Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[MilEME09]

Not going to happen as that would come at the expense of the Regular Force.

I meant the CF as a whole, The reserves doesn't have the need to be larger then the reg force, for now, unless we change our model.

 

[LightFighter]

Can the "Regiment" be civilianized?  Instead of the Regiment being a military construct can the emphasis be shifted to the Regimental Association?

The role of the Regimental Association would be that of a Social Club attracting members of the local community. Their military purpose would be to maintain the local profile of the Canadian Army in general and to ensure/promote a steady stream of volunteers to man one of the subunits of the Territorial Battalion Groups.  Serving members would be members of the Regimental Association but would not be actively involved, at least not on the Government's time, with Association duties. 

Jus' thinkin' (again)  ???

Why would a civilian with no Regimental/Military ties wish to join a Regiment's Association? What would the draw for them be?

Also, would it really be beneficial to the Regiment/Association and encourage people to join the unit? I have my doubts.
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One of the major changes that IMO needs to be done, like others has mentioned is a complete reorg of the Army Reserves and start combining units. Instead of a city having 2-4 Infantry "Regiments", they should reorg into 1 battalion, with the former "regiments" becoming a Rifle Company. As well, for the admin aspect, each of the former units could combine their Orderly Room into one Battalion Orderly room, and have each new company retain 1-2 clerks, 1 Ops NCO, etc - assuming that is realistic/doable. CO/RSM duties would rotate between cap badges.

Individual coys could carry on the linage/history of their prior regiment, keep the capbadge, etc. No more LCols commanding a Reserve "Regiment" that is in reality a under strength company. For weekend training, the battalion can go out and train together, instead of what is currently done with with unit being able to put out a platoon(+/-) and doing their own thing. Depending on what is being done, IBTS vs tactical training, it may be better for each Coy to do it's own individual training, but at other times it may be more beneficial to have each Coy working together.


As well this would occur in the brigade's Armour, Artillery, etc units as well.

I would assume having far less individual HQs and LCols, etc would save the brigades money which could be better spent towards training, recruiting, etc.

 

[Old Sweat]

To play a bit of the devil's advocate, if one wished to adopt such a course of action, it should be accompanied with a corresponding reduction in the bloated numbers of regular senior officers and marginally useful headquarters. Otherwise, the plan is vulnerable to attack for cutting the reserves so the regulars can grow.

There also may be more than a few unintended consequences here, and maybe we should barnstorm some what ifs. Consider in the late 1950s that we took a well-established militia structure with experienced war time commanders, many with impressive combat records, and converted it from a mobilization base for a war in Europe into a national survival organization to conduct recovery operations in our major cities after a nuclear attack. I really don't think the reserves really ever recovered, though I may be pessimistic.

 

[medicineman]

Why would a civilian with no Regimental/Military ties wish to join a Regiment's Association? What would the draw for them be?

The Association would benefit from monetary and political connections and those connections would be able to have some more LCF to add to their CV's and bio's and public sides.

MM

 

[Kirkhill]

Its what attracts Honoraries to the Regimental Associations in the first place.  That and the opportunity to hangout at places like the Canadian Forces College and New Year's Levees.

It would be the opposite of a Reg Force Regimental Association where the soldiers create a family.  In this instance the "family" (community) would create soldiers.

 

[LightFighter]

To play a bit of the devil's advocate, if one wished to adopt such a course of action, it should be accompanied with a corresponding reduction in the bloated numbers of regular senior officers and marginally useful headquarters. Otherwise, the plan is vulnerable to attack for cutting the reserves so the regulars can grow.

I agree, changes must be made in the Regular Force as well in regards to HQ, etc. IMO, we could probably do with less divisions as well, personally I would like to only see

1 Cdn Div - Western Canada
2 Cdn Div - Central/Atlantic Canada
3 Cdn Div - Quebec

I've also thought about having a 4th Cdn Div, but this one would have all Reserve Brigades fall under it, but I'm not sure it would work out well.

The Association would benefit from monetary and political connections and those connections would be able to have some more LCF to add to their CV's and bio's and public sides.

MM

Ack, but couldn't the Association hosting social events and inviting members/organizations in the community accomplish the same? As well, isn't the HCol supposed to help with this as well(eg connections, etc)?

 

[Kirkhill]

...

Ack, but couldn't the Association hosting social events and inviting members/organizations in the community accomplish the same? As well, isn't the HCol supposed to help with this as well(eg connections, etc)?

I think you are right.  I guess what I am suggesting is that the "social" burden be taken from the serving members and transferred to the Association or Honoraries, Past Members and Auxilliaries.  They could also take up the burden of managing the Cadet Corps.

The Civic value would be that of promoting values and raising a local corps of volunteers that may or may not sign up for Class A service but would be available to support the community in times of crisis.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Keep the militia, but make it all voluntary.

Redirect 'militia' funding into a dozen of the old 'numbered' battalions/ regiments, to be known as 'reserve battalions/ regiments', scattered across Canada. They get a 'corn flake' style cap badge with a number on it, like the good old days. Arty/Engr/CSS stay pretty much the same. Cav and Inf go briefly insane while they adjust to the new reality.

If the militia guys want to join the numbered units they have to Dag green. New recruits are enlisted directly into the numbered battalions.

Post regular soldiers, in their last 2 or 3 years, to the numbered battalions to bolster the skill/ experience levels and overall numbers.

Task each numbered battalion to support one of the CMBGs in some way.

There, simples right? 

Hat... coat... taxi!

 

[Fishbone Jones]

It's not the 'boots on the ground' Reservists that are opposed to amalgamation. This I know from experience.

It is the LCol Company Commanders, the platoon sized RSMs, the Honourary Cols and LCols that oppose for fear of losing their personal stature, not the Regiments.

Ask the Jr Officers, WOs', Snr NCOs' and Jnr NCOs'. Move to their wishes and you'll be 33BG, 1st Armoured tomorrow.

Fire the tit suckers and within 10 years you'll have the norm.

 

[kratz]

As a cautionary tale, I have to mention.

The system is quick enough to lose deadweight in the lower ranks.
If we start firing the mid to upper ranks as fast, what would be left with?

 

[George Wallace]

As a cautionary tale, I have to mention.

The system is quick enough to lose deadweight in the lower ranks.
If we start firing the mid to upper ranks as fast, what would be left with?

Ah!  But there is the rub.  You ensure the system is quick enough to lose the deadweight in the lower ranks before they reach mid to upper ranks.  Failure to do so on both the NCO and officer lower ranks is where we have seen the problem spread, through the deadweight being promoted, found to be lacking and then sent to the Schools to breed more deadweight in their likeness.

 

[MilEME09]

Ah!  But there is the rub.  You ensure the system is quick enough to lose the deadweight in the lower ranks before they reach mid to upper ranks.  Failure to do so on both the NCO and officer lower ranks is where we have seen the problem spread, through the deadweight being promoted, found to be lacking and then sent to the Schools to breed more deadweight in their likeness.

Unfortunately the deadweight has friends who wont let the system be respected, so they get a helping hand

 

[Underway]

The reserves are just like survivor:

Outwit,Outlast, Outplay,  And eventually you'll be a Major.

 

[Danjanou]

The reserves are just like survivor:

Outwit,Outlast, Outplay,  And eventually you'll be a Major CO.

FTFY  8)

 

[Brasidas]

It's not the 'boots on the ground' Reservists that are opposed to amalgamation. This I know from experience.

It is the LCol Company Commanders, the platoon sized RSMs, the Honourary Cols and LCols that oppose for fear of losing their personal stature, not the Regiments.

Ask the Jr Officers, WOs', Snr NCOs' and Jnr NCOs'. Move to their wishes and you'll be 33BG, 1st Armoured tomorrow.

Fire the tit suckers and within 10 years you'll have the norm.

In principle, maybe.

When the implementation ends up being three sub-units meeting at the most central location to conduct collective training (that was previously done on their own), driving everybody else 90 minutes, with breakdowns and holdups and coordination on site, orders are given, and then I get literally fifteen minutes to actually train troops before we're told to pack up and go home, I get skeptical.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Encouraging young officers and NCO, to work with the other units will build bonds and create those unofficial channels that makes things work. As mentioned being able to maximize training time on Parade nights needs to be a priority, much time is often whittled away. If things go off the rails, NCO's and Officers should have some idea how to fill that time with useful training. 

 

[Fishbone Jones]

In principle, maybe.

When the implementation ends up being three sub-units meeting at the most central location to conduct collective training (that was previously done on their own), driving everybody else 90 minutes, with breakdowns and holdups and coordination on site, orders are given, and then I get literally fifteen minutes to actually train troops before we're told to pack up and go home, I get skeptical.

A big part of the problem you are stuck on is that you have 3 x CO, 3 x RSM, 3 x Ops cells vying for control and coordination. An amalgamated outfit would have only one of each driving a single organization. Training can be conducted the way it always has, but at the Sqn level vice Regimental, with a Major and SSM at the hilt operating under direction of the central Command Cell.

 

[Eaglelord17]

Ah!  But there is the rub.  You ensure the system is quick enough to lose the deadweight in the lower ranks before they reach mid to upper ranks.  Failure to do so on both the NCO and officer lower ranks is where we have seen the problem spread, through the deadweight being promoted, found to be lacking and then sent to the Schools to breed more deadweight in their likeness.

To be fair having spent time in the Reserves and Regs, I have found much more deadweight in the Regs than the Reserves, main difference is one is always paid, the other isn't (and even then it is at 15% less with less benefits).

I feel the best way to fix the Reserves is to take it out of Reg Force control (at least budget wise). Give them a stable budget which shall increase by x amount each year, and if there are cuts do it equally between the Regs and Reserves (I know heresy). Also give them permission to recruit 180 troops per unit minimum with most the recruiting being done by the unit recruiter (as the current system bleeds the unit before they have a chance, how is it when you have 15 potential recruits in the fall only one gets in by the summer? Most recruits you get are either High School students or in University so it might be best to make it so you can hire them in a timely fashion before they get a job at X fastfood place or are no longer interested). This would bring the Reserve army up to approximately 25,000-30,000 troops which is something that can be used effectively (either in augmentation or in the event of a real war you actually have a decent force to call to arms).

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Increasing $$ to the Reserves when the Reg Force budgets are being slashed and Reg Force trg is being reduced isn't likely the smart thing to do and the thing that will happen. 

Simply having a 25-30k strength Reserve doesn't mean jack shit if you don't have the $ to train them to do something useful and the kit they need to do it once trained to the useful level.  Otherwise, all  you have is a paper force with no teeth. 

Now, if you did have that 25-30k force reserve army...just what are you doing with them that makes all this money worth spending to Joe and Jane Taxpayer?  The main purpose of the PRES is to augment the Regs.

(1) Define the need, role, whatever of the PRES.  (2) Define the realistic command and supply structures needed to support that role (3) fund that organization.

Its great to toss numbers around for troop strength.  Pease don't throw the token "domestic ops" lifeline out for what the PRES will do.

 

[dapaterson]

Increasing $$ to the Reserves when the Reg Force budgets are being slashed and Reg Force trg is being reduced isn't likely the smart thing to do and the thing that will happen. 

Simply having a 25-30k strength Reserve doesn't mean jack shit if you don't have the $ to train them to do something useful and the kit they need to do it once trained to the useful level.  Otherwise, all  you have is a paper force with no teeth. 

Now, if you did have that 25-30k force reserve army...just what are you doing with them that makes all this money worth spending to Joe and Jane Taxpayer?  The main purpose of the PRES is to augment the Regs.

(1) Define the need, role, whatever of the PRES.  (2) Define the realistic command and supply structures needed to support that role (3) fund that organization.

Its great to toss numbers around for troop strength.  Pease don't throw the token "domestic ops" lifeline out for what the PRES will do.

Realistically, that needs to be done for both Reg and Res F at the same time - what do we want the CAF writ large to be able to do; how should we structure it to do that, with a mix of high readiness (Reg F) and reduced readiness (Res F).

With 25% of the Reg F now officers, I'd argue that there's ample room for an examination of command structures there as well... and likely some savings that could be reinvested from staff processes into readiness.