Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[ArmyRick]

For a long time PRes units had Jump Coy’s
The issue isn’t that reservists can’t, it’s an issue if it’s not being supported beyond that.

Let’s face it any idiot can exit a plane and let gravity take over, it’s not rocket science. Both of us are proof of that

Most of the those companies where reliable CT sources when they got sick of their leadership. The only way those entities are of value is with a direct Ops task to a Para entity.

IMHO (having done it) Airborne deploying into the arctic is a quick and reliable method of showing the flag and posturing. There are also a lot of reasons to hang onto Para capabilities outside of strictly SOF roles.
No self respecting SOF entity wants to do a static line low level airfield seizure - or any sort of mass jump.

Now I don’t think there is any point to a conventional Para Coy - ideally it’s a Bde an a Bn Group at min

I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)

My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)

Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.

Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)

My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)

Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.

Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.

Para dropping for response seems like a valid idea. Especially for a country our size.

How long should the territorial response teams be self sustaining ? And how do we sustain them after they have exhausted their carried stores ?

 

[FJAG]

PCG - parachute company group

Thx

The M777 numbers are why I hate the idea of training guns. Even regular gunners show up to regiments without M777 qualifications, so they essentially have to retrain every person that arrives at regiment. Waste of time and effort.

You're preaching to the converted here.

WRT conversion training, in the 80’s everything started with the C1, 109 or L5 (even 81mm Mortar) was a simple bolt on, as the fundamentals didn’t change.
109 Drivers required Driver, Light Track (same as 113, 548 or Queen Mary) as a STT/PCF

MY BOTC-Arty in 1969 had us learning and firing the 81 mortar, C1, L5, M109, 106 RR and every small arm, machine gun and LAW/MAW in service at the time, but not the SS11 or Centurion (although we had demonstrations at Meaford)

We were taught to drive every vehicle the arty had including M113 (and M577, M548 and Lynx [which we didn't have but learned anyway] which are all basically the same), M109, all wheeled vehicles but not the M578 (which is based on the M107/M110 chassis and is different from but not dissimilar to the M109 using a steering bar vice a steering wheel or the M113s tiller bars).

Mind you being taught to drive the thing and being a qualified driver with all that entails as to maintenance etc are two very different things.

I’m of the opinion the PRes ideally would make up personnel to allow for enough guns for 4 gun Troops and 3 Firing Battery’s/ Reg’t, plus augmentation to CP and Recce/Survey (if that is still a thing given GPS etc).
With the hope that DArty and DLR are pushing for a 109 type vehicle for two of the Bde’s, and a Rocket Reg’t for Div GS.

I think we're firmly in the grip of the 6-gun battery divisible into two troops. I don't see a push for either a 109ish system nor a rocket one - all their eggs are in the GBAD basket and we seem to have lost the appetite for concurrent activity although I keep looking at that little icon for "indirect fires" for 2028 on the Force 2025 COAs and what appears to be the military symbol for a tracked single rocket vice multiple rocket launcher for 4 RCA (GS) (but which at least on one slide I've seen is labelled "HIMARS". Go figure.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)

My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)

Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.

Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.

Great idea.

In the end, Para and Commando are merely different ways to get to the battlefield/ place of work.

All the tough guy training is designed to make sure that you don't become a liability once you get there because follow on support can be very minimal and, after all, you still need to walk alot in harsh conditions carrying several days of CSupps on your back.

For example, I recall at least two large airborne/mobile exercises, in remote locations during periods of bad weather, where we had to evacuate the (non-PARA) umpire staff because they all either couldn't keep up, or went down with cold injuries.

 

[FJAG]

I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)

My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)

Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.

Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.

I would agree with you entirely if it wasn't for the fact that I think the deterrence value and political capital that comes with having a heavy commitment to NATO in Europe.

I firmly believe though that the bulk of our RegF should be in the light to medium quick reaction model and the bulk of our ResF and heavy equipment in the NATO model on a flyover basis on the basis of the likelihood or non-likelihood of use. Forming and training that heavy capability is an issue that needs to be solved.

That IMHO does call for a solid airborne, airmobile and amphibious capability primarily for the RegF. I also like the idea of a mountain capability but tend to think it might be an adjunct to either a light amphibious or airborne/airmobile capability.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I would agree with you entirely if it wasn't for the fact that I think the deterrence value and political capital that comes with having a heavy commitment to NATO in Europe.

I firmly believe though that the bulk of our RegF should be in the light to medium quick reaction model and the bulk of our ResF and heavy equipment in the NATO model on a flyover basis on the basis of the likelihood or non-likelihood of use. Forming and training that heavy capability is an issue that needs to be solved.

That IMHO does call for a solid airborne, airmobile and amphibious capability primarily for the RegF. I also like the idea of a mountain capability but tend to think it might be an adjunct to either a light amphibious or airborne/airmobile capability.

Well, the downside of that is that lightweight countries provide lightweight forces.

You have to 'pay to play' to have any kind of say in international politics, and if we commit ourselves to a 'Heavily Armed Scouting Brigade' we'll be treated like that.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I would agree with you entirely if it wasn't for the fact that I think the deterrence value and political capital that comes with having a heavy commitment to NATO in Europe.

I firmly believe though that the bulk of our RegF should be in the light to medium quick reaction model and the bulk of our ResF and heavy equipment in the NATO model on a flyover basis on the basis of the likelihood or non-likelihood of use. Forming and training that heavy capability is an issue that needs to be solved.

That IMHO does call for a solid airborne, airmobile and amphibious capability primarily for the RegF. I also like the idea of a mountain capability but tend to think it might be an adjunct to either a light amphibious or airborne/airmobile capability.

I know we tend to think in terms of 'silos' when we start talking about special capabilities, but, having done all three of these things with various different units in my past lives, it would be relatively easy to have one unit cover off PARA, Amphibious and Mountain capabilities.

You could probably get all that done right now with the three light battalions we have in place. They'd need support from the usual cast of characters though, who are fit and properly equipped enough to join them on their various escapades, such as Engr, Log, Arty, Sigs etc. Without these enablers, Infantry alone can't do it all.

But don't just don't call it the Airborne Comando Gebirgsjager Brigade .... no need for more Empires - or funny hats - than necessary

 

[KevinB]

I know we tend to think in terms of 'silos' when we start talking about special capabilities, but, having done all three of these things with various different units in my past lives, it would be relatively easy to have one unit cover off PARA, Amphibious and Mountain capabilities.

Until you need two units at the same time.
I think Para fits with mountains - while they can jump into help Amphib units.

You could probably get all that done right now with the three light battalions we have in place. They'd need support from the usual cast of characters though, who are fit and properly equipped enough to join them on their various escapades, such as Engr, Log, Arty, Sigs etc. Without these enablers, Infantry alone can't do it all.

It needs to be a properly resourced Bde.

But don't just don't call it the Airborne Comando Gebirgsjager Brigade .... no need for more Empires - or funny hats - than necessary

With a leopard print beret

 

[GK .Dundas]

Until you need two units at the same time.
I think Para fits with mountains - while they can jump into help Amphib units.


It needs to be a properly resourced Bde.


With a leopard print beret

Fezs.....fezs are cool !

 

[markppcli]

For a long time PRes units had Jump Coy’s
The issue isn’t that reservists can’t, it’s an issue if it’s not being supported beyond that.

Let’s face it any idiot can exit a plane and let gravity take over, it’s not rocket science. Both of us are proof of that

Most of the those companies where reliable CT sources when they got sick of their leadership. The only way those entities are of value is with a direct Ops task to a Para entity.

IMHO (having done it) Airborne deploying into the arctic is a quick and reliable method of showing the flag and posturing. There are also a lot of reasons to hang onto Para capabilities outside of strictly SOF roles.
No self respecting SOF entity wants to do a static line low level airfield seizure - or any sort of mass jump.

Now I don’t think there is any point to a conventional Para Coy - ideally it’s a Bde an a Bn Group at min

Speaking on behalf of the mechanized infantry, I am fully in favour of our light cousins spending more time in the arctic.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

10/90 throw that number system away. 10% Reg force is easy, career managers post 10 Reg troopers to a Unit and the Res Unit has to come up with 90, trained and able to do the job. That is is the hard number to fill.

I think they should look at it this way ( not 100% worked out in my head been away from the Inf and AD for longer than I remember) but I remember more of how the Armoured worked.

4 car troop of cougars ( yes me old) Give the Regiment the equipment to operate without having to beg, borrow or steal it so they can train.

2 of the cougars would be made of Reg Force troops so that they still do the training as required. The other 2 cougars are made up of Res Troops
They work together, Command and Control, The Reg force on an exercise provide a snr crewman to each Res crew so there is some mentorship and some training guidance. But each of the Res Cougars have a different position filled by the Reg Force staff. Reg force Gunner to assist in training Res Force Gunner ( more mentorship) , other cougar have a Reg F Crew commander to mentor crew commander.

Reg F cougars to have 1 Res F trooper to work with the crew to build up skills and work on getting everyone use to working with each other and within the Regiment have the experience of how both sides of the Regiment work so they can create a bond of working together as a team.
Have a Reg Force Officer lead the Res Troop, and Res Officer lead the Reg Force Troop, so the Res Officer gets the experience of leading more trained and rounded troops so the officer can learn from them and the SNR NCO can help guide the choices the troop leader makes.
The Reg Force troop leader helps guide the Res Crew commanders in the right direction so they have better command practices to follow.

HQ Control
CO and 2I/C

Reg force one term as CO , then the Res 2I/C takes command for a term and a Reg Force 2 I/C is posted in to assume command after the Res Command term is over

RSM
If the CO is Reg Force then the RSM is Res Force, and switches as the Command team switches after some over lap
The over lap is important so an united front is projected for all soldiers.

It would improve all way round as how the unit operates

Maintaining the fleet so to speak

Should be some class B positions that allow various rank positions to be filled beyond the normal class b positions in a regular Res Unit

Clerk BA
Storesman BA
Fin Clerk BA
Storesman BA
Ops person BA
plus

Fleet qualified drivers x2
Maintainer x2
Weapons maintainers x1

Some crew members to do crew training with the Reg Force team members

These positions could be switched out every quarter to allow other soldiers to take some extra training not to make these career Class B positions

Plus extra funds to send the Res side of the team on courses thru the year so they can up train to a better standard to work a long side the Reg Force part of the team.




Then they have to get rid of the Rules about deploying Res Forces and how they are deployed to make it easier to deploy as part of the Regimental Team.


Biggest Change is going to be uniforms and the Reg force team might have some issues here

Cap Badges and uniforms. They have to wear the Host Regimental Badges and Dress so they are more part of the team and when Posted out they put their Reg Force Cap Badge back on. So everyone is the same on the parade square and helps get rid of the Reg Force vs Res Force issues .


Jus the thoughts of an old Fin Clerk, who might be totally wrong

 

[Remius]

10% reg force might be a bit unrealistic.

There are 15 units in my brigade. So 150 reg force. That’s one CBG. 4 Div has 3 CBGs. So 450 reg force types give or take that you are pulling from reg force units in 4 Div alone.

I’m not sure that is achievable.

I’d buy it if they make it so they get posted if they are near getting out, embed with the a unit a facilitate a component transfer if that is what they want. But make sure they have the incentives to do so to go with that.

Heck even broken guys that can still add value and experience.

 

[IKnowNothing]

10% reg force might be a bit unrealistic.

There are 15 units in my brigade. So 150 reg force. That’s one CBG. 4 Div has 3 CBGs. So 450 reg force types give or take that you are pulling from reg force units in 4 Div alone.

I'm ignorant as hell, but from the outside looking in it seems like the path from CBG's as they are to useful 10/90 units is to toss out the existing unit structure and assign the 10% based on the targeted endstate.

 

[quadrapiper]

You’re 100 correct on JTAC not being doable by reservists.

Would an "independent section" (or whatever the customary Artillery term might be) coincidentally colocated and tasked with each Reserve battery, or simply assigning, as Regular positions, JTAC pers to Reserve units be sustainable or worthwhile? Set aside the whole 10/90 or other percentages discussion for these roles, but have them placed to support Reserve training.

Assume there might be some added costs as far as flying JTAC pers to train within more complex operational structures than might be readily available with the Reserve batteries.

 

[markppcli]

On 0 level does it make sense for any kind of operationally tasked unit to be led by a part time L Col. We need to stop seeing Reg / Res as some kind of different animals and start to see soldiers employed either full time or part time. It does not matter that the CO has been full time their whole career, it matters that to do that job effectively they must be. Rotating full and part time only serves the interests of those entrenched in a system that has become more about ensuring a building keeps its mess silver than on providing effective forces with a capability geared towards operational outputs.

 

[Remius]

I'm ignorant as hell, but from the outside looking in it seems like the path from CBG's as they are to useful 10/90 units is to toss out the existing unit structure and assign the 10% based on the targeted endstate.

Would have to establish the end state.

Establishment number, effective numbers and actual real numbers fluctuate yearly and sometimes monthly.

And then chances are your 10% end up tasked for a variety of « other » stuff the 90% can’t fill. Not sure how that would fly.

 

[markppcli]

Would an "independent section" (or whatever the customary Artillery term might be) coincidentally colocated and tasked with each Reserve battery, or simply assigning, as Regular positions, JTAC pers to Reserve units be sustainable or worthwhile? Set aside the whole 10/90 or other percentages discussion for these roles, but have them placed to support Reserve training.

Assume there might be some added costs as far as flying JTAC pers to train within more complex operational structures than might be readily available with the Reserve batteries.

No, there would be 0 benefit to either party there. Not only are there simply not enough to fill that, the training and qualification requirements are such that spreading them out all across the country would make keeping them qualified virtually impossible.

 

[markppcli]

Would have to establish the end state.

Establishment number, effective numbers and actual real numbers fluctuate yearly and sometimes monthly.

And then chances are your 10% end up tasked for a variety of « other » stuff the 90% can’t fill. Not sure how that would fly.

This becomes the problem. What is the end state?

I would suggest that the end state be that the reserves can independently force generate a deployable sub unit and a push and reliably generate sub sub units. Doesn’t mean they will, but that’s the largest group that’s ever deployed independently (CRIC for Bosnia 2003), but that is a realistic and attainable goal. So what does that mean ? Well we need Force generators that can assess sub sub units, ie Bn / Regiments, and that are manned to provide them, ie they need to encompass a catchment area that can reliable provide their sub units a full compliment. We need those Bn / Reg HQs to be fully staffed to manage the training of these sub units, and not just a skeleton crew sat around because there has to be a CO. It also means we need to be serious about the selection of these COs and their staffs, as opposed to who’s the oldest officer in the mess. This probably means each reserve CBG becomes essentially a Bn, probably holding a mixed bag of sub units (this is fine plenty of other militaries do this), and the Divisions end up with a reserve Bde, now made up of 3-5 properly manned units each with a goal of generating sub units, a piece.

Edit to add this is something I see are primarily a Armoured and Infantry thing. Reserve artillery should be built around adding guns / troops to existing regiments first and foremost. I’m not familiar enough with the engineers to really comment intelligently on how they should function.

 

[IKnowNothing]

This becomes the problem. What is the end state?

I would suggest that the end state be that the reserves can independently force generate a deployable sub unit and a push and reliably generate sub sub units. Doesn’t mean they will, but that’s the largest group that’s ever deployed independently (CRIC for Bosnia 2003), but that is a realistic and attainable goal. So what does that mean ? Well we need Force generators that can assess sub sub units, ie Bn / Regiments, and that are manned to provide them, ie they need to encompass a catchment area that can reliable provide their sub units a full compliment. We need those Bn / Reg HQs to be fully staffed to manage the training of these sub units, and not just a skeleton crew sat around because there has to be a CO. It also means we need to be serious about the selection of these COs and their staffs, as opposed to who’s the oldest officer in the mess. This probably means each reserve CBG becomes essentially a Bn, probably holding a mixed bag of sub units (this is fine plenty of other militaries do this), and the Divisions end up with a reserve Bde, now made up of 3-5 properly manned units each with a goal of generating sub units, a piece.

Make the transition from CBG= Canadian Brigade Group; a wholly fictional brigade made up of paper regiments to:CRBG = Canadian Reserve Battalion Group, A RegF led Unit fully accountable to take the PRes personnel in their catchment area, organize, train and deliver something that looks a lot like a light battlegroup. Any CBG where the "Regiments" are consistently in the platoon+ to Company- range maps over very well.

 

[dapaterson]

My best and worst C2 experiences as a part time CAF member were both under the same Reg F formation, which (a) made effort to accomodate the different working hours / capacity of part time vs full time, but also (b) demanded short fuse reports and returns to justify why part time personnel with full time non military careers who had not indicated availability for full time periods of service were not available for short fuse periods of full time service.