll every fighting age man and woman to go to the defence of Latvia? Or Taiwan?

The forward defence notion doesn't work if the population of Canada is sacrificed defending another country.

WW I and WW II enter the chat

 

[Kirkhill]

WW I and WW II enter the chat

And in WWI most of the Canadians were Brit emigres.

In WWII it was their sons.

The WWI tribe had relatives in the lines. They were citizens of the Empire.

More Canadians these days are philosophically aligned with the Quebecers of those wars.

They have no skin in the game and are disinclined to offer theirs up.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think the first thing that one has to realize is that the mass of forces fighting in Ukraine right now, on both sides, are troops with considerably less training and less capable equipment than the US or Brit RegF and to a large extent our RegF. ResFs there are holding the line. In Afghanistan our ResF made up from 15 to 25% of the units' strength. So let's not dismiss ResFs out of hand based on what we currently have.

Step 1 is to stop and reverse the decline. To do that Canada needs to train reservists to the same individual standards at DP1 and 2 as the RegF. That's doable with the full summer employment model.

To properly create and maintain that individual standard as well as to create and maintain a collective training capability the ResF must absolutely be put into a RegF framework but for peacetime training as well as operational deployment.

The problem with a pure ResF augmentation to the RegF model is that it does not provide adequate individual training for reservists nor a viable framework for growing the total force beyond the three existing RegF brigades without massively deconstructing those brigades and reassembling them in a time of crisis. We need a peacetime total force framework that provides and meets Canada's current peacetime army needs as well as a mobilizable structure for reasonably contemplated emergencies.

So.... as the purpose of the Reserves....

Will it be door #1, 2 or 3? I think we were 1 until about FRY and AFG kicked off, then it got (even more) confusing:

The Canadian Forces Reserves face a number of important challenges, including pay, equipment, infrastructure, recruiting, and veterans’ benefits. However, in addition to these everyday issues it is important to consider the fundamental strategic question: what is the purpose of the Reserves within the Forces? Contemporary debate reveals that there are in fact three distinct answers to this question: 1) full mobilization, 2) augmenting the Forces, and 3) complementing the skills of the Regular Force.

The Purpose of the Reserve: Mobilization, Augmentation, or Integration?

Misha Boutilier argues that Reserves need not serve as a base for mass mobilization, they should instead continue in their role of augmenting the Regular Force, while also expanding their ability to complement Regular Force skills.

natoassociation.ca

 

[IKnowNothing]

Part of the problem with any of these Force 2025 ideas is that we simply don't have enough positions being filled in the units we already have.

I think one key lesson we can take from the Russian experience in Ukraine is that it's suicide to deploy your forces at less than full establishment. They deployed BTG's at 70/30 readiness which resulted in fully crewed vehicles with almost no dismounts to support them. All the destroyed Russian tanks and IFVs from the first weeks of the war are proof of that peril.

These numbers are old (Force 2013 I think?) but I don't imagine they are radically different today:

Mechanized Infantry Battalion = 833 Establishment/593 Generation (x6 = 4998 Establishment/3558 Generation)
Light Infantry Battalion = 834 Establishment/560 Generation (x3 = 2502 Establishment/1680 Generation)
Total = 7500 Establishment/5238 Generation (i.e. 70/30)

In a conflict we may need to rapidly deploy our Reg Force without time to augment with Reserves.

Say for example we were to concentrate all of our LAVs/Tanks into a single Heavy(ish) 1st Mechanized Brigade with a full vehicle set in Edmonton and a full fly-over set in Latvia. We'd want to man this Brigade at 100% strength because due to their experience in Ukraine if Russia were to decide to attack NATO they would want to do it with strategic surprise so we don't have time to build up our forces.

We could then organize the balance of our forces around a total force three Brigade Light Division with each Brigade having one Battalion at 100% (giving us the ability to rotate a high-readiness Battle Group as a Rapid Response Force), one Battalion at 70/30 Reg/Reserve and a third Battalion at 30/70 Reg/Reserve.

For the Infantry that would require:
3 x 100% Strength Mech Battalions @ 833 = 2,499
3 x 100% Strength Light Battalions @ 834 = 2,502
3 x 70/30 Light Battalions @ 584 = 1,752
3 x 30/70 Light Battalions @ 250 = 750

Total Infantry Reg Force Requirements = 7,503

That's basically identical to our existing Establishment numbers but since our Generation numbers are only 5,238 that leaves us 2,265 Reg Force Infantry positions short of what we really should have in order to have a force that can reasonably be expected to deploy to a combat mission in a fast evolving crisis situation.

These numbers are just for the Infantry. I'm sure they are the same (or worse?) for the other trades as well.

So to my mind unless we look at increasing our manning levels we shouldn't be looking at growing the number of units in the Army because they will just be even more hollow than they are now. Without more numbers we might even be better off reducing the number of units to ensure that the ones we have are effective.

Unless I'm missing something, that math is damn close if we stuck with 2 Light Bde's, and move the 3rd light to a 10/90
3x 100% Mech = 2499
2x 100% Light = 1668
2x 70/30 Light = 1168
2x 10/90 Light = 166
=5501

It's thin on the readiness front, but if you included the 70/30's in the rotation they'd have two down cycles to recruit/select/onboard a companies worth of Class C, one to train to readiness, one on standby (presuming the budget is there to accommodate- from a co-located reserve pool of a short battalion.

 

[Kirkhill]

Unless I'm missing something, that math is damn close if we stuck with 2 Light Bde's, and move the 3rd light to a 10/90
3x 100% Mech = 2499
2x 100% Light = 1668
2x 70/30 Light = 1168
2x 10/90 Light = 166
=5501

It's thin on the readiness front, but if you included the 70/30's in the rotation they'd have two down cycles to recruit/select/onboard a companies worth of Class C, one to train to readiness, one on standby (presuming the budget is there to accommodate- from a co-located reserve pool of a short battalion.

In other countries 5500 isn't an army its a Special Forces Brigade.

 

[FJAG]

I'm assuming that you're only showing two Infantry Battalions in each Brigade simply because we don't have the density of Reserve units to provide enough Reserve Infantry Companies in most of Canada (Ontario being the possible exemption)?

My main reasons were as follows:

1) in general, I limited myself to the currently existing RegF and ResF strengths.

2) I upped the infantry battalions to a full strength of 848 all ranks (essentially 720 plus a 128 man fourth ResF rifle company) rather than the current 560 for a RegF light battalion and 594 for a RegF mech battalion. The extra 250 - 280 all ranks per battalion essentially required that the RegF battalions be reduced from 9 to 6 before being divided into 2 X 100/0 RFL1 battalions, 4 X 70/30 RFL1.1 battalions, and 7 X 30/70 RFL2 battalions. The increase to full strength of each battalion by roughly 30% means that the number of 100% RegF rifle companies was reduced from 27 partial strength ones to 21 full strength ones.

3) in 1 Div - the heavy brigades only need two infantry battalions as the armoured regiment makes the third manoeuvre battalion giving three manoeuvre units to the brigade.

4) In the case of 2 Div there are 9 infantry battalions so the choice was to give three brigades 3 battalions each or to form 4 brigades and give three 2 battalions and one 3 battalions. I ended up drifting to the latter because the more that I thought about it a light brigade for each coast made more sense than one light brigade covering the whole country. Concurrently there was the limitation that there were only 6 battalion's or 18 rifle companies worth of LAVs in total. 1 Div has 12 of those (6 in Canada and 6 prepositioned in Europe) which meant only 2 X 70/30 and 2 X 30/70 mech battalions (or 6 mech rifle companies) for 2 Div. (Incidentally I see 2 Div also deploying for flyover exercises to Europe and using the prepositioned equipment there as in my perfect world CMTC shuts down and moves to Europe rather than railing gear to Wainwright)

5) As mentioned above, each 30/70 and 70/30 infantry battalion has a fourth ResF rifle company for a total of 11 such companies. There is another rifle company as a div HQ force protection company in 33 Sigs Regt. Finally I have decided to add an infantry based combat support company to each of the 3 Bde Recce Regiments. Those could all have been amalgamated to form a third battalion in three of the 2 Div brigades. I didn't do that because:

• there wasn't enough RegF depth to form three more 30/70 battalions unless I went back to reducing the size of all battalions;
• I think there is value in a recce regt having a CS company;
• I think there is value in having the additional ResF personnel as the 4th company in each battalion; and
• I see 2 Div being the "peacetime army" which provides battle group sized task forces for deployments (other than Latvia) rather than a full brigade deployment. If a full light or mech brigade is ever needed a third battalion can be attached from another brigade.

6) With the rough count of ResF members available across the country, 13 X 848-man infantry battalions (roughly 5,500 each RegF and ResF infantry) seemed doable.

 

[FJAG]

Where is this vast reserve army going to be employed?

See my 30/70 napkin force as one example.

I am regularly told there is no foreseeable domestic requirement.

That's what you choose to hear. Many of us are saying that there is a domestic role as well as a NATO role.

So am I to assume we are going to enroll every fighting age man and woman to go to the defence of Latvia? Or Taiwan?

You can assume that, but you'd be assuming wrong.

The forward defence notion doesn't work if the population of Canada is sacrificed defending another country.

Forward defence's primary raison d'être is deterrence so that no one needs to be sacrificed. A brigade predeployed for forward defence commits 1/6th of the total army. Assuming another 1/6th as sustainment/reinforcement that leaves 2/3rd to be employed otherwise.

 

[KevinB]

In other countries 5500 isn't an army its a Special Forces Brigade.

Or a small portion.
Just USASOC (Army Special Operations) has 65,000 personnel.
Now not all are shooters, but it would suggest that Canada should be able to have a 6,500 personnel sized CANSOF.
And a 100k Regular Army…

 

[ueo]

@TangoTwoBravo roger I forgot it was 1RCR that first moved to Pet (from London)

For some reason I forgot that and thought 3RCR did 10/90 in London.

In other countries 5500 isn't an army its a Special Forces Brigade.

Maybe a Bn?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Or a small portion.
Just USASOC (Army Special Operations) has 65,000 personnel.
Now not all are shooters, but it would suggest that Canada should be able to have a 6,500 personnel sized CANSOF.
And a 100k Regular Army…

And a 200k Reserve...

 

[Kirkhill]

An info rich article on what the USMC is doing with their Indo-Pacific changes - Marine Littoral Regiment and MAGTF integration, tactics, vehicles, comms... and much much more.

Marine Hone Future Concepts with Dune Buggies, Liaison Officers, and Many Radios

The giant RIMPAC exercise helped the Corps test their newest type of agile unit within a multinational force.

www.defenseone.com

 

[GR66]

So.... as the purpose of the Reserves....

Will it be door #1, 2 or 3? I think we were 1 until about FRY and AFG kicked off, then it got (even more) confusing:

The Canadian Forces Reserves face a number of important challenges, including pay, equipment, infrastructure, recruiting, and veterans’ benefits. However, in addition to these everyday issues it is important to consider the fundamental strategic question: what is the purpose of the Reserves within the Forces? Contemporary debate reveals that there are in fact three distinct answers to this question: 1) full mobilization, 2) augmenting the Forces, and 3) complementing the skills of the Regular Force.

The Purpose of the Reserve: Mobilization, Augmentation, or Integration?

Misha Boutilier argues that Reserves need not serve as a base for mass mobilization, they should instead continue in their role of augmenting the Regular Force, while also expanding their ability to complement Regular Force skills.

natoassociation.ca

This of course is a very important foundational question. How Force 20xx looks very much depends on how you answer it.

I question whether we were anywhere near #1 before/during/after Yugoslavia and Afghanistan unless by full mobilization you mean the Reserves providing a pool of partially trained personnel to recruit from if the Army needed to expand. Reserve Regiments were/are in no way capable of actually deploying as formed combat units in case of war.

Personally I would pick a bit of Door #2 (Augmentation) and a bit of Door #3 (Complementary Capabilities).

With the cost of military hardware (vehicles, weapon systems, munitions, etc.) being so much higher today than in the lower-tech past I simply don't see Canada having the ability to significantly expand the size of the Army in time of war. In a serious peer conflict we will much more likely struggle to maintain the strength of our existing forces once deployed rather than be able to expand the Army.

The Reg Force provides the structure for the deployed Army and the high-readiness forces required for the initial deployment. The Reserves would provide "Augmentation" for those capabilities that are not required at full scale during peacetime operations (Artillery Batteries for example) as well as those "Complementary Capabilities" which are typically only required during wartime.

What those specific capabilities are depends on what you expect your Reg Force Army to do in both peacetime and when deployed for war.

 

[GR66]

I'd argue that Canada needs the capability to rapidly respond with at least a Battle Group/Battalion sized force when required.

That to me suggests a fully-manned Light Brigade with the three Battalions rotating readiness (2,502 personnel or roughly half of the current 5,238 Reg Force Infantry positions assigned to the existing Battalions).

How the rest of the positions are allocated depends on what you want the rest of the Army to be able to do.