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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
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It is complicated and goes back to very roots of the Militia in Canada.  Basically, in Canada, the system has been built on petty politics.

A book called "Canadian Brass" is a very book introduction to the system.
 
X_para76 said:
So how is it that some of these regimental senates hold such sway over DND and their ability to restructure the reserves in a more cost effective manor?
Many regiments have politically connected honorary colonels, and there are certainly incidents of these honouraries using their connections and the media to fight initiatives from the Army chain of command.

http://www.recorder.ca/2009/03/20/rifles-leader-concerned-over-amalgamation-report

... And somehow, recent years have seen us going in the opposite direction of what is needed with regrowth in the number of reserve regiments.

http://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20080905005
 
I've stated in other threads that I think the very idea of mass mobilization using the Reg Force as an organizational template is ridiculous since we simply don't have the equipment to provide for such a force and there isn't the ability to mass produce such equipment quick enough to meet our needs in the case of full-scaled war.

It would be nice if we could transform our Militia into something like the US National Guard...real, full-sized units with real equipment and training but let's be realistic...it just isn't possible with the budgets our governments are willing to put toward the military.  What we need to do is something in between the problematic system we have now and the National Guard model. 

My thought is that we go to a two-tier system.  The "Reserves" could be something approaching what the US National Guard has.  Each Reg Force Battalion/Squadron could have an associated Reserve Company/Troop integrated right into the Regimental organization.  These units would be full-strength units (possibly with sub-units in different locations as required) and would receive the same training as Reg Force units and have access to the same equipment as the Reg Force.  These units could be used to provide trained augmentees or even deployable sub-units to their parent Reg Force units in case of deployment. 

Similarly, other Reserve units could be organized to provide fully trained specialist sub-units for their parent Reg Force units.  For example, Reserve "Regiments" for each Reg Force battalion could be organized to provide a deployable "specialty" support platoons in case of mobilization.  These Reserve units could be trained for such tasks as providing a Pioneer Platoon, or a Mortar Platoon, or an MP Platoon, etc.  These "Reserve" units would ideally be located in centers relatively close to their parent units to facilitate joint training, etc. and to hopefully take advantage of absorbing as many releasing members from the Reg Force as possible to provide experienced members to the Reserve units.  Perhaps the federal government could provide much stronger job protection legislation to the members of these units in return for the members of these units being deployable when required.

Those Militia units not filling these "Reserve" roles could maybe then be reorganized to fill a more "traditional" Militia role.  The members of these units would be both a readily available, partially-trained source for replacement troops in case of major mobilization as well as a source of local government troops when assistance is required for local authorities.  These units could possibly have different training requirements than Reg Force/"Reserve" unit members assuming that if they are required for mobilization there will be time to give them more specialized training prior to deployment.  These Militia units would be organized differently than "Reserve" units and could use COTS equipment, etc. that would better suit the more realistic tasks they would be assigned.

 
Even though its not in our control the job protection aspect is a big one for the reserves, in Alberta we only get protection for 20 days for training, after that we must provide 30 days notice and have our employer agree with a defined start and end date to the leave of absence. If our legislation was more of looking at the reserves as a commitment to ones country by giving us all required time off, similar to the job protection those in the states get.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
It is complicated and goes back to very roots of the Militia in Canada.  Basically, in Canada, the system has been built on petty politics.

A book called "Canadian Brass" is a very book introduction to the system.

It's a good point. The "militia myth" perhaps best defined under Sir Hughes pre/during WW1 has always been a prevailing consideration for politicians. The belief that Canadians can simply "rise up" out of the militia as we apparently did in 1812 (spoiler alert- we didn't), 1914 and 1939 due to our natural fighting abilities remains in vogue today. Look at the focus on the 1812 anniversary- 1812 was a war almost completely fought by the British army (the York volunteers, during the US invasion of York defended the governors house, than marched around the city looking for new "volunteers" to go and surrender to the Americans so that they wouldn't have to fight again.

I believe that some semblance of this myth is perpetrated today to justify not spending money on the regular force. Its easier and cheaper to maintain the reserve capability than to pay for expensive regulars, and the perpetuation of this myth in Canadian society (like the peacekeeping myth) justifies defence cuts nicely.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
It's a good point. The "militia myth" perhaps best defined under Sir Hughes pre/during WW1 has always been a prevailing consideration for politicians. The belief that Canadians can simply "rise up" out of the militia as we apparently did in 1812 (spoiler alert- we didn't), 1914 and 1939 due to our natural fighting abilities remains in vogue today. Look at the focus on the 1812 anniversary- 1812 was a war almost completely fought by the British army (the York volunteers, during the US invasion of York defended the governors house, than marched around the city looking for new "volunteers" to go and surrender to the Americans so that they wouldn't have to fight again.

I believe that some semblance of this myth is perpetrated today to justify not spending money on the regular force. Its easier and cheaper to maintain the reserve capability than to pay for expensive regulars, and the perpetuation of this myth in Canadian society (like the peacekeeping myth) justifies defence cuts nicely.

The reality of the Canadian militia was indeed quite different from the myth. One needs look no further than the Fenian invasion of the Niagara Peninsula for an example of what happened when untrained and poorly equipped volunteers came up against a properly organized force of Civil War veterans at Ridgeway on 2 June 1866. See www.fenians.org for the details. The North West Rebellion also had the potential to go bad very quickly; the only thing that saved the reputation of the Canadian Militia was that the Metis were even more poorly organized, trained and equipped and their campaign plan was a disaster.

I am fond of saying we were very fortunate we did not come up against the Comanches or the Zulus.

So what is the solution. It has been suggested, with lots of evidence to back up the thesis, that the regular force can not sustain a prolonged campaign. Unfortunately the reserves, in my opinion, are not in any position to take over the battle except after a mobilization and training period of 18 months to two years at a minimum. Look at Korea and the Special Force: it took eight months to field a battalion built around a cadre of veterans and some regulars and a couple of months after that to deploy the rest of the brigade group. At that time we still had lots of modern equipment in our stores and tactics were dismounted and operated at 3.5 miles per hour. That is not the case today.

If the truth be known, we generated something pretty close to the Special Force in concept based on a combination of experienced regulars, reserves and people off the streets - without designating it as such - over the duration of the Afghanistan mission. Maybe we should start by asking how could we have done it better using the quasi Special Force model.
 
Old Sweat said:
If the truth be known, we generated something pretty close to the Special Force in concept based on a combination of experienced regulars, reserves and people off the streets - without designating it as such - over the duration of the Afghanistan mission. Maybe we should start by asking how could we have done it better using the quasi Special Force model.

If the truth of the matter is that Afghanistan was a stretch as far as providing personnel and it was a strain on our equipment, then what would the situation have been if we were faced with a high-intensity conflict against a near peer?  If we can't support a significantly larger force in the field for any meaningful length of time in combat then why do we have an organizational structure that calls for us to do exactly that? 

If all we're really capable of doing is putting a single Brigade Group in the field and maintaining it by rotating through our Reg Force Regiments and supplementing with troops from the Reserves while we throw more people into the training system then I'm fine with that.  I'd prefer to admit this fact and re-organize to truly support that reality rather than have a whole infrastructure based on a non-supportable fantasy. 
 
GR66 said:
My thought is that we go to a two-tier system.  The "Reserves" could be something approaching what the US National Guard has.  Each Reg Force Battalion/Squadron could have an associated Reserve Company/Troop integrated right into the Regimental organization.  These units would be full-strength units (possibly with sub-units in different locations as required) and would receive the same training as Reg Force units and have access to the same equipment as the Reg Force.  These units could be used to provide trained augmentees or even deployable sub-units to their parent Reg Force units in case of deployment.

Done already; Total Force and it was misery for both the Reg and Res members from what I could see.

Similarly, other Reserve units could be organized to provide fully trained specialist sub-units for their parent Reg Force units.  For example, Reserve "Regiments" for each Reg Force battalion could be organized to provide a deployable "specialty" support platoons in case of mobilization.  These Reserve units could be trained for such tasks as providing a Pioneer Platoon, or a Mortar Platoon, or an MP Platoon, etc.  These "Reserve" units would ideally be located in centers relatively close to their parent units to facilitate joint training, etc. and to hopefully take advantage of absorbing as many releasing members from the Reg Force as possible to provide experienced members to the Reserve units.  Perhaps the federal government could provide much stronger job protection legislation to the members of these units in return for the members of these units being deployable when required.

So you want current understrength say, PRes inf units to take on pioneer trg when they can't get enough time/money for basic inf trg ???

Those Militia units not filling these "Reserve" roles could maybe then be reorganized to fill a more "traditional" Militia role.  The members of these units would be both a readily available, partially-trained source for replacement troops in case of major mobilization as well as a source of local government troops when assistance is required for local authorities.  These units could possibly have different training requirements than Reg Force/"Reserve" unit members assuming that if they are required for mobilization there will be time to give them more specialized training prior to deployment.  These Militia units would be organized differently than "Reserve" units and could use COTS equipment, etc. that would better suit the more realistic tasks they would be assigned.

Sorry.  This sounds like too many differences, possibly more HQ type Res orgs, and while the idea sounds great it is unrealistic to think all of this 'special task' trg will be useful when the SHTF.

Reduce the number of COs and Bdes, Bde HQs and all that...sink the money into actual trg of the troops.  If the 409th Mukluk Repair Regiment is actaually a COy strength PRES unit, they get the funding and adopt the CofC that = a Company.  :2c:

The times are a'changing, but the PRES doesn't seem to be changing with them.  What worked pre-WWII..well...it is pre-WWII anymore?
 
Eye In The Sky said:
Reduce the number of COs and Bdes, Bde HQs and all that...sink the money into actual trg of the troops.  If the 409th Mukluk Repair Regiment is actaually a COy strength PRES unit, they get the funding and adopt the CofC that = a Company.  :2c:

CommentPhotos.com_1393010888.jpg
 
Perhaps if the army reserves were given their own budget allocation and essentially be a separate arm rather than fall under the army budget?  Fund it under actual numbers and strength.
 
Crantor said:
Perhaps if the army reserves were given their own budget allocation and essentially be a separate arm rather than fall under the army budget?  Fund it under actual numbers and strength.

I would argue that before this happens, there has to be a decision, by the Government - not the Army - outlining what they expect the Army Reserve to be  able to do.  Then, the policy enabler of proper job protection legislation for both operational deployment/employment and training must be enacted.  Finally, the Army must get it's marching ordsers from the Government and told to "get on with it".

Then, those COs/RSMs who subscribe to the Reseve worldview described by Royal Drew should be told to "lead, follow or get out of the way".  Should they refuse - apply QR&Os 19.75 and 15.01 (5)c. Draconian?  Yes.  But, by this time those obstructionist leaders will have had ample time to get on board with the new reailities. 
 
Page #1 of this thread appeared in 2001.  A quick sampling of the intervening 13 years and 64 pages have not produced a single new thought that wasn't put forward in the initial few pages.....just more angst, some members banned, ridicule towards "the other"......

It seems to me that: a) the Army just can't sort itself out on these issues, and b) the government doesn't care to.

Just sayin'.  Carry on.    :pop:
 
Journeyman said:
Page #1 of this thread appeared in 2001.  A quick sampling of the intervening 13 years and 64 pages have not produced a single new thought that wasn't put forward in the initial few pages.....just more angst, some members banned, ridicule towards "the other"......

It seems to me that: a) the Army just can't sort itself out on these issues, and b) the government doesn't care to.

Just sayin'.  Carry on.    :pop:

This thread was brought back from the dead by someone insinuating that the Reserves be given access to the TAPV, which in the present climate is incredibly wishful thinking.  That being said, over the past couple of days a general consensus has emerged from all parties that not only the Reserves, but also the Army itself, needs to change.  The problem with this is that we cannot come to a consensus on what the organization should actually look like.  The same can be said of the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces, they themselves cannot come to a consensus and as a result, we have arrived where we have arrived.

It will take someone with some big cojones to change all of this.  General Hillier was such an individual but I don't see anyone like him coming out of the woodwork any time soon.

Rocky Mountains said:
Reality check.  The military has as many clerks in Ottawa as it has reserves.  Perhaps we need more clerks.

Thanks for your valuable input  ::)
 
Rocky Mountains said:
Reality check.  The military has as many clerks in Ottawa as it has reserves.  Perhaps we need more clerks.

Source?  I know a little about occupational structure and geographic dispersion of the military (both Reg and Res) and that does not correlate to any information from reputable sources.
 
I was thinking much the same thing as Journeyman -  I couldn't get the tune of "Here we go round the mulberry bush" out of my head.

In the proposals suggested I see elements of the 10:90 solution, the reserve Jump Coy solution, the Defense & Duties solution, the Mortar and Machine Gun Platoons solution....all of which were actually implemented in the last 30 years and all of which ultimately foundered.  And they foundered on the same rock:  the inability of the reserves to field more than 10% of their authorized strength.  Given that units are authorized at sub-unit strength (~127 as RoyalDrew points out) than that means that, at best, the unit will be able to send a dozen motivated individuals for training, summer exercises or for operations.

It was ever thus.  In 1812 Brock and Prevost got some good service out of Militia "Flank Coys"  - basically those dozen soldiers brigaded into companies and attached to regular Brit battalions to thicken their lines.  It was the same again in 1866 with the Fenians, again it was "Flank Coys" - not the run of the mill militiamen - that contributed to the effort.

The Papal Zouaves, the NW Rebellion, the Boer War, the Mac-Pap Battalion, Korea, Bosnia, Afghanistan ..... those efforts were small.  Battalion/Brigade efforts - similar to what we managed all during the Cold War.  And all supplied by "Volunteers" - both full time and part time.

World Wars 1 and 2 were aberrations and even those were essentially "Volunteer" shows.  Yes conscription was introduced but late in the game and few of the conscripts made it to the front lines.

The underlying problem is that, unlike the Poles and Ukrainians and Russians, Canadians don't perceive any threat that would force them to pick up arms and kill the man in their front yard intent on slaughtering their family.  That threat is a nightmare in Eastern Europe.  It is a fantasy in Canada.

My solution:

Accept that you are never going to have the manpower.  Leverage technology.

In the beginning there was only manpower.  Men in lines with spears and shields.  Then it was bayonets and muskets.  Then it was bayonets and rifles.

World War 1 saw a move away from reliance on manpower with Quick Firing guns (75s and 18s) and of course the Machine Guns.  Lines were held by men on OPs and those guns.  The assault troops were husbanded in the reserve lines.

I suggest that technology makes possible, and politics demand, a continuation of that thought.  If I were in your position I would be lobbying to create a ring of unmanned sensors, backed by a ring of crew served weapons (aircraft, helos, guns) containing a core (not corps) of assault troops.  The sensors and the crew served weapons require money and time - not necessarily manpower.  The assault troops are nothing but manpower - with elan - a vital commodity that the French identified but wasted.

Again, if it were me, Reg Force infantry battalions when, they were being cut down in manpower, I would have held on to all the specialist companies platoons before I would have maintained my full strength rifle coys.  Equally I would have held onto my weapons dets, 4 per company, and reduced my rifle sections from 10 men to 6.

The role of the reserves would then be to thicken up the sections (12 men from one Reserve unit would bring a Regular Platoon back up to strength) in Roto 0 to 2.  If the operation proceeded longer than that then they could be brought up to trained platoon and trained company status and deployed as required.

In the US the Army instructs its COs, when they are sent to their training exercises, that if they are short of manpower they are to man their crew served weapons and vehicles as a priority.  The rifles suffer accordingly.

In 309(3) the advice used to be the same.

Rifles are not cannon fodder.  They are too valuable for that.  But the key elements of a good rifleman, a good assault trooper, are physical fitness and attitude.  Add in small arms training and small unit tactics, which can be accomplished locally, and you can turn out useful platoons of rifles at relatively low cost.

With respect to the clerks in Ottawa: as I was taking a look at the role of the Adjutant (for discussion in the expanding HQ thread) I was surprised to discover that the Brits had created something call the Adjutant General's Corps into which the enrolled all the clerks from Transport, REME, Post, Catering .... you name it.  It then dawned on me that Canada has done something of the same thing.

I get the idea of a common training syllabus for clerks but why do they have a separate command structure?  A separate empire.  Shouldn't they be creatures of the organizations and the commanders they serve?  Does the clerical empire contribute to the ever expanding HQs?


 
Now for a different tack from Kirkhill, not better, not worse, just different.

Surely someone, somewhere, in the system can do a basic staff check with a set of basic assumptions. For example, to maintain a national contingent of a headquarters based on a brigade headquarters, a reconnaissance squadron, a battle group of three (four) mechanized or light companies and a combat support and combat service support companies, a tank squadron, an artillery regiment of a FSCC/ASCC, a gun battery, an AD battery, a mortar battery or troop, a STA battery and a HQ battery, an engineer regiment or squadron, a logistics element, a medical element along with an aviation wing including TACP, UAV, UTTH and MTH as well as an organization to run the airhead and look after the airplanes, a strategic communications organization and on and on* requires so many people with planned casualty rate of x and a tour length of y. But we can maintain z people which gives a shortfall or a surplus of whatever.

Then it comes to options and choices for the grownups and eventually the government.

Maybe, just maybe we can design a regular and reserve structure, or maybe not. This is the CAF after all and dynamic inertia is our overwhelming bureaucratic characteristic.

* Oops, forgot the PA bn.  :D 
 
Maybe not so different Old Sweat.

Planning assumptions:

Brigade/Battle Group Operations - check
Leverage Technology - I see an awful lot of technical positions implied in that structure of yours - so I'll take that as a check as well
Husband Rifles/Assault Troops - I don't see many of those in that long list of trades - a third check.

I think that another piece of the puzzle is trying to determine what technologies to leverage - starting with the decision on whether we are going to be an armour heavy force dependent on trucks and roads or a light force dependent on helos and airlift.  Once that is sorted, based on what our politicians expect our army to accomplish, then all the other decisions start falling into place.
 
Journeyman said:
Page #1 of this thread appeared in 2001.  A quick sampling of the intervening 13 years and 64 pages have not produced a single new thought that wasn't put forward in the initial few pages.....just more angst, some members banned, ridicule towards "the other"......

It seems to me that: a) the Army just can't sort itself out on these issues, and b) the government doesn't care to.

Just sayin'.  Carry on.    :pop:

And the thread title has always baffled me... what is divine about the role of the reserves ??
 
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