Fundamentally our divergence stems from if we can have reservists forced to deploy or not. I don’t ever see that happening so I think the deployable units need to be 100/0 at least on paper.
Strangely enough, this is the argument that I had with a number of GOFOs during the Reserve Force Employment Project.
There is a very large gap between "can we" and "will we" where people seem to muddle legislative reality and the conscription crisis.
The NDA is absolutely 100% clear:
- 31 (1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so
- (a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada;
- (b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter; or
- (c) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.
This provision applies to all members, including reservists and reserve units
If the conditions are met - the GoC can place reservists or units of reservists on active service. Essentially, by having once volunteered to enlist in the ResF the individual has volunteered to allow himself to be placed on active service if the GoC considers it advisable. This is not the same as conscription which takes a civilian off the street and makes him a soldier without their consent.
The real question is "will the GoC" ever place any reservists on active service? If for example the GoC decides it wants to send a reserve unit for a rotation to Latvia as part of the ePF, they could legally do so under s 31(1)(c).
In all my dealings on giving legal advice on this issue I've pointed out that this is a power that the government has by legislation and that it is not up to the CAF to predict or guess as to whether or not the government will ever use that power, but to configure the ResF in such a way that the GiC at least has the option to use it if it considers it advisable.
QR&O states:
4.02 - GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICERS
(1) An officer shall:
....
3. promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all subordinates;
QR&O is an order issued by the MND.
One might wish to argue the meaning of the term "efficiency" as it relates to the ResF but, IMHO, I'll go so far as to say that if the CAF leadership organizes and trains the ResF in such a way that the GiC is denied the option of using s 31(1) vis a vis the ResF then the leadership has been negligent in the performance of a military duty to properly structure and train and equip the ResF.
Yup. I'm bullish on this issue.