Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[PPCLI Guy]

A Commanding Officer is just as good, or just as bad, as the Soldiers under his command make him.

And soldiers are often just as good as their COs enable them to be

 

[Rifleman62]

MCG

"Should all of these units actually be units?  Could some be sub-units (or even sub-sub-units) of units in other locations?  Could others be independant sub-units?" I was going for the juggular. Reduce the number of reserve units. And not just in TB, and not just the "militia".

 

[McG]

At the end of an honest assessment, it may well turn out that some locations currently have a number units that exceeds even the number of sub-units that can actually be sustained in that location.  If that is the case, and it is determined that no unit can be 'down-graded' to a satellite platoon of a unit located elsewhere, then we may have to be prepaired to reduce the spectrum of capabilities currently found in those smaller populations.

We should also be communicating between the various environments to ensure that there is no destructive competition for manpower in population centres too small to support all the reserve presence the CF is trying to establish.

 

[bwatch]

Well I guess that settles our debate!  If it is implemented well, I think this could be a very good thing for the army reserves.

Gary O'Brien was once with the Black Watch and was in it during the Disbandment of the 1st and 2nd Reg Force Units. So he should know first hand what this move will do for morale. I can tell you now, if that man ever shows up at the regiment, the Pipes and Drums will be waiting to Pipe him right back out.

 

[Rifleman62]

You think so. Somehow I doubt it.

Is it not complementary to be piped out in the Highland Infantry?

 

[Rifleman62]

Public news, but not news to the Brigades and units I would think.

 

[geo]

Ugh... link to Wikipedia... here is the link to the unit's web site:

http://www.voltigeursdequebec.net/

 

[daftandbarmy]

This oughta be good - units prognosticated for providing Arctic troops by the Ottawa Citizen.

I can see the Russian bear and Uncle Sam cringing in fear even now....  :

 

[Journeyman]

As if the militarization of the arctic with those death-dealing commandos, the Canadian Rangers, wasn't bad enough... 


Sorry, the voices in my head were channelling some left-wing freaks; I've readjusted my antenna and upped my meds again. ;D

 

[daftandbarmy]

I wonder if the KGB units will be as elite as our folks? They'd be easy to tell apart anyways: Canucks in red shirts vs. Russians in long leather jackets.

Russia plans elite Arctic army unit to protect interests in ice-cold war

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1165318/Russia-plans-elite-Arctic-army-unit-protect-interests-ice-cold-war.html

 

[McG]

Battle cry over joining forces - Don't merge reserves, critics say
Aldo Santin
Winnipeg Free Press
30 Mar 08

Manitoba's military reserve community is bracing for another assault on the country's civilian-soldier tradition.

Reserve supporters wonder if recent comments by the head of the military's reserve system that small reserve units will be merged in 2012 spell the end to the tradition-bound military reserve units.

Robert Darling said he doesn't know what prompted Brig.-Gen. Gary O'Brien to tell CBC Radio recently that small reserve units will be merged for efficiency reasons after Canada concludes its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011.

"We are going to mess with the basic structure of the army reserve," said O'Brien, known for his blunt manner. "It isn't about closing more locations or getting smaller -- it's about getting more efficient." "Who told him to say this?" asked Darling, the Manitoba representative of a lobby group dedicated to preserving the reserve system and a former honorary colonel to an Ontario-based reserve unit.

A Canadian Forces spokeswoman said O'Brien would not be available to speak to the Free Press about the issue.

There are six army reserve units in Manitoba, including three of the country's most storied units -- the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and the Fort Garry Horse.

Membership in these units is well below their authorized strengths, in some cases less than half, most ranging between 60 and 80 members.

The problem is that many of the key personnel from these units -- the warrant officers, master warrant officers, sergeants and corporals -- have volunteered to join the regular army for rotations in Afghanistan. Without them, the reserve units can't conduct necessary training.

Murray Burt, the secretary to the Camerons, said combining reserve units for training purposes makes sense, and points to what happened to the Camerons and Rifles a year ago when the two were tactically grouped for training purposes.

Unlike the changes O'Brien hinted at, the Rifles and Camerons maintain their separate identities.

Burt said it's this loss of identity that reserve proponents fear, along with the resulting disconnect from the community: "There are suspicions they'll eliminate the names of the reserve units and replace them with numbers." O'Brien's comments may simply be a trial ballon, Darling said, sent afloat by O'Brien's boss, Gen. Andrew Leslie, the chief of land staff and commander land forces command.

Darling said he thinks military top brass is trying to determine the depth of the opposition to the merger plan and how the politicians will react to pressure from reserve supporters.

"Gen. Leslie has stated that he doesn't need a second war, one over reserves restructuring," Darling said. "We must try to show him that it would not be worth his while."

It seems to me that Robert Darling has lost sight of why the reserves exist.  He shows this by casting his full support solely behind regimental identities and tossing threats of making organizational improvement a fight not worth the military's while.

The Primary Reserve does not exist for the glory of its regiments.  The Primary Reserve exists as an element of meeting the military needs of the nation. 

As I’ve stated before, I think that it is possible to amalgamate units and fully preserve regimental identities.  However, if the regimental protectionists do not constructively involve themselves in this process and if they consistently insist on circling wagons & becoming obstructionists at any/every hint of change, well then they will in fact do more harm than good for the regimental system.  If the protectionists deny all evolution to the force structure they will have successfully made the regimental system irrelevant and a hindrance to be done away with. 

I’d personally like to see the regimental system stay.  That means people need to stop using it as an obstruction to change.  Those who want the regimental system should show how it can fit our needs today.  I propose numbered battalions in which the companies may have shared or unique regimental identities.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Should any regiment’s continued survival be primarily dependent on the degree of activism of its supporters?

To enter the fray with the sole objective to save one’s own Regiment through an era of Army reorganization, perhaps at the expense of a stronger Army, is to set aside the soldier’s higher moral obligations.

The continuance of the regimental system, in and of itself, is not sufficient justification to defend the continued existence of any particular regiment.

The Regimental System

 

[Rifleman62]

Bob Darling is a gentleman who obviously was prompted to be the spokesperson. There is a fair bit of opposition in Wpg to change amongst the old guard. I have a fairly good knowledge of the situation and the players due to the positions I held or hold in Wpg. I do not know everything. I believe some of the information in the article is incorrect.

IMO, the opposition is mainly with the Regt Senate of the Camerons of C, some retired members of the FGH, and a member of the RWpgRif Regt Senate. They live in the pass, and some of them think they are important. They also think that the Honoraries and Senates have power and influence. Sorry, the truth is they do not. Not anymore and not for several decades.

Last year, the RWpgRif and Camerons of C were officially tactically grouped. For years prior they were doing almost all of their training together. When it became official, the Camerons Senate woke up, and went to the media as they are doing now. If a person had some knowledge of what was really going on, that person would wonder what planet the Camerons Senate was on. Their "message" was incorrect and convoluted. Their "message" was also ignored after the initial run by the media, as this one will be.

There are a couple of members here who can post how things are going, but may not as they may feel that posting info is circumventing the chain of command.

As I stated before, success depends on the key, the CO. He may be well-intentioned, but his execution may be flawed. CO's come and go, but The Regiment is always there.

I do not want my regiment to go, and I am sure retired members of the Camerons feel the same. I personally think that the Camerons of C are being saved at the expense of the RWpgRif. Since the 1960’s, Wpg has not, and today cannot support two Reserve infantry units. It is the only city East of Toronto with two Reserve infantry units.

Without going into details, several fundamental “Rifle regiment” traditions have been mistakenly done away with. Some are obvious. How are the individual soldiers taking it?

I don’t know, and how do you ask/survey in a neutral manner so that the Army’s authority to tactically group and the CO is not undermined?

IMO, you don’t. Soldiers will vote with their feet. Sooner, rather than later, the corner will be turned, with or without the old guard.

Tactically grouped is far different from amalgamation. If the Army decides "to do away" with my regiment, so be it. It is not a decision that the Army will take lightly.

 

[Biggoals2bdone]

ummmm NO...DP1 = BMQ+SQ+BIQ (for inf ex example.)

An Army Reservist who has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ (AKA DP1 BMQ (L)) since 2003 will be granted the equvalency of Reg F BMQ. That is a CDA certification.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

ummmm NO...DP1 = BMQ+SQ+BIQ (for inf ex example.)

An Army Reservist who has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ (AKA DP1 BMQ (L)) since 2003 will be granted the equvalency of Reg F BMQ. That is a CDA certification.

Just a little bit off

DP1 Complete is BMQ + BMQ(L) [SQ] + BIQ [OR what ever trades course you do]

All these courses have DP 1 in the title of the TP. This is to just indicate where in the developmental period the course is ran.

What Haggis is stating is that,

PRes BMQ + PRes BMQ(L) [SQ] = Reg Force BMQ Course.

 

[George Wallace]

Please read the whole thread before adding incorrect information.

Biggoals2bdone

Do we have to place you under maximum supervision on this site?  It seems we are constantly following you around, finding you posting well outside of your lanes with incorrect information.

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

Why is no-one held responsible for the terrible state of the army reserves?  The reserves have no control over their own budgets, equipment, pay, and most job satisfaction issues. 

Close to half of American troops in Iraq are reservists because of cost savings.  The all-inclusive annual cost of the Canadian regular force is about $400,000 per member.  The annual cost of a reservist is about $10,000.  On face value that's a 40 to 1 cost differential.  We could juggle some numbers that could be perceived as unfair and maybe we could lower the differntial to 20 to 1 or 10 to 1 but it isn't going away.  Trying to save money at the expense of the reserves is false economy.

The numbers escape me now but some years ago I did a calculation on the pay of the cost of pay in a reserve regiment compared to the pay of 4 regular force staff supporting the regiment.  The regiment had about 60 reliable members working an average of about 50 full days or 3,000 full days or about 8 full years.  At the time reserve daily pay seemed to be based on 1/365 of regular force pay.  The regular force staff were a CAPT, WO, SGT, and CPL.  Their pay rates were above the reserve regiment average so I estimate that the cost of personnel to the regiment was somewhere between 33 and 40 % regular force.  These guys were invaluable and I do not criticize them, just pointing out an anomaly.

What is needed is someone's butt to be in a sling for failure of the reserves to maintain numbers and operational capability.  Blaming the reserves for failure of the reserves makes no sense as most of the potential elements leading to success are out of their hands.  A study needs to be done to determine job satisfaction issues to find out why MacDonalds is a slam-dunk choice for young people compared to the reserves.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Why is no-one held responsible for the terrible state of the army reserves?  The reserves have no control over their own budgets, equipment, pay, and most job satisfaction issues. 

Close to half of American troops in Iraq are reservists because of cost savings.  The all-inclusive annual cost of the Canadian regular force is about $400,000 per member.  The annual cost of a reservist is about $10,000.  On face value that's a 40 to 1 cost differential.  We could juggle some numbers that could be perceived as unfair and maybe we could lower the differntial to 20 to 1 or 10 to 1 but it isn't going away.  Trying to save money at the expense of the reserves is false economy.

Do you have a source for your numbers which might give us a glimpse into the methodology?

In any case, most of the discussion here has focused on improvements to training and organization by rationalizing units. This is different that a simple money saving exercise. The arguments for amalgamation have centred on having realistic sub-unit and unit sizes that could execute realistic training. Individuals could slow their career progression down a little as they would be forced upwards to quickly to fill the succession plan demend created by single sub-unit regiments.

Be careful throwing around examples from the US. I conducted an exchange as a Reservist with a USMC Reserve Battalion. This battalion had four full companies drawn from four major urban centres in two States. The Marines did the same training as their Active Duty counterparts and they had to come to the monthly training session. The officers were all ex-Active Duty. The focus was on training - no Thursday night mess fun. Is this what you had in mind?

 

[dapaterson]

Why is no-one held responsible for the terrible state of the army reserves?  The reserves have no control over their own budgets, equipment, pay, and most job satisfaction issues. 

Interesting assertions.

Utterly baseless and without merit, but interesting nevertheless.

Budgets:  Within the army, funding for the Reserves is allocated though a funding model that is accessible on the DWAN; anyone with a DWAN account and view it and work through it to see how allocations are calculated.

Equipment:  All DND equipment is purchased by PWGSC (less minor items under $25K or or those bought through standing offers negotiated by PWGSC).  The Reserves 2000 friendly LFRR initiative failed to assemble a coherent equipment plan for the Army Reserve, leading to The Reserves (as you'd put it) leaving millions of dollars in equipment funding untouched.

Pay:  Treasury board, in negotiation with DND / CF, sets military pay rates.  Other benefits are similarly set by TB, as they are for all personnel employed by the Crown.

Close to half of American troops in Iraq are reservists because of cost savings.  The all-inclusive annual cost of the Canadian regular force is about $400,000 per member.  The annual cost of a reservist is about $10,000.  On face value that's a 40 to 1 cost differential.  We could juggle some numbers that could be perceived as unfair and maybe we could lower the differntial to 20 to 1 or 10 to 1 but it isn't going away.  Trying to save money at the expense of the reserves is false economy.

I'd love to see a source for those figures.  DP1 training for reservists consumes significantly more than 10K even for the shortest of courses - it's over 80 training days for most BMQ/SQ/DP1 training; add pay and O&M (to say nothing of course overhead) and you're already over $10K without parading class A.

And the value of that differential is reduced by the reduced availablilty of Reservists vs Reg F members, and the training deltas that Reservists are required to make up prior to deployment.  Of course, increasing training would reduce those deltas, but increase the cost of the Reserves.

The numbers escape me now but some years ago I did a calculation on the pay of the cost of pay in a reserve regiment compared to the pay of 4 regular force staff supporting the regiment.  The regiment had about 60 reliable members working an average of about 50 full days or 3,000 full days or about 8 full years.  At the time reserve daily pay seemed to be based on 1/365 of regular force pay.  The regular force staff were a CAPT, WO, SGT, and CPL.  Their pay rates were above the reserve regiment average so I estimate that the cost of personnel to the regiment was somewhere between 33 and 40 % regular force.  These guys were invaluable and I do not criticize them, just pointing out an anomaly.

Reserve units do not pay a cent in Regular Force pay.  Regular Force pay (with the exception of capital projects) is entirely funded by a central account.  In certain attribution exercises pro-rated shares may be assigned to groups to estiamet costs of activities, but no Reserve unit pays a cent of Reg Force pay.

What is needed is someone's butt to be in a sling for failure of the reserves to maintain numbers and operational capability.  Blaming the reserves for failure of the reserves makes no sense as most of the potential elements leading to success are out of their hands.  A study needs to be done to determine job satisfaction issues to find out why MacDonalds is a slam-dunk choice for young people compared to the reserves.

Define the operation capability required.  That's the first step.  On the topic of nubmers, the Army Reserves writ large met or exceeded their target strengths through the past several years.  Our problem, as often discussed, is too many units - if you are allocated 19K in target strength, but have units that would require over 25K to all be full strength - which 19K do you fill?  Going over that target would disobey the government's direction.

As for job satisfaction, it may be worthwhile to look at some indicators - length of tenure with the organziation, rates of volunterrism for deployments and tasks, and component transfers.  What are we trying to measure?

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

Do you have a source for your numbers which might give us a glimpse into the methodology?

In any case, most of the discussion here has focused on improvements to training and organization by rationalizing units. This is different that a simple money saving exercise. The arguments for amalgamation have centred on having realistic sub-unit and unit sizes that could execute realistic training. Individuals could slow their career progression down a little as they would be forced upwards to quickly to fill the succession plan demend created by single sub-unit regiments.

Be careful throwing around examples from the US. I conducted an exchange as a Reservist with a USMC Reserve Battalion. This battalion had four full companies drawn from four major urban centres in two States. The Marines did the same training as their Active Duty counterparts and they had to come to the monthly training session. The officers were all ex-Active Duty. The focus was on training - no Thursday night mess fun. Is this what you had in mind?

Total defense spending $20 billion - 50,0000 members - $400,000 per - mixes soldiers with frigates but informative.  The militia numbers came off a regimental website showing a $1 million budget and a bit over 100 members.  I can't find it at the moment.  I wouldn't think it an unreasonable number.

I was thinking state guard units as opposed to USMC reserve units.  In any unit I was in the mess fun started after the training ended.