Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[daftandbarmy]

Sooo like what happening right now in Latvia then ?

I'm not exactly sure what the process is for Latvia these days. I'm just told that there aren't enough available spots to make the 'lottery' an attractive option.

If there were hundreds of positions available, so that there was a decent opportunity for all those who wanted to go (given they are suitable) could go, it would be more effective I think.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Name one element of the CAF that is successfully performing its primary role of effectively defending Canada and its interests?

RCAF SAR, Transport and tactical Sqns (Tac AVN, LRP and MH)?

 

[foresterab]

Maybe they could be integrated into work up training at a given ration, say 1/4 as a random number, go through pre deployment training and then be employed as any other section member.

In a perfect world I view it as Roto 0 and Roto 1 are fully Reg force. From there on assuming it's a long term commitment each Reserve force Brigade would be ordered, via Federal orders, to provide a minmum of platoon force that will form a subunit under additional Reg Force command.
I say platoon as that's an easy unit to force generate. Ideally it's a company force with full Reserve leadership up to that command level. So much depends on whether you're talking Brigade/Division/Battalion orders and frankly it's such a mess it's tough to tell what should be the right terminology as a civilian looking in.

What is more important to me is that the reserve force has been given a clear, national priority mission - Generate X force for deployment date Y for mission role Z. It's at least a year in advance and allows for both junior and senior NCO development within the reserves + platoon command I think is doable. Company command I defer to the experts if a Captain/Major can be fully functional while part time. Formed reserve forces should be prioritized over new recruit Reg force as long as they are formed sub units. There are enough Reserve units that no unit should be tapped more than every 3 years....which frankly is the about the career of a university student reservist.

Big objective is to move away from single person integration to more formed unit integration.

But that's a dream and maybe not possible.
foresterab

 

[Halifax Tar]

Not really much to add but some observations having been with the ARes for a while now.

It's been an awesome experience. I find these folks very motivated and truly interested making the organization better. It's been very refreshing as the Regs can be pretty bitter at times.

The folks who show want to do good things. The problem is getting more people to show up.

 

[MilEME09]

RCAF SAR, Transport and tactical Sqns (Tac AVN, LRP and MH)?

Rangers?

 

[markppcli]

I'm not exactly sure what the process is for Latvia these days. I'm just told that there aren't enough available spots to make the 'lottery' an attractive option.

If there were hundreds of positions available, so that there was a decent opportunity for all those who wanted to go (given they are suitable) could go, it would be more effective I think.

Well there’s only a few hundred troops in Latvia to begin with. I don’t think we’re going to make it fully reserve at this stage.

In 2020 we had a fully formed reserve mortar platoon (with the LER RSS Sgt / MCpls as part of their mission role orbat). This time around we had 60 odd guys in various roles between the rifle company, HQ, and combined recce organization. I’m sure the artillery Bty has some support as well but I’m less clued in. But either way all of them were full time and working with us all through work up.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

The Korean War's 'Special Force enters the chat

Special Force​

Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, then Chief of the General Staff was in favour of Canada providing an infantry brigade for the 1st Commonwealth Division. Since Foulkes favoured keeping the Canadian Army's Mobile Striking Force intact for the defence of North America, he recommended recruiting a separate Special Force for the Korean War.

Recruits for the Special Force were enlisted for a period of eighteen months with recruits coming from both the Active Force, World War II veterans and adventure seeking young men. The normal recruitment standards were lowered since "the army would not wish to retain the 'soldier of fortune' type of personnel on a long term basis'". Units of the Special Force would be second battalions of the existing three Permanent Force regiments.

Canada in the Korean War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Special Force is EXACTLY what would be raised if Canada needed to field a similar force today.

The GoC could continue to go along with their emasculation plan for the CAF while a niche force of ruffians is raised using "less politically palatable" stock .

I work withquite a few fellows atm that could be molded in to highly capable soldiers in fairly short order.

We'd need to overlook a few minorish criminal convictions, probably bring back the rum ration but lots of promise otherwise!

 

[MilEME09]

Well there’s only a few hundred troops in Latvia to begin with. I don’t think we’re going to make it fully reserve at this stage.

In 2020 we had a fully formed reserve mortar platoon (with the LER RSS Sgt / MCpls as part of their mission role orbat). This time around we had 60 odd guys in various roles between the rifle company, HQ, and combined recce organization. I’m sure the artillery Bty has some support as well but I’m less clued in. But either way all of them were full time and working with us all through work up.

Ah yes the combined LER/CH platoon, under STARS, only one of those units was supposed to me a mortar platoon, the other was supposed to be a DFS platoon. They were atleast to closest to ever reaching their STARS goal. No other unit did, heck from what I heard, some units leadership didn't even try.

 

[markppcli]

Ah yes the combined LER/CH platoon, under STARS, only one of those units was supposed to me a mortar platoon, the other was supposed to be a DFS platoon. They were atleast to closest to ever reaching their STARS goal. No other unit did, heck from what I heard, some units leadership didn't even try.

Some units got mission tasked as “force generation” not sure how that was supposed to help anyone. The harsh reality is that a single reserve regiment, or at least 90 percent of them, would struggle to put a platoon in the field let alone deploy one.

 

[dapaterson]

To "try" the Army would have to have provided the necessary equipment and personnel. If you expect a unit to generate an equipment dependent capability, and for five years running the Army doesn't even order the necessary equipment or provide training, it becomes "challenging" to meet the Army's declared intent. It also becomes challenging to motivate soldiers - there are only so many excuses a unit CO can make for "The Army once again failed to do what they said" or ways to say "The Army has no plan and apparently no intent to make one, either".

 

[markppcli]

To "try" the Army would have to have provided the necessary equipment and personnel. If you expect a unit to generate an equipment dependent capability, and for five years running the Army doesn't even order the necessary equipment or provide training, it becomes "challenging" to meet the Army's declared intent. It also becomes challenging to motivate soldiers - there are only so many excuses a unit CO can make for "The Army once again failed to do what they said" or ways to say "The Army has no plan and apparently no intent to make one, either".

I’m a bit curious where the lack of personnel comes from ? We’ve been pumping out NCOs to a few reserve units now, in excess of RSS. Equipment I get, I assume they received our .50s for DFS but I know they had mortars at the LERs and k assume the Seaforth have Asslt Pioneers. The reserve mortar platoon had its own MFCs and pers loaded on Intermediate and Advanced Mortars, although some of the loading was the reg force STARS positions which I assume was mostly due to the length and trying to find bodies for it. I will say that whomever edited Training Safety to make it mandatory that a mortar range have an RSO with an artillery MOSID deserves the full RAF Reg initiation.

 

[dapaterson]

If specialist skills are necessary, post in personnel with those skills to provide training to those already in the unit. Or as a minimum give training vacancies to the unit, for both part time and full-time personnel.

Or promise additional Reg F personnel and equipment repeatedly and fail to do so.

 

[FJAG]

The folks who show want to do good things. The problem is getting more people to show up.

The mechanism exists in NDA 33(2)(a), QR&O 9.04(2) - order to train. It is a system to compel attendance on training but has some issues (see primarily NDA 60(1)(c) and 294(1))

The biggest problem is the failure in leadership in how this power is used.

If a unit implemented a system of let's say one compulsory training weekend per month and one or even two weeks per summer and set those dates a year in advance so that everyone could build their life's schedule around it and made all other parades voluntary. And then let's say that all the really important training is done during those compulsory periods (and not some rinky dink ceremonial parade) and they were well organized, then one would probably have high attendance and would only need the s 294 charging provisions sparingly.

It would even be better if s 60(1)(c) was changed so that s 294(1) could be incorporated into the CSD.

But that would take some leadership, wouldn't it?

I’m sure the artillery Bty has some support as well

They do.

 

[daftandbarmy]

the full RAF Reg initiation.

 

[daftandbarmy]

If specialist skills are necessary, post in personnel with those skills to provide training to those already in the unit. Or as a minimum give training vacancies to the unit, for both part time and full-time personnel.

Or promise additional Reg F personnel who actually get out of the office and do come leadership stuff and equipment repeatedly and fail to do so.

There, FTFY

 

[dapaterson]

The career managers have sometimes viewed Res units as a place to "give someone a rest", or as a place to park an individual with temporary or permanent medical limitations.

A WO with medical limitations that preclude full time work, preclude the ability to get themselves to and from work, preclude the ability to be employed in trade and unfit field is, regardless of their character, not an optimal person to post to a Res F unit as a one of one.

 

[markppcli]

I mean maybe I’m just confused because I knew the guys at the LERs and that my frame of reference but it seemed like we were sending guys that were qualified to do those jobs.

Part of this is that STARS was always supposed to end up with self sustaining reserve units.

There, FTFY

I had a great conversation with one of our former JTACs who’s now RSS. The subject of what he does came up and he gave some good perspective. He’s there to be the Ops WO, that’s his job. Yes he can do a lot of the BSMs work, he can run a Tp as it’s TSM, he could even be a QM if required. So let’s say he does that stuff and “get out of the office” and “leads,” well now what? Who’s learning, who’s developing ? The previous guys did it all and as a result no one in that unit was used to doing those jobs, no one was learning to be a SNCO.

The goal of all RSS staff should be to become redundant.

 

[GR66]

RCAF SAR, Transport and tactical Sqns (Tac AVN, LRP and MH)?

Certainly not in any way meant to disrespect the efforts being put in by any of the members of the CAF that are giving their all to fulfil their duties, but I simply believe that the GOC and CAF aren't providing the resources required to properly so their jobs.

Respectfully SAR is not a primary defence roll for the RCAF and things like the CC-295 debacle put into question the tools being provided for the task.

Transport? Do we have the capability to rapidly deploy a Brigade to a conflict zone if required?

Tac Hel? What is our lift capability? What about AH? Ground attack assets?

LRP and MH? Based on the size of our maritime domain both fleets are far too small for our requirements.

Again, we have great people doing great things with the tools they are given, but lets not pretend that there are enough of any of them to make a serious military contribution in a major conflict.

 

[dapaterson]

I had a great conversation with one of our former JTACs who’s now RSS. The subject of what he does came up and he gave some good perspective. He’s there to be the Ops WO, that’s his job. Yes he can do a lot of the BSMs work, he can run a Tp as it’s TSM, he could even be a QM if required. So let’s say he does that stuff and “get out of the office” and “leads,” well now what? Who’s learning, who’s developing ? The previous guys did it all and as a result no one in that unit was used to doing those jobs, no one was learning to be a SNCO.

The goal of all RSS staff should be to become redundant.

The Role of the Permanent Active Militia should be to support the Non-Permanent Active Militia. That includes planning and organizing, but also mentoring and training.

Artificial divides are harmful and detrimental to both.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I mean maybe I’m just confused because I knew the guys at the LERs and that my frame of reference but it seemed like we were sending guys that were qualified to do those jobs.

Qualified? No doubt.

Suitable? Rarely.