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Helicopter/Cyclone discussion (split from HMCS Fredricton thread)

  • Thread starter Thread starter Baz
  • Start date Start date
Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.
 
Colin P said:
Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.

The S92 crash off NFLD a few years ago was the result of an oil leak from the gear box. DND originally required a 30 minute run dry gear box for safety reasons. However with delivery very behind schedule and the gear boxes not yet made the choice was made to axe that modification. I hope to God that wasn't the cause otherwise our procurement system cost us 6 lives.
 
Colin P said:
Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.

One of the news releases had the depth of water at 3000m. Does salvage equipment exist that can go down that far?  I know they've sent drones down 10km to the Marianna trench, but figuring out how to float a cyclone up would be a big different then taking some video.

Grisly job, but hopefully they can do that and confirm the cause. From my personal experience, the maintainers are highly skilled and meticulous, and the pilots were always very, very good, so was always assuming it was some kind of catastrophic mechanical failure. Not going to speculate on it, but as much as they can be a pain in the ass, the whole air det is just too good for something like this to happen because of human error.

 
Navy_Pete said:
One of the news releases had the depth of water at 3000m. Does salvage equipment exist that can go down that far?  I know they've sent drones down 10km to the Marianna trench, but figuring out how to float a cyclone up would be a big different then taking some video.

Im no expert but if the CIA was able to raise a soviet submarine from a depth of 4600m in 1974 (although they did loose part of it on the way up due to a failure of the equipment) I am guessing technology has made recovery of a helicopter at 3000m possible. Likely it would be costly though to get to that depth, depends as well if the fuselage is intact or in pieces/sections, along with I am sure a lot of other factors.
 
Colin P said:
Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.

There is no publicly available cause of the crash, AFAIK. There might not even been be any cause factor yet, given the early stage of the investigation. Therefore, I would not go around the internet stating it was a component failure.
 
MilEME09 said:
The S92 crash off NFLD a few years ago was the result of an oil leak from the gear box.

That's a massive oversimplification.  I suggest you read https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2009/a09a0016/a09a0016.html  In particular though, I draw your attention to:
7.The S-92A rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) MGB oil system failure procedure was ambiguous and lacked clearly defined symptoms of either a massive loss of MGB oil or a single MGB oil pump failure. This ambiguity contributed to the flight crew's misdiagnosis that a faulty oil pump or sensor was the source of the problem.
8.The pilots misdiagnosed the emergency due to a lack of understanding of the MGB oil system and an over-reliance on prevalent expectations that a loss of oil would result in an increase in oil temperature. This led the pilots to incorrectly rely on MGB oil temperature as a secondary indication of an impending MGB failure.
9.By the time that the crew of CHI91 had established that MGB oil pressure of less than 5 psi warranted a "land immediately" condition, the captain had dismissed ditching in the absence of other compelling indications such as unusual noises or vibrations.

MilEME09 said:
DND originally required a 30 minute run dry gear box for safety reasons. However with delivery very behind schedule and the gear boxes not yet made the choice was made to axe that modification.

Another massive oversimplification.  Although the press reports of the time only hint at it, it is subject to the certification and airworthiness requirements of the aircraft.  In this case, the aircraft is certified to FAR-29.  I draw your attention to other quotes from the same flight safety investigation:
The FAA's Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) was published on 27 November 1984. For section 29.927(c)(1) Category A rotorcraft the NPRM stated:
It must be shown by tests that each rotor drive system, where the probable failure of any element could result in the loss of lubricant, is capable of continued operation, although not necessarily without damage, for a period of at least 30 minutes at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, after indication to the flightcrew of the loss of lubricant.
The FAA's Final Rule was published on 02 September 1988. The Final Rule took into account comments received from stakeholders. One commenter had noted that, as proposed, the requirement in paragraph 29.927(c) could be interpreted to preclude credit for auxiliary lubrication systems or to require consideration of lubricant failures to self-lubricated bearings. The FAA stated that this was not intended, and the wording of paragraph (c)(l) was revised to eliminate this possible ambiguity. The proposed rule was therefore modified to require that:
Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation, although not necessarily without damage, at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, for at least 30 minutes after perception by the flight crew of the lubrication system failure or loss of lubricant. (emphasis added)
The update of the design requirements for large, multiengine transport rotorcraft (Category A) recognized the need for main gearboxes (MGB) to have a significant capacity to operate following a loss of lubricant in order to optimize eventual landing opportunities. This consideration led directly to the introduction of the 30 minute requirement to operate after a loss of MGB lubricant. However the introduction of the "extremely remote" concept following the comment phase of the rule-making made it possible for a helicopter to be certified without being capable of operating for 30 minutes with only residual lubricant. Category A rotorcraft certified under the "extremely remote" criteria may not be capable of continued operation for 30 minutes with only residual lubrication. These helicopters remain vulnerable to gearbox failures stemming from unforeseen massive losses of MGB lubricant, placing passengers and crew at risk.
Therefore, the Board recommends that:
The Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Canada and the European Aviation Safety Agency remove the "extremely remote" provision from the rule requiring 30 minutes of safe operation following the loss of main gearbox lubricant for all newly constructed Category A transport helicopters and, after a phase-in period, for all existing ones.
Ie, there is an ongoing problem with what "run dry" means, and the FAA rule in FAR 29 allows exceptions.  Given the Cyclone is certified under FAR-29 led to issues.  Basically it is about it is 30 minutes after indications to the crew, unless the cause is extremely remote, as shearing of the three titanium studs was supposed to be, and still is considered that way as the three studs have been replaced by 6 steel ones.

However, to be clear (and I checked the checklist), if there are indications of an imminent gear box failure, the S-92 then, and now, and the Cyclone now, must Land Immediately.  The S-92 Newfoundland incident crew did not fully understand what the indications were (again, see the report).

MilEME09 said:
I hope to God that wasn't the cause otherwise our procurement system cost us 6 lives.

I also hope that is not the case; however, I'm relatively certain it isn't.  The S-92 crash was about the factors that led them to not understand they were facing an imminent MGB failure.  Nothing in the Cyclone incident that has been released indicates they had any indication of an MGB failure.

By the way, the S-92 incident pilot was ex 12 Wing and was a good stick as well.

I'll also note, again, that much of this speculation is being fueled by one ex- Sea King pilot in the media.  He first speculated they wouldn't get the CVR/FDR because it was so deep, demonstrating a lack of knowledge how the CVR/FDR is designed to depart the aircraft.  Once it became clear that is not the case as it was recovered, he then started speculating that they need the wreckage in any case because the CVR/FDR is not sufficient.  There are no indications at this point that is the case; how about we wait until the experts analyze that data, in addition to the eye witness accounts which have not been released (and no, it's not a coverup).  Even it is a MGB Lube problem, which I doubt but have no contrary information either, the FDR well tell us a great deal.

Am I showing my frustration???
 
You have every right to be annoyed, Baz. And for the very reasons you state. So don't feel bad about it.

Now, I'll comment on something that is in my lane:

Yes, equipment and personnel that can recover an airframe at -3000 meters does exist. It is specialized equipment for sure, but not that rare, and recovery is well within current capabilities.
 
Baz said:
Am I showing my frustration???

Not at all, but if you were it would be for good cause.

MilEME09;  seriously.  Give it a rest.  Your 'pin the tail on the donkey' posts are misleading and annoying.

Your own words:

MilEME09 said:
Im no expert
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
Personally, I find it sad that right at the beginning of the Cyclone era, we are already down one airframe - not to mention one crew, may they rest in peace.

But with only 28 airframes and since we are using a unique design no one else has decided to acquire, can they be replaced as more and more of them become unavailable?

I mean, would Sikorsky agree to restart the line to build one or two more at a time?

And are the ten still not "delivered" on the assembly line or just waiting for the final upgrades to spec so the line is actually already closed?

I would appreciate knowledgeable answers on these to try and map out the future of the fleet capability for an upcoming article I am working on.

P.S.: Open source only, please.

OGBD: given my earlier reference dump, I'm not in the frame of mind to provide refs, but I will share some thoughts.

The original number of airframes was 35 which was basically two TGs, two available 24/7 in each (around 5 aircraft), plus two independent deployed.  Basically at one in four deployed with surge to 1 in 2, 15 det equivalents in 11 sets (4 two help sets... not having them will affect sparing) so make it 4 avail any given time surge to 8.

So that's 15 aircraft, 2 more in Sqn HQs, 8 in 406, 1ish at HOTEF (now 434 Sqn MHTEF) and a couple or more in heavy maintenance... so 28.

Oversimplifying, but original plan was 35 (plus 15 SAR when it was EH-101) so 7ish for attrition.  Not exactly, but CEFGW.

So it's less of one will affect us.  But here's the kicker: are the original estimates still valid: 406 and readiness aircraft vs sims, west coast sims, AOps, two helo sets, TG composition, two in the screen, tanker wanker 2nd line, etc, etc???

Right now the shortage isn't aircraft, it's crews.  Sort of.  Maybe.  Serviceability?

Don't forget the bathtub curve: historically most aircraft are lost at the begining(inexperience) and end (training phase out , lack of spares, etc) of life cycle.  Tried to plan for it, but you know how it goes.

So, building more... probably not.  Without saying the line is closed, it's complex.  Aircraft are in various stages of 1.0, 2.0, and 2.1, with a bunch of other stuff.  Supposed to firm up with 2.1 delivery.

And how much Sikorsky resources have been moved to 53K?

Not helpful, I know.  PM me... if it's for something credible and not media bs we can chat and maybe I can hook you up with the right people.

Editted: sorry, didn't proof read, lots of typos.  Let me know if you need it cleaned up, but as I said better to pm me.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
There is no publicly available cause of the crash, AFAIK. There might not even been be any cause factor yet, given the early stage of the investigation. Therefore, I would not go around the internet stating it was a component failure.

I dearly want the Cyclone to succeed and give us many years in service. I also have a very high opinion of our helicopter pilots who fly off of the ships. My understanding so far is a fairly routine flight, approaching the ship and weather and vis fair to good. That it happened so quickly leads me to believe equipment failure and unlikely pilot error. I could be wrong, but that's the way I leaning for now.

3 of the helicopters I have used for work have crashed, a helicopter is always looking for ways to kill it's occupants.
 
Colin P said:
a helicopter is always looking for ways to kill it's occupants.

Sad, but true:

Cross decking between ships.... biggest SAS death toll from a single incident in history, so far:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-454382/For-time-25-years-fomer-SAS-man-tells-Falklands-tragedy-killed-20.html

Flying to a meeting... killed more senior Intelligence Officers than the IRA ever did:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Scotland_RAF_Chinook_crash





 
Colin P said:
I dearly want the Cyclone to succeed and give us many years in service. I also have a very high opinion of our helicopter pilots who fly off of the ships. My understanding so far is a fairly routine flight, approaching the ship and weather and vis fair to good. That it happened so quickly leads me to believe equipment failure and unlikely pilot error. I could be wrong, but that's the way I leaning for now.

3 of the helicopters I have used for work have crashed, a helicopter is always looking for ways to kill it's occupants.

Colin,

With all due respect, that may be the way your leaning, but what purpose does it serve to speculate about it on the internet?
 
Baz said:
Colin,

With all due respect, that may be the way your leaning, but what purpose does it serve to speculate about it on the internet?

Spur discussion?
Correct assumptions?
Educate the ignorant?
Dispel myths?
 
DFS is pretty good (world renowned, actually) at effectively and openly communicating its findings, usually in a phased approach that appropriately provides as much information as possible as early as possible, while respecting the integrity of the overall investigative process.  In several months, we’ll have a better idea of what happened, and then the drive to get expedited information now won’t seem as important then. Best to let DFS perform its investigation per the policies and procedures in place, and then comment thereafter in an informed manner. Conjecture can be quite damaging, even if well-intentioned.

:2c:
 
Lumber said:
Spur discussion?
Correct assumptions?
Educate the ignorant?
Dispel myths?

Except his speculation is based on assumptions.  Therefore, is he really educating anyone.  He's not actually dispelling any myths as there are no incorrect statements he's correcting.

I'm all for spurring discussion if it's a discussion of the facts and the possible implications.  The facts as publicly known  are it was evening but still VFR, clear weather, the aircraft was serviceable to that point, and they were "returning to the ship."  As anyone who's flown MH (as crew, not along for the ride) can tell you, that can mean a lot of things.  Assuming they we're transitting and then just fell out of the sky is more than the statement implies.

Edited to add: Maybe I should be more explicit why it bugs me.  Speculating on a single web forum is one thing, but there are other's doing the exact same thing on national media.  What that does is create a public misconception about what happened, and when the reality is established it doesn't have the public interest anymore, so the public believes they know.  This leads to understandings like discussed above about the S-92 crash; the public believes that Sikorsky acted maliciously and the helicopter was lost due to that and the cause was simply it lost all it's oil and then didn't fly 30 more minutes, when the reality is much more nuanced.  I can't correct the national press and certainly not the internet, but I choose to try to influence the little corner of it I hang out in (and by the way, trust, because of the expertise here, which is exactly why I don't want the expertise eroded).
 
Please let an old, superannuated pongo who subscribes to the theory that if God had wanted soldiers to fly, he would have made the sky brown, interject. I find your discussion gratifyingly honest, restrained, and professional, as well as refreshingly free of speculation. My knowledge of technical matters rotary-winged is limited to not much more than wondering if "the Jesus nut failed" when said nut was s blanket term from my subaltern days for the power train between the engine and the rotor. And this is not speculation and I am not offering it as a possibility. Please continue your debate; maybe I will learn something.
 
Old Sweat said:
Please let an old, superannuated pongo who subscribes to the theory that if God had wanted soldiers to fly, he would have made the sky brown, interject. I find your discussion gratifyingly honest, restrained, and professional, as well as refreshingly free of speculation. My knowledge of technical matters rotary-winged is limited to not much more than wondering if "the Jesus nut failed" when said nut was s blanket term from my subaltern days for the power train between the engine and the rotor. And this is not speculation and I am not offering it as a possibility. Please continue your debate; maybe I will learn something.

Ah, the Jesus Nut.  Not just a blanket term:
Jesus nut is a slang term for the main rotor retaining nut or mast nut, which holds the main rotor to the mast of some helicopters, such as the UH-1 Iroquois helicopter. The related slang term Jesus pin refers to the lock pin used to secure the retaining nut. More generally, Jesus nut (or Jesus pin) has been used to refer to any component that is a single point of failure which results in catastrophic consequences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_nut

Sea King had one too, here is a picture: http://www.adf-gallery.com.au/gallery/Sea-King-Details/2014_09_13_40

To be fair, I have no idea if the Cyclone has one... SKT?

Edited to add, it seems it does.
 
Baz said:
Edited to add: Maybe I should be more explicit why it bugs me.  Speculating on a single web forum is one thing, but there are other's doing the exact same thing on national media.  What that does is create a public misconception about what happened, and when the reality is established it doesn't have the public interest anymore, so the public believes they know.  This leads to understandings like discussed above about the S-92 crash; the public believes that Sikorsky acted maliciously and the helicopter was lost due to that and the cause was simply it lost all it's oil and then didn't fly 30 more minutes, when the reality is much more nuanced.  I can't correct the national press and certainly not the internet, but I choose to try to influence the little corner of it I hang out in (and by the way, trust, because of the expertise here, which is exactly why I don't want the expertise eroded).

This is a reason that I believe the CDS decision to not release preliminary crash information is the right one.  Wait until the report is done and all the rocks have been turned over.  Then inform the families of what happened, then the public.  This way forward feels right. 
 
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