I'll believe it when I see it.
Is that for the 101 or 149? Because I was thinking the 149 to replace the Griffon, augmented by 101s.
Don't get me wrong, I love the 101 and think we should get a lot more (and junk the Cyclone), but is it right for the Griffon role?I would argue that the best thing to do is to buy a single marinized type (suitable for maritime ops) and the configure the optional kit for each role. That way the helos can be managed as one large fleet. And I would say skip the 149. Too small for us. Go 101 across the fleet. The Brits do just fine using 101s as a transport helicopter.
What about the 2 JSS? What if we move to 4-5 JSS as we really should. What does that do your numbers?Close. But a real frustration has been how much we've skimped and lost organizational efficiency with the helo fleets.
We have 25 Cyclones right now. Those basically support 12 frigates, 6 AOPS and 12 MCDVs. We should be closer to 1:1 between ships and helicopters. And there needs to be enough to fill the maintenance pipeline and an attrition reserve. So 35 is pretty accurate for the 15 River Class.
The SAR side is low. We have 5 operational SAR squadrons. Each of them should have 3x helos. And then the OTU needs inventory and the maintenance pipeline. This fleet should be about 20 frames. But this doesn't address the Base rescue squadrons at the three fighter bases. Those could be upgraded to full SAR squadrons or they get contracted. But that could then add another 10 frames if they become full SAR squadrons.
The Tactical Helicopter piece is interesting. There's about 70 Griffons assigned to tactical airlift. On paper replacing that total lift capacity requires only 27 frames. But that number of frames becomes too little when spread out across 5 operational squadrons and an OTU. If we're saying at least one TALH squadron per division + SOF + OTU, we're talking about 6 squadrons with 10 frames each at least. Add on another 10 more for the maintenance pipeline and attrition reserve. That's 70 frames.
Add all that up and the fleet should be closer to 135 frames.
Personally, I think all regular squadrons should be total force (mixed reg/res) and based near major airline hubs (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax) using a lot more reserve pilots. But that would bump up the TH number to 80 frames (6 TH squadrons + SOF + OTU + attrition/maintenance) and total fleet for medium helicopters to 145 frames.
That's not a crazy number given that we now have 81 Griffons, 25 Cyclones and 16 Cormorants. 145 medium lift helicopters of a single type to replace the mix of 122 medium and light helos we have now would be a substantial increase in capability for very little increase in manning and logistics burden.
I doubt we need bespoke units. We need capabilities, with soldiers trained to use them. What I mean is that we don't need soldiers with specialized training for opposed landings under fire unless we are prepared to risk them and prepared to do so on a scale that matters. That leaves capabilities for moving people by air and across beaches mostly unopposed during initial entry. Somewhere between "leg infantry" and "air assault", for example, there is "infantry capable of working with aviation".I think the Army needs to get onboard with that vision and ride it. Fewer dreams of heavy armoured brigades. And more poster boards of how air and sea mobile the army can be. Government wants more ships? Tell them how the army can build a marine regiment to crew an amphib. Government talking about buying more helicopters? The CA should explain to the MND their new concept for an air assault regiment. Etc.
The highlighted part really is the key change of mindset that needs to take place nationally. We are a very small minded country in so many ways - not just in regard to our military.The interesting thing in Canada is that policy reviews and even internal restructuring plans rarely focus on the capabilities of the various force structures to fight and win Canada’s wars.
There is some consideration to NATO remits and NORAD remits but only as contributions.
There is a difference between structuring your forces to contribute and structuring your forces to fight to win as an independent joint force.
Canada has historically always preferred to contribute via air and naval power for domestic political reasons until circumstances force otherwise. I don’t see anything indicating that Canada has changed.
Don't get me wrong, I love the 101 and think we should get a lot more (and junk the Cyclone), but is it right for the Griffon role?
What about the 2 JSS? What if we move to 4-5 JSS as we really should. What does that do your numbers?
I doubt we need bespoke units. We need capabilities, with soldiers trained to use them. What I mean is that we don't need soldiers with specialized training for opposed landings under fire unless we are prepared to risk them and prepared to do so on a scale that matters. That leaves capabilities for moving people by air and across beaches mostly unopposed during initial entry. Somewhere between "leg infantry" and "air assault", for example, there is "infantry capable of working with aviation".
I do.
Your economy.
Generally the Regular Force gives poor returns unless they are actively deployed. You would be much better suited to vastly expanding the Reserves for all services. Then using the fact that a Reservist costs about 1/10th the Regular Force PY to upgrade your equipment, infrastructure and material holdings.
I’d suggest you want a 2:1 ratio of Reservists to Regulars. Not the inverse pyramid you currently have.
Tracking so far.Close. But a real frustration has been how much we've skimped and lost organizational efficiency with the helo fleets.
We have 25 Cyclones right now. Those basically support 12 frigates, 6 AOPS and 12 MCDVs. We should be closer to 1:1 between ships and helicopters. And there needs to be enough to fill the maintenance pipeline and an attrition reserve. So 35 is pretty accurate for the 15 River Class.
I'd have suggested each should have 12-18 airframes/squadron. But again I also think you should have some CSAR outside of 427.The SAR side is low. We have 5 operational SAR squadrons. Each of them should have 3x helos.
Your TacHel is already way too small to be of much use. Especially if the CA intends to have a Reg Force Light/Para Bde Group that is somewhat airmobile capable.And then the OTU needs inventory and the maintenance pipeline. This fleet should be about 20 frames. But this doesn't address the Base rescue squadrons at the three fighter bases. Those could be upgraded to full SAR squadrons or they get contracted. But that could then add another 10 frames if they become full SAR squadrons.
The Tactical Helicopter piece is interesting. There's about 70 Griffons assigned to tactical airlift. On paper replacing that total lift capacity requires only 27 frames. But that number of frames becomes too little when spread out across 5 operational squadrons and an OTU. If we're saying at least one TALH squadron per division + SOF + OTU, we're talking about 6 squadrons with 10 frames each at least. Add on another 10 more for the maintenance pipeline and attrition reserve. That's 70 frames.
Would you accept a Tac Hel of 159 UH, 72 AH, and 36 HooksAdd all that up and the fleet should be closer to 135 frames.
Van, Cal, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec City, HalifaxPersonally, I think all regular squadrons should be total force (mixed reg/res) and based near major airline hubs (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax) using a lot more reserve pilots. But that would bump up the TH number to 80 frames (6 TH squadrons + SOF + OTU + attrition/maintenance) and total fleet for medium helicopters to 145 frames.
I'm a Blackhawk fan, mainly as I have counted a lot of holes in one's I've been a GIB in and still landed in one piece.That's not a crazy number given that we now have 81 Griffons, 25 Cyclones and 16 Cormorants. 145 medium lift helicopters of a single type to replace the mix of 122 medium and light helos we have now would be a substantial increase in capability for very little increase in manning and logistics burden.
If Ukraine has shown the way of war over the next 5-25yrs, armour may not be the way forward. The way forward might be heavy on the very mobile arty (in all forms), heavy on drones (both first person and larger), lots of air support and light infantry to move lightly and fast to grab and hold land.There are a couple of reasons for Canada to have an armoured brigade.
The first is conditional. I'll assume our top-ranked scenarios leading to war all involve NATO. What is the mix of armoured and infantry brigades across NATO? If the alliance is a bit short on armoured formations, a Canadian contribution would be useful. This analysis should also be applied to artillery (shorthand for all things fire support) formations attached to echelons corps and above. Maybe we should also be able to contribute the modern equivalent of an AGRA, no matter how few divisions we have right now.
The second is absolute. If we don't attempt to maintain the capabilities essential to running at least an armoured brigade, perhaps we ought to get out of the land game entirely. Either-or. The same applies to all the formation and major unit components of a division, really - mechanized brigade, artillery brigade, engineers, CSS, etc.
I reiterate that the minimum balance of armour required for an armoured brigade and armoured division are probably* the same: two armoured units in one brigade. That's all. Everything else is about stuff to support the operations and movement (tactical and operational) of an armoured formation. That includes a lot of infantry (preferably two brigades), appropriately equipped.
*based on historical observation, subject to ongoing operational analysis and validation
Neither Ukraine nor Russia has demonstrated high competence at fighting much higher than brigade echelon. How do we know the lessons of this war are entirely applicable to the kinds of war they're not fighting? We have no idea what forces with capabilities of fighting through the entire operational depth would look like.If Ukraine has shown the way of war over the next 5-25yrs, armour may not be the way forward. The way forward might be heavy on the very mobile arty (in all forms), heavy on drones (both first person and larger), lots of air support and light infantry to move lightly and fast to grab and hold land.
But what to I know, I've never had the privilege of serving and openly admit that.
You need to compare it to a full lieutenant as at that point in time we went from cadet on graduation to full lt and after 6 years service automatically to captain - so I guess today that would be $6,185.In 1970 that 600 dollars had the buying power of 4,900 in 2025. Starting as a DEO 2 LT you’d make 4,800 now. So about the same. However your military housing wasn’t adjusted to the economy until the 1990s so the benefits were a touch better. Now your wife’s judgment on agreeing to all of that is of course open to debate![]()
Neither Ukraine nor Russia has demonstrated high competence at fighting much higher than brigade echelon. How do we know the lessons of this war are entirely applicable to the kinds of war they're not fighting? We have no idea what forces with capabilities of fighting through the entire operational depth would look like.
I mean I literally lived like that until I was in my mid to late 20s as a Captain. Couch surfing is what happens when you go through girlfriends like cases of beer.... ask me how I knowWe're at the point where junior Captains have roommates. Privates live like broke college students. And yet none of the leadership or even retired guys want to talk about pay.
Sure, we don't have members going to food banks like the 90s (that we know of). But we've had surveys that identified members being functionally homeless and couch surfing. And they all hide it from their their CoC. Victoria and Comox are notorious for this.
We also had CFINTCOM members literally calling out their general in a townhall for compromise risk with junior members posted to the NCR, because of housing costs:
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Military's intelligence command avoids posting staff to Ottawa because of region's high cost of living
The Canadian Forces Intelligence Command tries to accommodate its personnel, when possible, by supporting alternative work arrangements such as working from home, N…ottawacitizen.com
But sure, shiny F-35s will fix that....
Don't get me wrong, I love the 101 and think we should get a lot more
I'd have suggested each should have 12-18 airframes/squadron. But again I also think you should have some CSAR outside of 427.
I'll pencil in 60 for SAR.
Your TacHel is already way too small to be of much use. Especially if the CA intends to have a Reg Force Light/Para Bde Group that is somewhat airmobile capable.
I'd suggest that Cdn TacHel should be more like 3 Combat Aviation Brigades, plus SOA.
I'm a Blackhawk fan, mainly as I have counted a lot of holes in one's I've been a GIB in and still landed in one piece.
I also think that with the US Army downsizing its Aviation component one could get a decent deal (and probably even better now that no one wants to deal with us). You can get a Maritime version - and it's a smaller footprint than the Cyclone (and I suspect that LocMart would love to solve the Cyclone issue with a replacement for SeaHawks)
Van, Cal, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec City, Halifax
I'd throw Hamilton's Munro airport into that mix. Its the perfect location in the GTA but gives you added flexibility of it not being Pearson with its constant air traffic volumes.Major airline hubs in Canada are Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. Somewhat Halifax. Putting reserve squadrons near these cities allows for a substantial pool of reserve pilots. This is what 400 in Borden and 438 in St-Hubert do. Although 400 is becoming a maintenance line now....
Edmonton and Quebec City are nice to have. And they exist today to support Reg F units mostly. But if you had larger total force squadrons in the region, you wouldn't really need them. But sure, I guess they could add two more squadrons (10 frames each) to the list.
I'd throw Hamilton's Munro airport into that mix. Its the perfect location in the GTA but gives you added flexibility of it not being Pearson with its constant air traffic volumes.