- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
Part 2 of 2:
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/09/25/report-from-the-middle-east-part-one/
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/09/25/report-from-the-middle-east-part-one/
For American presidents, a thriving peace process is good domestic and international politics. This is one reason every US president sooner or later tries to get some kind of negotiation going, even though bringing Israelis and Palestinians together makes cat herding look easy.
Ever since the original peace process collapsed in 1999-2000 when President Clinton bet — and lost — the ranch on getting the final deal done while he was in the White House, the US has struggled to replace the old peace process with something new. So far, nothing durable has emerged, but Plan B has had some success. Under both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the US and the EU have poured billions of dollars and a great deal of effort in helping the Palestinians build stronger institutions and a healthier economy on the West Bank.
The concept was that this policy would have two benefits. First, by creating strong and credible institutions (including Palestinian security forces), the US and our EU associates can help Israel develop confidence that a Palestinian government exists which can carry out the terms of a peace treaty, suppressing violent Palestinian movements that will inevitably seek to torpedo peace. Second, by developing the economy, universities and civil society, the US can promote the emergence of a sophisticated and modern thinking Palestinian national intelligentsia and business class who will prefer peace to war.
These efforts have made a real difference. The Palestinian Authority was once a resistance movement; these days it is an emerging government, though often not a very transparent or effective one. I hear from both Israelis and Americans who are familiar with these matters that the US-trained security forces are good at what they do and getting better, and that cooperation between them and their Israeli counterparts is pretty professional.
As a result of all this work, we seem to be edging closer to a situation in which the Palestinian Authority might, if it could assert authority over both Gaza and the West Bank, become what compromise-minded Israelis say they want: a credible partner for peace.
But it is not still not clear that any Palestinian government could say out loud what sophisticated Palestinians have known for years: the right of return is dead, and compensation is the best that can be hoped for. When I visited Ramallah (the West Bank boom town and de facto capital city) in 2010, signs in English and Arabic all over the city proclaimed the PA’s determination to fight for the right of return. Those signs had been taken down this time, but I don’t think the idea is dead in people’s hearts.
Palestinian capacity is growing, but to some degree that increased political and social capacity makes Palestinians more frustrated rather than less. The more educated, sophisticated and experienced people are, the less willing they are to put up with fundamentally unacceptable political restraints. The Palestinians by and large are better educated than almost any other Arab nationality, but they have less control over their lives than most — and the fact that their overlords are foreign rather than homegrown does not make the lack of autonomy easier to bear.
The US has been hoisted on its own petard here; the civil society that we help to build makes Palestinians less patient rather than more patient — and forces their leaders to pay closer attention to public opinion than in the past. This makes it fundamentally harder to build a peace process that can move the ball down the field toward the ultimate (if distant) goal of peace while managing the day-to-day conflict in ways that reduce tension and make life better for people on both sides. It also ensures that Palestinians aren’t particularly grateful for America’s financial help.
Each of the last three US presidents made poor decisions that have made this tangle worse. President Clinton had good intentions and many accomplishments to his credit, but his final, foolhardy rush to peace in the closing months and days of his administration was perhaps the worst decision made by any US president on this issue since the controversy began. His goal should have been to shore up a faltering peace process rather than pushing it to a premature climax. The failure of his peacemaking effort was predictable and expensive, and the absence of a legitimate peace process has been a serious problem in the region ever since.
President George W. Bush inherited a bad situation and made it worse. On the one hand, he inflamed Arab and world opinion by a confrontational approach on a range of issues and serial failures in both the development and presentation of policy alienated friends and antagonized enemies. His record was not entirely bleak; he managed to nudge the Israelis back toward some kind of negotiating posture and his strengthening of Palestinian institutions and the promotion of a strong West Bank economic miracle helped to reduce tension. Nevertheless, the US agenda was in worse shape when he left office than when he first took the oath.
President Obama added his own contribution to the record of failed US initiatives. While I personally agree with him that an extendable settlement freeze would greatly simplify the task of getting a good peace negotiation going, in the real world to make that demand was to lose all initiative on the issue — and to miss the opportunity to get the Israelis to make less dramatic but quite useful concessions in its place. He has allowed Prime Minister Netanyahu to outmaneuver him diplomatically and in US politics more than once. The US president’s optimistic speeches about building bridges to the Muslim world fell hollow and flat after he linked that effort to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute which his own errors placed out of reach.
In fairness to President Obama, this has never been an easy issue for the United States and his two predecessors both left the situation in worse shape than they found it. But not even the President can believe at this point that his peace initiatives have had much success.
It’s doubtful at this point if the President can get much done before the 2012 election. Palestinians don’t much like negotiating during US election years as they believe that Israel’s political popularity in the US makes itself felt most strongly then. (One reason President Clinton’s peace blitz was ill-timed in 2000: his wife was running for the Senate in New York and Palestinians believed he would not force Israel to make difficult concessions while his wife was running in a state where the Jewish vote is so important and while his vice president Al Gore was in a tough race against George W. Bush. After the election, Clinton was a lame duck and the Palestinians had little confidence that he could deliver on any promises he made.)
There are no magic solutions to this problem, but as long as the US has interests in the Middle East we must keep coming back to it. Over the next few months, I hope the Obama administration — and the Republican foreign policy strategists who hope to return to power after 2012 — think carefully about how to manage this difficult process a little better. After more than a decade of failure and retreat, it is time for a deep and searching review of the assumptions and ideas that have brought so little joy to us or to the parties involved.