van Gemeren said:
I know this thread's last reply is a little old, but how do units that are service arms merge with combat arms. I have indirectly heard that the Algonquin Regiment in North Bay and 26 Service (North Bay) Battalion were combining some of their operations. I asked this question in a low visibility area.
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/60782/post-565168.html#msg565168
I don't think it's really a question of "merging" so much as it is a question of a command and control grouping. The way I understand the process of "tactical grouping", the weaker of the two units (ie the one that can't produce enough leadership to run itself and train its troops properly) is placed under command of the stronger unit. This grouping is usually foreseen as temporary, but depending on the causes of the weakness, it could be for years. The "under command" unit does not give up its capbadges, MOC training, nor anything important like that. What it gains is the support of a functioning command and control structure than can provide all the "life support" functions that keep a Res unit healthy and functioning. And, let's face it, 80% of those functions have little or nothing to do with MOC or capbadge.
In 38 CBG we launched two of these (one for our Arty units, one for our three Svc Bns) and I was recently informed of at least one more that is now under way in that CBG. These tactical groupings are more likely to happen in a command like 38 CBG where regional and local demographics can make it very, very difficult to recruit, retain and develop officers and NCOs past Lt/Sgt, but there are adequate numbers of young Canadians willing to join and serve a few years as junior ranks.
Personally, I have come to believe that this is the way ahead for the Army Res: it is just getting far too difficult to grow unit-level leadership. You need a deep and healthy gene pool, not a little puddle of 50 people, from which to truly be able to select the best, and keep on selecting them over years and decades. Where this not possible because of demographics and local economics, units have been struggling and in some cases gradually shrivelling and dying, as troops without effective leaders simply stop coming down to train, thus further attriting the unit and further reducing the pool from which to draw potential leaders. It can be a death spiral.
Making things worse, we are now demanding so much of our senior Res leaders that fewer and fewer suitable people can actually find the time to do it. After all, a Res officer/NCO has a family, a job, possibly ongoing post graduate or professional education, and perhaps other commitments as well. While I was COS 38 CBG, I attended a USARNG event in Minnesota with my Comd. His ARNG peers were shocked to realize how many days a year he was giving to commanding his CBG and all the myriad of activities that entails. Our Res unit COs face very similar demands, as guys like dglad can readily tell us.
The old model has gradually been running down for years (it was not much better off when I joined the Militia in 1974: I read exactly the same complaints on these pages today as we had 33 years ago...) and now in some places it is failing altogether. We have to preserve what is good and useful about our Army Res system, but get on with developing something that will survive and regenerate itself, with the best people leading our troops. The "last man standing" approach to promotion is a guarantee for continuing decline.
Cheers
