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Failing Islamic States - 2011

Israel executes a brilliant turning of the tables. If they work this meme long and hard enough to penetrate public awareness it will collapse a lot of the popular propaganda from the Palestinian side:

http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2012/09/21/turnabout-fair-play-israel-demands-restitution-of-jewish-land-confiscated-by-arabs/

Turnabout Fair Play: Israel Demands Restitution of Jewish Land Confiscated by Arabs

by
ROGER L SIMON
Bio
September 21, 2012 - 5:48 pm
     
In a startling and revelatory initiative at the United Nations, Deputy Israeli FM Danny Ayalon (interviewed by PJTV in 2011 here) has asked for the restitution of Jewish land confiscated by Arabs. It is five times the state of Israel.

Israel has launched a new and controversial diplomatic initiative aimed at placing the plight of Jews in Arab countries on an equal footing with that of Palestinian refugees, insisting that the resolution of both problems is a prerequisite to Middle East peace.

Speaking at special conference convened on Friday at UN headquarters in New York, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon said “We will not arrive at peace without solving the refugee problem – but that includes the Jewish refugees. Justice does not lie on just one side and equal measures must be applied to both.”


The first-of-its-kind conference, which was convened over the objections of Arab representatives to the UN, attracted several hundred participants, including Israeli diplomats, senior Jewish organizational leaders, New York State and city politicians and a modest number of other countries’ ambassadors to the UN (8) as well as lower ranking representatives (17). The conference heard Israeli and Jewish officials – as well as eyewitness accounts by Jews whose families had been persecuted and expelled from Arab countries.

Delivering an impassioned speech, Israeli Ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor lambasted Arab leaders who “launched a war of terror, incitement, and expulsion to decimate and destroy their Jewish communities. Their effort was systematic. It was deliberate. It was planned.”

Prosor cited Arab statements inciting to violence as well as official decrees depriving them of their rights. He said that “billions of dollars of their property and assets were seized” and that “the total area of land confiscated from Jews in Arab countries amounts to nearly 40,000 square miles. That is five times the size of Israel.”

Ha’aretz has the rest – and it’s interesting. So far, no response from our State Department. But you knew that.
 
This could go into the "Visiting the way stations of the new Long War" thread as wel, since it shows many of the fault lines that we may need to watch as well. The future regional conflict predicted by ERC amy well follow the outlines described here. Graphs can be seen by following the link:

http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NJ10Ak02.html

The horizon collapses in the Middle East
By Spengler

"In the long run we are all dead," said John Maynard Keynes. To which the pertinent response is: "What do you mean, 'we'?" For most countries, the long run is a point on the horizon that never arrives. In the Middle East, by contrast, the horizon has collapsed in upon the present. It isn't the apocalypse, but in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt it must be what the apocalypse feels like. "What some hailed as an Arab Spring," I wrote in my September 2011 book How Civilizations Die (and Why Islam is Dying, Too), "is descending into an Arab Nightmare." The descent continues. We are a long way from hitting bottom.

The short-run problems of the Middle East appear intractable because they are irruptions of long-term problems, in a self-aggravating regional disturbance. It's like August 1914, but without the same civilizational implications: at risk are countries that long since have languished on the sidelines of the world economy and culture, and whose demise would have few repercussions for the rest of the world.

Egypt cannot achieve stability under a democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood regime any more than it could under military dictatorship, because 60 years of sham modernization atop a pre-modern substratum have destroyed the country's capacity to function.

Turkey cannot solve its Kurdish problem today because the Kurds know that time is on their side: with a fertility three times that of ethnic Turks, Anatolian Kurds will comprise half the country's military-age population a generation from now.

Syria cannot solve its ethnic and religious civil conflicts because the only mechanism capable of suppressing them - a dictatorship by a religious minority - exhausted its capacity to do so.

Iraq's Shi'ite majority cannot govern in the face of Sunni opposition without leaning on Iran, leaving Iran with the option to destabilize and perhaps, eventually, to dismember the country.

And Iran cannot abandon or even postpone its nuclear ambitions, because the collapse of its currency on the black market during the past two weeks reminds its leaders that a rapidly-aging population and fast-depleting oil reserves will lead to an economic breakdown of a scale that no major country has suffered in the modern era.

When the future irrupts into the present, nations take existential risks. Iran will pursue nuclear ambitions that almost beg for military pre-emption; Egypt will pursue a provocative course of Islamist expansion that cuts off its sources of financial support at a moment of economic desperation; Syria's Alawites, Sunnis, Kurds and Druze will fight to bloody exhaustion; Iraq will veer towards a civil war exacerbated by outside actors; and Turkey will lash out in all directions. And in the West, idealists will be demoralized and realists will be confused, the former by the collapse of interest in deals, the latter by the refusal of all players in those countries to accept reality.

Iran's population is aging faster than any population in the history of the world, its economy is a hydrocarbon monoculture, and its oil is running out.

Figure 1: Iranian Population Ages As Oil Runs Out

Sources: United Nations World Population Prospects: US Department of Energy

About 8% of Iranians are of retirement age now. But Iran's fertility has fallen from seven children per female at the time of the 1979 revolution to around 1.6 at present. When today's bulge generation of young people reaches retirement age, there will be few children to support them, and by mid-century a third of all Iranians will be elderly dependents. Nothing like this sudden shift form pre-modern to post-modern demographics ever has happened. Rich Western countries may not survive the graying of their population. For Iran, with US$4,000 in personal income per capita, low fertility is a national sentence. President Mahmud Ahmadinedjad called it "genocide against the Iranian nation".

Just when Iran most needs hydrocarbon revenues, its oil output will decline sharply. Natural gas exports can offset the decline to some extent, but not entirely. Iran's only chance of survival lies in annexing oil-rich regions on its borders: Bahrain, Iraq's Basra province, parts of Azerbaijan, and ultimately Saudi Arabia's Shi'ite-majority Eastern Province. That is why Iran needs nuclear weapons.

Figure 2: Iran's Population Train Wreck (Click to enlarge)

Iran's fertility collapse is the most extreme example of the trend across the Muslim world. Just behind Iran is Turkey.

Figure 3: Total Fertility Rate in Egypt, Turkey and Iran

Source: UN World Population Prospects

Turkey's overall fertility rate of 2.1 children per female masks a yawning demographic gap between Turkish-speakers, whose fertility rate is just 1.5, and the Kurdish minority, whose fertility is estimated variously at between three and four children per family. Half the military-age men in Anatolian Turkey will have Kurdish as a first language a generation from now.

That is why Kurdish separatists are confident that their guerilla campaign against Turkish security forces ultimately will triumph. There is a demographic time-bomb in the Middle East, but it isn't on the West Bank of the Jordan River, where the Palestinian Arab fertility rate long since converged with the Jewish rate. The map of Anatolia eventually will be redrawn, and probably the adjacent maps of Syria, Iraq and Iran along with it.

Syria's Kurds have become the vanguard of Kurdish hopes for autonomy, raising the Kurdish national flag in Syrian border towns in sight of the Turkish army. Turkey's threat to intervene in Syria's civil war is a bluff. The country's 2 million Kurds are divided among 17 political parties; a minority is cooperating with the Iraq-based Kurdish Workers Party, the main guerilla organization harassing Turkish security forces. Turkish analysts perceive no immediate threat that Syria's Kurds will ally with the independence movement and attempt to establish an independent Kurdistan in the foreseeable future, as Mesut Cevikalp wrote in August. If Turkish troops entered Syria, the Kurds would unite against Turkey.

Turkey's raids on Kurdish guerillas across the Iraqi border, meanwhile, prompted Iraq to threaten an alliance with Iran. That is the last thing that Ankara wants: the Turkish economy is living on credit from the Gulf states, which are paying for Turkey to contain Iran. If Turkey's internal problems push Iraq into the Iranian camp, making itself more of a nuisance than a help to the Sunni Gulf States, this arrangement will be in jeopardy.

Figure 4: Turkey's Rising Dependence on Short-Term Foreign Debt

Source: Central Bank of Turkey

Turkey's current account deficit is running at 8% to 10% of gross domestic product, about the same level as Greece before its financial collapse. Short-term debt doubled since 2010 to cover the deficit, most of it borrowed by Turkish banks from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. That looks more like a political subsidy than a financial investment. For all of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's grandiosity, Riyadh has Turkey on a short leash.

"The Syrian civil war is now evidence of how much Turkey overestimated itself in its dreams of great power status," wrote the German daily Die Welt on October 6. "A year and a half ago, Foreign Minister [Ahmet] Davutoglu said that no-one could undertake anything in the entirety of the Middle East without first asking Turkey. But in the intervening year and a half, the supposed great power hasn't been able to get things in order at its own front door."

There is no Turkish solution for Syria. There is no Saudi or Jordanian solution, because the two conservative monarchies fear that the Muslim Brotherhood will dominate the Sunni opposition. Saudi Arabia fears the Muslim Brotherhood, the only credible organized opposition to the corrupt and feckless monarchy. The Jordanian monarchy already is under siege from the Muslim Brotherhood, which organized "reform" demonstrations last week demanding limits on the monarchy's power.

And there is no American solution for Syria. Robert Worth reported in the New York Times October 7 that Sunni Arab countries won't provide Syrian rebels with shoulder-fired missiles and anti-tank weapons out of fear that terrorists might obtain them. After Washington's embarrassment in Benghazi, compounded by the appearance that the Obama administration suppressed intelligence reports of al-Qaeda activities in Libya and Syria, American caution is understandable.

No-one in the region wants Syria's Sunnis to win, but no-one wants them to lose, either. The Syrian standoff is likely to continue into the indefinite future, lowering the cost of Arab life in the market of world opinion.

Egypt lacks all of the elements for successful economic development. Its population is 45% illiterate; its university graduates are almost without exception incompetent; it has insufficient water from the Nile to expand agriculture; its existing agriculture is inefficient and leaves the country dependent on imports for half its food; its population is for the most part pre-modern, with a 30% rate of consanguineous marriage and a 90% rate of female genital mutilation.

The bad news is that none of the major countries in the region can be kept from falling, and once fallen, they cannot be put back together again. The good news is that the bad news is not so bad. As long as the calamity is restricted to the region, and prospective malefactors are prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, the impact on the rest of the world will be surprisingly small.

Spengler is channeled by David P Goldman. His book How Civilizations Die (and why Islam is Dying, Too) was published by Regnery Press in September 2011. A volume of his essays on culture, religion and economics, It's Not the End of the World - It's Just the End of You, also appeared last fall, from Van Praag Press.
 
I rarely agree with Doug Saunders, the Globe and Mail's European political correspondent, but we do, broadly, on this issues, defined in this column which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/where-the-pakistani-state-fails-religion-steps-in/article4610201/
Where the Pakistani state fails, religion steps in

DOUG SAUNDERS
The Globe and Mail

Published Saturday, Oct. 13 2012

Try to look into the eyes of Malala Yousafzai, the 14-year-old Pakistani girl who was shot in the head by Taliban militants this week because she was advocating for universal education and the rights of girls, without despairing for the future. The war between human advancement and religious authority now has a human face. But it is a far wider war, threatening to engulf a country of 180 million people.

Yet even as Pakistanis rose in outrage against the shooting, influential people in both Pakistan and the West were dismissing the scope of the problem she has come to embody.

This is just a regional problem, Pakistani elites say. Her home is in the Swat Valley, in Pakistan’s lawless northern frontier, where extremist forces from Afghanistan are at work. This, they say, has nothing to do with the rest of Pakistan. And many Westerners, as well as Pakistanis, have rushed to condemn her shooting (and those of countless others) as a consequence of the U.S.-led drone war against the Taliban.

Yet the problem of religious extremism is not confined to Pakistan’s border provinces. It is now present in all four major regions. Punjab, in the east, has become a stronghold of violent, sectarian extremist groups in its southern regions. Baluchistan, in the west, is home to an insurgency supported by extreme Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, that are seeking religious government. Karachi, in the centre, is being ripped apart by Islamic violence and houses countless circles of radicalism. Even Sindh, in the south, has seen its historically moderate, secular values ruptured by the establishment of religious schools in rural areas, financed by Islamists, that are radicalizing a generation.

Nor does it make sense to blame the United States for this. While there may be good reasons for criticizing its anti-Taliban air campaign, the attack on Malala had nothing to do with drone strikes.

“This is a war that is within Pakistan,” Pakistani historian Farzana Shaikh tells me. “It is between different visions of the kind of Pakistan people want … The Taliban themselves have blamed not U.S. policy or U.S. drone strikes for their attack on her, but the fact that she seemed to be promoting a secular agenda.”

Both Westerners and many Pakistanis are all too willing to assume that these developments are an inevitable consequence of Pakistan being a poor, Muslim-majority, postcolonial state with bad neighbours.

Yet if you look around the region, you quickly realize that almost every other state is moving in the opposite direction. Bangladesh recently passed a constitutional amendment declaring itself secular and recognizing religious minorities. And while it has had Muslim-Buddhist riots recently, the government has made strong progress in reducing the influence and power of extremist groups. Education levels are on the rise, poverty is dropping and birth rates have plummeted. In India, home to almost as many Muslims as Pakistan, Islamic extremism is rare (and usually originates in Pakistan) and on the decline. Both countries have seen more moderate forms of Islam and secularizing trends dominate, while Pakistan has shifted toward the more hardline, restrictive, Saudi-based practices of the religion.

What is happening in Pakistan is not military or religious or social, but purely a failure of politics. By obsessing over its unnecessary war with India and squandering billions in aid on an overly powerful military, by devoting itself to internecine wars of dynastic politics and grotesque corruption, and by tolerating religious voices within the state, Pakistan has allowed fringe religious groups to become a surrogate for a government gone missing.

“The state over many years has reneged on its primary responsibilities toward average citizens in Pakistan,” Dr. Shaikh says. “Things that one might normally have taken for granted from the state – access to decent education, access to decent health care, to housing – have simply not been there. That vacuum has been filled by many of these extremist groups, who have very powerful charitable arms.”

Those groups are the ones building the new schools. They are also the ones forbidding girls from becoming educated. This, in turn, is feeding a deadly cycle of alarmingly high birth rates, overpopulation and poverty.

Where the state fails, religion steps in. Malala was trying to stop that cycle – and only the education of women, and therefore the removal of religion from education, will accomplish it.

Pakistan’s future might be found in the eyes of Malala Yousafzai. Or it might lie with those who put a bullet in her head. Poorer, less generously assisted Islamic countries have prevented this from happening. Pakistan has no excuse.


One point on which I suspect Saunders and I disagree is the relative weight he assigned to Pakistani political failure vs what I assign to Pakistani cultural weakness.

But, I do agree that Pakistan is failing and that medieval Arab clerics are now driving the political processes. I observed this, close up, last year in Malaysia; a Malaysian family with whom I spent part of a day were quite open in describing the cultural changes which they felt were being forced upon them by Arab religious 'leaders.' Even traditional Malay (female) dress, for example, was under attack as not being sufficiently "modest."



 
Deploying weapons of mass culture. This is one of the ways we can really create fault lines in Islamic societies and get them to turn on each other rather than against us. J lo as the carrot, and the UAV hovering overhead as the stick...OF course our active support for both these measures and these nations is needed for the strategy to get results.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tiny-azerbaijan-unleashes-pop-power-against-irans-mullahs/2012/10/14/0a0819ec-14b3-11e2-bf18-a8a596df4bee_story.html

Tiny Azerbaijan unleashes pop-power against Iran’s mullahs

View Photo Gallery — Azerbaijan relishes its anti-Iran role: The secular, Western-leaning country is socially and religiously tolerant, offering itself as a model of a nonsectarian Muslim-majority society.

By Joby Warrick, Published: October 14

BAKU, Azerbaijan — The latest weapon in this country’s ideological war with Iran arrived late last month in an armada of jets from California, accompanied by a private security force, dazzling pyrotechnics and a wardrobe that consisted of sequins and not much else.

A crowd of nearly 30,000 gathered to watch as the leader of this mini-invasion pranced onto a stage built on the edge of the Caspian Sea. With a shout of “Hello, lovers!” Jennifer Lopez wiggled out of her skirt and launched into a throbbing disco anthem, delighting her Azerbaijani fans and — it was hoped — infuriating the turbaned ayatollahs who live just across the water.

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“You could almost feel the Iranians seething,” said an Azerbaijani official who attended the U.S. pop star’s first concert in this predominantly Shiite Muslim country of 9 million. “This stuff makes them crazy.”

The effect on Iran’s leaders is real enough, and it is at least partly by design. Azerbaijan, Iran’s neighbor and longtime rival, is coming to relish its role as the region’s anti-Iran, a secular, Western-leaning country that is working mightily to become everything that Iran is not.

As Iran sinks ever deeper into isolation and economic distress, its northern neighbor is sprinting in the opposite direction, building political and cultural ties to the West along with new pipelines connecting energy-hungry Europe with the country’s rich petroleum fields on the Caspian Sea. Where Iran is repressive and theocratic, Azerbaijan is socially and religiously tolerant, offering itself as a model of a nonsectarian, Muslim-majority society that champions women’s athletics and embraces Western music and entertainers.

It also enthusiastically pursues diplomatic and business ties with Israel, the Jewish state that Iranian officials have threatened to destroy.

Azerbaijan’s leaders insist that such policies have nothing to do with Iran, and they point to a record of mostly cordial relations with the vastly larger, notoriously peevish republic to the south. Yet, with each stride toward modernity — and with every Western diva who arrives to croon and titillate on Baku’s expanding international stage — Azerbaijan chips away at the legitimacy of Iran’s government and fuels discontent among ordinary Iranians, say Western officials who study the region.

“It is one of the most serious threats to the long-term viability of the Iranian regime,” said Matthew Bryza, a former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan who now works as a private consultant. “Every day that Azerbaijan grows stronger economically and more connected to the Euro-Atlantic community — that’s another day in which the Iranian regime grows weaker.”

It is hardly a perfect role model. The government in Baku is dominated by a single political party, and it has frequently come under criticism by independent watchdogs for its human rights record and alleged corruption. Azerbaijan also is mired in a nearly two-decade-old conflict with another of its neighbors, Armenia, over control of the disputed enclave known as Nagorno-Karabakh.
 
Egypt is spiraling down a rabbit hole, mostly because while we (the royal *we*) sat back and applauded the "Arab Spring", no one seemed to take the time to look at who was really taking power. The "Narrative" created by the Legacy Media and echoed by the Administration seems to have totally collapsed, but the positive (if there is one) is the new regime seems to be having difficulty with their attempts to consolidate power. The Israelis may have scored a big win by "allowing" Mohamed Morsi to be seen as the dealmaker in the recent conflict with Gaza; many people will now be against him and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood.

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2012/11/its-a-good-thing-weve-got-smart-diplomacy.php

It’s A Good Thing We’ve Got Smart Diplomacy!

As Paul noted earlier today, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi followed up his supposed diplomatic triumph in Gaza by claiming new, more or less dictatorial powers. Morsi’s announcement was greeted with outrage by many Egyptians, some of whom took to the streets:

    [A]nti-Morsi demonstrators set fire to Muslim Brotherhood offices in cities across Egypt on Friday. As enraged demonstrators torched Muslim Brotherhood offices in several Egyptian cities, a defiant Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi defended his recent decree granting himself sweeping powers before a crowd of supporters outside the presidential palace in Cairo Friday. …

    Reacting to the decree, thousands of demonstrators gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on Friday, responding to calls by Egyptian opposition leaders for a “million-man march” to protest against what they called a “coup” by the Islamist president.

Here, protesters have set the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Alexandria on fire:

In Tahrir Square, protesters objecting to Morsi’s tyrannical pretensions have gathered, only to be dispersed by government-fired tear gas:

I am so confused! When anti-Mubarak demonstrators gathered in Tahrir Square and were met with tear gas, they represented the Arab Spring. So what do these anti-Morsi demonstrators represent? Are they Arab Spring too? Or Arab Autumn? Or maybe the seasonal analogies are no longer operative.

The France 24 news report continues:

    The rival demonstrations – which took place in several Egyptian cities Friday – exposed the deep divisions in the world’s most populous Arab nation five months after Morsi was elected with a 51% sliver of a majority.

What a coincidence! Obama got 51% too. So far, however, I haven’t heard anyone refer to Obama’s “sliver of a majority.”

But never mind that–I am still really, really confused! Mubarak was our friend, but a bad guy. So he had to go, and Obama denounced him and helped force him out. Morsi is our enemy, and also is a bad guy. So Obama thinks he’s A-OK, and helped Morsi take power. That’s called “smart diplomacy.” You probably wouldn’t understand.

Other things are confusing, too. Did Obama know that Morsi was about to claim dictatorial powers when he made Morsi the “hero” of the Israel-Gaza cease fire? If so, did he mind? If Obama didn’t know–which seems more likely–does he now think that Morsi double-crossed him by capitalizing on his faux diplomatic mission to proclaim himself a dictator? Or is that one more thing that is A-OK with Obama? If Obama doesn’t like the fact that Morsi has cut “Arab Spring” democracy off at the knees, does he intend to do anything about it? Or, when bad things happen, is it “smart diplomacy” to do nothing and pretend you don’t mind?

Investors Business Daily doesn’t have high hopes for the Obama administration:

    The seriousness of Morsi’s coup, as many Egyptians are fearlessly calling it, is indicated by the posture of Mohamed ElBaradei, the longtime head of the U.N.’s atomic weapons oversight body and critic of the U.S., who on Friday called on Egyptians to “save the nation,” charging Morsi “blasted the concept of the state and the legitimacy and appointed himself ruler by divine decree.”

    The left-leaning Nobel Peace Prize winner also declared: “The revolution is aborted until further notice.”

    Just don’t expect White House press secretary Jay Carney to announce that the Egyptian people’s “grievances have reached a boiling point, and they have to be addressed,” as his predecessor Robert Gibbs did when Mubarak was on the ropes.

    And don’t hold your breath for Clinton — or whoever her successor is at the State Department — to call for “an orderly, peaceful transition to real democracy, not faux democracy” in which “the people just keep staying in power and become less and less responsive,” as she said two years ago during street demos against Mubarak.

    It took 24 hours for Morsi to take advantage of the prestige Obama and his secretary of state handed him. Now he’s using America’s stamp of approval to oppress his own people.

    Some “new beginning.”

All I can say is, it’s a good thing we now have such smart diplomacy! If Obama, Clinton, Susan Rice and others weren’t so smart, things might go really badly in Egypt and the Middle East.
 
Perhaps the writer needs to expand their knowledge base a little more outside the conservative bubble. It might help clarify the confusion.

And help lessen the hypocrisy.

First, there was the criticism because the administration sat on the sidelines, not taking a position while the protests were going on. Then they went apoplectic when Obama said that Egypt was neither friend or foe in an interview.

It's not surprising that Egypt is going into a spiral.

To borrow a quote from a foremost authority on the subject  :sarcasm: : "Sometimes Democracy can be messy"
 
No Cupper, the Administration sat on the sidelines while a pro-US client was deposed, yet made little or no efforts to understand what was actually going on.

Now US policy makers make vague "non statements" out of one side of their mouth, while still providing billions in aid to a nation they now have no handle on.  Attempting to use Egypt as a broker in the region and then discovering the President of Egypt had double crossed them (and did they really get what they wanted from Egypt's efforts in Gaza, or did Israel manage to outfox everyone?) is a sign of the confusion and outright incompetence of the Administration.
 
Mursis' Islamic Brotherhood seems to have whacked a hornets nest with his power grab.  The peasants are revolting again so it would seem and I'll bet there's some buyers regret among some supporters from the election.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2238416/Pharoh-president-Egyptian-opposition-strike-President-Mursis-grab-increased-powers-fuels-clashes.html
 
Another view of the greater Muslim Brotherhood movement and how they recruit and vet their members. An interesting mental exercise would be how to counter this sort of effort, and how to break current low ranking members free of the leadership:

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/egypts-morsi-proclaims-himself-pharaoh

Egypt's Morsi Proclaims Himself Pharaoh
26 November 2012

Almost two years after Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak was removed from power, Cairo’s Tahrir Square is still an epicenter of protest and violence. It’s an epicenter of protest and violence because Egypt is again ruled by a man who has declared himself dictator. The country’s new president, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, announced that “constitutional declarations, decisions and laws issued by the president are final and not subject to appeal.”

He’s already being called the new Pharaoh. It makes no difference that he was elected. Democracy isn’t just about getting elected. A democratic election is not a one-time plebiscite on who the next tyrant is going to be. Democracy requires individual and minority rights and the separation of powers. Winners cannot oppress losers, nor do losers get to wage war on the winners.

Some of us are more surprised than others by this development, but the Muslim Brotherhood was never a democratic political movement. It's not even a close call. You don't have to be a cheerleader for Hosni Mubarak to recognize its inherent authoritarianism.

Egypt expert Eric Trager explains in The New Republic how the organization weeds out moderates by design.

    It begins when specially designated Brotherhood recruiters, who work at mosques and universities across Egypt, identify pious young men and begin engaging them in social activities to assess their suitability for the organization. The Brotherhood’s ideological brainwashing begins a few months later, as new recruits are incorporated into Brotherhood cells (known as “families”) and introduced to the organization’s curriculum, which emphasizes Qur’anic memorization and the writings of founder Hassan al-Banna, among others. Then, over a five-to-eight-year period, a team of three senior Muslim Brothers monitors each recruit as he advances through five different ranks of Brotherhood membership—muhib, muayyad, muntasib, muntazim, and finally ach amal, or “active brother.” 

    Throughout this process, rising Muslim Brothers are continually vetted for their embrace of the Brotherhood’s ideology, commitment to its cause, and—most importantly—willingness to follow orders from the Brotherhood’s senior leadership. As a result, Muslim Brothers come to see themselves as foot soldiers in service of the organization’s theocratic credo: “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” Meanwhile, those dissenting with the organization’s aims or tactics are eliminated at various stages during the five-to-eight-year vetting period.

Last year in Cairo I met a couple of young activist recruits who washed out. They weren’t fired, exactly. One just up and quit because he could no longer stand the paranoid and authoritarian politics of its leaders, and the other was pressured out by what Americans call a hostile work environment.

“Hamas is more liberal,” Mohamed Adel told me, “and more willing to cooperate with other movements than the Muslim Brotherhood is.” He had left just weeks before I met him at the journalist syndicate. “The Brotherhood thinks dealing with anyone who is a former member . . . or someone from other movements and parties, is like dealing with an infidel.”

Abdul-Jalil al-Sharnouby, another young activist, was an editor at the Brotherhood’s Web site. Party officials treated him horribly and it became obvious, from his insider’s view, that the leaders would lord it over Egypt with a military regime or a police state if given the chance. “The Brotherhood as it exists now,” he told me, “wants to come to power and rule the way Hosni Mubarak did.”

Egypt’s political culture is authoritarian and always has been. The Muslim Brotherhood is a logical and perhaps inevitable product of a pre-existing problem bigger than itself and older than its religion.

I’ve met Egyptian liberals. They exist, but they’re a minority. Moderates are a larger minority, but genuine liberals belong to an even smaller minority and they know it. They feel it keenly, and are therefore far gloomier about Egypt’s prospects than Westerners were when the so-called Arab Spring started almost two years ago.

“The Western worldview is not very popular in Egypt,” Egyptian journalist Mohamed Ahmed Raouf told me. “They watch American movies, they drive American cars, but they don't accept Western culture or values of democracy, pluralism, and enlightenment. They don't accept it. People have to be open-minded, and that's not the case here.”

Hala Mustafa, a liberal intellectual at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, told me the Muslim Brothers grotesquely distort the words “freedom” and “democracy.” “I heard one of them just the other day referring to individual rights,” she said, “but in a very backward way. He thinks Islam already has all rights for everybody and that we have to respect that. He thinks this is freedom, but it’s completely different from any liberal concept of freedom. The Muslim Brotherhood is against individual freedom not just for women and Christians, but also for Muslims and men.”

Egypt’s deeply embedded illiberalism isn’t exactly a secret. It’s the country’s most obvious political characteristic, one that imposes itself on the observant almost at once. Egyptian blogger Big Pharaoh explained it to me this way the first time I visited Cairo seven years ago: “Most of the armed terrorist groups we see now were born out of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood…My biggest fear is that if the Muslim Brotherhood rules Egypt we will get Islamism-lite, that they won’t be quite bad enough that people will revolt against them. Most Egyptians don’t drink, so they won’t mind if alcohol is illegal. The same goes for banning books. Most Egyptians don’t read. So why should they care if books are banned? Most women wear a veil or a headscarf already, so if it becomes the law hardly anyone will resist.”

But sure, the Brothers threw the word “democracy” around when they were on their way up, especially when gullible foreign journalists were in town. They got a big kick out of portraying themselves as religiously conservative democrats, as though they were the Egyptian equivalents of Germany’s Christian Democrats or the Republicans in the United States. But their slogan is and always has been “Islam is the solution.” They’re only moderate compared with the totalitarian Salafists.

Morsi promises that his dictatorial powers are temporary. Feel free to believe that if you find it credible. Hey, it might even be true. Weird things happen in the Middle East all the time. The army could remove him tomorrow. Other regime components might tell him to get stuffed, making him more Hugo Chavez than Fidel Castro. The “street” might throw the country into ungovernable chaos. Morsi might even feel enough pressure from abroad that he dials it down. But whatever happens later, he just proclaimed himself dictator. If he isn’t stopped, that’s exactly what he will be.
 
Thucydides said:
No Cupper, the Administration sat on the sidelines while a pro-US client was deposed, yet made little or no efforts to understand what was actually going on.

Now US policy makers make vague "non statements" out of one side of their mouth, while still providing billions in aid to a nation they now have no handle on.  Attempting to use Egypt as a broker in the region and then discovering the President of Egypt had double crossed them (and did they really get what they wanted from Egypt's efforts in Gaza, or did Israel manage to outfox everyone?) is a sign of the confusion and outright incompetence of the Administration.

All good and valid points. And I do not necessarily disagree with you.

But I still stand by my assessment that the writer is simply continuing the echo from the bubble.
 
Islamic radicalism spreads in Africa. Equally horrid scenes play out in areas of Nigeria where the Boko Haram have taken control, and of course the "Arab Spring" seems to have become a springboard for the Muslim Brotherhood to grasp for power. Astute readers will not the Taliban used similar techniques and ideas during their reign during the 1990's in Afghanistan, and there are plenty of extremist groups willing to impose this version of Sharia law throughout the world. What we should do about this, or indeed what we can do about this with our resources is a difficult question to answer:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-northern-mali-islamists-attacks-against-civilians-grow-more-brutal/2012/12/11/5b74a734-3e46-11e2-8a5c-473797be602c_story.html

In northern Mali, Islamists’ attacks against civilians grow more brutal

By Sudarsan Raghavan, Published: December 11

SEGOU, Mali — On a sweltering afternoon, Islamist police officers dragged Fatima Al Hassan out of her house in the fabled city of Timbuktu. They beat her up, shoved her into a white pickup truck and drove her to their headquarters. She was locked up in a jail as she awaited her sentence: 100 lashes with an electrical cord.

“Why are you doing this?” she recalled asking.

Hassan was being punished for giving water to a male visitor.

The Islamist radicals who seized a vast arc of territory in northern Mali in the spring are intensifying their brutality against the population, according to victims, human rights groups, and U.N. and Malian officials. The attacks are being perpetrated as the United States, European countries and regional powers are readying an African force to retake northern Mali, after months of hesitation.

But such an action, if approved by the U.N. Security Council, is unlikely to begin until next summer or fall, U.S. and other Western officials say, and political turmoil in the south is adding to the uncertainty. That has raised fears that the extremists could consolidate their grip over the Texas-size territory and further terrorize civilians, particularly women and children.

“The people are losing all hope,” said Sadou Diallo, a former mayor of the northern city of Gao. “For the past eight months, they have lived without any government, without any actions taken against the Islamists. Now the Islamists feel they can do anything to the people.”

Refugees fleeing the north are now bringing stories that are darker than those recounted in interviews from this summer. Although their experiences cannot be independently verified — because the Islamists have threatened to kill or kidnap Westerners who visit — U.N. officials and human rights activists say that they have heard similar reports of horrific abuses and that some may amount to war crimes.

The refugees say the Islamists are raping and forcibly marrying women, and recruiting children for armed conflict. Social interaction deemed an affront to their interpretation of Islam is zealously punished through Islamic courts and a police force that has become more systematic and inflexible, human rights activists and local officials say.

Two weeks ago, the Islamists publicly whipped three couples 100 times each in Timbuktu for not being married, human rights activists said.

The Islamist police had spotted Hassan giving water to a male visitor at her house last month. Hassan’s brother knew an Islamist commander and pleaded for mercy. After spending 18 hours in jail, she was set free with a warning. The next day, she fled here to Segou, a town in southern Mali that has taken in thousands of the displaced, mostly women and children.

It was fortunate, Hassan said, that she was handing the glass to her friend out on the veranda. “If they had found me with him near the bedroom, they would have shot us both on the spot,” she said.

With organization, ‘abuse’

Radical Islamists have transformed vast stretches of desert in the north into an enclave for al-Qaeda militants and other jihadists. They have imposed a hard-edged brand of sharia law, echoing Afghanistan’s Taliban movement, in this West African country where moderate Islam has thrived for centuries.

People are deprived of basic freedoms, historic tombs have been destroyed, and any cultural practices deemed un-Islamic are banned. Children are denied education. The sick and elderly die because many doctors and nurses have fled, and most clinics and hospitals have been destroyed or looted.

In March, the militants joined forces with secular Tuareg separatists, fueled by weapons from the arsenal of former Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, to seize control of the north in the wake of a military coup that crippled the government. The extremists then pushed out the Tuareg rebels and solidified their control.

In August, they began establishing courts, jails and police forces in major towns, according to human rights activists. The police scour neighborhoods for anyone who disobeys their decrees.

“It’s much more organized now,” said Corinne Dufka, a senior researcher on Mali for Human Rights Watch, referring to the network of courts and police. “The Islamists have taken away the joie de vivre of the people.”

On Oct. 9, Mariam Conate, 15, was walking to her uncle’s house in Timbuktu. She had forgotten to fully cover her face. Two Islamist police officers confronted her, and “one held me, the other beat me with the barrel of his gun,” Conate recalled. “They took me to their headquarters and threw me into a room. They locked the door and left.”

Outside, her jailors discussed her future. One wanted to cut off her ears as punishment. The other wanted to send her to a prison where six of her friends had been raped, she said. She was also worried that she would be forced to marry a militant, a fate her cousin had recently suffered.

“As I listened, I was trembling and crying,” Conate said.

U.N. and Malian officials said they have learned of many cases of rape and forced weddings by Islamist gunmen in the north. Two weeks ago, U.N. Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson told U.N. members that sexual violence is prevalent in the region.

Publicly, though, the Islamists have claimed moral righteousness, banning sex before marriage. In August, they stoned a couple to death after accusing them of adultery. Now the Islamists are systematically asking men and women who walk together whether they are married. In the town of Kidal, the Islamists are making lists of unmarried pregnant women in order to punish them and their partners, said U.N. and Malian human rights officials and local community leaders.

“They are going around asking every pregnant woman who made her pregnant,” said Alkaya Toure, an official with Cri de Coeur, a Malian human rights group. “They also rely on spies inside the populations in Gao, Timbuktu and elsewhere.”

But as a reward for loyalty, the Islamists have found a religious loophole. They have encouraged their fighters to marry women and girls, some as young as 10, and often at gunpoint. After sex, they initiate a quick divorce. In an extreme case that has shocked the country, a girl in Timbuktu was forced last month to “marry” six fighters in one night, according to a report in one of Mali’s biggest newspapers.

“They are abusing religion to force women and girls to have intercourse,” said Ibrahima Berte, an official at Mali’s National Commission for Human Rights. “This kind of forced marriage is really just sexual abuse.”

In a telephone interview, a senior Islamist commander conceded that his fighters were marrying young girls.

“Our religion says that if a girl is 12, she must get married to avoid losing her virginity in a wrong way,” said Oumar Ould Hamaha, the military leader of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, one of the three radical groups ruling the north. The other two are al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the network’s North and West Africa affiliate; and Ansar Dine, or “defenders of the faith.”

Conate was eventually set free after a cousin who knew one of the Islamists intervened. On Oct. 12, she fled to Segou, where she stays with an aunt in a small, crowded house.

Boys, too, are being abused. With a possible war looming, some as young as 10 have been taken to training camps, where they learn to use weapons and plant homemade bombs, U.N. officials and human rights activists say. And as the economy worsens in rebel areas, some parents have “sold” their children as it becomes harder to buy food and to curry favor with the Islamists.

“They give $10 to impoverished parents to recruit their children in the name of defending Islam,” said Gaoussou Traore, the secretary general of Comade, a Malian children’s rights group. “The Islamists tell parents that their children will go to paradise, that they will benefit in the next world.”

Pro-government self-defense militias in the south, made up of civilians seeking to liberate the north, have also recruited children, activists say.

“The situation of children in Mali is normally very bad,” Traore said. “With the arrival of the Islamists, it’s become a lot worse.”

‘They came to destroy us’

In a few parts of the north, the Islamists have been more lenient with the locals because they are from the same tribes. But Timbuktu is controlled by hard-liners from all three groups, particularly AQIM, which is largely made up of foreigners. There, the sharia codes have been fiercely enforced.

By some estimates, more than half the population of 60,000 has fled; a majority of the refugees in Segou and the capital, Bamako, are from Timbuktu, said Western refugee officials and community leaders.

But the price of escape has been steep. Maman Dedeou, a 22-year-old laborer, has no job in Bamako, where he lives with relatives who are also refugees. Like them, all he possesses are bitter memories.

“I just eat and sleep,” he said, raising his injured right arm, wrapped in a thick white bandage, as an explanation.

The extremists have not stopped at destroying ancient mausoleums and shrines in Timbuktu, which was an important center for Islamic learning 500 years ago. They have also targeted shop owners such as Moktar Ben Sidi, 50, who sold traditional masks and other items to Western tourists. One day, a group of Islamist fighters broke down his door and smashed everything, he said.

“They said such artifacts were forbidden under Islam,” Sidi said. “They didn’t come to help us. They came to destroy us.”

Inside his barbershop, Ali Maiga, 33, had a mural of hairstyles favored by American and French rappers on the wall. The Islamists sprayed white paint over it, he recalled, and warned him that he risks being whipped if he shaves off anyone’s beard.

Juddu Bojuama, 26, was thrown in jail, accused by the Islamist police of drinking a beer. He denials went unheard. “They beat me 100 times with a tree branch,” he said, pointing at his back and legs.

Dedeou, the laborer, suffered even more. He recalled having no lawyer when he stood before an Islamic judge on charges of stealing a mattress. Afterward, he said, police tied his arms and legs and took away his cellphone. They took him to a clearing near the Niger River, where a man gave him two injections that put him to sleep.

Dedeou woke up in a hospital. His right hand had been amputated.

An Islamist fighter, standing guard at his bedside, uttered a judgment that Dedeou said he could never forget:

“This is the punishment God has decided for you.”
 
Egyptian liberals are being pushed out now that they are no longer needed to achieve power or as window dressing (Lenin had something to say about people like that), but the Muslim Brotherhoods have inherited a bankrupt and broken nation with no real plans or ideas of how to fix things. A distracting foreign war is one of the usual routes governments and political movements of that sort like to use; look for something along these lines in the near to mid future:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/12/22/in-egypt-liberals-losing-at-polls-and-in-streets/

In Egypt, Liberals Losing at Polls and in Streets

In much of Egypt, Islamists are dominating the streets as liberal protests fade away. Half the country is voting today in the second part of the referendum on Islamist President Morsi’s draft constitution today. Rival protestors are still clashing in cities like Alexandria, but the Islamists feel victory is heading their way.

The constitution won 57 percent approval in the first round of voting, and many predict that it will pass by an even larger margin in the last round, when rural, more religious parts of Egypt vote.

But the issues passing the constitution are only the beginning, as Reuters reports:

If the constitution is passed, national elections can take place early next year, something many hope will help end the turmoil that has gripped the Arab world’s most populous nation since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak almost two years ago.

But the closeness of the first day of voting and the low turnout suggest more difficulties ahead for Mursi as he seeks to rally support for difficult economic reforms needed to bring down the budget deficit, such as raising taxes and cutting fuel subsidies.

Morsi insists that the constitution, and the controversial measures taken to put it through a referendum, are necessary steps for Egypt to move away from military rule and towards a constitution-based democracy. Sadly, at best he is half-right. While Egypt’s greatest problems can’t be solved without stable political institutions of some kind, having a constitution (even a much better one than the cobbled together document the Islamists hastily whooped through the Constituent Assembly before the judiciary could shut them down) won’t solve Egypt’s problems.

We’ve noted the core problem for Egypt before: to our knowledge, nobody on Planet Earth has a viable strategy to put this venerable country onto a path out of poverty. At their best—and Egypt’s new constitution is a muddled one—constitutions establish a set of institutions and some procedures that allow the peaceful resolution of political disputes and provide legitimacy for decisions reached through constitutional means.

If the Muslim Brotherhood had a workable plan to make Egypt successful and prosperous, a constitution would provide a framework through which the plan could be enacted and applied. But the constitution is not a magic carpet on which Egypt can fly to paradise. Given the country’s poor prospects, the most difficult problem facing the Muslim Brotherhood isn’t how to get the constitution passed in a referendum; it’s how a broke government in a depressed economy can meet the enormous demands of angry, poor Egyptians—or how it can keep power after the masses realize those demands cannot be met.

Constitutions are much less useful when facing problems of that kind.
 
More on the growing Sunni/Shiite civil war brewing in the Middle East. We have a difficult time seeing this because our Legacy Media tends to try and keep things inside well defined narative boxes, rather than looking at what is really happening in the greater world. Of course it isn't as simple and clear cut as a straight religious conflict, many overlapping lines cover the region, including national, ethnic, linguistic and even demographic ones. The 30 years war is perhaps the best historic way of looking at the possible future:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/01/04/what-a-car-bomb-in-iraq-means-for-the-civil-war-in-syria/

What a Car Bomb in Iraq Means for the Civil War in Syria

A car bomb ripped through a procession of Shia pilgrims today in Musayyib, Iraq, almost 40 miles south of Baghdad, killing 27 people. The bombers were most likely Sunnis trying to reignite Iraq’s civil war.

As the Shia regime of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki grows increasingly authoritarian and sectarian violence gets worse and worse, the fear grows that Iraq is heading back into civil war. Parts of the country have been virtually under siege over the past few weeks, with 60,000 protesters turning out in Fallujah last Friday, blocking highways and chanting the familiar slogan of the Arab Spring—”the people want to bring down the regime!”—and the more direct “Maliki you coward, don’t take your advice from Iran!”

Iraq’s volatile mixture of Sunnis and Shia is once again boiling over, and the civil war next door in Syria is not making matters any easier. Iraqi fighters are operating in Syria on both sides of the war. The U.S. recently determined that the Nusra Front, which claims credit for several spectacular attacks on Syrian regime targets and is one of the strongest rebel groups, is virtually identical in personnel and ideology to al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Iraq’s and Syria’s troubles are closely related—a fact the mainstream media often forgets, choosing instead to stubbornly define the Syrian war as a fight for democracy against a dictatorship and the violence in Iraq as a contained sectarian conflict. This shortsightedness fails to recognize that across the Middle East Sunnis and Shia are engaged in a struggle for political power and religious legitimacy. Sunni rebel groups backed by Sunnis in the Gulf are fighting a Shia regime in Damascus backed by a Shia theocracy in Iran. The same is happening in Iraq, where a Shia authoritarian regime backed by Iran is fighting Sunni groups backed by the Gulf Arabs. Other actors, like the U.S., Turkey, and the Kurds, make this a truly volatile international conflict. And it is Iraq where all of this is going to erupt next, writes Henri Barkey here at the AI:

Today Iraq is held together by a shoestring. . . . The Saudis have not given him [Maliki] much quarter and would like to see him go. He has made an enemy of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as each accuses the other of putting sectarian interests ahead of regional interests and stability. Turks provided refuge to the Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who escaped following his indictment on charges of helping Sunni death squads to operate in Baghdad. This increasing regional rift may be music to the ears of many Iraqi Sunnis, who have been heard saying, in effect, “the Ottomans are back in Istanbul, the Umayyad are about to re-conquer Damascus, and next Sunni Abbasid power will return to Baghdad.”

A Sunni victory in Damascus will necessarily mean a shift in the regional sectarian balance of power. Sunnis in Iraq have also revived the idea of seeking autonomous arrangements like the KRG, something they had violently supressed earlier. What is at stake is the 1916 Sykes-Picot Anglo-French-drawn regional boundaries. Having “lost” Syria, Iran’s natural reaction will be to double down in Iraq, where it already has a great deal of influence. It will want Iraq to provide strategic depth. It is even conceivable that Tehran will create a Shi‘a analogue of the Brezhnev Doctrine—once a government is Shi‘a, it stays Shi‘a, even if we have to send expeditionary forces to keep it that way. Will the neighbors stand idly by if this were to occur?

This is the broad outline of what we see as a Sunni-Shia war for the Arab world, and its two most volatile fronts, Iraq and Syria. If Assad falls, this conflict won’t be over. Expect Iraqi Sunnis to receive even more backing from their co-religionists.
 
And the situation deteriorates in Egypt. As WRM suggests, the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to effectively govern or provide solutions could drive the population into revolt, but the choice isn't between the liberals and the Salafis, as he suggests, but between the military and the various more extreme Islamists:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/01/05/the-most-important-story-from-egypt-this-week/

The Most Important Story From Egypt This Week

From the FT, reporting on the consequences of the fall in the Egyptian currency:

At a central Cairo produce market, vendors have increased prices for green beans by 33 per cent, tomatoes by 50 per cent and zucchini and bananas by 100 per cent. Imported coffee prices have risen more than 20 per cent. The price of bread, a staple of the Egyptian diet, has gone up by 20 per cent in poor neighbourhoods and by even more in well-to-do areas.

Most Egyptians live very close to the margin; a 20 percent rise in the price of bread means that many people will be eating fewer calories and giving less food to their kids. For people in this situation, the only important political question is the availability of the basics you need for survival. The Muslim Brotherhood promised change; so far, the change involves mostly belt-tightening.

Significant further falls in the value of the Egyptian pound can be expected and any economic recovery is a long way off; the question now is whether the MB can hold onto popular (and military) support as conditions worsen, and, if the people begin to turn away from the government, do they turn toward the liberals and the old regime types, or do they double down on ‘Islam as the answer’ and go to the Salafis?
 
While the focus is on Egypt and Lebanon, the article points to a much deeper problem when *we* attempt to understand what exactly is going on in the world. Our perceptions are based on Liberal Democratic values, and we are inclined to look for similarities elsewhere. Some of this is valid; in most basic matters humans are the same in all times and places, otherwise there literally could not be studies like History or Anthropology. OTOH, culture does make a huge difference (otherwise we would be reading about missions to the Moon in Pharonic times).

I first understood this many years ago reading Victor Davis Hanson, who pointed out and explored the implications of the fact that 80% of the Greek people in Classical times were farmers (The Other Greeks). While this fact seems obvious and well known, most people who think about Classical Greece at all tend to think about figures like Pericles or achievements like building the Parthenon, and not on what the bulk of the people are thinking and doing (and without whom, there would be no Pericles or Parthenon to begin with).

Learning to view things without the Liberal Democratic prism would certainly change may of our perceptions and ideas (remember how enthused the media and establishment was about intervention in Libya and the so called "Arab Spring"?), but will be quite difficult and disconcerting to do:

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/international-elite-bubble

The International Elite Bubble
8 January 2013

Robert D. Kaplan is always worth reading. He’s interesting even when I don’t agree with him, and his recent piece in the Wall Street Journal called “The Return of Toxic Nationalism” is right on the money. (It was published over the Christmas holiday, so most of us probably missed it.)

    Western elites believe that universal values are trumping the forces of reaction. They wax eloquent about the triumph of human rights, women's liberation, social media, financial markets, international and regional organizations and all the other forces that are breaking down boundaries separating humanity.

    Tragically, they are really observing a self-referential world of global cosmopolitans like themselves. In country after country, the Westerners identify like-minded, educated elites and mistake them for the population at large. They prefer not to see the regressive and exclusivist forces—such as nationalism and sectarianism—that are mightily reshaping the future.

This is a real and serious problem. I’m prone to it myself and have to consciously go out of my way to counter it.

Lebanon taught me why this is necessary. When I first showed up there during the Beirut Spring in 2005, I met one cosmopolitan liberal-minded person after another protesting Syria’s military occupation in Martyr’s Square in downtown Beirut. I interviewed some startlingly bigoted sectarians at the same time in the same place in the same crowd of activists, though they were the minority.

Had I left the country immediately after hanging with that crowd, I might have come away with a completely distorted impression. Or had that revolution of sorts taken place in any other country, I might have fallen right into the trap Kaplan describes and assumed Beirut was Berlin in 1989. The reason I didn’t, and couldn’t, is because I stuck around because Lebanon is also where Hezbollah lives.

Hezbollah was, and still is, far too big and powerful and nasty to ignore. So one of the first things I did after orienting myself in Martyr’s Square with Lebanon’s liberals was head down to the Hezbollah office in the dahiyeh south of Beirut, which gave me a serious education in totalitarian Islamist politics which I narrate in detail in my first book, The Road to Fatima Gate. The Beirut Spring was not enough to save Lebanon in 2005. Hezbollah blew the country to hell the very next year.

The first time I went to Egypt, also in 2005, I met the same kinds of people I met in Lebanon. Cosmopolitan, liberal-minded individuals who were like Arab versions of me. Egypt had nothing like Hezbollah controlling large swaths of the country and warmongering against the neighbors. No foreign army smothered the country. Instead it had a police state. The narrative there at first seemed to be: democrats against the regime. That’s what it looked like. But my experience in Lebanon prompted me to ask a question of my liberal Egyptian friends that seems not to have occurred to some of the other journalists and Western internationalists who have been there. I asked these Egyptian liberals, “how many Egyptians agree with you about politics?” The answer stopped me cold: five percent at the most.

These people felt profoundly alienated by their own society, but it didn’t seem to occur to them to tell me about it until I asked. Perhaps they thought I knew that already. And of course they knew they were a tiny minority. How could they not? They belonged to a smaller minority than a Republican in San Francisco or gay feminist activist in rural Utah. It isn’t possible to be so out of step with everybody around you and be clueless about it, at least not before the Arab Spring started.

Well north of five percent of Egyptians are secular, to be sure, but liberalism isn’t Egypt’s only secular ideology. Its biggest competitors after Islamism are Arab Nationalism and socialism.

Kaplan is quite right that Western internationalists often don’t like to see what’s going on outside elite bubbles in distant societies. I also prefer not to see it, but I can’t help seeing it anyway. It’s unpleasant, but I force myself to look anyway. It’s not going away. And it’s not at all hard to see if you take the time and effort to look.

How big of a problem are we talking about? Here’s Kaplan again:

    Asia is in the midst of a feverish arms race, featuring advanced diesel-electric submarines, the latest fighter jets and ballistic missiles. China, having consolidated its land borders following nearly two centuries of disorder, is projecting air and sea power into what it regards as the blue national soil of the South China and East China seas.

    Japan and other countries are reacting in kind. Slipping out of its quasi-pacifistic shell, Japan is rediscovering nationalism as a default option. The Japanese navy boasts roughly four times as many major warships as the British Royal Navy. As for Vietnam and the Philippines, nobody who visits those countries and talks with their officials, as I have, about their territorial claims would imagine for a moment that we live in a post-national age.

    The disputes in Asia are not about ideology or any uplifting moral philosophy; they are about who gets to control space on the map. The same drama is being played out in Syria where Alawites, Sunnis and Kurds are in a territorial contest over power and control as much as over ideas. Syria's writhing sectarianism—in which Bashar Assad is merely the leading warlord among many—is a far cruder, chaotic and primitive version of the primate game of king of the hill.

    […]

    Nor can Europe be left out of this larger Eurasian trend. A weakening European Union, coupled with onerous social and economic conditions for years to come, invites a resurgence of nationalism and extremism, as we have already seen in countries as diverse as Hungary, Finland, Ukraine and Greece. That is exactly the fear of the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize committee, which gave this year's award to the European Union in order to make a statement against this trend.

    Fascists are not about to regain power anywhere on the Continent, but the age of deepening European integration is likely behind us.

I’d like to see a world where the majority of people everywhere have cosmopolitan values. That world might be less interesting to write about, but more pleasant to live in.

We’re not there yet. And I’m not at all convinced we’re even heading in that direction. The cultural elites of the world are heading in that direction, for sure, but it’s not true of everyone everywhere.
 
Staying out of MAli may have been a political calculation, but it also keeps our resources available for other, worse contingencies:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2013/01/14/the-brotherhoods-agenda-cairos-catastrophe/

The Brotherhood's Agenda, Cairo's Catastrophe

It has been heralded as a humanitarian gesture and a sign of Arab leadership, but Qatar’s decision last week to double its $2.5 billion aid package to Egypt is also a telling indicator of the true economic state of affairs in post-revolutionary Egypt.

The prognosis is exceedingly grim. Two years after the ouster of long-serving strongman Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is in the throes of a full-blown economic crisis. Government reserves have dropped by more than half, plummeting from $36 billion in 2011 to just $15 billion today. That’s enough to cover just three months of imports of vital commodities such as food and petroleum. GDP growth has slowed to under 2 percent, and the country’s national currency, the Egyptian Pound, is in freefall. At the same time, unemployment has surged, now estimated at nearly 13 percent and rising. It’s no wonder that Maher Hamoud of the English-language Daily News Egypt recently likened the country’s economy to “a mud house in the rainy season.”

These statistics are all the more tragic because they could have been avoided. The February 2011 ouster of Mubarak was followed by a pronounced fiscal downturn, leading many to conclude that the country’s new, Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government—for all of its bluster to the contrary—wouldn’t impose radical changes on the country’s political direction. Instead, conventional wisdom held that the new powers-that-be in Cairo would, for both economic and political reasons, opt for a process of “creeping Islamization”—a slow, gradual changeover of the country’s civilian bureaucracy and legislature which wouldn’t rile international markets or spook jittery investors.

The conventional wisdom turned out to be wrong. In recent months, the Brotherhood has thrown caution to the wind and set about remaking the Egyptian state in its own image with a speed and ferocity that has surprised most onlookers.

In late November, in the wake of his public turn as peacemaker between Israel and Hamas, Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi made a significant power grab, issuing a presidential decree dramatically broadening his executive powers. Simultaneously, his government put forward a new draft constitution imbuing the country’s Islamist-dominated parliament with greater powers, trimming the size of Egypt’s Constitutional Court, and enshrining sharia as the law of the land. (The constitution was approved in a referendum the following month, and promptly signed into law by President Morsi). Since then Egypt has trended more authoritarian still, most recently via a draft law proposed by the Human Rights Committee of Egypt’s Shura Council which, if adopted, will significantly limit the rights of ordinary Egyptians to engage in political protest.

This anti-democratic drift might not have spurred Egypt’s economic ills, but it undoubtedly has made them worse. Tourism, the country’s economic lifeblood, which withered following Mubarak’s ouster in 2011, remains minimal as a result of widespread political and security concerns. The hotels in Egypt’s famed tourist town of Luxor, for example, are now reportedly mostly empty. Foreign direct investment into the country has dwindled to “near zero,” reports the Egypt Independent, as skittish investors seek greener pastures. And planned bailouts—chief among them a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund widely believed to be critical to Cairo’s fiscal health—have stalled amid the political turmoil.

The cumulative effect is that Egypt is fast becoming a Middle Eastern version of Haiti: a country without meaningful tourism, minimal foreign investment, massive capital flight, and eventually an exodus of its best and brightest. That, of course, will inevitably become a crisis for Egypt’s neighbors, who will be forced to shoulder the political and security burdens of its implosion. But most of all, it is a tragedy for Egyptians themselves, who, having once dreamed of greater political liberalism after Mubarak, have woken up to an economic nightmare presided over by the Muslim Brotherhood.

An economic implosion in Egypt will have far reaching effects, especially since Egypt is perhaps the most populous of the Arab states, and also has lots of military hardware from old Soviet tanks to late model American helicopters and fighter/bombers. I expect the first stage (which may already be happening) is to "export" trouble and troublemakers in order to divert attention from "home".

If there is a positive side, many of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia will be forced to divert lots of cash and resources to attempting to stabilize Egypt, or alternatively to knock off the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than exporting trouble of their own.
 
Found this interesting in an interview with General Stanley McChrystal regarding several issues with respect to the Middle East and North Africa.

http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2013-01-16/general-stanley-mcchrystal-my-share-task/transcript

RAMIE
Good morning. Yes, thank you for taking my call. Firstly, I wanted to thank the general for his service and his sacrifice. What he does really makes this country the shining beacon that I as an immigrant would strive to be a part of. And I want to thank him and all the veterans that do that. I have a two part question for the general. The first one is his opinion on the nominee Hagel vis-a-vis the Iran and Israel situation.

RAMIE
And secondly, as an immigrant of Palestinian origin, I want to get his opinion of the situation in Palestine Israel and if that's the crux of the symptoms that we're seeing in the Middle East, and if that's get solved, what kind of reaction would we have in the greater Middle East area.

GJELTEN
Thank you, Ramie.

MCCHRYSTAL
Great. Thanks for your question and kind words first. I would say on the nomination of Senator Hagel, he's certainly got a great background. Of course, I like the fact that he served in the military. I like he's obviously thoughtful. I don't know him well, met him once. A lot of people are focusing on things that he said in his potential policy positions. My personal concern -- or my personal position is I don't worry too much about his policy positions. I think that the most important thing is he's going to be a policy implementer under President Obama.

MCCHRYSTAL
I think that they're, as a group, a cabinet and as a wider government, they're going to have to deal with a lot of very difficult issues in the next four years. The reduction of the defense budget. There's clearly going to be some development of our relationship with Iran, North Korea. I really want to make sure that they've got a tight team that can navigate that and other unexpected things. So my tendency would be to say that if President Obama trusts him and he's willing to do it, that my default would be to support that request.

MCCHRYSTAL
On the second issue on the Mid East region, I do think the Palestinian issue's extraordinarily important. I used to be able to go to remote places in Afghanistan and ask an Afghan villager about the situation in Palestine and they would be very, very opinionated on it. But then if you asked them where it was, they really didn't have much concept. So it's an important region or issue to the people right close to it in Palestine, but it's also one of those issues that has resonance far from it.

MCCHRYSTAL
But I'm not sure that's the biggest issue in the region right now. I actually think that if we look at what's likely to drive events in the Mid East and the wider Mid East over the next 20 years, I think the Sunni, Shia divide is likely to be something that we are underestimating right now. If you see that, if you watch what's happening in Syria, there's a serious component to that there. And then also the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, I think that they're going to be a player bigger than some people expect. Egypt of course is the most obvious location right now. But their role and their evolution as a movement I think is going to be very, very important.

GJELTEN
And of course there you spend a lot of time fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I think we have to conclude that al-Qaeda as a generalized foe has not been vanquished. We see what's going on in Mali right now where al-Qaeda linked Islamist militias have been making great inroads. And just this morning some very concerning news from Algeria where Islamist militants have apparently taken hostages, including some Americans, from a foreign operated gas field in Eastern Algeria. Your thoughts about the state of al-Qaeda right now, particularly in North Africa.

MCCHRYSTAL
Yeah, it's dangerous and it's growing. The thing about al-Qaeda is I've always viewed al-Qaeda as a political movement wrapped in a religious cloak. It's also a flexible movement if you go to al-Qaeda in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, al-Qaeda in Maghreb. The local elements can fit that to their particular desire. So people who have aims for one thing or another can grab the al-Qaeda banner, they can use that, they can get a certain amount of legitimacy from that and then go forward. I think Mali, Algeria and other areas are going to be a difficult struggle, as much a war of ideas as anything else, but it's going to be -- it's going to be difficult.
 
Hopefully this field, is the best place to post this video. It refers to Iraq post US occupation. It specifically talks about Nouri Al-Maliki and his government, from what is mentioned, it seems that Al-Maliki is not the best man to run the country. With the crisis next door (in Syria), does anyone here think that the Islamist threat and the Kurdish issue could bring down the regime. One of the commentator's states that Iraq best asset is it's military.
Here is the video.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=3tydPC1L7kU
 
The interconnectedness of all things. Diplomatic errors in Libya have cascaded across Northern Africa, with consequences we will be reaping for years and maybe decades to come:

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Swaminomics/entry/from-libya-to-algeria-a-bloody-trail

From Libya to Algeria, a bloody trail SA Aiyar
27 January 2013, 06:02 AM IST 

Barack Obama’s triumphal second inauguration as US President has been tarnished by Al Qaida’s attack on an Algerian gas plant that killed 38 foreigners. US analysts may ignore the connection, but the Libyan chickens have come home to roost.
   
A major Obama achievement is supposedly Gaddafi’s overthrow in Libya. Yet a line of direct causality runs from Gaddafi’s overthrow to the rise of Al Qaida in Mali and attack in Algeria.
   
Paranoid about the possibility of an internal coup, Gaddafi hired mercenaries from many African countries. These included Tuareg soldiers from Mali. Historically, the Tuaregs were great traders. They ferried gold and slaves from black Africa across the Sahara to the Mediterranean, and brought back salt. Their trade yielded huge wealth, with which they built the great city of Timbuktu.
   
Then came white colonial rule, dividing Africa through arbitrary lines on maps. One such artificial creation was Mali, combining blacks in the south with mostly Tuaregs in the Saharan north. The blacks were more numerous, so the capital was the southern city of Bamako, not Timbuktu.
   
After Gaddafi’s overthrow, his Tuareg mercenaries took their heavy weapons back to northern Mali. They joined hands with local Tuareg secessionists and an Islamist group, Ansar Dine. The Islamists soon came to dominate the new Tuareg combination. They linked up with Islamists in neighbouring countries to form Al Qaida of the Maghreb.
   
Mali had been a democracy for two decades. But after the Tuareg revolt, the Mali army staged a coup in Bamako. Under pressure of sanctions, the army allowed a partial restoration of civilian rule, but basically remained in charge. So, the NATO intervention in Libya, widely trumpeted as a triumph for democracy, actually ended up destroying both ethnic unity and democracy in Mali.
   
Meanwhile, the Islamist Tuaregs started moving south, taking several French hostages. France intervened to protect its citizens and greater interests. It is being supported by token forces from neighbouring African countries, but this is essentially a French/NATO move.
   
Islamists call this a religious war. This explains their suicide attack on the gas plant in Algeria, which was planned in Mali. Other attacks will surely follow.
   
The Islamists are not popular save in some pockets, and are feared by African governments. Their strict interpretation of sharia is widely resented. They have destroyed historic buildings in Timbuktu as unIslamic. Yet they are strong enough to take over territories.
   
Obama triumphalism over Gaddafi’s overthrow looks comic after the disastrous consequences in Mali and Algeria. The US media hail Hilary Clinton as a great Secretarty of State. Why? For exiting from Iraq leaving behind a Shia sectarian government, not an inclusive democracy? For exiting from Afghanistan after failing in all strategic goals? For promising to close down Guantanamo and not doing so?
   
May be Libya will evolve into a genuine democracy, but this is uncertain because of deep tribal rivalries that sparked Gaddafi’s overthrow. Democracy in next-door Egypt is already at risk, with secular parties accusing President Morsi of Islamist murder of the constitution. Of the Arab Spring countries, only Tunisia looks safe for democracy.
   
Militarization of the Arab Spring, by NATO in Libya, unwittingly destroyed democracy and ethnic peace in Mali. It greatly expanded Al Qaeda’s influence in the region. Yet we see no agonizing by US politicians or media over their role in this sorry sequence of events.
   
What lessons flow from this? In Syria, the US should stop the simplistic portrayal of the revolt against Bashir Assad as one of democratic forces against a tyrannical dictator. Overthrowing one nasty regime can simply lead to another.
   
Assad is a bloody dictator. But most rebel groups are Sunni and Islamist sectarians who have little time for secularism, democracy or minority rights. US support for these rebels could be as disastrous as was support to Islamist rebels in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The very Islamists who forced the withdrawal of Soviet troops have now forced the withdrawal of US troops.
   
The most powerful nation in history has been fiscally bankrupted by failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Debate on budget deficits drowns out debate on foreign policy.
   
French troops in Mali will, at least temporarily, check the advance of Islamist troops. But this has revived memories of colonial rule and is fraught with danger. Roping in troops from neighbouring countries makes sense, but these will be seen widely as colonial camp-followers, not a pan-African force. This will fuel Al Qaida’s propaganda.
   
There are no easy answers. Obama’s Libyan strategy of “leading from behind” will not work here. The ultimate solutions will have to come from within the region. Sadly, these are not in sight.
 
A look at how the various Arab states are dealing with the fallout of the Arab Spring. One big surprise is that, so far, no one has decided to go after Israel as a means of distracting people from the problems inside the nation, indeed Israel has dropped off most people's radar as more pressing issues are now at hand. Various other issues are touched on here, especially the looming backdrop of Shiite/Sunni conflict in the region:

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/01/29/jonathan-kay-welcome-to-the-new-arab-world-where-no-one-really-cares-much-about-israel/

Jonathan Kay: Welcome to the new Arab world — where no one really cares much about Israel

Jonathan Kay | Jan 29, 2013 11:56 AM ET | Last Updated: Jan 29, 2013 2:29 PM ET
More from Jonathan Kay | @jonkay

When Israel declared independence in 1948, every single one of its Arab neighbours sent in their armies to destroy the Jewish state. The war convulsed the region, as did the many wars that followed. To this day, the received wisdom among bien-penants is that Israel’s very existence is the main destabilizing factor in the Levant.

And so, 65 years later, how bizarre is it to survey the results of the Arab Spring? Once again, every single one of Israel’s immediate neighbours is locked in a potentially cataclysmic struggle — but this time, the Arab chaos is all internal. For the populations of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, it as if the Israeli menace were merely an engrossing, terrifying epic film that suddenly has come to an abrupt finale. The house lights have come on, and the viewers’ minds are returning to the real-life internal problems that have been festering in their autocratic societies for generations.

Syria is in a state of full-fledged civil war, largely waged by Sunnis who are seeking to dethrone Bashar Assad’s Allawite-led dictatorship. Mr. Assad has made some vague and pathetic attempts to implicate “Zionist” conspirators, but no one is buying it. The only Israeli border incident of note was a Syrian-on-Syrian skirmish, during which government ordinance accidentally fell on Israeli soil, to no effect.

Next door in Lebanon, there have been spillover skirmishes, and the country’s leaders are doing everything they can not to get sucked into the Syrian vortex. Yet Hezbollah fighters (who support the Assad regime, for cynical reasons connected to their Iranian patrons) go back and forth freely across the border, along with refugees. It is this border, not the Israeli-Lebanese border, that is likely to become Lebanon’s next flash point. Hezbollah remains the dominant power-broker in Lebanon, but will become isolated and vulnerable once Iran loses its logistical routes through Syrian soil. Lebanon fought a long and complicated civil war from 1975 to 1990, and another one could come soon — but this time, Israel will be smart enough to sit it out.


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Egypt is not in a state of civil war. But its military leader is warning of a “collapse of the state,” amidst continued deadly clashes with protesters in several cities. (The latest spark involved was a spate of death sentences handed out to 21 Port Said soccer hooligans who’d rioted in 2012.) With a Muslim Brotherhood President at the helm, the country is racked with debate and anxiety about the role of Islam in public life. But even that grand theme has little to do with the current violence, which apparently is rooted in obscure inter-municipal grievances nursed by residents of Egypt’s non-Cairene population. While the Western press has spotlighted President Mohamed Morsi’s views on Israel, and Jews in general, the whole subject of confronting the Zionists is non-existent as an Egyptian national priority: Egypt’s only military project in Sinai has been to confront Jihadi terrorists who are the shared enemy of Egypt and Israel alike. In the May 2012 presidential debate between former Arab League secretary-general Amr Moussa and self-described Islamist moderate Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, four and half hours passed before the word Israel was even mentioned.

Finally, there is Jordan, long seen as the Morocco of the Levant. Last week’s parliamentary elections went smoothly. But the country has been destabilized by waves of refugees from Iraq, and now Syria. So much so that the country is now declaring that it will not accept any more refugees — including, most controversially, Syrian Palestinians. “We do not encourage our Syrian brothers to come to Jordan because their country needs them more and they should remain there,” the Jordanian PM declared, explicitly raising the prospect of a quasi-humanitarian military action on the border. “We will stop them and keep them in their country.”

For a regular observer of the Middle East, it is actually quite stunning to read such a steady stream of reports from countries that, in the not-too-distant past, have defined their entire national mission as being the eradication of the Jewish state. Syria is actually still technically at war with Israel — as, of course, is Hezbollah. Even in Egypt, which signed a peace treaty with Israel, explosive gestures of anti-Israel hate were a mainstay of street demonstrations under Hosni Mubarak, since it was one of the few officially permitted forms of political protest.

But now that Mubarak is gone, Egyptians are free to shout and protest, and even riot, over the things that really matter in their lives. And apparently, Israel doesn’t even make the top-10 list. Instead, what these people care about is the nature of their government, the price of bread and gas, the treatment of women and Copts and Allawites, soccer and — yes — freedom.

That f-word is important here because for the last decade, George W. Bush and the neo-cons have been denounced as naive, and worse, for insisting, post-9/11, that the Muslim world hungered deeply for Western-style liberty, so much so that they would welcome American troops on Arab soil.

That last part was wrong. But Bush was perfectly correct on his much larger point, which I never grow tired of repeating. “We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East,” he declared in 2003. “In the past, [we] have been willing to make a bargain to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Long-standing ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.… No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims and our great democracies should oppose tyranny wherever it is found.”

Bush was talking about protecting America. Yet the Arab Spring (of which Bush deserves to be considered its godfather) also has destroyed the cynical Arab political game of funnelling all of their population’s accumulated hate and frustration at Israel and the Jews.

I haven’t the slightest doubt that anti-Semitism remains rife in these Arab societies, and that solidarity with the Palestinians will continue to guide their posturing at times of war. But current upheavals show that ordinary Arabs now increasingly view Israel as a sideshow to the acute birthing pains of their own crumbling autocracies. Amid all the death and chaos, that counts as good news.

National Post
jkay@nationalpost.com
@jonkay
 
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