Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[TCBF]

I would say it would cost more to reform the so-called outdated reserve structure than we would save by doing it.

Want to save money on Colonels?   Best place to do that is NDHQ, not Upper Armpit, Nova Scotia.

If you want to "increase the efficiency" of the reserves:   Limit man-days by rank.   If the LCol has only 1/10th of the soldiers he would have in a regular unit, cut his man days to one tenth.   But that would only be grossly parsimonious.   If the Res LCol loves his unit - and they do - he will show up anyway, paid or not.

No, if money is "wasted" in the reserves, it is done under Regular Force supervision: The RSSO and the Chief Clerk.   Clerks, in particular, invariably know where the bodies are buried.

No easy answers.   The units could be as big as we wanted them to be, if we increased their man-days.

So, lets ask the Militia what they think?

 

[old medic]

I'm going to be really cynical here and suggest that combining
five reserve batallions into one unit on paper would only result in a bean
counter somewhere deciding that this new one unit only needs the resources of one
reserve unit and that four units worth of equipment and budget could
be axed from defence spending.

 

[Trinity]

Its my understanding that we have only so many line serials in peace time

And this grows ... three or four times the size in war.  So its not that we
aren't a real brigade as much as our war time serials aren't filled.  On paper
we are if the situation arises, but this assumes that people would step up
and join the army to help fight a war...  which i don't think would happen.

I do think a revamp is totally needed.

please correct the above line serial comment if i'm wrong
(note the word correct... not flame)  : :

 

[aesop081]

Trinity,

My take on it is that you are correct. Units hava peace time establishement and a war time establishemnt.  The trouble is that mobilization plans are grossly outmoded IMHO.  modern day crisses develop too quickly to build up an army and then go fight.  it takes too long to train soldiers to fill those "wartime' positions in the establishemnt, takes too long to build the weapons to fight the conflict, for a WW2 style mobilization scheme.  It is my opinion, that it does the CF no good to have a reserve force structured like ours if it cannot be mobilized fully and rapidly. I dont think we are likely to ever require the generation of a reserve brigade for operations. So why the need to have the militia organized in a brigade structure ? Why not concentrate on creating a full-strenght ( or as close as possible) reserve force capable of being deployed on short notice to augment/replace regular force units or on an individual basis ?  To me, less units at full strenght are less of a burden that many units understrenght.  Further more, i dont think that a reserve presence in every community is all that of an important requirement.  I think this creates a spliting of limited resources we can ill aford

Modern day war is " come as you are"...if you don't have it now......you won't have it by the time the fighting stops

 

[swanita]

Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse.   Who, in Thunder Bay, is going to join a regiment with the name of a city 750 km away?   They might as well join the Toronto Scottish.

Not necessarily a bad thing!!  ;D

 

[McG]

I'm going to be really cynical here and suggest that combining five reserve batallions into one unit on paper would only result in a bean counter somewhere deciding that this new one unit only needs the resources of one reserve unit and that four units worth of equipment and budget could be axed from defence spending.

Except that reserve units are currently established to raise only one or two sub-units (and often those are sub-units of only 1 or two sub-sub units).  If the amalgamated units were established (and equipped) for five sub units, those bean counters that have you scared would see the need for five sub-units' worth of equipment.

 

[McG]

I'm sorry I didnt make myself clear. A battalion with only 40 people is a waste of resources. If a battalion cant stay at 50% it doesnt need to be kept on the rolls.

The problem is, the Army will not allow the regiments to grow.  Each has only been established for one or two small companies and an undersized RHQ.  Rather than shutting these battalions, it would be better to re-group their sub units into one battalion.

 

[TCBF]

No.  To easy to cut if they did that.  Convert the LSSR to 3 TSR, then five years later they close it out saying "We don't need a bn of the Tor Scots in Thunder Bay".

All of this talk - when in doubt, re-org - is just cows jostling for a nice slot on the ramp into the abattoir.  The more the Militia and Regs says it wants to change, the more those changes will be mandated by a bunch of long haired civie back door power brokers in Ottawa who will dust off Phase VII of the plan to de-militarize Canada, and out the door you all will go.

The present bloated inefficient system is flawed not because of the concept - a cadre that can expand to fifty times it's size in a PROLONGED emergency - but because the process has not been effectively led.

But we don't blame people any more, do we?  We blame organizations.

 

[Brad Sallows]

This amalgamation thing is very attractive.  Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:

- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt

...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.  Very efficient productivity gain there.  Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?  What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?

 

[TCBF]

This amalgamation thing is very attractive.   Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:

- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt

...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.   Very efficient productivity gain there.   Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?   What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?

You are being sarcastic, right?

 

[old medic]

Except that reserve units are currently established to raise only one or two sub-units (and often those are sub-units of only 1 or two sub-sub units).  If the amalgamated units were established (and equipped) for five sub units, those bean counters that have you scared would see the need for five sub-units' worth of equipment.

It's not a scare, I watched this actually happen several times in LFWA in the 1990's with sub units.
They were put together on paper, a lot of equipment was lost, then remaining gear was divided up between cities.
That wiped out effective training except on major exercise. In the case of the Field Kitchens, it even wiped out
effective use of the equipment.  (They put the kitchen trucks in Thunder Bay and the kitchen trailers in Winnipeg).

I must agree with TCBF. Don't mess with unit names or histories. That's the biggest link the CF has with most
communities in this country.  The local Officers (usually leading citizens), senates, honourary Colonels, Veterans,
past unit members all have a connection back to their unit. If you take that away, your going to wipe out your local
support.  That's exactly what happened in 1954 when they renamed all the reserve Field Ambulances. 

The biggest problem with the reserve infantry units is probably the massive unit budget cuts that took place in 1994.
That, coupled with restrictions on parade numbers, closed establishment positions, limits and numbers on recruiting,
and only allowing each unit a tiny number of positions on BMT serials are what's brought the reserve to it's current
state.

Restore the unit budgets and allow them to enroll new members. Then come back and decide which ones are
viable.

 

[enfield]

Restore the unit budgets and allow them to enroll new members. Then come back and decide which ones are
viable.

No reserve unit will ever be a real battalion - let alone a multi-battalion regiment - in peacetime. And, as was mentioned by Infanteer, mobilization is no longer possible and is thus irrelevant. So why maintain the bloated structures where companies pretend to be battalions and battalions pretend to be brigades? I'll bet no other army in the world so closely resembles its 1945 version.

I'm not arguing for the histories and distinctness of the regiments to be erased. They can be maintained, just as effectively, by a Company - since that is essentially what reserve infantry units are anyways. Our job is to be relevant and effective, and administering ourselves as are is harming our ability to fulfil our duties and needs.

Merge the operational and administrative functions of the regiments, so that they become companies and are administered and trained as such by regional battalions. Easy. Knock away the entire command apparatus above company level from each unit, and give those duties to what is now "brigade", and treat a brigade like what it really is, a battalion or battle group. Everything still gets done, but the units will have easier admin, more cohesive and meaningful training, and more bodies available on the parade square. And keep the kilts, marching paces, battle honours, museums, etc.

At present we are maintain a rank structure that is wasteful and possibly dangerous, for political reasons. No one in a reserve unit above the company level can possibly be qualified to do their job because we never operate that high in the field or garrison (in reality its even lower than that, probably platoon level). So why pretend?

A question: if we did change things so that the units become companies within regional battalions, is there any reason the units (which would be administered as companies) could they not be called 'regiments' as well? A regiment is a family and a tradition, not a field formation, so why not keep the term?

On a separate rant....
I'm so sure this 'local connections' argument is quite so strong. Most people have no idea what the Army Reserves are or what they do, and have zero concept of their local regiments. I'm not sure what this local support is that we keep talking about - recruiting doesn't seem to indicate the presence of local support. I've served in two units, one with an exceptionally strong Association and probably the most influential Honourary Colonel in the Reserves, and the other with neither an association nor a high profile Honourary. I haven't seen any difference in recruiting, training, or effectiveness in the field.

 

[Brad Sallows]

>You are being sarcastic, right?

Yes.  While I'm sure there would be some economy of effort (fewer people attending conferences aimed at people at unit HQ level) I figure there would be between 150 and 200 person-days worth of Class "A" work to absorb into each sub-unit HQ.  If the full-time officers were left as sub-unit 2I/Cs in respective locations, then there would remain the interesting experiential jump from platoon to company command for a selected few officers without the benefit of any staff or administrative appointments.  "Congratulations, Lt.  You are promoted to Maj and hereby appointed OC B Coy."  The thing to do would be to downrank reserve sub-units to Capt and have a Lt as 2I/C and Lt or 2Lt as platoon commanders.  Nice and lean: 6 to 8 years in for officers, and then up to battle group HQ or out.  Lots of time for other hobbies.

Maybe this would work.  All I ever read about, though, are the pay savings (miniscule unless positions are eliminated entirely) and the improved sub-unit/unit collective training opportunities.  Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS.  Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes.  Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?

My guess is that after "mission creep" the end-state would look something like this: each former unit, now sub-unit, would have as full-timers a 2I/C, two clerks, a CQMS, and a QMSI.  Tacked onto the normal sub-unit establishment after repeated complaints and position papers would be a few supernumary officers and NCOs with appointments to deal with all the odds and sods of work that currently must be done.  Plus, somewhere in each brigade, there would be 2 or 3 or 4 new battle group HQs ("BG North".  "BG South".  "BG Island".  "BG Mainland."  "BG Interior".  Etc).  In short, the entirety of every original unit would still be there, just reduced by one rank across the board for the part-timers, with a net increase in the number of officers and senior NCOs to staff the new HQs.

 

[Infanteer]

This amalgamation thing is very attractive.   Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:

- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt

...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.   Very efficient productivity gain there.   Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?   What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?

So, how is it that a regular Force battalion can train 600 soldiers within a Battalion Command Structure while the Reserves need Bde RSMs, Bde Commanders, Brigade Chiefs of Staff, a whack of CO's and RSM's, Company Commanders, and RSS staff to boot in order to get a couple hundred reservists out for four days?

Why every reserve unit has to play to its own tune is a mystery - for example, in Vancouver's case, why do the Seaforth Highlanders and the Royal Westminster Regiment always do their own things?  Why isn't their resources pooled in order to husband resources and staffing manpower (I have a feeling the Regimental bone has a part in this)?  Heck, you could even get the local BCR armoured guys out to further increase efficency.

Others could fill me in, but I believe that Winnipeg (Rifles and the Camerons) parade in the same location - we need the Command and Staffing of 2 units for 80 guys kicking around on the same parade square?  I believe this is the case in some Ontario units as well.

I remain unconvinced that the nature of the Reserves somehow necessitates the requirement for 4 times the overhead to get things done.

I still argue that it is neccessary for the Reserves to reorganize into a realistic TO&E so as to be deployable as an Echelon IV unit (as I described above) - we should expect our Reserves to be called up for deployment at sub-unit and unit levels (as our American neighbours are doing at this moment) before we expect and plan for   National Mobilization and Total War.

PS: Interesting example of a Reserve Force structured with an actual TO&E (instead of our hodgepodge structure of independent units) is 4th MarDiv.   Not saying we could achieve the scope of the USMCR, but it does show that Reserve units can be organized, manned, and run as proper units and formations.

http://www.mfr.usmc.mil/4thmardiv/units/

 

[enfield]

Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS.   Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes.   Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?

Right now a Reserve unit administers itself as a battalion, and carries the load of paperwork and command structure expected to run a battalion. However, a reserve unit does not have nearly the same resources as a real battalion to run that administrative load - not as many clerks, not the various cells, not the full-time staff to do all the work that needs to be done, etc.

Reserve units generally claim to be able to field a company. So what exactly is everyone above the company level doing? An operational Reg F company manages to run itself on one clerk, an OC, 2ic, a CSM, and a CQ. A Reserve company is run by: a CQ/RQ, Coy CoComdrCoy 2ic, CSM, RSM, CO, DCO, Adjt, Ops & Trg O, and a BOR - and all that to get guys out one day a week, one weekend a month, and in reality it probably fields a platoon.
My unit fielded the equivalent of a overstrength platoon on the last 7-day concentration. But, on any given weekday we usually have 3 people working full-time in the BOR, plus the Adjt, the RSS WO, CQ, a Recruiting Officer, and various others doing pay administration or odd jobs. The tail is definitely overwhelming the teeth.

Plus the reality that most reserve SNCO's and Officers are not really qualified or experienced enough to do their jobs operationally - no slight on them, and they could learn the job if need be, but they just don't have the training and experience. Why maintain people in ranks and positions they aren't really qualified for?

The administravia in this model goes up - up to Battalion, to a real battalion.   The administrative structure of a battalion isn't justified for a company. So, move it up to a level where the administrative structure actually runs a battalion, which in the case of BC would mean commanding all of the army reserves in the province. Everything done in units right now by the CO, the RSM, the Adj, the RQ, Ops and Training cells, and the BOR would be done centrally for all the units in the region, and would be staffed by trained full-time personnel. It seems to work well enough for the Reg's, we might as well give it a shot.

The reserves don't justify a 50-odd Battalion structure - not to many armies in the western world do. We do, however, justify and require a 50-odd Company structure.

 

[Brad Sallows]

>Right now a Reserve unit administers itself as a battalion, and carries the load of paperwork and command structure expected to run a battalion.

It has never been my impression that reserve units run themselves like battalions.  I would describe them as depots because of all the extra baggage.  Regardless, my point is that no one has identified exactly what it is all those people do in their offices and identified how much of it can and how much can not be eliminated from each parading location.

If the full-time staff can be consolidated and reduced and still get all the work done, there is an obvious lesson there.  But perhaps they can not; we need to ask why before we do it.

 

[enfield]

It has never been my impression that reserve units run themselves like battalions.   I would describe them as depots because of all the extra baggage.  

Perhaps not operational battalions, but they do have Lieutenant Colonels, RSMs, Adjts, Ops & Trng Cells, Transport Section, Battalion Orderly Rooms, and one or more (notional) Companies within them. That seems to fit many characteristics of a battalion structure.

Regardless, my point is that no one has identified exactly what it is all those people do in their offices and identified how much of it can and how much can not be eliminated from each parading location.

I believe that we can - and should - eliminate senior positions, such as CO and RSM. The table of organization for a reserve unit looks rather silly, since its is a straight line rather than a pyramid.

If the full-time staff can be consolidated and reduced and still get all the work done, there is an obvious lesson there.   But perhaps they can not; we need to ask why before we do it.

Each 'unit'/parade location requires the admin to keep its people happy, tasked, and placed on courses. It has to have training, both on parade nights and on weekend ex's to fulfill requirements and increase the skills of personnel. It has to have the admin and organization to provide support to the Reg F, and the possibility of call up/active service.

Why can't most of this be done by a separate central location that would take the work from each unit and do it at once? I believe that multi-subunit reserve regiments, like the C Scot R, have multiple companies run by a single battalion organization. Anyone aware of how this works out?

There is a basic level of admin/logistics/organization that needs to be done by each unit no matter how many troops it parades, and there's an increased level of basic work that has to be done as long as we pretend to be Battalions. After this point, the extra work per troop is minimal. So, pushing all the battalion-level apparatus up to a central point does not mean the same number of staff at the higher headquarters that currently sit in scattered units.
- There is a savings in personnel, which is not important in terms of money savings, but in terms of streamlining admin and ensuring that experienced RMS clerks and knowledgable Adjt's handle the work.
- Less dupduplication effort on admin, logistics, planning, and training. Why does one Armoury have two BOR's/CQ's/Lieutenant-Colonels to administer a tiny number of soldiers?
- Better training as all ex's would be bigger and combined. Why do two units in the same city train sepseparately?

 

[Brad Sallows]

Let me rephrase: over the years, in various staff positions in a unit which numbered anywhere from 50 to 100 all ranks, I had enough administrative work to keep me busy every weekly parade evening and most local HQ training days.  For each eliminated appointment, the work must go into one of the following:

1) Absorbed into the centralized appointment with no additional effort because there was an exact duplication of effort (ie. what is done for one sub-unit can be done for many with no additional time).

2) Absorbed into the centralized appointment with some additional effort, which comes out in the wash because the appointment holder was in fact always underemployed and occasionally just marking time.

3) Dropped onto the shoulders of the remaining appointments in the local (sub-unit) HQ with some additional effort, which is taken on board regardless whether the person was already fully occupied with pre-existing duties and assignments.  If the incumbent was already fully occupied, expect a new position to be created or for the wheel to eventually break.

4) Dropped into the aether because it was only pointless busywork, or is low on the scale of administrative priorities.  This works until higher HQ demands a response.

The alternative is that effectively some appointments must remain.  If it turns out that a company still needs some semblance of, say, an ops/trg cell and a log cell to function, less or nothing is saved.

My point: don't assume administrative streamlining will happen; show where it must happen.  Otherwise you are basically embarking on a gamble.

 

[George Wallace]

There is one problem you have overlooked and that is the lack of personal contact which in some cases will cause problems.  If a clerk is in Armoury X, processing paperwork on personnel in Armoury X, Armoury Y and Armoury Z, there is sometimes a tendency to concentrate on Armoury X's pers first, and overlook those in Armouries Y and Z.  This has already been a sore point a the Area Level, where taskings for Tours or Call Outs have made their way to 'select' Units; a case of favouritism by pers disseminating the Msgs, leaving some Units with no idea of what Taskings, Tours and even Crses are being loaded.

When you go to a store or bank, do you prefer to talk to a person, or deal with a machine or voice-mail?  Take away the Unit Clerks and Medics and the Administration becomes more ineffective than any 'money cruncher' can predict.  The personal touch is required, and most efficient (in the end), as well as part of Unit cohesion.

 

[McG]

This amalgamation thing is very attractive.  Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:

- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt

...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.  Very efficient productivity gain there.  Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?  What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?

Very few positions would be eliminated.  Instead, many would be moved to where they are more efficient.  The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).

My guess is that after "mission creep" the end-state would look something like this: each former unit, now sub-unit, would have as full-timers a 2I/C, two clerks, a CQMS, and a QMSI.  Tacked onto the normal sub-unit establishment after repeated complaints and position papers would be a few supernumerary officers and NCOs with appointments to deal with all the odds and sods of work that currently must be done.

I'd predict a unit structure more like an engr sqn with an Ops O in each Coy.  The regular officer could be either Ops O or 2ic (depending on the experience level of the local reserve officers).  The QMSI/DSM is a bn level position and would not be established in each sub unit.  However, there would be a CQMS, one clerk and possibly an Ops NCO.

somewhere in each brigade, there would be 2 or 3 or 4 new battle group HQs ("BG North".  "BG South".  "BG Island".  "BG Mainland."  "BG Interior".  Etc).  In short, the entirety of every original unit would still be there, just reduced by one rank across the board for the part-timers, with a net increase in the number of officers and senior NCOs to staff the new HQs.

The greatest benefit would show through increased trg and sp output from the bn HQs.  This structure would produce a greatly increased capacity for collective trg.  The sub units would continue to train their sub-sub units, however the bn HQs would train and validate sub units to operate in a bn context (as opposed the sub-unit trg and validating itself).  It takes a lot of manpower and resources to train a sub unit, and these do not currently exist in reserve units.  The sub unit should have the capacity to train its platoons/troops.  However, during my time in a reserve unit, the SHQ was always too involved in the exercise control to gain anything as part of the trg audience.  This is fixed by splitting off the bn HQ, making it more robust, and giving it responsibility for several sub units. This larger bn also needs a functioning admin element (pl/tp as the minimum, but potentially a coy/sqn) in order to support the higher level of trg that will be conducted.

There would be some efficiencies gained as well.  The battalion would share the secondary duties.  BMQ, SQ, driver, and other courses would become battalion activities (instead of the sub-units burdening themselves with each of these).  

No reserve unit will ever be a real battalion - let alone a multi-battalion regiment - in peacetime. ...

I'm not arguing for the histories and distinctness of the regiments to be erased. They can be maintained, just as effectively, by a Company

Yes. A multi-regimental battalion that may or may not include both infantry and recce.

Merge the operational and administrative functions of the regiments, so that they become companies and are administered and trained as such by regional battalions. Easy. Knock away the entire command apparatus above company level from each unit, and give those duties to what is now "brigade", and treat a brigade like what it really is, a battalion or battle group. Everything still gets done, but the units will have easier admin, more cohesive and meaningful training, and more bodies available on the parade square. And keep the kilts, marching paces, battle honours, museums, etc.

I would leave the Bde HQs in place in order to train the Bn HQ (or a Bn HQ each year).  The Bde should be able to put together a trg NCE and NSE in order to train a BG in a TF context.  Additionally, I don't think a bn HQ would have the staff resources to deal with the various other formations, higher HQs, and other demands that arise in a bde geographic area.

If done properly, the larger Bn HQs and the continuation of the Bde HQs should allow the reservists to train themselves without drawing on units/sub units of the regular force brigades to act as EXCON (as is typical with the Ex ACTIVE EDGE series).