Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Dennis Ruhl]

What is your experience with National Guard or Army Reserve units? You might just find that they are organized along the lines suggested by those advocating amalgamation.

I've driven around the western states a lot and armouries and Guard recruiting offices are everywhere.

Montana - about 1 million pop

163rd Infantry Regiment is in 16 locations.  It fought as a unit in the Pacific in WWII.  Perhaps it could be the model for a revitalization in Canada.  While built around the Bradley AFV it seems to include all trades.  If we want to economize on colonels, perhaps a regiment like the Loyal Edmonton Regiment could have an MP Platoon, Medical Company, Engineering Squadron, and Communication Squadron etc. under their umbrella for administrative purposes while keeping their branch identities.



Alberta - about 3 million pop

The Loyal Edmonton Regiment and B Sqn. The South Alberta Light Horse - 1 location

The Kings Own Calgary Regiment and The Calgary Highlanders  - 1 location

The South Alberta Light Horse - A Sqn - 1 location

Other units - 4 more locations

 

[cavalryman]

A quick real-world $ break-down for a reserve unit of my personal acquaintance....  about 100 Cl A effectives, plus the usual number of in-unit Cl B paid out of the unit budget... $800K for the year total allocation; 1/3 of that amount is spent on actual training (incl. IBTS, crew served weapons ranges & field trg), the remainder on admin, Cl B salaries, etc.  Make of that what you will.

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

Thank you for the clarification, but the data remains utterly spurious.

And, ultimately, the Reserves are overly fixated on dollars and roll calls; to my mind, the focus needs to be on capability output - what can they provide?  When leaders (at all levels up to and including LGens) are given concrete data indicating capability they get very attentive and supportive.

I do realize that sailors need something to ride on as do pilots.  Reality is that reserve units do not have ships, fighter planes, helicopters, tanks etc.  To ignore the gross cost of these items would also create some unrealistic numbers.  Not everyone is light infantry like most reserve units.

Reserves are fixated on dollars and roll calls because it is a perceived measure of efficiency.  Smarter people than me have attempted to measure efficiency in governmental organizations and lacking a bottom line, all have failed miserably.  You can set objectives and try to determine whether the objectives have been met but the process quickly becomes subjective.

Canada was on the winning side in WWII so we could say the objectives were met.  That much we know.  The rest?

 

[aesop081]

I do realize that sailors need something to ride on as do pilots.  Reality is that reserve units do not have ships, fighter planes, helicopters, tanks etc.  To ignore the gross cost of these items would also create some unrealistic numbers.  Not everyone is light infantry like most reserve units.

You still,cant seem to grasp why your reasoning is flawed and steadfastly refuse to adress the reasons that have been posted. Nice going.

 

[Rick Goebel]

Tango2bravo, I think your comment "I wondered if we could have used an NCM-RESO program that offered four summers of full employment right off the bat - as long as you remained active in your home unit. The first summer would be DP1 training.  The second summer would be DP2 courses to include PLQ-L (bit of a rush but there you go). The third and fourth summers would be spent instructing." is one of the best possible ways of improving the general efficiency of the army reserve.  I lost count of how many times in how many places I suggested this when I was still serving.

Unfortunately, I no longer have access to a lot of the figures I used to support the proposal, though it did seem easy to support.

I would encourage anyone with access to retention and training cost numbers to look at this and to recommend it anywhere any time you can.

 

[dapaterson]

Canada was on the winning side in WWII so we could say the objectives were met.  That much we know.  The rest?

Ouch.  Dupuy would disagree; arguably, the Allies wasted resources in profligate manner - including the lives of their sons and daughters.  Unfortunately, victors tend not to learn the lessons they need to know.

But that's a whole other rabbit hole...


Cavalryman:  That $800K includes no infrastructure costs for the facility; no payments in lieu of taxes for the facility; no acquisition costs for vehicles or weapons; no life-cycle support for those vehicles or weapons; no ammunition; no support from bases (and please leave out the gratuitous CFSU(O) jokes); no pay for the Regular Force members posted in; no individual training for the soldiers; no IMPs; no benefits (including the dental plan, disability compensation, now pension benefits, CPP and EI contributions (employer's share), RFRG...); individual clothing and equipment...

But the $18B figure does include those amounts.  So we can't reconcile the two.  Indeed, we can't even stand up a new unit using the $800K as an estimate, as there are so many other costs involved.

That's the main critique here - the starting numbers are so dissimilar that they are not comparable at all.

 

[dapaterson]

Tango2bravo['s comment] is one of the best possible ways of improving the general efficiency of the army reserve.  I lost count of how many times in how many places I suggested this when I was still serving.

Unfortunately, I no longer have access to a lot of the figures I used to support the proposal, though it did seem easy to support.

I would encourage anyone with access to retention and training cost numbers to look at this and to recommend it anywhere any time you can.

The devil is always in the details, though, and such a program would have to be individually tailored to each soldier - depending on their availabilities for training and sync with courses.

As well, and this is a CF dirty little secret, year one attrition is about the same for the Reg F and the Res F.  Most of the folks who leave at 0-11+ months of service are those who discover the Army/CF just isn't for them.  (Reg F attrition isn't noticed because it takes place in the recruit school and during DP1 training, so line units never see it, except as "What happened to XXXXX who was on our recruit course?")

The challenge is the year 2 (and, to a lesser extent) the year 3 attrition.  A "NCM Entry Scheme Trial" (NEST - how about that for an abbreviation?) would need to address that - and would have to be portable, from unit to unit, as young soldiers move for school or work.

Indeed, perhaps that's a first place to look for efficiency - streamlining the process for soldiers to parade with other units.  Could we even (gasp) permit COs to talk directly, and info their higher HQ that Bloggins will be parading with them, vice the current useless system of CBG and LFA HQ mailboxes transferring information in a less than timely manner.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The devil is always in the details, though, and such a program would have to be individually tailored to each soldier - depending on their availabilities for training and sync with courses.

As well, and this is a CF dirty little secret, year one attrition is about the same for the Reg F and the Res F.  Most of the folks who leave at 0-11+ months of service are those who discover the Army/CF just isn't for them.  (Reg F attrition isn't noticed because it takes place in the recruit school and during DP1 training, so line units never see it, except as "What happened to XXXXX who was on our recruit course?")

The challenge is the year 2 (and, to a lesser extent) the year 3 attrition.  A "NCM Entry Scheme Trial" (NEST - how about that for an abbreviation?) would need to address that - and would have to be portable, from unit to unit, as young soldiers move for school or work.

Indeed, perhaps that's a first place to look for efficiency - streamlining the process for soldiers to parade with other units.  Could we even (gasp) permit COs to talk directly, and info their higher HQ that Bloggins will be parading with them, vice the current useless system of CBG and LFA HQ mailboxes transferring information in a less than timely manner.

You are correct that little details can sometimes be quite major obstacles that scuttle a plan!

I would see this plan as being offered to Reservists who are enrolled (or enrolling) in a post-secondary institution. I was a RESO guy and benefited from three full summers, and I think that we could broaden the arcs somewhat. Univeristy and college calendars have a centre of visible mass in terms of calendars which could be used as the baseline. We would certainly need to allow for individuals to transfer between units - which might mean that this program would need central funding.

As an aside, I watched de-centralized funding kill officer training and production in the Reserves. When RESO was centrally funded units could recruit six officer cadets in the hopes of getting three Troop Leaders. Once funding was de-centralized I saw units suddenly stop asking for RESO vacancies and opting for the cheaper MITCP (I was a CBG G3 IT at the time) to save a couple of bucks. They would also only hire one or two and then wonder why they had no junior officers. Anyhoo.

I don't think that we would need any obligation except that to qualify for subsequent summers the individual would need to have paraded at his unit. I think that the prospect of interesting training (offer challenging DP2s) combined with guaranteed employment for three to four months would be a good draw for the average post-secondary student. When I was a unit Ops O the Ops WO worked hard to find full summers of employment for our Troopers/non-CLC Cpls and this was very hard. We could only make it work for a few and the rest would then seek employment elsewhere (can't blame them). Once a guy got CLC he had more work than he could handle, so the trick is to have a good second summer.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Having experienced both Canadian and USMC reserve training models, I'd say that something in the middle would be of greater benefit.

Within the Canadian context, many weekly parade nights were of little training value, but as mentioned, good for maintaining social contact, and building the bonds at the crew/section/troop/platoon level.

We've always had the best results when training nights were part of battle prep for the exercise. Issue a warning order for the ex on D-30 days (ish) then work up to the 'operational deployment' during the following 3 or 4 evenings. This gives the PM training purpose, just like any battel prep evolution. It works great, as long as you maintain the aim and are not seriously sidetracked by some of the usual mo-lisha clutter - which is also a feature of any regular army unit.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

We've always had the best results when training nights were part of battle prep for the exercise. Issue a warning order for the ex on D-30 days (ish) then work up to the 'operational deployment' during the following 3 or 4 evenings. This gives the PM training purpose, just like any battel prep evolution. It works great, as long as you maintain the aim and are not seriously sidetracked by some of the usual mo-lisha clutter - which is also a feature of any regular army unit.

I agree here.  Too many Canadian militia training nights were done on an ad hoc basis, with little serious thought given to how the training plan tied into our monthly FTXs and annual transition from individual to collective training.  I'd say we could probably eliminate 2 training nights without any real damage to the standards, and use that money for an additional week long concentration sometime towards the end of the training year, before units stand down, and most importantly, before they send their members off for summer taskings and courses.

I still think a contract method would be the best way to ensure that units get consistent numbers, even if it is only an annual or bi-annual contract.  Make the contract renewal a public parade whereby members who are renewing get to sign on via the CO in front of their mates and families.  That puts alot of face-saving pressure on those who are pondering not signing on for another year, and again, strengthen bonds within the unit.

For members who don't opt to sign on to the contract, they're moved away from 'deploying tier 1' positions within the unit, i.e. the 4th rifle company within the affiliated battlegroup, whereby a serious commitment to training and physical fitness have to be maintained; separate what I would classify as the professional reservist from the social club/dad's Army type.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I agree here.  Too many Canadian militia training nights were done on an ad hoc basis, with little serious thought given to how the training plan tied into our monthly FTXs and annual transition from individual to collective training.  I'd say we could probably eliminate 2 training nights without any real damage to the standards, and use that money for an additional week long concentration sometime towards the end of the training year, before units stand down, and most importantly, before they send their members off for summer taskings and courses.

The onus is on the leadership (i.e., those at my pay grade and above) to plan far enough in advance, of course. Then the Jnr Offr/SNCO network can kick into gear and get down to the details needed. I think if we get the planning and 'certainty' right, we can dispense with other forms of coercion and bribery. I mean, if you can't plan well enough to fill the armoury every night with keeners who want to blow things up and shoot things, then you lack imagination.  :camo:

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

For my first three years in the Reserves (90 to 93) the training was fairly marginal. We lacked access to equipment, training funds were tight and with the exception of a brief ACP phase in 1991 we also seemed to lack focus. My own unit had three Squadrons, but each Troop began with half of its strength on long-term NES.

A new Area Comd in 1993 changed all this and while his measures were broadly unpopular with the old guard the new focus on training and associated accountability for it gave us resources and focus. We were given new powers to sweep out the NES folks. Our first year under the new program had some fits and starts but by the second year I think that we were rolling.

With the guidance of the CO and 2IC and a fairly clear District Annual Training Directive that expressed goals, the Ops WO and I sat down for a month in the summer and hammered out a training plan. The CO made some final tweaks and we made some other adjustments when consulting with District and the other units (deconflicting resources like Cougars and range timings). By the middle of August we had an approved plan and the Ops WO booked everything. We handed the soldiers a calendar in September that laid out the year.

I was double-hatted as a Troop Leader, and my Troop had 100% attendance for the training weekends. I think that led to this was that the training looked fairly interesting and they had the schedule in time to make arrangements. Our year had a focus that was given to us by higher command, and it was one that everyone could buy into. We repeated this the following year.

 

[dapaterson]

Selection and maintenance of the aim - who'd have thought?

 

[daftandbarmy]

With the guidance of the CO and 2IC and a fairly clear District Annual Training Directive that expressed goals, the Ops WO and I sat down for a month in the summer and hammered out a training plan. The CO made some final tweaks and we made some other adjustments when consulting with District and the other units (deconflicting resources like Cougars and range timings). By the middle of August we had an approved plan and the Ops WO booked everything. We handed the soldiers a calendar in September that laid out the year.

I was double-hatted as a Troop Leader, and my Troop had 100% attendance for the training weekends. I think that led to this was that the training looked fairly interesting and they had the schedule in time to make arrangements. Our year had a focus that was given to us by higher command, and it was one that everyone could buy into. We repeated this the following year.

Let me take a wild assed guess here: recruiting and retention skyrocketed, right?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Recruiting was stable, but retention was very good. We had an oustanding core of about twenty-five Troopers who had joined in '93 and they stuck together for about three years as a group. It think it was partially that they all enjoyed each other's company but also that we offered them something that was challenging and somewhat consistent (they joined to serve as Crewmen on Cougars and they actually got to do that). Some then went on to other things but some are indeed still in.

I think that what made this possible was the firm direction from the Area Commander.

Bringing this back to the thread, if I was suddenly a Reservist again and in charge of a Recce Squadron I could probably make something work if the CO came in and said:

"Tango2Bravo, when you are done searching the Internet for pictures of the green-skinned red-head from Star Trek would you mind reading my Annual Training Directive that I sent you last week? In there you may find some direction that you are to train your Squadron for Convoy Escort tasks. You have your one Troop of LUVWs to stretch across three Troops for the Fall, but for the April to June period the other COs and myself have pooled our resources. You will get two weekends with a full Squadron and there will be a Convoy Escort BTS evaluation at the end. There will be Troop of LAV RWS worked in as well so you need to get some guys trained up on that. Brief me next Thursday."

"Don't worry sir, the SSM and me went through it on the weekend and we have a rough plan. Once I've downloaded this last picture I can brief you. The BC and Ops Sgt are already working on the details. Can I get a live-fire 360 degree Troop convoy escort live fire range in March?"

 

[Haggis]

T2B, I find this very interesting.  Just how did you bypass the DWAN Firewall to get those photos downloaded?

But seriously, folks, the absolute key to successful training nights and weekends is to get commitment.  The ONLY way to get commitment is to plan innovative, relevant, interesting training on firm, fixed dates and then deliver on this, each and every time the troops show up.

 

[ArmyRick]

Well said. Ad hoc = chaos = troops not wanting to come out.

 

[Long in the tooth]

I recall training on weeknights and weekends on at least three ambitious combat related courses that took a huge commitment.  About three quarters of the way thru on each we were told "course cancelled due to 1.  We haven't recv auth to give the qual;  2.  We don't have the ammo; or 3.  We've run out of money."

And then during the summer we would have to take rifleman in a demo coy and watch everyone else with those quals get the jammy jobs.

One reason why I left the reserves... and I'm not slagging the members, it's just the nature of the beast.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I recall training on weeknights and weekends on at least three ambitious combat related courses that took a huge commitment.  About three quarters of the way thru on each we were told "course cancelled due to 1.  We haven't recv auth to give the qual;  2.  We don't have the ammo; or 3.  We've run out of money."

And then during the summer we would have to take rifleman in a demo coy and watch everyone else with those quals get the jammy jobs.

One reason why I left the reserves... and I'm not slagging the members, it's just the nature of the beast.

I'm guessing that at least one of those courses was Basic Recce, AWT or Driver Wheeled. They look good on paper, troops love them, but they're a huge effort for a reserve unit.

Nevertheless, I've seen courses like these run well by reserve units; they just need to make sure that they get the planning right.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We usually had good ideas and imagination, but were short on resources. Running really cool courses and exotic exercises sounds great, but it can fall flat on its face when the resources are not there. As a Reserve G3 IT I saw some minor disasters when units tried to run advanced courses without having access to the advanced resources necessary to run them through to their conclusion. Hurt feelings ensue and credibility suffers.

Linking this back to the role and capabilities piece, I really think that the senior commanders have a huge role to play. They control the resources and they allocate the tasks/missions. Missions and tasks don't necessarily have to be glamourous - they do need to be resourced.

The current proposed tasks offer units the opportunity to execute training for tasks that are relevent and resourced. An OC can then brief the training year to the troops with some expectation that what he is saying will actually happen. The imagination and initiative of the junior leadership can then be used to make that training interesting and exciting within the lane set by the higher commander.