...Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets...
After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected...
[p. 3] ...
Near-term procurement quantities were reduced by 246 aircraft through 2016; the annual rate of increase in production was lowered; and the full-rate production decision moved to 2018, a 5-year slip from the current baseline.
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The military services were directed to reexamine their initial operational capability (IOC) requirements, the critical need dates when the warfighter must have in place the first increment of operational forces available for combat. We expect the Marine Corps’ IOC will slip significantly from its current 2012 date and that the Air Force’s and and Navy’s IOC dates will also slip from the current dates in 2016 [so if we get any F-35As in 2016 they won't have USAF IOC status]...
[p. 4]...
DOD does not yet know the full impact from restructuring actions on future procurement funding requirements beyond this 5-year period. Cost analysts are still calculating the net effects from deferring the near-term procurement of 246 aircraft to future years and from lowering the annual rate of increased procurement...Future funding requirements could be higher than projected and the quantities, which are considered affordable by the U.S. and allies, could be reduced, further driving up unit costs [emphasis added]...
[p. 5]...the estimated average unit procurement price for the JSF has about doubled since program start and current forecasts indicate that life-cycle costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it replaces [emphasis added]. Rising JSF costs erode buying power and may make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy and sustain as many aircraft as planned. a period of more austere defense budgets...[for Canada see:
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/82898/post-1026337.html#msg1026337 ]
[p. 7]...
Although still hampered by the late delivery of test aircraft to testing sites, the development flight test program significantly ramped up operations in 2010, accomplishing 3 times as many test flights as the previous 3 years combined. The Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant significantly exceeded the annual plan...
[p. 8]...
After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to gain adequate knowledge to ensure its design is stable and the manufacturing process ready for greater levels of annual production. The JSF program still lags in achieving critical indicators of success expected from well-performing acquisition programs. Specifically, the program has not yet stabilized aircraft designs...manufacturing cost increases and delays in delivering test and production aircraft indicate need for substantial improvements in factory throughput and performance of the global supply chain...
[p. 11]...
Since the first flight in December 2006, only about 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, both. The pace of flight testing accelerated significantly in 2010, but overall progress is still much below plans forecast several years ago...
[p. 13]...
The JSF test program relies much more heavily than previous weapon systems on its modeling and simulation labs to test and verify aircraft design and subsystem performance. However, only 3 of 32 labs and models have been fully accredited to date...
The JSF test program relies much more heavily than previous weapon systems on its modeling and simulation labs to test and verify aircraft design and subsystem performance. However, only 3 of 32 labs and models have been fully accredited to date...JSF depends on millions more lines of software code than the F-22A Raptor and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet [emphasis added]. While good progress has been reported on the writing of code, total of code have grown by 40 percent since preliminary design review and 13 percent since the critical design review. The amount of code needed will likely increase as integration and testing efforts intensify. A second software integration line added as part of the restructuring will improve capacity and output...
[p. 14]...
The JSF program is at a critical juncture—9 years in development and 4 years in limited production–but still early in flight testing to verify aircraft design and performance. If effectively implemented and sustained the restructuring DOD is conducting should place the JSF program on a firmer footing and lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. However, restructuring comes with a price—higher development costs,fewer aircraft received in the near term, training delays, prolonged times for testing and delivering the capabilities required by the warfighter...
