Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[dapaterson]

The Kiwis have integrated bits of Maori culture (specifically the Haka) into every aspect of their society.  Each school/sporting team/etc. has their own Haka, so it's natural for them that the military would have it as well. 

I'm not sure we could do something similar now, since the aboriginal culture isn't as ingrained in the collective Canadian identity.

Canada has no single aboriginal culture; the Sto Lo of the Fraser Valley are different from the Mohawks for Kanewake who are different from the Mi'kmaq of Eskatoni.

 

[a_majoor]

A few semi random observations here:

1. The reserves could expand quite rapidly into a large force if we simply look at the issue of available bodies. A typical example was a Reserve CoOp course I was 2I/C on a few years ago, which was limited to an intake of 30 for London and surrounding area. One of the school councillors responsible for their school's intake told me that over 100 students applied from that school alone. Most of the other councillors had similar observations, meaning that up to 1000 recruits could have been taken (although after weeding out I suspect the real number would have been a still respectable 500+). I will also note that the CoOp program is NOT heavy promoted or advertised in the schools (often because *we* don't even know until the last minute if it will be given the green light or not: the mad scramble for course stores and training aids is something to behold), and in many schools the administration is indifferent or even hostile. In this case the limiting factor is more the size of the instructor cadre and amount of uniforms and training stores and areas that can be secured.

2. I think the real locus of evolution needs to be in the Regular Force. Looking at conflicts like Ukraine, Gaza or the general mess in the Middle East, the types of forces which are being used tend towards SoF supported by a wide range of enablers (Cyber, PSYOPS, ISTAR and remote fire support in the form of UAVs and aircraft etc.). Large numbers of men are needed for "holding" actions rather than fighting (the bulk of the Russian forces are there on the border seemingly to mesmerize Ukrainian and NATO decision makers, the fighting was done by irregulars backed up with SPETSNAZ troops and training until quite recently. Even now, the numbers of Russian troops "on vacation" in Ukraine is a fraction of the potential available). These sorts of troops require intensive training to receive the proper skill sets, and to practice them often, hence the need for full time and relatively long term troops for these tasks.

3. COIN, STABOPS and other forms of "holding actions" (the Russians don't have to be the only ones massed on the border, after all) needs lots of manpower, but fewer of the specialist skills and training of SoF and enablers. Bulking up the Reserves to do the traditional "peer to peer" type fighting and provide the boots on the ground for other manpower intensive missions makes sense because these missions are shorter term and much less frequent. Of course, lots of manpower still translates into lots of equipment, from actual boots (I'm down to one pair again, so the issue rankles) to trucks, AFVs, aircraft and ships, plus the stores to train people and run things. Now while this is expensive, it isn't impossible. Nordic nations have entire mechanized battalions "under tarps" waiting for their soldiers to arrive for their two week annual training exercise. US National Guardsmen only parade one weekend a month, yet seem able to operate in mechanized formations as well. We should look at how they can pull that off with far less parading then *we* get.

This turns a lot of the arguments on their heads, but the reality we are facing is quite different than even the end of the cold war, when I first learned about fighting a large peer enemy force, much less the 90's or '00's.

 

[PanaEng]

We have just had one of our guys finally get his MSEop qualification... after three years. I can give him his Pte hooks this week (and a bottle of champagne for hanging in there for so long!).

Unfortunately, that is common with the Engineers.

 

[PanaEng]

then clear them to the deployable standards of fitness and allowable moral turpitude.

I may not agree but I respect what you wrote in that post, except for this. There is no such thing as 'allowable moral turpitude' and, if you think there is or ought to be in the army, have a look at the events that led to the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment.
I hope none here condones that concept. (I'm going by this definition/explanation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_turpitude)
Having said that, and having done stupid things drunk and sober both in my time (and may still do), there are things of low consequence that may be handled at the lowest levels and leadership discretion is warranted - but every "stupid" action must be addressed.

Chimo!

 

[Kirkhill]

PanaEng:

I have been trapped again by my own cynical brand of "humour".  And yet you and I are not so far apart.

"Allowable moral turpitude" was intended to be a euphemism for "character" which will always be determined subjectively.  Also, while I agree that high standards in that area are desirable I can't bring myself to accept that all positions in the CF require the same standard. 

Historically the quality of the force was not necessarily reflected in the quality of the individual. But that was likely due to soldiers being under tighter control and supervision both in garrison and in the field.  Once upon a time officers and NCOs had low expectations of their charges and behaved accordingly.

Do your officers and NCOs find it convenient to assume higher standards amongst their troops as an opportunity to spend less time "supervising" them?  Doesn't the tendency towards billeting troops on the economy, a practice "outlawed" in Britain in the 17th century (albeit for different reasons),  also tend to make the connection between the paternal command structure and the troops under command more tenuous?

For clarity's sake: I am not criticizing or implying criticism.  Your response to my comment just caused me to start wondering about the importance of, and necessity for, character and how it was and is managed.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think the past SnrNCO's were expected to maintain order in the ranks and were given fair latitude in how to go about this. I suspect with their hands being tied in this modern era, more problems find their way into the more formal disciplinary procedures. This prevents abuses, but also limits what an NCO can do with a young soldier who needs a bit of firm guidance to correct his path. I can imagine the likes of Smokey Smith not doing well under the new structure.

 

[Dissident]

Or how about opening up the recruiting valve and let units do more recruiting events. Take recruiting away from the recruiting centers.

Yes, I know there would be problems. That is probably why recruiting was largely taken away from units in the first place. But the way we are doing it right now is killing us.

 

[Rocky Mountains]

Or how about opening up the recruiting valve and let units do more recruiting events. Take recruiting away from the recruiting centers.

Yes, I know there would be problems. That is probably why recruiting was largely taken away from units in the first place. But the way we are doing it right now is killing us.

A lot of reserve units seemed to be quite proficient at recruiting.  My recollection is that recruiting centres took over reserve recruiting as a make-work project in the early 1990s when regular force recruiting was cut back severely.

 

[Jungle]

limited and uncomplicated combat operations.

Combat operations are uncomplicated until the shooting starts...

 

[Fishbone Jones]

"Units can recruit all by themselves!"  No.  I recall the days of the helpful MCpl giving advice on the entry exams, and perhaps fudging a colour blindness test to help a unit make its numbers.  Standards exist for reasons, and undergo regular validation.  Saying "He's a great guy, just not smart enough to pass the test" is not a reason to lower or ignore the standards.

: Of course the RC is the better choice, after all look at the headache and money waster they gave us. I'm sure you still have nightmares trying to short circuit his letters to the CDS, MoD and the PM. Yup, the RCs are a better choice because they would never screw up, right? :waiting:

 

[GR66]

Our deployment in Afghanistan was a strain on the military to sustain and relied heavily on Reserve augmentation.  How quickly would we go through our pool of "trained" replacements if we were ever forced to engage in major combat operations against a near-peer enemy?  WWI, WWII, Korea.  They all required expanding the Army and recruiting/conscripting to fill the military's manpower needs in time of war.  Untrained civilians have out of necessity been turned into soldiers in pretty short order in all our major wars.  I'm sure our next major war will be the same.  A larger pool of even partially trained recruits would certainly be better than nothing as a starting point. 

Even a relatively small pool of volunteer Militia combined with the unit rationalizations suggested throughout this thread would swell the size of the remaining Militia units.  This would permit better unit-level training opportunities even at a company level which would give the Class-A Reservists more chances to practice their basic soldiering skills, take on leadership roles and pass on their more advanced knowledge to the volunteer members. 

As to the question of why anyone would volunteer for the Militia instead of getting paid?  You'd probably be surprised.  Some people might have the interest but not have the time to devote to the courses required to become a Class A member.  Or their availability may be spotty.  Some may be curious and wish to find out if they like it before they make a greater commitment.  Regardless of the reason it's been my experience that many people will work much harder giving their time freely for something they love and care about than many others who are paid to do the same thing.

 

[dangerboy]

Our deployment in Afghanistan was a strain on the military to sustain and relied heavily on Reserve augmentation.  How quickly would we go through our pool of "trained" replacements if we were ever forced to engage in major combat operations against a near-peer enemy?  WWI, WWII, Korea.  They all required expanding the Army and recruiting/conscripting to fill the military's manpower needs in time of war.  Untrained civilians have out of necessity been turned into soldiers in pretty short order in all our major wars.  I'm sure our next major war will be the same.  A larger pool of even partially trained recruits would certainly be better than nothing as a starting point. 

For all our major wars you are talking 3 wars, WWI, WWII and Korea.  Training and tactics have changed since then and what the solider needs to know to be able to fight has increased.  And for all 3 of the wars it was not an immediate get there and fight.  In WWII they were fortunate to have a few years in England to train before they deployed to Italy.  And in Korea they had a lot of WWII veterans in key positions and it was one unit at the beginning and Col Stone delayed 2 PPCLI going into battle as he know they were not ready yet.

So to say that mass recruitment worked in the past and will work in the future is in my opinion not a very valid assumption. 

 

[GR66]

For all our major wars you are talking 3 wars, WWI, WWII and Korea.  Training and tactics have changed since then and what the solider needs to know to be able to fight has increased.  And for all 3 of the wars it was not an immediate get there and fight.  In WWII they were fortunate to have a few years in England to train before they deployed to Italy.  And in Korea they had a lot of WWII veterans in key positions and it was one unit at the beginning and Col Stone delayed 2 PPCLI going into battle as he know they were not ready yet.

So to say that mass recruitment worked in the past and will work in the future is in my opinion not a very valid assumption.

I don't argue what you're saying at all.  In a more "restrained" high intensity conflict we wouldn't send recruits right into combat either.  The same training period would be required for any call-ups to bring them up to the "modern" standard of warfare. 

However, I believe that in the case of a full-scale war between NATO and Russia or China in the worst case scenario (which after all is what mobilization plans are designed to address aren't they?) the situation would be very different.  While nobody can divine the future with any certainty I would be willing to bet that we will run out of our advanced equipment (vehicles, combat aircraft, missiles, etc.) before we run out of people (excepting if it goes Nuclear of course which would make any military planning irrelevant). 

Modern combat vehicles, equipment and munitions are not quick to make and I would suspect that in the case of a general war our production facilities (or the power and transportation networks that allow them to operate) would be primary targets for enemy attack/disruption.  It wouldn't surprise me at all that if a war lasts beyond the relatively short "come as you are" phase and we have time to mobilize reserves that they will be equipped and operate in a very similar way to the way our fathers and grandfathers did in WWII.  Simple vehicles and weapons are faster and easier to make in quantity and are much more likely to be available to our mobilized forces than modern MBTs, F-35s, ATGMs, etc.  Having a pool of people that already have a basic understanding of fundamental infantry tactics probably wouldn't be a bad thing.

 

[daftandbarmy]

For all our major wars you are talking 3 wars, WWI, WWII and Korea.  Training and tactics have changed since then and what the solider needs to know to be able to fight has increased.  And for all 3 of the wars it was not an immediate get there and fight.  In WWII they were fortunate to have a few years in England to train before they deployed to Italy.  And in Korea they had a lot of WWII veterans in key positions and it was one unit at the beginning and Col Stone delayed 2 PPCLI going into battle as he know they were not ready yet.

So to say that mass recruitment worked in the past and will work in the future is in my opinion not a very valid assumption.

AFAIK, the main thing that made our mass mobilizations of the past work at all is what we have in place today:

1) A small but well trained professional military
2) A broadly based national military 'footprint', and recruiting/mobilization capacity, represented by the militia and other reserve units based at local armouries

Do we need this 'legacy' organizational structure now? Too far above my pay grade....

 

[Rifleman62]

Do you really think that if Canada had an immediate/urgent requirement to expand the CF, the CFRG would be responsible for recruitment with all their known worts?

 

[a_majoor]

Do you really think that if Canada had an immediate/urgent requirement to expand the CF, the CFRG would be responsible for recruitment with all their known worts?

We could always try the Sir Sam Hughes solution instead.......

 

[Old Sweat]

We could always try the Sir Sam Hughes solution instead.......

Or the 1950 Brooke Claxton approach which resulted in massive chaos and the recruitment of, among others, a Boer War veteran for the Special Force for Korea.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Is the British Reservist any different from ours regarding rights and obligations during mobilization?

Mobilisation means being called up for operational duties. These can be anywhere in the World where regular forces are operating. This page explains what happens when a soldier is mobilised and what happens when he returns to work following a tour of duty. Find out more about both Army Reserve and employer obligations.


Rights and responsibilities


The laws covering mobilisation are there to protect both Reservists and their employers.

Although the mobilisation process includes the issuing of an employer pack, the Reservist is still responsible for informing their employer that they have been called out.

Once a call-out notice has been issued, the Reservist is covered by the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985 (SOE 85). This provides two types of protection - protection of employment for those liable to be mobilised, and reinstatement for those who have been mobilised. This means that:
•the employer cannot terminate a persons employment based on their liability to be mobilised and without their consent
•the Reservist is entitled to reinstatement to their original position (or one of equal pay and status) on completion of military service
•Employers and Reservists are entitled to make claims for financial assistance and apply for exemption or deferral of mobilisation

http://www.army.mod.uk/reserve/31786.aspx

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Is the British Reservist any different from ours regarding rights and obligations during mobilization?

Mobilisation means being called up for operational duties. These can be anywhere in the World where regular forces are operating. This page explains what happens when a soldier is mobilised and what happens when he returns to work following a tour of duty. Find out more about both Army Reserve and employer obligations.


Rights and responsibilities


The laws covering mobilisation are there to protect both Reservists and their employers.

Although the mobilisation process includes the issuing of an employer pack, the Reservist is still responsible for informing their employer that they have been called out.

Once a call-out notice has been issued, the Reservist is covered by the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985 (SOE 85). This provides two types of protection - protection of employment for those liable to be mobilised, and reinstatement for those who have been mobilised. This means that:
•the employer cannot terminate a persons employment based on their liability to be mobilised and without their consent
•the Reservist is entitled to reinstatement to their original position (or one of equal pay and status) on completion of military service
•Employers and Reservists are entitled to make claims for financial assistance and apply for exemption or deferral of mobilisation

http://www.army.mod.uk/reserve/31786.aspx

How dare you make such a sensible solution that even the Cdn gov't would find impossible not to pass :facepalm:

It's already written, all they have to do is find someone that has the balls to table it. :dunno:

 

[Haggis]

•the employer cannot terminate a persons employment based on their liability to be mobilised and without their consent

Instead, the employer can refuse to hire the Reservist based on their liability to be mobilised.  This became a form of proactive discrimination in both the UK and the US during the last round of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

•the Reservist is entitled to reinstatement to their original position (or one of equal pay and status) on completion of military service

Unless the employer reorganizes or restructures in such a way as to render the Reservist's position redundant.  Also, this clause does not apply if the Reservists place of employment changes hands. The new owners are not bound by this.

•Employers and Reservists are entitled to make claims for financial assistance and apply for exemption or deferral of mobilisation

This is the one piece of the UK plan which actually stands to benefit small and medium sized enterprises, those hardest hit when 1/3 to 1/2 of their workforce is mobilised.