Brad Sallows
Army.ca Legend
- Reaction score
- 8,734
- Points
- 1,040
From anecdotes, I came to believe that the junior soldiers and officers responded well to 10/90 because they responded well to being led and trained by experienced full-time officers and NCOs. If there was lukewarm to negative response, it seemed to reside in the middle and senior rank levels. Is there anyone who was directly involved at the time who can reinforce my perception one way or the other?
If that perception were borne out, then 10/90 or some other fractional arrangement might be the most successful reserve restructure we never really tried, provided we could afford the full-time staff and the equipment pools. In the end, while some of the part-time middle and senior leadership at the time of initiation might be shunted aside, it would be reasonable to expect the next crop of reserve leaders to be at least a little bit better for having been trained by, and worked alongside, a sizeable critical mass of regulars.
The train wreck I observed from a distance was that at least one reserve unit dumped a portion of its middle and senior rank levels which were felt (rightly or wrongly, I don't know) at the time to be unnecessary and underperforming, and then was in turn dumped from 10/90 when the battalion withdrew - taking with it not a few component transfers, and supposedly leaving with a slightly more complete CFFET than it brought to the party - leaving the unit shorter of soldiers, leaders, and kit. Note that the only decision I criticize was the one to prematurely eject the former senior leadership; component transfers are a valuable source of already-committed soldiers and it is axiomatic that the deployable forces have first call on deployable kit. The lesson is that if we try it again, we must stand behind it for a decade or more rather than changing fashions with the next change of government or senior NDHQ appointments.
If that perception were borne out, then 10/90 or some other fractional arrangement might be the most successful reserve restructure we never really tried, provided we could afford the full-time staff and the equipment pools. In the end, while some of the part-time middle and senior leadership at the time of initiation might be shunted aside, it would be reasonable to expect the next crop of reserve leaders to be at least a little bit better for having been trained by, and worked alongside, a sizeable critical mass of regulars.
The train wreck I observed from a distance was that at least one reserve unit dumped a portion of its middle and senior rank levels which were felt (rightly or wrongly, I don't know) at the time to be unnecessary and underperforming, and then was in turn dumped from 10/90 when the battalion withdrew - taking with it not a few component transfers, and supposedly leaving with a slightly more complete CFFET than it brought to the party - leaving the unit shorter of soldiers, leaders, and kit. Note that the only decision I criticize was the one to prematurely eject the former senior leadership; component transfers are a valuable source of already-committed soldiers and it is axiomatic that the deployable forces have first call on deployable kit. The lesson is that if we try it again, we must stand behind it for a decade or more rather than changing fashions with the next change of government or senior NDHQ appointments.