Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[McG]

DOMOPS encompasses a wide range of potential tasks, and I am fairly sure the proposal was this unit was there to assist in all contingencies, from an Ice Storm to an FLQ type crisis.

a_majoor,
About the only DOMOPs roll that could justify a Bn in full-time trg is aid-to-civil power.  Do we need full time battalions in every major city for the event that they need to be employed against the citizens?  I think that is a waste.  The likely needs can be met by part-time pers, and there are enough regular force if we ever need to call on this.

 

[a_majoor]

a_majoor,
About the only DOMOPs roll that could justify a Bn in full-time trg is aid-to-civil power.  Do we need full time battalions in every major city for the event that they need to be employed against the citizens?  I think that is a waste.  The likely needs can be met by part-time pers, and there are enough regular force if we ever need to call on this.

Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea. A 200 some odd 50/50 would be a fine compromise, able to serve as a command node and support element for the arriving IRU and follow on forces. The remainder of the time can be split between MLOC, contingency planning/training and perhaps providing continuation training or support for the local P Res units (many P Res units have support issues, so there is a good training fit there).

We need to get out of the box and look around some more, maybe there is something which can be made of the Conservative's notion (besides unintentionally funny interviews of Paul Martin trying to explain election ads), or maybe not.

 

[Donut]

Several pages ago Mr Sallows asked if there was anyone here with first-hand experience of the 10/90 experiment, and I’ve got to say that I was there.  I’d kind of tuned this thread out, and hadn't noticed the topic come up. The experience was mixed, I suspect, for all parties, but I’ll tell what I can recall; It’s a worms-eye view, for sure. 

I was the only Pte in the 10, on Cl C from the tour to nowhere.  I went there from 1RCHA, after the tour was scrubbed in September/October.  We’d spent the time from May to August working up with 3VP in Dundurn before splitting up for Winnipeg and 2VP and Shilo with 1RCHA.

In addition to the workups, I participated in several exercises with the 39CBG units that comprised the 90, including Cougar Salvo.  Fundamentally, I think Mr Sallows is correct, the reserve NCMs and jr leadership greatly benefited from, and enjoyed, the chance to work under professional, full-time, been there done that leadership.  All of the training was to a higher standard.  NBC?  Taught by a man who’d been slimed in the post-gulf war cleanup.  Range Ex?  Bring the Snipers.  Comms course?  We had full time Jimmies, techs and operators.  Maintenance was better, scales of issue were excellent.  We had a Res Tow pl, Recce, Mortar, and Pioneer capabilities.

We had 2 full time medics in the Btn, and 6 ambulances, 2 ML with trailers, 2 Ilti, and an LS for the UMS, to be staffed by 11 and 12 Med Coys. I can’t really speak to what the rifle coys had, except during the workups when I was lumped in with R West Regt and the Engineers and additional odds and sods, but it was the first, and last, time anyone asked me accomplish anything in NVGs, or do a crack-thump range, or get in really top-notch shape, or run with a ruck (gasp!)

Several other reservists were on Cl B or C at the Btn, many ended up Reg F, but lots of others went over after the tours were cancelled, or the seeds were sown for it then.  Most Res units involved had a high number of CT’s afterward, and most were solid, long-serving reservists.

Now, I understand that the Reg F 10% viewed this as a slow, lingering career death, but I can’t really speak to that.

DF

Edit:  I just want to add, for fairness sake, that several members of 3VP stayed in the lower mainland, and I still see one or two on occasion in uniform.  Since this experiment ended 10 years ago, that's not too bad.

 

[McG]

Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea.

I would propose that the 10/90 or 20/80 (or something in between) makes more sense when its purpose is to raise the training standard within the reserves.  DOMOPS would certainly be a task of a 10/90, but it would not be the end-all/be-all of it. 

As mentioned above, such a 10/90 organization would be complimentary to proposals (seen in the Reserve Regimental restructure thread) to combine multiple coy sized regiments within one battalion structure.  The HQ & HQ Pl could be a 50/50 structure, the Admin Coy could be a 80/20 structure, and the rifle coys could just see a reinforced RSS manning.  This would allow the reserves to start better developing battalion level staff (with field experience at that level) outside of the summer concentrations.

Every DOMOPS capability, that might be gained from a DOMOPS focused 50/50 company, could also be gained from a 10/90 battalion that was primarily part-time.  However, that same 50/50 company would not provide a comparable trg benefit as a 10/90.

 

[a_majoor]

Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea. A 200 some odd 50/50 would be a fine compromise, able to serve as a command node and support element for the arriving IRU and follow on forces. The remainder of the time can be split between MLOC, contingency planning/training and perhaps providing continuation training or support for the local P Res units (many P Res units have support issues, so there is a good training fit there).

I would propose that the 10/90 or 20/80 (or something in between) makes more sense when its purpose is to raise the training standard within the reserves.  DOMOPS would certainly be a task of a 10/90, but it would not be the end-all/be-all of it. 

As mentioned above, such a 10/90 organization would be complimentary to proposals (seen in the Reserve Regimental restructure thread) to combine multiple coy sized regiments within one battalion structure.  The HQ & HQ Pl could be a 50/50 structure, the Admin Coy could be a 80/20 structure, and the rifle coys could just see a reinforced RSS manning.  This would allow the reserves to start better developing battalion level staff (with field experience at that level) outside of the summer concentrations.

Every DOMOPS capability, that might be gained from a DOMOPS focused 50/50 company, could also be gained from a 10/90 battalion that was primarily part-time.  However, that same 50/50 company would not provide a comparable trg benefit as a 10/90.

If the 50/50 is considered as part of the overall Reserve Brigade structure, then it could represent a concentration of effort brigade wide to improve training, support DOMOPS etc. Indeed if we looked at a Brigade as a 10/90 or whatever structure, then it would make more sense to roll the Regular Force staff together to provide the horsepower in a few key areas, and use these as "pivot points" around which we improve training, streamline administration, conduct higher level planning and so on. There is a whole world of possibilities opening before us, but we have to get out of the "perpetuating the units of the CEF" box to take full advantage of them.

 

[Kirkhill]

a-majoor and MCG:

Agree with both of you 

Especially this:

There is a whole world of possibilities opening before us, but we have to get out of the "perpetuating the units of the CEF" box to take full advantage of them.

 

[3rd Horseman]

I have found that having the Reserves as part of reg formations was the best end result.

  My example would be the Guns for that example when 3RCHA would train it would expect that the 4th Bty would be the reserve unit that would flush out the regt to 4 full Btys. We all gain benefit from this relationship. It would be reasonable to expect that if the Unit was rotated to War or Ops then the 4th Bty would go or flush out the shortages in the other three. The only place that this would break down would be with Reserve units that are too far away from Reg formations to make it log reasonable. To try and build the Reseves on there own as stand alone units and formations is a flawed strategy.

 

[pbi]

As a general comment, I believe that the climate for thinking about real change is here. My impression is that most of the people in the Army Reserve today are far more operationally oriented,  and enjoy a much better relationship with the Regular Army, than was ever the case in previous decades. They are also far more used to being part of the big picture than was the historic case. I have personally experienced that Res leadership is ready to consider, develop and implement real change, even in the teeth of rabid defenders of the status quo who depict themselves as the "Friends and Protectors of The Militia". So, the mental climate exists, now.

I think  a  discussion of first principles and fundamentals needs to precede any discussion of what technical structure or detailed roles the Army Res will eventually take on. In other words, the "Why" before the "What". A few caveats for such a discussion:

-Stay the hell away from a "Dom Ops" focus. There is IMHO a huge risk that this will bite us in the ass someday, big time. Our own experience with Snakes and Ladders, and the sorry state that the USARNG descended into pre-Gulf War I, should be strong reminders to stay focused on soldiering. We respond to domestic emergencies as a secondary function of who and what we are. Get too "stuck in" to Dom Ops and we will find it is a tar baby that prevents us from doing what we need to do to be soldiers. If Canada needs a reserve of volunteer emergency workers for domestic response, maybe it should bring back the Civil Defense, or raise an Auxiliary Fire Service as the UK did in WWII, or something along those lines;

-Trim Res command structure, but maintain numbers of troops and community presence. Call 100 troops a squadron battery or company, but keep it healthy, and let it establish outlying sub-units. IMHO there are very few Res CBGs in Canada where the current command structure can actually be sustained without far too many examples of retreading, rebadging, under-ranking or employing the utterly unsuited and undeserving to lead our citizen soldiers. There are just too many positions for the available stock of leaders, so "last man standing" is far too often the deciding criteria. One CO and one RSM for every 500 soldiers (let's say...) would not only introduce some possibility for selectivity, but would also provide a sufficiently large "breeding stock" to produce the leaders we need;

-Stop tip-toeing around the idea of amalgamation. A number of the Res units on the order of battle today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA has done it frequently for decades. For the great majority of Res soldiers (IMHO) the pain would be brief if the issue were managed properly;

-Examine why we have so many units in communities that cannot support them now, have not supported them for decades, and whose ability to support them in the future is declining. Thunder Bay and Regina are two examples that come to mind. Each has at least five Res units of various types, (all of them struggling), against a declining demographic;

-Consider whether or not full time duties in units really have to be done by Regulars. The USARNG does not do this. Why should we? Is the shortage of Regulars to fill full time positions a limitation we should accept as ironclad? Some Regulars are of great value, no doubt, but shackling the improvement of the Army Res to the manning capability of the Regular Army may not be the best way to go. I have had the pleasure to work with some full time Res officers, WOs and NCOs who were easily as capable (if not better...) than anybody I ever met in the Regular Army.

In the end, it can no longer be about cap badges and preservation of the past at all costs: that is the job of a museum, not a living military force that has to deal with the real world. We have to salvage the strengths in the Army Res, but consider what is the best way to generate a healthy, sustainable Res that is not just a bunch of cut-rate emergency responders or a "puppy mill" for the Regular Army.

Cheers

 

[dutchie]

-Stop tip-toeing around the idea of amalgamation. A number of the Res units on the order of battle today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA has done it frequently for decades. For the great majority of Res soldiers (IMHO) the pain would be brief if the issue were managed properly;

This has to be done very carefully if we hope to maintain regimental pride, esprit de corps, etc., but it CAN be done, IMHO. A number of regiments today were created as an offshoot of another regiment. The Candian Scottish and the Seaforths are an excellent example. The CScotts were created from the men and officers of the Seaforths. Only later did they become the Canadian Scottish. You could amalgamate those 2, retaining each name but one CO/RSM/HQ. A CSM/OC for each Coy, etc. The uniforms would not have to change, which admitidly doesn't fit with 'amalgamation', but there is no financial or organizational reason to do so. Why mess with something unnecesarily?

 

[dapaterson]

The current reserve system produced the current reserve leadership.  How many of them will stand up and say "The system that produced me is broken"?  Couple that with outside organisations determined to perpetuate readiness for Sept 1939 as the sole raison d'etre for the Army Reserve, and you've got the current situation.

The overwhelming majority of Reserve units field less than a trained company.  Quickly looking over November's attendance stats, only six units surpassed 200 pers parading, with the largest (in numbers) being 55 Svc Bn in Quebec City.  Even among those six units, what proportion of their soldiers are occupationally qualified and employable?  With a unit of 90 including privates who have not completed their MOC training, how can anyone justify a LCol in command (or, for that matter, even a Maj - but now I'm getting REALLY heretical)

As PBI wrote, we need to maintain community presences.  That does not translate into "we need to maintain LCols and CWOs".  One pillar of the developmental process is experience - a LCol who commands a rump platoon of trained soldiers lacks the requisite experience at that rank level (and likely at the Maj level as well).

But why not have several companies (differently badged) feeding into a Bn HQ - with all those elements manned with trained soldiers?  What a concept!  So instead of claiming "An Army Reserve with 51 infantry battalions etc etc and a strength of 17 300" to a chorus of guffaws, the Army Reserve could be defined as presenting a real set of military abilities today - with the widespread community base providing an ability to expand in the future if required.  And with a structure filled with trained and qualified soldiers, the ability to expand is enhanced as you're building on a solid foundation.

Just a few thoughts for a Friday afternoon...

 

[Kirkhill]

Tying this back into the original proposition:

Is there any reason to believe that the "100/400" battalion proposed has to be a combat arms battalion?

Could we not stipulate that the greatest need in time of civil crisis is the very thing that the Reserve is weakest in and that is logistic support and C4I?

Suppose this battalion were a Service Battalion with most of the adm and maint types being Regs, along with much of the command structure, and most of the drivers and other log types being reservists.  Wouldn't that fit the need of both the emergency response type and more broadly the operational capability of the Reserves/Militia?

They could then become the core element around which a Task Force could be built with the combat arms elements being supplied by reservists.

With that in mind - suppose money were made available to permit more frequent parading - say to the level of commitment your average teen-ager makes to a part-time job at MacDonalds.  5-10-20? hours a week.  Could local training be provided to generally raise the quality of the Reserves?

It seems to me that part of the problem with the Reserves was not that the young troops found the obligation to onerous.  In fact it was the opposite.  Loss of youngsters was in large part due to a lack of activity.

If youngsters could be retained long enough and trained hard enough and well enough while they are still keen could they be made into an effective reserve force?

 

[George Wallace]

Is there any reason to believe that the "100/400" battalion proposed has to be a combat arms battalion?

When I have seen Service Battalions strip Cbt Arms troops from Cbt Arms Units to fill Driver positions and such for a ROTO (because their people refused to go - it might be too dangerouse), I would say "NO!" to this proposal.  I would think that an Engineer Unit would be much more in line of what is required.  After that, I would say a Sigs Unit, to provide Comms to any 'Relief' efforts that may take place.  Service Battalion Truckers and that would not be as useful as these two. 

 

[dapaterson]

At the national level, resources are assigned to the areas to provide for one night a week, one weekend a month of training for the period of Sept-May every year (Four nights at 1/2 day each, 1 weekend at 2 1/2 days).  (December is funded for 3 nights only, since most folks have other plans for Christmas than freezing in Meaford or Wainwright).  This makes the famous 37.5 days of training per year.  For a Pte, 37.5 days @ $77.90 per day (lowest IPC) plus 9% PILL would be $3184 for the training year, not that bad for something part-time (Ancillary benefits such as the $2000/year in tuition support are excluded from this calculation, as is any full-time training during the summer).  The 37.5 days commitment is less than McDonalds, but does provide a regular framework to promote attendance.

The estimated number of days is adjusted upwards for MCpl and up since such ranks have supervisory responsibilities.  However, the reality is that many personnel do not attend all scheduled parades, so an attendance factor is applied, assuming differing participation rates at different ranks.

Perhaps the question isn't "Should we ask for a greater commitment" but rather "How can we ensure that the funds intended for in-unit training actually get to the units"?

 

[rifleman]

I agree that units should be training together to get a critical mass and actually train higher than individual level. I always have said that Tradition can't get in the way of getting the job done. However I don't believe you have to totally throw out the old to get that job done.

I usually find the people who propose cutting Regiments also propose how their Branch/ Unit can maintain their relevancy during the change. Lets face the facts. Service Bns have a hard enough time looking after themselves to even consider looking after other units. After doing all the basic soldier skills, maintenance of their own gear, what more time do they have? They could become a CSS Coy. We are already seeing armour take over direct fire and arty take over indirect, Throw them into a Company as well. Oops forgot the Field Engineers they can go in there too. This of course would eliminate the need for Reserve Brigade Commanders too. Back to LCol

As for unit affiliations and cap badges.  If it isn't such a big deal just look at the CSOR. Here is a unit that is going to have many elements, branches and units thrown together and everyone wants another cap badge, another colour beret. They have to be special. Why? The CSOR will be another CF Unit that has a different role. It may have different requirements for entry as it will be at a higher readiness level. If it is going to be a composite unit, leave all the different affiliations alone. Issue the unit with a shoulder title.  Cripe, We don"t even trust a Col with his old cap badge run a brigade because a logistics Col just can't care about an infantry soldier. The Regs can't get rid of the old either. If we are going to have Tanks any more, get rid of the Armoured. Does Canada have enough soldiers to sustain 9 Bns, Perhaps the PPCLI will volunteer to fold so each of the other reg force units can have 4 companies and 4 Bns per.

Then there is the "Reserves have to be trained better" well, you get what you pay for... And even the Regular Force doesn't always send qualified people to teach courses. Post a MCpl to the school and he can get qualified Sgt and start teaching his peers. They promote people before they are qualified too, so they can get paid more.

Sorry for what seems like a rant but keep some of the old and tweak it , instead of totally messing with it. 

NEXT: Don't even get me started on turning the Reserve into a sandbagging and Firefighting Brigade.

 

[GO!!!]

The current reserve system produced the current reserve leadership.  How many of them will stand up and say "The system that produced me is broken"? 

I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!

Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."

Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?

 

[rifleman]

I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!

Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."

Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?

Sgt: "And Cpl you know enough to know that I didn't need to spell Battalion then, but you do now. Sucks to be you..oh and give me twenty"

 

[old medic]

At the national level, resources are assigned to the areas to provide for one night a week, one weekend a month of training for the period of Sept-May every year (Four nights at 1/2 day each, 1 weekend at 2 1/2 days).  (December is funded for 3 nights only, since most folks have other plans for Christmas than freezing in Meaford or Wainwright).  This makes the famous 37.5 days of training per year. 

For the sake of discussion,  where did these numbers stand 20 years ago, 15 years ago, 10 years ago, etc ?

 

[enfield]

I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!

Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."

Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?

Oh no...  coffee all over the desk...crap....
;D

(italics added)

 

[pbi]

Kirkhill: the problem is not so much getting the young Pte/Cpls out for more training. Traditionally, this group has usually been available for more training time than the Army Res could fund. The real problem is finding time for the Res leadership, who tend to have more demanding civilian jobs and, eventually, families. You can only demand so much from these people before you reach a point at which a Reservist is not a Reservist anymore but has become a "part-time Regular". One of the strengths of the Army Res (and, by the way, of the USARNG and Army Res in the US) is supposed to be that it represents the productive, solid members of the community. Once upon a time ( a long long time ago) it also may have represented the leadership of the community. Unfortunately, the more you demand, the less these people can deliver (although God knows many of them struggle to do so, often at greater personal cost that many Regulars realize). Volunteer fire departments often struggle with the same issues, as training a firefighter becomes more and more demanding, and communities demand faster response times and better protection.

This problem of "dipping the well" too often is not uniquely Canadian. Since GWOT/OIF/OEF, the demand on the US Army's Res component has been huge. While I was in Afgh in 2004, the then-Chief of the US Army Reserve voiced a fear that the demands for active service would turn the Res into a "refuge for the chronically unemployable" (or words to that effect). And that is in a country with well-established job protection laws.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

Point taken pbi.

I allowed myself to drift towards considering a Reserve Force consisting of lower rank part-timers and higher rank full-timers and that generally implies regs.  You make a valid point about how that would stretch attachments to the community.  Can that gap be bridged with "full-time" Reservists on call-out?  Can training and experience be gained at a local level?