Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[MilEME09]

  :rofl:  Yet SMP vehicles are too complex....

I'm just saying if they want us to be useful, they better give us the skills to do that, until then our tiny disorganization of a reserve force is useless for anything but GD tasks until augmentation for a tour is needed.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

So are U.S. National Guard F16 Squadrons useless?  The U.S. is committed to military reserves and half of overseas deployments seem to be reserves of one sort or another.  Canadians reserves have been gutted and re-gutted until there is nothing left to gut.  Then they are criticized for lack of capability.

Rocky Mountains you missed my point and comparing National Guard units to our current Army Reserve is a very poor comparison.  For one, national guard units are kept at full strength so a national guard infantry battalion, for example, is a full strength battalion (of part time soldiers obviously) and they can be deployed complete by the government if req'd.  Not quite the same thing is it now?  National Guard units are reserves but they are operationally focused, our Reserves are anything but.

Our Army Reserve is a bunch of severely under-strength units with no ability to deploy anything bigger than a platoon worth of soldiers.  It's run by a bunch of good old boys who hearken back to the good old days and are resistant to any change within the organization.  To give you some numbers... We have approx 16,000 Army Reservists in 118 Army Reserve Units.  Simple division would tell me that's approximately 127 people per unit (obviously this is just an average).  Now how many of these 127 people parade regularly?  Lets say 60% so 76 pers (I am probably being generous in some cases).  Out of those 76 pers, how many are operationally fit to deploy, lets say 50%??? so your now down to 30 to 40 pers max. 

The fact is we have far too many units with far too few people in them to ever make using the Army Reserve for anything more than a replacement pool a viable option. 

The state of the reserves is deliberate and in no way the fault of the reserves.  Prior to 1940 the primary mission of the permanent force was to train the militia not fight wars.  It seems to have worked.

Step 6 of mission analysis, has the situation changed? 

I think you might want to start asking yourself that a little more.  This isn't 1940 and we unfortunately do not have time to spend years mobilizing an army.  When the Government of Canada requires our services it usually needs it in a fairly timely fashion.  You also neglect the fact that weapons systems have become far more complex and warfare is far more fluid.  This is why we need a professional army that is ready to go at a moments notice. 

I would like to see the Reserves consolidate the number of Bde's and Units they have to something that is reflective of their actual strength.  A model like the US National Guard would be favorable IMO.  This way Reserve units would be actual operational units and could be deployed if req'd.  The government would also need to create legislation protecting Reservist employment in order for this to work. 

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

MSVS and LUVW Milcot ring a bell, heck in our lot the only SMP vehicles we have left are a couple broken ML's, an LS, and one cargo HL. Also I will point directly to the Alberta floods when you say Dom ops and reserves, 90% we sat around and did crap all. If the reserves are to help in Dom ops we need equipment and the trades to help do things like restoring power.

Division staff spend more time figuring out how they are going to try and mobilize reservists for DomOps than they do actually aiding the civil powers.  The Reserves have the lead on DomOps in theory but in reality they don't have the equipment, training or reaction time to be of much use.

 

[MilEME09]

Rocky Mountains you missed my point and comparing National Guard units to our current Army Reserve is a very poor comparison.  For one, national guard units are kept at full strength so a national guard infantry battalion, for example, is a full strength battalion (of part time soldiers obviously) and they can be deployed complete by the government if req'd.  Not quite the same thing is it now?  National Guard units are reserves but they are operationally focused, our Reserves are anything but.

Our Army Reserve is a bunch of severely under-strength units with no ability to deploy anything bigger than a platoon worth of soldiers.  It's run by a bunch of good old boys who hearken back to the good old days and are resistant to any change within the organization.  To give you some numbers... We have approx 16,000 Army Reservists in 118 Army Reserve Units.  Simple division would tell me that's approximately 127 people per unit (obviously this is just an average).  Now how many of these 127 people parade regularly?  Lets say 60% so 76 pers (I am probably being generous in some cases).  Out of those 76 pers, how many are operationally fit to deploy, lets say 50%??? so your now down to 30 to 40 pers max. 

The fact is we have far too many units with far too few people in them to ever make using the Army Reserve for anything more than a replacement pool a viable option. 

Step 6 of mission analysis, has the situation changed? 

I think you might want to start asking yourself that a little more.  This isn't 1940 and we unfortunately do not have time to spend years mobilizing an army.  When the Government of Canada requires our services it usually needs it in a fairly timely fashion.  You also neglect the fact that weapons systems have become far more complex and warfare is far more fluid.  This is why we need a professional army that is ready to go at a moments notice. 

I would like to see the Reserves consolidate the number of Bde's and Units they have to something that is reflective of their actual strength.  A model like the US National Guard would be favorable IMO.  This way Reserve units would be actual operational units and could be deployed if req'd.  The government would also need to create legislation protecting Reservist employment in order for this to work.

The problem is, how can you do large scale amalgamation like that with such a large geographical area like Canada? Are you saying we need to stand down half the reserve units in the country? If so where will the personal go? You would spend say 2 hours to drive from home to base, so why expect a reservist to drive that long for a weekend EX for example? while its a great idea the geography of Canada makes it impossible.

 

[McG]

With the recent insertion of the split-off TAPV discussions, I will not that there seem to have been many threads seeking a reason/role and a vehicle to justify PRes Armour.  If one has to look so hard to justify the existence of an organization(s), then maybe it is time to consider the function has outlived its usefulness.  Maybe there is only room for one manoeuvre arm in the Canadian reserve force?

... People can dream all they want but need to be brought back down to reality.  The Reserves serve a useful purpose in that they provide bodies to beef up the Army in times of need but they don't generate capability as they have no actual cohesive structure.

Units in the reserves aren't even real units, just a bunch of independent companies, squadrons and batteries (in some cases they are closer to platoon/troop strength).  We can't generate any sort of combat capability with an organization like this so why would we give them the latest and greatest military kit.

If the Reserves were reformed and units were merged to bring them up to something near battalion/regiment strength and had some sort of cohesion, I would be more willing to give them better kit.  If the Reserves want to continue to exist as a large shell organization and only serve the purpose of providing bodies to beef up the Regs in times of need, sorry no good kit for you.

This is not a knock on Reservists themselves as I have met many fantastic Reservists.  It's a knock on the archaic structure that the Reserves currently exist in.

In this thread, you will find a number of suggestions along the same lines.  It has been proposed that PRes battalions be permanently merged.  Regimental identities could be preserved at the sub-unit level, or (if the regimentals are the point of resistance) the regiments could be merged.

Bullcrap.  The Militia in Canada has been reduced to the state it is currently in for two reasons:

...
2) Reserve Regimental Senates which have consistently, vocally and politically fought off any attempt to meaningfully update and change the structure of reserve units.  They are stuck in a mobilization mindset, which has led to Regimental HQs leading Platoons.

If the PRes regimental system is the impediment to having a useful Army reserve, then it is time to destroy that system.  Hopefully the regimental senates/mafias/brandy-clubs can keep that in mind when given the choice to reorganize with their regimental identities or without.

 

[Haggis]

It's run by a bunch of good old boys who hearken back to the good old days and are resistant to any change within the organization.

  I can safely say that this statement is an unfair and factually incorrect genralized condemnation of the professionalism and dedication of the vast majority or Reserve Force COs and RSMs.

However, Reserve lobby groups fit this description nicely as many are out of touch with what today's Reserves are and what they want and need to be effective.

The government would also need to create legislation protecting Reservist employment in order for this to work.

Done already, but not well done.  Reserve employer support legislation(s) is/are neither harmonized or consistent across the land.  But that's a topic discussed in another thread.

In this thread, you will find a number of suggestions along the same lines.  It has been proposed that PRes battalions be permanently merged.  Regimental identities could be preserved at the sub-unit level...

...as was done in the UK, particularly with Highland Scottish regiments.

If the PRes regimental system is the impediment to having a useful Army reserve, then it is time to destroy that system.  Hopefully the regimental senates/mafias/brandy-clubs can keep that in mind when given the choice to reorganize with their regimental identities or without.

There are some leaders (as in the Reg F) who cannot see beyond the walls of thier garrisons and fail to grasp that they can contribute to the strategic health of the Army Reserve (and the tactical survival of their units)  by being more innovative and flexible and less obstructionist.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

The problem is, how can you do large scale amalgamation like that with such a large geographical area like Canada? Are you saying we need to stand down half the reserve units in the country? If so where will the personal go? You would spend say 2 hours to drive from home to base, so why expect a reservist to drive that long for a weekend EX for example? while its a great idea the geography of Canada makes it impossible.

Not what I am saying at all... in certain cases geography adds challenges but all that means is you have different companies/squadrons in different cities and you come together only for certain collective training events. 

Use Ex STALWART GUARDIAN for instance, I would have companies train independently throughout the year and when the big summer Ex comes around, we bring it all together under our own Bn HQ, like a real Bn would. 

Why does an area like the Maritimes have 3 Armour Regt's, 8 Infantry Bn's, 3 Arty Regt's, 2 Engr Regt's, 2 Sigs Regt's and 2 Svc Bn's? 

Cut the # of Bde's in half, close down Regt's or merge Regt's together to get rid of the needless overhead which presently exists. 

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

  I can safely say that this statement is an unfair and factually incorrect genralized condemnation of the professionalism and dedication of the vast majority or Reserve Force COs and RSMs.

  Just because your dedicated and work hard doesn't mean your work provides any value to the organization.  From what I've seen many of these same COs and RSMs think more about the balmoral or beret on their head than they do about the actual health of the army. 

Done already, but not well done.  Reserve employer support legislation(s) is/are neither harmonized or consistent across the land.  But that's a topic discussed in another thread.

Hence why it needs to be revisited and sorted.

 

[MilEME09]

Not what I am saying at all... in certain cases geography adds challenges but all that means is you have different companies/squadrons in different cities and you come together only for certain collective training events. 

Use Ex STALWART GUARDIAN for instance, I would have companies train independently throughout the year and when the big summer Ex comes around, we bring it all together under our own Bn HQ, like a real Bn would. 

Why does an area like the Maritimes have 3 Armour Regt's, 8 Infantry Bn's, 3 Arty Regt's, 2 Engr Regt's, 2 Sigs Regt's and 2 Svc Bn's? 

Cut the # of Bde's in half, close down Regt's or merge Regt's together to get rid of the needless overhead which presently exists.

Ok I get what your saying now, something similar to the merger of all the reserve service battalions so it was only one per brigade? my unit has a FSG in edmonton and calgary, weekend EX's we meet up as well as in large brigade and divisional EX's. The only challenges become logistical when moving equipment for EX's and HQ communication issues but thats another story.

 

[Old Sweat]

I could write a book on the subject, but it has been flogged to death. The militia was re-organized in 1936 to constitute six divisions along with corps and army troops for a war in Europe. The plan was to mobilize two divisions at the start and then build up. As the government was not keen on going to war in Europe again, the plan was written for home defence.

What we have now is the remnants of the 1936 plan, while since 1950 we have been concentrating on forces in being. The militia has been hacked willy-nilly, especially in the 1960s, but since then no one of any political stripe has had the cojones to take on the local movers and shakers to rationalize an inefficient structure. This is not an attack on the reservists or even the units, but the numbers game leads to what Royal Drew has pointed out. I fear this has become sacrosanct, even with its defects. We have tried to play games with things like the 10/90 battalions and the total force venture into cloud cuckoo land with predictable results.

I wish I could be optimistic, but . . .

 

[MilEME09]

I could write a book on the subject, but it has been flogged to death. The militia was re-organized in 1936 to constitute six divisions along with corps and army troops for a war in Europe. The plan was to mobilize two divisions at the start and then build up. As the government was not keen on going to war in Europe again, the plan was written for home defence.

What we have now is the remnants of the 1936 plan, while since 1950 we have been concentrating on forces in being. The militia has been hacked willy-nilly, especially in the 1960s, but since then no one of any political stripe has had the cojones to take on the local movers and shakers to rationalize an inefficient structure. This is not an attack on the reservists or even the units, but the numbers game leads to what Royal Drew has pointed out. I fear this has become sacrosanct, even with its defects. We have tried to play games with things like the 10/90 battalions and the total force venture into cloud cuckoo land with predictable results.

I wish I could be optimistic, but . . .

I'm afraid im not to well informed about the history of the reserves however it sounds like the structure of the reserves is yet another rotting element of the organization as a whole. Which makes me think that all of DND/CAF needs a large scale reorganization both at the organizational level and the bureaucratic level.

 

[Haggis]

  Just because your dedicated and work hard doesn't mean your work provides any value to the organization.  From what I've seen many of these same COs and RSMs think more about the balmoral or beret on their head than they do about the actual health of the army. 

Hence my comment:

There are some leaders (as in the Reg F) who cannot see beyond the walls of their garrisons and fail to grasp that they can contribute to the strategic health of the Army Reserve (and the tactical survival of their units) by being more innovative and flexible and less obstructionist.

In my experience, such leaders as you describe are the exception and need to be shown the path to strategic enlightenment.

Reserve Job Protection Legislation is beyond the Army's ability to fix.  However, it has to be nationally harmonized so that ALL Reservists in every province and territory have the same protection.  And, continuing on a slight tangent, such legislation should have both rewarding and punitive components to encourage support and ensure compliance.  Think of tax breaks for small business who support Reservists and their activities.  The best way to give Reservists the ability to deploy in larger numbers is to minimize the risk to their post-deloyment livelihoods and educations.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I could write a book on the subject, but it has been flogged to death. The militia was re-organized in 1936 to constitute six divisions along with corps and army troops for a war in Europe. The plan was to mobilize two divisions at the start and then build up. As the government was not keen on going to war in Europe again, the plan was written for home defence.

What we have now is the remnants of the 1936 plan, while since 1950 we have been concentrating on forces in being. The militia has been hacked willy-nilly, especially in the 1960s, but since then no one of any political stripe has had the cojones to take on the local movers and shakers to rationalize an inefficient structure. This is not an attack on the reservists or even the units, but the numbers game leads to what Royal Drew has pointed out. I fear this has become sacrosanct, even with its defects. We have tried to play games with things like the 10/90 battalions and the total force venture into cloud cuckoo land with predictable results.

I wish I could be optimistic, but . . .

If the Reserves re-oriented themselves I envision them providing valuable contributions to Canada both on Domestic and Expeditionary Ops.  Initial forces on operations would be comprised of Regulars but with time to conduct requisite amounts of individual and collective training the Reserves would be able to provide far greater contributions to Operations than they presently do. 

I would like to eventually get to the point where the Reserves deploy sub-units or even entire units on operations.  Is a company of regular force soldiers better than company of reservists?  Yes, but only because they have been trained properly, with six to twelve months of workup training with proper equipment, a reservist company would be for all intents and purposes interchangeable with a regular company.  Afghanistan showed the Regular Force can't sustain itself for a prolonged period on an operation that size, it nearly broke us.  We need a stronger Army Reserve more than ever but the Reserve needs to be structured in a way that gives us flexibility, something it presently doesn't provide.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Reserve Job Protection Legislation is beyond the Army's ability to fix.  However, it has to be nationally harmonized so that ALL Reservists in every province and territory have the same protection.  And, continuing on a slight tangent, such legislation should have both rewarding and punitive components to encourage support and ensure compliance.  Think of tax breaks for small business who support Reservists and their activities.  The best way to give Reservists the ability to deploy in larger numbers is to minimize the risk to their post-deloyment livelihoods and educations.

Yep, we can't do anything about this but potentially we can use some of the same Reserve Lobbying groups we hate so much to do exactly this, they managed to re-instate pips and crowns so maybe they could focus on, you know, actually helping out the soldiers in their respective organizations.

 

[x_para76]

So let me see if I've got this correct? What is being is suggested is taking all of the reserve infantry regiment in an area like 31 Brigade for example and reorganizing them under 1 unit badge? Let's say in this case all of the regiments become outlying companies of 4 RCR with one battalion head quarters based in London and each of the outlying companies maintains it's own company HQ and training facilities in its respective city or town?

Have I got this right or did I misunderstand something?

 

[dapaterson]

The Army's current thought process (such as it is) is fundamentally flawed.

In the event of an emergency, you need to rely on standing forces, not wait for a call up and muster.  Conversely, when participating in deployed operations, beyond Roto 0 there is ample time to mobilize.

Thus, simple logic would suggest that the Reg F needs to have the Domestic response task, and the Roto 0 deployment task; for subsequent rotations the Reserves should be heavily leveraged.  Which suggests that you put the high training cost skillsets more heavily in the Regular Force as those have much longer timelines to generate. 

Of course, that suggests that the Army would take a holistic approach in assessing its requirements, and balancing forces between part and full time; instead, there seems to be perpetual competition within the Reg F between corps and regiments, looking for internal dominance and advantage regardless of the cost.  So we penny packet out fleets not based on a plan but on the desire of this, that or the other regiment to have the same toys as the others (thankfully, the worst example of that thought was stopped before it was purchased).  We reverse engineer plans to reflect the need to maintain the infantry balance of terror - and so the answer to the number of battalions needed must always be an even multiple of three.

Meanwhile, we were taking upwards of a year to prepare forces for deployment; if it takes a year to train the Regular Army for deployment then they're taking money under false pretences.

In short, if we want to look for dysfunctional messes that waste resources, the Reserves, sadly, do not hold a monopoly.

 

[McG]

From what I've seen many of these same COs and RSMs think more about the balmoral or beret on their head than they do about the actual health of the army. 

To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.

So let me see if I've got this correct? What is being is suggested is taking all of the reserve infantry regiment in an area like 31 Brigade for example and reorganizing them under 1 unit badge? Let's say in this case all of the regiments become outlying companies of 4 RCR with one battalion head quarters based in London and each of the outlying companies maintains it's own company HQ and training facilities in its respective city or town?

Have I got this right or did I misunderstand something?

That is only one possible course of action.  They could all become companies of the Royal Southwest Ontario Regiment.  Or, maybe all the cap badges remain but the regimental identity is at the sub-unit level while the Bn HQ holds no regimental affiliation.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

The Army's current thought process (such as it is) is fundamentally flawed.

In the event of an emergency, you need to rely on standing forces, not wait for a call up and muster.  Conversely, when participating in deployed operations, beyond Roto 0 there is ample time to mobilize.

Thus, simple logic would suggest that the Reg F needs to have the Domestic response task, and the Roto 0 deployment task; for subsequent rotations the Reserves should be heavily leveraged.  Which suggests that you put the high training cost skillsets more heavily in the Regular Force as those have much longer timelines to generate. 

Of course, that suggests that the Army would take a holistic approach in assessing its requirements, and balancing forces between part and full time; instead, there seems to be perpetual competition within the Reg F between corps and regiments, looking for internal dominance and advantage regardless of the cost.  So we penny packet out fleets not based on a plan but on the desire of this, that or the other regiment to have the same toys as the others (thankfully, the worst example of that thought was stopped before it was purchased).  We reverse engineer plans to reflect the need to maintain the infantry balance of terror - and so the answer to the number of battalions needed must always be an even multiple of three.

Meanwhile, we were taking upwards of a year to prepare forces for deployment; if it takes a year to train the Regular Army for deployment then they're taking money under false pretences.

In short, if we want to look for dysfunctional messes that waste resources, the Reserves, sadly, do not hold a monopoly.

:goodpost:

You sure you're not a sniper?  Hitting the mark every time!

To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.

Completely agree, I re-read some of my posts and I sounded a little biased... not my intent, apologies.

 

[x_para76]

To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.
That is only one possible course of action.  They could all become companies of the Royal Southwest Ontario Regiment.  Or, maybe all the cap badges remain but the regimental identity is at the sub-unit level while the Bn HQ holds no regimental affiliation.

I just used this example because I believe the Brits have done something similar with their T.A units. They have gassed regiments regular and T.A that are older than Canada. So how is it that some of these regimental senates hold such sway over DND and their ability to restructure the reserves in a more cost effective manor?

 

[Infanteer]

The Army's current thought process (such as it is) is fundamentally flawed.

In the event of an emergency, you need to rely on standing forces, not wait for a call up and muster.  Conversely, when participating in deployed operations, beyond Roto 0 there is ample time to mobilize.

Thus, simple logic would suggest that the Reg F needs to have the Domestic response task, and the Roto 0 deployment task; for subsequent rotations the Reserves should be heavily leveraged.  Which suggests that you put the high training cost skillsets more heavily in the Regular Force as those have much longer timelines to generate.

Yes, but I disagree with the simple categorization of expeditionary operations - I'd argue that the Regular Force needs to be responsible for standing tasks of reaction and projection.  Forces for Op REASSURANCE were ready to go in 3 days and deployed in 7.  The MRP considers 60 and 90 days to deploy abroad (after a year of training) to be "high readiness", but this is, in my view, a medium level of readiness that could be tasked to a group of Reg/Res mixed formations.