Government hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I like to see the Non-US NATO countries setup a requirement for NATO countries to organize their Reserves to be able to be called up in short order and to have equipment for X amount at all times. Basically forcing Canada to change it's laws to allow the call up of Reservists and to actually have to do so every few years.

 

[ytz]

Is that for the 101 or 149? Because I was thinking the 149 to replace the Griffon, augmented by 101s.

I would argue that the best thing to do is to buy a single marinized type (suitable for maritime ops) and the configure the optional kit for each role. That way the helos can be managed as one large fleet. And I would say skip the 149. Too small for us. Go 101 across the fleet. The Brits do just fine using 101s as a transport helicopter.

 

[Maxman1]

I would argue that the best thing to do is to buy a single marinized type (suitable for maritime ops) and the configure the optional kit for each role. That way the helos can be managed as one large fleet. And I would say skip the 149. Too small for us. Go 101 across the fleet. The Brits do just fine using 101s as a transport helicopter.

Don't get me wrong, I love the 101 and think we should get a lot more (and junk the Cyclone), but is it right for the Griffon role?

And the RAF also have a fleet of Pumas they're looking to replace under the New Medium Helicopter program, which is now a one horse race with the 149 after Airbus and Sikorsky declined to bid.

Airbus Helicopters and Sikorsky walk away from UK NMH contest at 11th hour

Leonardo Helicopters is the sole remaining bidder for the UK's ongoing New Medium Helicopter (NMH) contest after rivals Airbus Helicopters and Sikorsky confirmed they were withdrawing from the competition.

www.flightglobal.com

 

[Czech_pivo]

Close. But a real frustration has been how much we've skimped and lost organizational efficiency with the helo fleets.

We have 25 Cyclones right now. Those basically support 12 frigates, 6 AOPS and 12 MCDVs. We should be closer to 1:1 between ships and helicopters. And there needs to be enough to fill the maintenance pipeline and an attrition reserve. So 35 is pretty accurate for the 15 River Class.

The SAR side is low. We have 5 operational SAR squadrons. Each of them should have 3x helos. And then the OTU needs inventory and the maintenance pipeline. This fleet should be about 20 frames. But this doesn't address the Base rescue squadrons at the three fighter bases. Those could be upgraded to full SAR squadrons or they get contracted. But that could then add another 10 frames if they become full SAR squadrons.

The Tactical Helicopter piece is interesting. There's about 70 Griffons assigned to tactical airlift. On paper replacing that total lift capacity requires only 27 frames. But that number of frames becomes too little when spread out across 5 operational squadrons and an OTU. If we're saying at least one TALH squadron per division + SOF + OTU, we're talking about 6 squadrons with 10 frames each at least. Add on another 10 more for the maintenance pipeline and attrition reserve. That's 70 frames.

Add all that up and the fleet should be closer to 135 frames.

Personally, I think all regular squadrons should be total force (mixed reg/res) and based near major airline hubs (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax) using a lot more reserve pilots. But that would bump up the TH number to 80 frames (6 TH squadrons + SOF + OTU + attrition/maintenance) and total fleet for medium helicopters to 145 frames.

That's not a crazy number given that we now have 81 Griffons, 25 Cyclones and 16 Cormorants. 145 medium lift helicopters of a single type to replace the mix of 122 medium and light helos we have now would be a substantial increase in capability for very little increase in manning and logistics burden.

What about the 2 JSS? What if we move to 4-5 JSS as we really should. What does that do your numbers?

 

[Brad Sallows]

I think the Army needs to get onboard with that vision and ride it. Fewer dreams of heavy armoured brigades. And more poster boards of how air and sea mobile the army can be. Government wants more ships? Tell them how the army can build a marine regiment to crew an amphib. Government talking about buying more helicopters? The CA should explain to the MND their new concept for an air assault regiment. Etc.

I doubt we need bespoke units. We need capabilities, with soldiers trained to use them. What I mean is that we don't need soldiers with specialized training for opposed landings under fire unless we are prepared to risk them and prepared to do so on a scale that matters. That leaves capabilities for moving people by air and across beaches mostly unopposed during initial entry. Somewhere between "leg infantry" and "air assault", for example, there is "infantry capable of working with aviation".

 

[GR66]

The interesting thing in Canada is that policy reviews and even internal restructuring plans rarely focus on the capabilities of the various force structures to fight and win Canada’s wars.

There is some consideration to NATO remits and NORAD remits but only as contributions.

There is a difference between structuring your forces to contribute and structuring your forces to fight to win as an independent joint force.

Canada has historically always preferred to contribute via air and naval power for domestic political reasons until circumstances force otherwise. I don’t see anything indicating that Canada has changed.

The highlighted part really is the key change of mindset that needs to take place nationally. We are a very small minded country in so many ways - not just in regard to our military.

Re-thinking the CAF as a force capable of independent operations rather than as a force contributor to NATO, NORAD and the UN will require a fundamental change to the way we view our nation as a whole. Hopefully our current "difficulties" with POTUS 47 will be the match that finally lights that fire under our population and leaders.

 

[Brad Sallows]

There are a couple of reasons for Canada to have an armoured brigade.

The first is conditional. I'll assume our top-ranked scenarios leading to war all involve NATO. What is the mix of armoured and infantry brigades across NATO? If the alliance is a bit short on armoured formations, a Canadian contribution would be useful. This analysis should also be applied to artillery (shorthand for all things fire support) formations attached to echelons corps and above. Maybe we should also be able to contribute the modern equivalent of an AGRA, no matter how few divisions we have right now.

The second is absolute. If we don't attempt to maintain the capabilities essential to running at least an armoured brigade, perhaps we ought to get out of the land game entirely. Either-or. The same applies to all the formation and major unit components of a division, really - mechanized brigade, artillery brigade, engineers, CSS, etc.

I reiterate that the minimum balance of armour required for an armoured brigade and armoured division are probably* the same: two armoured units in one brigade. That's all. Everything else is about stuff to support the operations and movement (tactical and operational) of an armoured formation. That includes a lot of infantry (preferably two brigades), appropriately equipped.

*based on historical observation, subject to ongoing operational analysis and validation

 

[ytz]

Don't get me wrong, I love the 101 and think we should get a lot more (and junk the Cyclone), but is it right for the Griffon role?

The Griffon isn't right for the Griffon role. And what role are we talking about? Are we talking about? On paper the Griffon can do armed reconnaissance. In reality..... I think replacing Griffons in their primary role as a transport helicopter is just fine. All their other roles (reconnaissance, interdiction, etc.) can and should move to drones and dedicated armed recon platforms?

What about the 2 JSS? What if we move to 4-5 JSS as we really should. What does that do your numbers?

Doesn't change much. We have supply ships now and 25 helos.

I doubt we need bespoke units. We need capabilities, with soldiers trained to use them. What I mean is that we don't need soldiers with specialized training for opposed landings under fire unless we are prepared to risk them and prepared to do so on a scale that matters. That leaves capabilities for moving people by air and across beaches mostly unopposed during initial entry. Somewhere between "leg infantry" and "air assault", for example, there is "infantry capable of working with aviation".

I agree. And never said the CA needs bespoke units. What they need to present is a capability roadmap that lines up with where the rest of the CAF is going. If the new defence strategy is lining up to say we are going to focus on North America and enable Europe, the dreams of more brigades and heavier forces will seem out of touch. Any new strategy is also going to take into account where Europe is going and where we fit into that. And just my opinion, I don't think the Europeans will ask for more infantry. They'll probably want us to show up with more of the expensive toys.

 

[Kirkhill]

I do.

Your economy.

Generally the Regular Force gives poor returns unless they are actively deployed. You would be much better suited to vastly expanding the Reserves for all services. Then using the fact that a Reservist costs about 1/10th the Regular Force PY to upgrade your equipment, infrastructure and material holdings.

I’d suggest you want a 2:1 ratio of Reservists to Regulars. Not the inverse pyramid you currently have.

I'd be happy if we could reliably reach 120,000 when fully fielded with reserves. That means having 3 or 4 times more trained effective reserves than we have now.

 

[KevinB]

Close. But a real frustration has been how much we've skimped and lost organizational efficiency with the helo fleets.

We have 25 Cyclones right now. Those basically support 12 frigates, 6 AOPS and 12 MCDVs. We should be closer to 1:1 between ships and helicopters. And there needs to be enough to fill the maintenance pipeline and an attrition reserve. So 35 is pretty accurate for the 15 River Class.

Tracking so far.

The SAR side is low. We have 5 operational SAR squadrons. Each of them should have 3x helos.

I'd have suggested each should have 12-18 airframes/squadron. But again I also think you should have some CSAR outside of 427.
I'll pencil in 60 for SAR.

And then the OTU needs inventory and the maintenance pipeline. This fleet should be about 20 frames. But this doesn't address the Base rescue squadrons at the three fighter bases. Those could be upgraded to full SAR squadrons or they get contracted. But that could then add another 10 frames if they become full SAR squadrons.

The Tactical Helicopter piece is interesting. There's about 70 Griffons assigned to tactical airlift. On paper replacing that total lift capacity requires only 27 frames. But that number of frames becomes too little when spread out across 5 operational squadrons and an OTU. If we're saying at least one TALH squadron per division + SOF + OTU, we're talking about 6 squadrons with 10 frames each at least. Add on another 10 more for the maintenance pipeline and attrition reserve. That's 70 frames.

Your TacHel is already way too small to be of much use. Especially if the CA intends to have a Reg Force Light/Para Bde Group that is somewhat airmobile capable.

I'd suggest that Cdn TacHel should be more like 3 Combat Aviation Brigades, plus SOA.

Add all that up and the fleet should be closer to 135 frames.

Would you accept a Tac Hel of 159 UH, 72 AH, and 36 Hooks

Personally, I think all regular squadrons should be total force (mixed reg/res) and based near major airline hubs (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax) using a lot more reserve pilots. But that would bump up the TH number to 80 frames (6 TH squadrons + SOF + OTU + attrition/maintenance) and total fleet for medium helicopters to 145 frames.

Van, Cal, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec City, Halifax
Plus SOF and OTU etc

That's not a crazy number given that we now have 81 Griffons, 25 Cyclones and 16 Cormorants. 145 medium lift helicopters of a single type to replace the mix of 122 medium and light helos we have now would be a substantial increase in capability for very little increase in manning and logistics burden.

I'm a Blackhawk fan, mainly as I have counted a lot of holes in one's I've been a GIB in and still landed in one piece.
I also think that with the US Army downsizing its Aviation component one could get a decent deal (and probably even better now that no one wants to deal with us). You can get a Maritime version - and it's a smaller footprint than the Cyclone (and I suspect that LocMart would love to solve the Cyclone issue with a replacement for SeaHawks)

Call it 250 Hawk Variants, 36 Hooks, and throw Bell a bone for 72 of the AH-1Z.

 

[Czech_pivo]

There are a couple of reasons for Canada to have an armoured brigade.

The first is conditional. I'll assume our top-ranked scenarios leading to war all involve NATO. What is the mix of armoured and infantry brigades across NATO? If the alliance is a bit short on armoured formations, a Canadian contribution would be useful. This analysis should also be applied to artillery (shorthand for all things fire support) formations attached to echelons corps and above. Maybe we should also be able to contribute the modern equivalent of an AGRA, no matter how few divisions we have right now.

The second is absolute. If we don't attempt to maintain the capabilities essential to running at least an armoured brigade, perhaps we ought to get out of the land game entirely. Either-or. The same applies to all the formation and major unit components of a division, really - mechanized brigade, artillery brigade, engineers, CSS, etc.

I reiterate that the minimum balance of armour required for an armoured brigade and armoured division are probably* the same: two armoured units in one brigade. That's all. Everything else is about stuff to support the operations and movement (tactical and operational) of an armoured formation. That includes a lot of infantry (preferably two brigades), appropriately equipped.

*based on historical observation, subject to ongoing operational analysis and validation

If Ukraine has shown the way of war over the next 5-25yrs, armour may not be the way forward. The way forward might be heavy on the very mobile arty (in all forms), heavy on drones (both first person and larger), lots of air support and light infantry to move lightly and fast to grab and hold land.

But what to I know, I've never had the privilege of serving and openly admit that.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If Ukraine has shown the way of war over the next 5-25yrs, armour may not be the way forward. The way forward might be heavy on the very mobile arty (in all forms), heavy on drones (both first person and larger), lots of air support and light infantry to move lightly and fast to grab and hold land.

But what to I know, I've never had the privilege of serving and openly admit that.

Neither Ukraine nor Russia has demonstrated high competence at fighting much higher than brigade echelon. How do we know the lessons of this war are entirely applicable to the kinds of war they're not fighting? We have no idea what forces with capabilities of fighting through the entire operational depth would look like.

 

[FJAG]

In 1970 that 600 dollars had the buying power of 4,900 in 2025. Starting as a DEO 2 LT you’d make 4,800 now. So about the same. However your military housing wasn’t adjusted to the economy until the 1990s so the benefits were a touch better. Now your wife’s judgment on agreeing to all of that is of course open to debate

You need to compare it to a full lieutenant as at that point in time we went from cadet on graduation to full lt and after 6 years service automatically to captain - so I guess today that would be $6,185.

We did have some perks. As a single living in rat, the charge for my two room "suite" in quarters plus rations was $85. When we went to Petawawa I seem to recall that our semi-detached, 2-bedroom PMQ on the other side of the river was $149 per month which, if my math is right, is actually more expensive than it would be today. More importantly, my used 65 Mustang (with a few fancifications to it) cost me $1,400. Oh. And a 24 of beer in stubbies was a little over $4. (And we had six guns in our batteries but had to FAC with CF 5s )

 

[Kirkhill]

WRT SAR the old RCAF had Transport and Rescue Squadrons.

The Transport portion of the squadrons could conduct search. Fixed wing assets stay in the air a lot longer, cover more area and react faster. The Rescue bit is pretty much a rotary wing requirement. They need what legs they have to get to a designated distant scene. They are the only asset that can mate with the ground and recover the imperilled. (Short of specialized aircraft in particular circumstances, like the Twin Otter in the Arctic)..

So 2 transport flights of Hercs or Twotters and 1 flight of 149s for each of 5 T&R Squadrons. Maybe 6. The North deserves its own.

 

[Kirkhill]

Neither Ukraine nor Russia has demonstrated high competence at fighting much higher than brigade echelon. How do we know the lessons of this war are entirely applicable to the kinds of war they're not fighting? We have no idea what forces with capabilities of fighting through the entire operational depth would look like.

Can the Canadian Army fight at Brigade?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

We're at the point where junior Captains have roommates. Privates live like broke college students. And yet none of the leadership or even retired guys want to talk about pay.

Sure, we don't have members going to food banks like the 90s (that we know of). But we've had surveys that identified members being functionally homeless and couch surfing. And they all hide it from their their CoC. Victoria and Comox are notorious for this.

We also had CFINTCOM members literally calling out their general in a townhall for compromise risk with junior members posted to the NCR, because of housing costs:

Military's intelligence command avoids posting staff to Ottawa because of region's high cost of living

The Canadian Forces Intelligence Command tries to accommodate its personnel, when possible, by supporting alternative work arrangements such as working from home, N…

ottawacitizen.com

But sure, shiny F-35s will fix that....

I mean I literally lived like that until I was in my mid to late 20s as a Captain. Couch surfing is what happens when you go through girlfriends like cases of beer.... ask me how I know .

 

[ytz]

Don't get me wrong, I love the 101 and think we should get a lot more

To be clear I think the 149 could work. But traditionally, we've had medium-heavy helos for maritime and SAR. And those are the driving requirements. Any transport helicopter requirement in a combined scenario will be downstream of that. Not sure where the 149 lines up in the maritime and SAR role. But if it can work, then it could well be the choice. I wouldn't change numbers too much for TH either.

I'd have suggested each should have 12-18 airframes/squadron. But again I also think you should have some CSAR outside of 427.
I'll pencil in 60 for SAR.

Our SAR squadrons aren't CSAR squadrons. They would be a coast guard service in most countries. They are built with two flights. A fixed wing flight of 3x FWSAR and a rotary wing flight of 3x RWSAR. They operate together where the FWSAR is the first and fastest to get to a site and provide top cover, while providing jumpers. The RWSAR arrives late and completes the rescue by moving everybody out.

Any CSAR capability would normally be set up outside this. And in Canada's assigned to CANSOFCOM.

Your TacHel is already way too small to be of much use. Especially if the CA intends to have a Reg Force Light/Para Bde Group that is somewhat airmobile capable.

I'd suggest that Cdn TacHel should be more like 3 Combat Aviation Brigades, plus SOA.

For lift, a typical US Combat Aviation Brigade has 30x UH-60s in an Assault Helicopter Battalion and 8x UH-60s + 12 CH-47s + 15x HH-60s in the General Support Aviation Battalion. And that CAB is suporting a division. That's 53 medium helicopters and 12 heavy helicopters. For context, just counting a Blackhawk at 11 pax and Chinook at 33 pax, a fleet of 51 AW-149s (19 pax) could provide the equivalent lift of the CAB. If it's using AW-101 with 26 pax, you only need 38 helos. A force of 70-80 medium-heavy helicopters (that can all lift more than a Blackhawk) and a dozen Chinooks is actually substantially more lift than a US CAB. And we're unlikely to be supporting a full army division in the field anytime soon. If we get to that point, I agree the force should be larger.

I do wish we had 5-8 more Chinooks for a proper OTU and training support flight in Gagetown.

I'm a Blackhawk fan, mainly as I have counted a lot of holes in one's I've been a GIB in and still landed in one piece.
I also think that with the US Army downsizing its Aviation component one could get a decent deal (and probably even better now that no one wants to deal with us). You can get a Maritime version - and it's a smaller footprint than the Cyclone (and I suspect that LocMart would love to solve the Cyclone issue with a replacement for SeaHawks)

This would have been true without Trump. But if diversification is now a major policy driver, I assume it's going to come down to what Bell can build in Canada, or what we can buy from Europe.

 

[ytz]

Van, Cal, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec City, Halifax

Major airline hubs in Canada are Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. Somewhat Halifax. Putting reserve squadrons near these cities allows for a substantial pool of reserve pilots. This is what 400 in Borden and 438 in St-Hubert do. Although 400 is becoming a maintenance line now....

Edmonton and Quebec City are nice to have. And they exist today to support Reg F units mostly. But if you had larger total force squadrons in the region, you wouldn't really need them. But sure, I guess they could add two more squadrons (10 frames each) to the list.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Major airline hubs in Canada are Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. Somewhat Halifax. Putting reserve squadrons near these cities allows for a substantial pool of reserve pilots. This is what 400 in Borden and 438 in St-Hubert do. Although 400 is becoming a maintenance line now....

Edmonton and Quebec City are nice to have. And they exist today to support Reg F units mostly. But if you had larger total force squadrons in the region, you wouldn't really need them. But sure, I guess they could add two more squadrons (10 frames each) to the list.

I'd throw Hamilton's Munro airport into that mix. Its the perfect location in the GTA but gives you added flexibility of it not being Pearson with its constant air traffic volumes.

 

[ytz]

I'd throw Hamilton's Munro airport into that mix. Its the perfect location in the GTA but gives you added flexibility of it not being Pearson with its constant air traffic volumes.

You don't need squadrons everywhere. Right now, there's pilots who live in Hamilton but will work at 400 Sqn in Borden as reservists on their days off from their day job. The point of having a squadron near active major airline hubs is to enable those airline pilots to serve as reservists. But these pilots are also restricted from total flying hours per month. So they can't exactly be used exactly like Reg F pilots.