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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
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PPCLI Guy said:
I have listened to this meme for entirely too long without going into rant mode, so here it is.  We (the Reg F) were mandated to have a 20% Res component, because that is what we had in Bosnia.  It was not necessary for AStan - it was habit.  We could, and I would argue should, have met the need from within the ranks of the Standing Force.  We didn't because we allowed ourselves the luxury of a 20-24 month readiness cycle.

Yep and we let Regulars sit on their rucksacks for years at a time.  I had soldiers in my Platoon who had joined the Battalion in 2008, while 2/3 of the unit was deployed to Afghanistan.  From that point until 2013 when I left, they still hadn't deployed.  I'm not talking one or two soldiers either, I'm talking like two Companies worth of Pte's and Cpl's and a Platoon of Junior Officers.

We've got plenty of meat for the grinder, anyone who says otherwise doesn't have the whole picture.  As PPCLI Guy said, we could and should have met the entire requirement in the Standing Force.

dapaterson said:
At least one resident of the office of COS Land Strat would disagree.

And there were numerous no-fills from the Standing Force - including at least once when the Infantry no-filled a hard LCol position (as all 100+ Inf LCols were doing more important work than our #1 priority), and then no-filled for a Maj to be promoted WSE LCol (since all ~400 Inf Maj were doing more important work than our #1 priority) - and thus a Reservist was deployed to Afghanistan, since all 500 senior Infantry officers in the Standing Force were doingmore important things.

The Standing Force appears in many cases to have lost the bubble and lost their focus, and become more interested in palace intrigues and the protection of their iron rice bowls than in the generation of combat to meet the needs of our nation (We need nine infantry battalions because it must be a multiple of three!  MAPLE RESOLVE is the Army's vital ground!  I won't be the Commander, RCN who permits the fleet to shrink!  We need more command positions!).  The Standing Force has over 5000 senior officers; has 25% of its paid strength as officers; has 25% of its officers in Ottawa... there is a long overdue requirement for the Standing Force to conduct some honest self assessment.

DP, I agree with everything you said.  I remember asking to deploy on Op ATTENTION numerous times and being told "no" because what I was doing atm was more important for my "career".  It's the same story now, "you should be working on French!" "You should be doing a masters!" "How about you go work for Col XXX so we can get you a better PER score and get you promoted!" 

We've lost the freaking plot man!  We have too many officers involved in career enhancement projects.  It's a sign that we have too many officers.
 
PPCLI Guy said:
I don't dispute any of that.  Like I said, we allowed ourselves the luxury of a long road (or parking lot) to high readiness, and did not go all in when we clearly should have.  Given a choice, the institution always takes the path of least resistance, which is becoming a well worn path to rack and ruin.

For many reservists (like myself) that particular road was soooooooo long that it turned everyone off. The horror stories coming back from tours were mainly about the tremendously long work up phase, during which huge amounts of time were wasted 'guarding the lockers' or the equivalent, and various other idiocies that had nothing to do with getting ready to go kill bad guys.

We need more of this kind of stuff: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxFgSmR0i3A

;D

 
RoyalDrew said:
Yep and we let Regulars sit on their rucksacks for years at a time.  I had soldiers in my Platoon who had joined the Battalion in 2008, while 2/3 of the unit was deployed to Afghanistan.  From that point until 2013 when I left, they still hadn't deployed.  I'm not talking one or two soldiers either, I'm talking like two Companies worth of Pte's and Cpl's and a Platoon of Junior Officers.

We've got plenty of meat for the grinder, anyone who says otherwise doesn't have the whole picture.  As PPCLI Guy said, we could and should have met the entire requirement in the Standing Force.

DP, I agree with everything you said.  I remember asking to deploy on Op ATTENTION numerous times and being told "no" because what I was doing atm was more important for my "career".  It's the same story now, "you should be working on French!" "You should be doing a masters!" "How about you go work for Col XXX so we can get you a better PER score and get you promoted!" 

We've lost the freaking plot man!  We have too many officers involved in career enhancement projects.  It's a sign that w
we have too many officers.

Well that is how I remember it from 2008 - 2010. Lot's of BS flying around why it was so much more important for you to be here and not there.
 
Jed said:
Well that is how I remember it from 2008 - 2010. Lot's of BS flying around why it was so much more important for you to be here and not there.

The CAF are not the only ones with that issue. The British Army were in Northern Ireland for over 30 years and I was amazed that I kept coming across people who had never been there, while others had 20 tours or more.

For some of them it was accidental, of course, as they missed tours for various reasons related to the units they were with at the time, and where their careers took them.

Others, I'm afraid, were simply cowards who managed to wriggle their way out of it somehow and not enough had been done to hold them accountable to their duty, IMHO.
 
daftandbarmy said:
The CAF are not the only ones with that issue. The British Army were in Northern Ireland for over 30 years and I was amazed that I kept coming across people who had never been there, while others had 20 tours or more.

For some of them it was accidental, of course, as they missed tours for various reasons related to the units they were with at the time, and where their careers took them.

Others, I'm afraid, were simply cowards who managed to wriggle their way out of it somehow and not enough had been done to hold them accountable to their duty, IMHO.

Agreed on your points. For me in my career, mostly reg force, I missed about 5 postings into the shit somewhere because it was just 'so necessary' that I stay behind and man the fort or some bad luck on where I was working at the time. It pissed me off to no end. I felt like Marty McFly when some knob would imply I was a chickenshit.
 
It seems to be a case of mismanagement or underemployed for some. A reservist currently (and for remainder of career) but have been on the reg force side of the fence my views
1. We NEED to have a coherent and straight up defence policy FIRST (as stated by some well seasoned members here :-)
2. Both the Reserves and the Regs need to scale back on "spent casings" hanging around, collecting money and marking time. Where possible more of the 20+ crowd should consider moving on to new careers (I realize economy and job market is brutal, but can still be done)
3. There has to be a constant inflow of new troops, especially for the combat arms. Combat arms is rugged and tough, can wear people down.
4. I said it before and I stand by it, I think majority of new army recruits should be stream lined to combat arms. After 4-6 years advance to MCPL or we find a new job (remuster to tech something). I firmly believe in section level leadership being young, eager, a little experienced and still able to "give 'er hard".
5. As for reservist, we should recruit much more. I know alot of 50 man regiments in Nowhere, Ontario would become 250 man regiments if given the chance (and $$$)
6. For pre-deploment (I will speak for infantry anyways), seriously 6 months is plenty of time. You are either ready or never going to be.
7. Keeping a large reserve force keeps that military-community connection, very important so that our forces do not become some obscure thing that 30% of Canadians only see once in a while on TV. It also takes away from using Ref F troops for this public display event or that community event ("soldier petting zoo"), let the P Res take that off your plates.
8. The P Res can serve as a great recruiting pool or stepping up point for many who want to join the Regs. I initially joined the reserves 25 years ago so I could serve while I was in high school and then go reg force afterwards. In my regiment, its slim pickings these days for alot of 17-18 year olds who WANT to join but can not due to positions available, etc.

One final point, I have instructed many reserve and reg force SQ/BMQ(Lands) and DP1 infantry courses. For the infantry, you can easily get a fully trained troop in about 8 weeks of summer training (to whats employable but will still need on the job experience). I would go further to say that if we concentrate on weekend and coop BMQs during the year, we focus on DP trg in summer months. My thoughts anyways. 
 
Here's an option that strays from the historic organizations of battalions, regiments and brigades.  The idea is to organize into deployable units.  We don't deploy battalions or brigades.  We deploy battlegroups.  This also coincides with the Reserve Force Structure of 10 small brigade groups.

Maintaining an army based on "3", three CMBGs, each with three infantry battalions, with three rifle companies....etc doesn't necessarily work.  The Army could reorganize into something more suitable for what is required on the modern battle field.  Prior to Army Structure 2020 the British Army was planning to organize itself based on the Rule of Five.  That would be 5 large (6,500-personnel) multi-role brigades + 16th Air Assault Brigade.  All CS and CSS units were based on the Rule of Five as well (ie. STA Regiment had 5 batteries, etc).  This they believed would allow them to sustain a deployed brigade at all times.  The Rule of Five allowed for a 2.5 year rotational cycle with five 6-month deployment cycles (rest, reset/training, collective training, high-readiness & deployment) a brigade would have 24 months at home in between 6-month deployments. 

The Canadian Army could do the same thing on a battle group level.  Five large battle groups spread across the country, each paired with two large Reserve Force Territorial Battalion Groups. 

The 5 battle groups would maintain the history and traditions of the brigade groups:
1 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Edmonton/Wainwright
2 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Petawawa
3 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Gagetown
4 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Shilo
5 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Valcartier

Each battle group would consist approximately to 2,000 personnel permanently organized as a combined arms unit with a COL in command and a LCol as deputy commander. 

- Headquarters
- Information Operations Squadron (signals, military intelligence, CIMIC, etc)
4 x Mechanized Rifle Company (4 rifle platoons & administration platoon = 20 LAV-6.0 Stryker ISC/TCPs with RWS)
Cavalry Squadron (4 fire support troops with LAV-6.0 FSV, admin troop = 20 LAV-6.0 FSV/TCPs with 25mm gun turret)
Combat Engineer Squadron (4 field troops with LAV-Engineer variant, support troop, admin troop & HQ)
Artillery Battery (mortar troop with 8 81mm or 120mm mortars on LAV variant, 2 gun troops with 2 M777 each, ATG troop, STA troop & HQ/Svc troop)
Service Company (Close Support/2nd line supply, transport, maintenance & food services platoons)
Field Ambulance Company (Role 2 BMS and evacuation assets)
Military Police Platoon

The Reserve Brigade Groups would be reorganized and renamed as Territorial Battalion Groups and organized in the same way but on a light infantry scale with about 1,800 personnel with current regiments reduced to sub-unit status. This would allow for five divisions.  The current four but with 3 Div divided into two and a little shuffling.  The Shilo based brigade would have 38 Brigade and one of the Ontario brigades under command I guess.

Each division would have 1 Reg Force battle group and 2 Res Force battalion groups with a division support group (general support battalion, engineer support squadron and HQ/Sigs elements).

The cost savings from eliminating headquarters and support units could be reinvested in a sixth combat group.  The Canadian Airborne Regiment Group organized along the same lines but as an airmobile rather than mechanized unit.  This would give the Army 5 mechanized battle groups and an airmobile (rapid reaction) battle group for expeditionary operations and 10 battalion groups for domestic response and augmentation of their affiliated Reg Force battle group.
 
I am going to suggest turning things on their head and suggest that the Regular Force only be comprised of those members who are actually at ease with being ordered to kill people according to the wishes of Her Majesty's Canadian Government.  - The qualification for the Combat Arms.

Critical Edit - this is not to suggest that all soldiering is killing.  A larger part of soldiering is being willing to conduct mundane, civilian tasks in harsh environments, while you are being shot at.

Regular force personnel should also include such numbers as are necessary to administer the Combat Arms and ensure the Combat Arms are properly supplied.

All technical trades should first and foremost be contracted from civilian suppliers. 

HMCG enters into an agreement with a service provider.  The terms of the contract are that the provider supply and maintain the capability - right into the back pocket of the Combat Arms.

As part of the supply and maintenance package the supplier will be required to supply ex-number of physically fit technicians, acceptable to the CAF, that are willing to under go military training, or have undergone military training,  and put themselves under the jurisdiction of QR&Os, CFAOs, etc.

The supplier would as, part of their contract have X number of technicians on deployment contracts and Y number on reserve contracts.

The military would ensure the technicians had passed Basic so they could operate in a military environment (salute when necessary - wear appropriate buttons and bows), wear the prescribed military PPE and operate weapons for their own personal defence (should they so choose).

The military would get out of trades training entirely.  It would not hire soldiers and turn them into technicians. It would be provided technicians to be turned into soldiers.

The RCN, CA and CAF could then concentrate their efforts entirely in training and organizing for combat. 

Time expired servicemen would, as part of their service contract be expected to spend some years working with the Militia training the Militia in military skills.  (Not technical trades).

The Militia would be a two part organization - a strictly volunteer, unpaid, civilian entity focused on emergency response in their local community - and a military core (not corps, core) - of individuals able and willing to undergo military training and supplement the Regular Force when and if required.  Some portion of those militarily trained Militiamen will be available for voluntary augmentation of the Regs, a larger portion will be available if ordered to the colours. 

The Regs should know their Reservists and Augmentees, and their skills and capabilities, long before they call them up.

Just some thoughts.

Second Critical Edit.

The Technicians are paid at civilian scale.  Their civilian wages are augmented by HMCG for the duration of their service/deployment.  Dismemberment results in a lifetime pension with benefits.  Death results in the family being cared for for life.  Reserve technicians on the company payroll, and not deployed are available to the company for other duties.

Get the military out of trades training.  Hire qualified tradesmen and turn them into soldiers, sailors and airfolks.


 
Kirkhill said:
All technical trades should first and foremost be contracted from civilian suppliers. 

So your intelligence, your communications, your medicine, your prisoner of war camps and your priests are all provided by Blackwater, Halliburton, KBR, and/or SNC-Lavalin? In a best case scenario that sounds a lot like a cross between the Rumsfeld model of minimal boots on the ground, maximum spend, and you could end up doubling your defence budget but not increasing your firepower, because all the money is going to shareholders, not to combat power. In a worst case scenario your commercial partners end up steering wars towards what is best for their bottom line -- not necessarily what is best for Canadian national security.
 
Not to mention Alternate Service Delivery was tried in the late 90s and failed. 

The civilians we have now in the service support branches are hard enough to get earn their pay,  let's not turn the whole thing over to them.

Training I agree with, that makes sense.  But not employment/deployment. 
 
I don't agree with a lot of what kirkhill stated.  I would rather see some conversion to the PS rather than contract out. 

Some trades could be pared down.  You could take for example a chunk of TDOs, clerks, logistics, musicians and legal officers and make them into DND employees.  But you still need the other chunk to be able to meet universality of service and as such in uniform, swearing allegiance to the crown.
 
https://www.falck.com/en/services/
http://wcmrc.com/
http://www.provincialaerospace.com/SurveillanceSpecialists/
http://gs.mdacorporation.com/
http://www.chc.ca/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airlines_of_Canada
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/policy/anre-menu-3019.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_railways
http://www.canadatransportation.com/
http://www.arifleet.ca/services/canadian_fleet_management
http://www.aiac.ca/canadas-aerospace-industry/canadian-aerospace-sector-profiles/aircraft-maintenance-repair-and-overhaul/
http://www.impgroup.com/en/home/aerospace_defence/aerospace_division/aircraft_maintenance/default.aspx
http://www.mas.l-3com.com/depot.asp
http://www.gdlscanada.com/index.php/about-us/locations
http://www.rheinmetall.ca/en/rheinmetall_canada/systemsandproducts/vehicleintegration/vehicle-integration.php
http://www.seaspan.com/seaspan-shipyards-current-programs
http://www.irvingshipbuilding.com/
http://www.davie.ca/
http://www.bell.ca/Mobility
http://www.rogers.com/consumer/wireless/promotions
http://saab.com/region/saab-australia/naval/tacticall/
http://saabgroup.com/
hagglunds

And then hire these three guys (or the nearest facsimile).

C.D._Howe%2C_wartime.jpg

h100.515.jpg

200px-Samuel_Pepys.jpg



 
Remius said:
I don't agree with a lot of what kirkhill stated.  I would rather see some conversion to the PS rather than contract out. 

Some trades could be pared down.  You could take for example a chunk of TDOs, clerks, logistics, musicians and legal officers and make them into DND employees.  But you still need the other chunk to be able to meet universality of service and as such in uniform, swearing allegiance to the crown.

Remius - I am still proposing that the guys operating radios, driving trucks, flying air transports, supplying intelligence feeds, maintaining weapons and vehicles and radios and optics, are all in uniform, all under the command of the Combat Arms officers, and all subject to the universality of service.  All I am proposing is that the service providers supply suitable candidates to the CAF to man the equipment when it is in the field.  One of their services would be to act as a headhunter and also to maintain a viable pool of qualified reserve personnel - personnel that it would be a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider to find, train, make available for military training and for military deployments.

These are not Blackwater guys.  They are Rheinmetall employees who are available for reserve training and for deployments.  They are Finning Cat employees.  They are Volker Stevins employees.  They are Calfrac employees (logistics of remote camps).  But, when they put the uniform on - just like any other Reservist - they become soldiers and are subject to service discipline.
 
Kirkhill said:
Remius - I am still proposing that the guys operating radios, driving trucks, flying air transports, supplying intelligence feeds, maintaining weapons and vehicles and radios and optics, are all in uniform, all under the command of the Combat Arms officers, and all subject to the universality of service.  All I am proposing is that the service providers supply suitable candidates to the CAF to man the equipment when it is in the field.  One of their services would be to act as a headhunter and also to maintain a viable pool of qualified reserve personnel - personnel that it would be a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider to find, train, make available for military training and for military deployments.

These are not Blackwater guys.  They are Rheinmetall employees who are available for reserve training and for deployments.  They are Finning Cat employees.  They are Volker Stevins employees.  They are Calfrac employees (logistics of remote camps).  But, when they put the uniform on - just like any other Reservist - they become soldiers and are subject to service discipline.

Wasn't that the model the US used in Iraq with Haliburton et al?

What a crap show that was.

In 45 Cdo and 1 PARA I was always able to take clerks, drivers and other assorted 'base wallahs' out on patrol with me.

And a damn fine job they all did too at proving there is no 'REMF' in modern war.

We need an echelon that can fight, not one that has to suck up resources by being protected by scarce teeth arms.

 
daftandbarmy said:
Wasn't that the model the US used in Iraq with Haliburton et al?

What a crap show that was.

In 45 Cdo and 1 PARA I was always able to take clerks, drivers and other assorted 'base wallahs' out on patrol with me.

And a damn fine job they all did too at proving there is no 'REMF' in modern war.

We need an echelon that can fight, not one that has to suck up resources by being protected by scarce teeth arms.

NO.  It was not the Halliburton model.

I stated explicitly that the bodies in your Troop/Platoon/Company/Commando/Battalion are soldiers and marines first, last and always. 

The difference is that "Halliburton" or "Rheinmetall" or "Saab" - when they get the contract to supply you with a new Comms system, radar system, weapons system, supplies a pool of physically fit technicians that are willing to join the Army/Navy/Air Force and that the CAF can screen to find out if the are a good fit and then send them off to basic training.

They do their time.  They can decide to extend or than can decide to go back to their primary employer to resume their civilian job and stay  in the employer's Reserve pool, which he would be required, under his contract to maintain.

The employee is available to the civvy employer for other civvy tasks.  The employer is obligated to make the trained technician, or his suitably trained, army capable replacement, available at the time and place of Her Majesty's choosing.

One of your major issues is trying to get employers to give Reservists time off.  Write it right into the vendor's contract.  Thou shalt supply army capable technicians and keep them on staff or thou shalt not get this multibillion dollar contract.  Breach will result in penalties.

This is not Halliburton dumping some unemployed Hoosier behind a wheel of  semi in Basra and then pointing him in the direction of Baghdad.
 
Kirkhill said:
NO.  It was not the Halliburton model.

I stated explicitly that the bodies in your Troop/Platoon/Company/Commando/Battalion are soldiers and marines first, last and always. 

The difference is that "Halliburton" or "Rheinmetall" or "Saab" - when they get the contract to supply you with a new Comms system, radar system, weapons system, supplies a pool of physically fit technicians that are willing to join the Army/Navy/Air Force and that the CAF can screen to find out if the are a good fit and then send them off to basic training.

They do their time.  They can decide to extend or than can decide to go back to their primary employer to resume their civilian job and stay  in the employer's Reserve pool, which he would be required, under his contract to maintain.

The employee is available to the civvy employer for other civvy tasks.  The employer is obligated to make the trained technician, or his suitably trained, army capable replacement, available at the time and place of Her Majesty's choosing.

One of your major issues is trying to get employers to give Reservists time off.  Write it right into the vendor's contract.  Thou shalt supply army capable technicians and keep them on staff or thou shalt not get this multibillion dollar contract.  Breach will result in penalties.

This is not Halliburton dumping some unemployed Hoosier behind a wheel of  semi in Basra and then pointing him in the direction of Baghdad.

The we should figure out how to employ Mexican nationals in these roles just like the LNG and other industries are doing, right?

E.g.,

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/temporary-foreign-workers-needed-for-b-c-s-future-says-premier-1.2786289

Sadly, we are spending billions on student loans preparing our kids for jobs that don't have vacancies, like teachers and hairdressers. So the employers we will be insisting provide reservists will be relying on temporary foreign workers to fill the gaps.

 
FJAG said:
Follow on combat forces such as armoured, artillery and engineer ...
You do realize these are all required in the vanguard force and not something that can wait for R1 to replace R0?

MedCorps said:
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• 6 x Maint Coys sounds very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective.

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This is to address what I am told is a problem, the Res F having to rely totally on the Reg F for equipment maintenance and being the "poor step-brother".  A Maint Coy would ideally attract people with civilian vocational training in the field they are employed in the reserve. They would concentrate on vehicle repair, towing operations and weapons repair. Maybe less comprehensive occupations need to be made for Res F versus Reg F in these areas. 

The coy tasks would be:

1) provide qualified maintenance individuals to back-fill or augment the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave. Especially in the summer.

2) Field two or three of each vehicle repair, tow truck, weapons repair teams (I have seen these referred to as light aid detachments / mobile repair teams) for exercise or deployment.

3) Provide support to other reserve units in garrison. Especially for the Maint Coys in Windsor (Close Support Tn Coy) and Hamilton (Medical Unit), but also for other units where weapons and vehicles could be sent. 

4) Provide support to the EME School / Base EME for the Maint Coy in Barrie.

I find it odd that Maint is grouped with Log in the Service Bn in the current Res F structure. They seem to get forgotten about in the Res F because of this (I suspect most of the Svc Bns are led by Logistics Officers).  They need to be separated out.  I was also amazed by the training lengths to get someone qualified.  I do not know the answer to this, but someone needs to figure this out if Maint is going to work in the Res F. 
Maintaining the PRes fleet is not a part-time job.  The solution is not more PRes maintainers to tinker on weekends and evenings; the solution is to establish standing contracts to support the vehicles through local civilian garages (more and more we are contracting this through-life support within the vehicle procurement).

Maintaining the skill sets in the PRes is problematic in itself.  If every PRes vehicle maintainer is a civilian Red Seal mechanic, then I suppose you would have a good start point to build from.  But, a lot of guys do not want to join the PRes to do their day job in a green uniform.  Instead, you must be prepared for the possibility of establishing and sustaining both the technical and the soldier skill sets in every member.  This is difficult enough in the Reg F where RCEME techs work full time and are exposed to a greater cross section of military equipment.

EME and Logistics are grouped within common battalions in the Reg F too.

MedCorps said:
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• Does the proposed Ceremonial Guard consist of more than a year round planning staff that is filled-out in the summer?
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I did not know that CG was not full all year. Their website is misleading. I would suggest they have a standing cadre and standing full ceremonial band for NCR use (there must be all sorts of functions in the capital) and then fill out the guard and band for the busy summer season. Maybe by having a standing band, redundancy could be found in the Ottawa Reg F band? 
Why invest in capability that is already adequately serving its purpose?  The ceremonial guard pulls in sufficient university students on summer break to fill its 3 month function, and the year round planning cadre has been more than up to the task for ages.  A PRes band will not displace the NDHQ band because the NDHQ band is available for functions during working hours, and there already is a largely volunteer (ie. unpaid) band with the highlanders in Ottawa.

... On the other hand, I am personally not opposed to the idea of eliminating all Reg F bands.  If another part-time band enables such a transition, then I could maybe accept it.

MedCorps said:
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• What does a PRes Postal Coy do?
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A Res F Postal Coy:

1) provides qualified postal clerks / officers (?) to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  Especially during the summer employment period.

2) generating (mobilizing) up to three mobile military post offices for larger exercises and deployments. I suspect these are not large organizations in terms of personnel requirement.  It is my impression from some of my reading that the Reg F is starting to civilianize the military postal system and the Res F might help that process along. 

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Brockville area.

4) generating subject matter experts for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country to re-establish their civilian or military postal system post crisis or improve an existing postal system (delivery networks, parcel services, mail processing, physical delivery, customer engagement, commercial products and government postal policy). It is my impression from reading a few things that this is a new and upcoming area the CAF is becoming more interested in. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance. Canada Post is not in a position to deploy employees overseas (especially where unlimited liability is a factor) despite being part of the "Whole of Government" approach to global engagement.
The military should not get in the business of rebuilding (or mentoring to rebuild) another nation's postal service; this is an area where civilian postal experts can be used.  I don't believe the back-fill demand or individual augmentation demand is particularly high for military postal clerks (there are no postal officers).  I don't think this proposal warrants the investment.  From time to time we do need "general support troops" for domestic response, but this can be done by any occupation.  My recommendation is to leave this as an infantry location.

MedCorps said:
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• What does a PRes Ammo Coy do?
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1) provides qualified ammunition technicians / ammunition officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave and mat-pat leave.

2) generating (mobilizing) a field ammo storage team and up to three EOD teams.

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area.

4) generating subject matter experts for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country to re-establish their military ammunition storage system. It is my impression from reading a few things that this is a new and upcoming area the CAF is becoming more interested in. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance.

5) generating subject matter experts for deployment to teach civilians (especially children) in post-conflict area of the risks of mines and un-exploded munitions. 

6) Consideration could be given to establishing a standing ammo storage facility for the large number of Res F units in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area.  This would be run by this Res F Coy and would save the drive to Borden.
In the Canadian Army, post-conflict mines and UXO are a Combat Engineer problem and not Ammo Techs.  Operational EOD is done by Combat Engineers and Clearance Divers; Depot and garrison level EOD are Ammo Tech roles.  Educating children of explosive hazards does not require a technical expert of the threat.  Creating a TDM in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area would result in a full time staffing requirement ... this is not a good fit for part-time reservists.  If one wants reserve Ammo Techs, it might better be achieved by creating a few Class A positions in CFAD Bedford or even with the TDM of larger bases. Like the postal clerks, I don't see the value in creating a new PRes occupation in this area.

MedCorps said:
• 5 x Med Coys also sound very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective, and these are not Army Reserve.
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They should be Army Reserve.  Not having your field medical support owned and tasked by the Army is strange. Not having some dedicated garrison medical support for the Res F is counter-productive given the business hours of the Res F vs. Reg F.  These Med Coys are all in areas where there are medical / nursing or paramedic schools (McMaster, U of O, U of T, Western).  Recruiting would be targeted on these civilian professionals. These units would also provide medical screening support to Res F units in area (or via a mobile road show) to conduct medical screening (which I am told the Reg F does poorly for the Res F). Deployment of these folks (like the recent Ebola) thing I think will be on the rise as part of the GoC “global engagement” movement. 
The Reg F Army does not have medics either.  It is a whole other stovepipe in the empire building CAF.  I am not opposed to more PRes health services capability, but breaking the HSS empire is not worth the fight within a PRes context.

As far as the Reg F doing a poor job supporting the PRes, is this a performance shortcoming or is it a dissatisfaction over the limited entitlement that PRes have for medical services?  If it is the latter, creating more capability will change nothing.

MedCorps said:
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• What does a PRes Dental Coy do?  It would not be Army Reserve if it were to exist.
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They should be Army Reserve.  Not having field dental support currently owned Army is strange. It is also strange that Res F personnel do not get Reg F dental support when dental fitness is required for deployment I am told.

1) provides qualified dental technicians to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  You will never get a dentist to leave their civilian practice to do back-fill, especially given the rates of Res F pay.

2) generating (mobilizing) three mobile dental clinics for exercises and deployments.  These mobile clinics could also visit Res F units in 4 Cdn Div to conduct periodic dental examinations (and minor repairs) for Res F personnel.

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Cambridge / Kitchener area. 

4) generating subject matter experts (officers) for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country using dentistry. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance.
Observations here are generally the same as above.  The HSS empire owns dental services and not the Army.  Growing this capability in the PRes will not afford regular dental services to PRes members because there is no entitlement.  And when you want "general support troops" then the efficient means to generate these is with Infantry and not technical trades.

MedCorps said:
• 3 x Int Coys sounds like overkill (especially beside only 5 x Rifle Coys).
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Units are not linked like they are now, so do not use ratios like 3 Int Coys to 5 Light Inf Coys as it does not matter as they will never deploy as a Bde. I read that the ASIC / Army Intelligence Regiment concept is the rage and it seems like the Reg F is sucking positions away from the combat arms to staff these large organizations.  Having 3 x Int Coys could help offset these Reg F position shifts.  It also seems like military intelligence world is well suited for reservists who may have a number of civilian occupations / education that would be useful to the military on a part-time basis. 
You are not proposing that the PRes deploy in brigades, but there should still be some balance to the numbers; the force generation base should be proportional to the individual augmentation demand that will exist.  3:5 seems steep to me.

MedCorps said:
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• The Army Reserve does not have Construction Engineers.  Like maintainers, this is difficult to support from a skills/training perspective.
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I think they should have a Troop of these guys. It seems like a hole in the current establishment. 30 guys who do the skilled trades in their civilian Brick and Stone Mason, General Carpenter, Plumber, etc Monday to Friday then you would just need to learn and master the solider and leadership skills and learn the army way of doing construction engineering. Two weeks of training in the summer could be spent working on a base, etc learning the organizational culture while still doing your trade.
Like the RCEME techs, it is difficult to find guys who want to join the PRes to do their civilian job.  Even more so than RCEME Techs, military construction trades are not so nicely analogous to civilian trades (generally, the military skill sets cover multiple civilian trades while leaving out skills of each trade that are not militarily relevant).  The RCAF makes construction troops work by hiring mostly retired military, having a larger Reg F presence, and sending the few off-the-street recruits on the year long Reg F trades training.  It works, but is this a model the Army wants to introduce to the Army Reserve?

MedCorps said:
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• What does a Engr Sp Tp do in the Reserve?  Is this Hy Eqpt, ROWPU, a bridge train or something else?
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1) provides qualified combat engineers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.

2) generating (mobilizing) a ROWPU for exercises and deployments. 

3) generating (mobilizing) a section of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Waterloo / St Thomas area.

4) generating subject matter experts (officers) for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country using civil-engineering. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance.
This Tp has a foot print in Waterloo which has a big engineering school. 
If you have properly trained engineers, you are wasting them as "general support troops" in domestic response.  In domestic operations, there is always a job for combat engineers.  Currently, the PRes Engr support troops are established with specific roles but many of those roles are not actually realised because the training or equipment does not exist.  PRes EROC Tps and Hy Eqpt Tps exist on paper but not in reality - The EOD, vehicle and Hy Eqpt training is not provided to PRes and the equipment does not exist outside the Reg F.  The "light Hy Eqpt" (aka. backhoe & dump truck) capability does function within the PRes, though I don't know that the resources exist to actually field full troops where they are designated.  There are also some water supply troops, and I do not know how these are resourced.  In any case, if you want to say there is going to be an Engr Sp Tp, then you need to specify what capability that Tp embodies.
 
... So, not everything is negative in your friend's proposal, but I will have to come back later to cover the ideas to build on.  It is late.
 
Mountie said:
Here's an option that strays from the historic organizations of battalions, regiments and brigades.  The idea is to organize into deployable units.  We don't deploy battalions or brigades.  We deploy battlegroups.  This also coincides with the Reserve Force Structure of 10 small brigade groups.

Maintaining an army based on "3", three CMBGs, each with three infantry battalions, with three rifle companies....etc doesn't necessarily work.  The Army could reorganize into something more suitable for what is required on the modern battle field.  Prior to Army Structure 2020 the British Army was planning to organize itself based on the Rule of Five.  That would be 5 large (6,500-personnel) multi-role brigades + 16th Air Assault Brigade.  All CS and CSS units were based on the Rule of Five as well (ie. STA Regiment had 5 batteries, etc).  This they believed would allow them to sustain a deployed brigade at all times.  The Rule of Five allowed for a 2.5 year rotational cycle with five 6-month deployment cycles (rest, reset/training, collective training, high-readiness & deployment) a brigade would have 24 months at home in between 6-month deployments.

Looks similar to the organization of U.S. Army Pentomic Divisions, which lasted about 10 years before being folded up as too unwieldy.
 
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