Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

[Transporter]

I count 9.

Army, Navy, Air Force, CJOC, CMP, VCDS, CanMilRep NATO, DCom NORAD, DCom Allied JFC Naples.

Did I miss anyone?

FTFY

 

[Old Sweat]

And for something completely different, this USAF press release indicates that service is making an attempt to reduce some of its various headquarters. Mods, I considered posting this in the US military area, but the contrast with the latest upgrading in NDHQ was too good to let pass. 

Air Force Announces Changes to Headquarters Organization
http://www.afgsc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123417577


Air Force leaders announced changes to headquarters staff manning and organization today.
The Air Force will create efficiencies by deactivating and realigning organizations at headquarters Air Force, major commands (MAJCOMs), numbered air forces and field operating agencies, resulting in savings of $1.6 billion across the Air Force in the next five years.

'I will work to ensure the world's best Air Force is the most capable at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer,' said Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James. 'Everyone knows our economy is still not where it should be; we have a responsibility to ensure that every dollar adds value to the taxpayers and our national defense.'

The changes are a result of a comprehensive effort to reduce overhead costs, increase efficiencies, eliminate redundant activities and improve effectiveness and business processes (also known as Air Force Management Headquarters Review). The efficiencies created through the reorganization will also help meet the Department of Defense's directive to reduce costs and staff levels by at least 20 percent, eliminating 3,459 positions at headquarters across the Air Force, both in country and at overseas locations. As part of ongoing cost savings initiatives, the Air Force will also continue to reduce contract spending, operating budgets and travel expenditures.

To minimize the effect on civilian personnel, the Air Force will initiate Voluntary Early Retirement Authority programs and Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay to foster voluntary reductions before pursuing involuntary measures. As part of ongoing efforts to responsibly shape the force, military members were offered a variety of voluntary incentive programs.

'We are aggressively pursuing reductions within the first year, rather than spread them out over five years as allowed by DoD,' said James. 'It's better for airmen because it provides them predictability and allows us to re-stabilize our workforce sooner. It also allows us to harvest the savings earlier so that we can plow it back into readiness and some of our key modernization programs.'

The Air Force's goal is to go beyond the 20 percent reduction mandated by the DoD so any additional savings can be achieved from staff functions above the wing level, and set to provide additional combat capability to the combatant commanders.

'The Air Force has been making incremental changes in our business practices for the last several years, but we must change the way we are doing business if we are to meet the Air Force's goal to reduce staffing functions by more than 20 percent,' explained Bill Booth, Air Force acting deputy chief management officer. 'Reducing higher headquarters' staffs means we can save money that can be re-invested in getting ready for combat missions at the wing level.'

The largest initiative will include centralizing policy and oversight of installation and mission support activities within a newly created Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC), which will report to Air Force Materiel Command. Execution will remain at the local level.

'The current and projected fiscal climate make it essential to centralize management and streamline support to the maximum extent possible in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness, as well as deliver more standardized levels of service across the Air Force,' Booth said. Support functions currently spread across the MAJCOMs' staffs will be centralized at the AFIMSC.

The Air Force will also make changes to the headquarters Air Force staff organization by splitting Operations, Plans and Requirements (A3/5) and Strategic Plans and Programs (A8) and reorganizing them into the new Operations (A3) organization which will stand alone and merge the planning staffs into the new A5/8 organization.

Also, the current programming functions from A8 will be merged into the service's financial management organization (FM).

'We will now have an organization, A5/8, that is responsible for developing, managing and constantly assessing an Air Force strategy that is bounded by long-range resource projections and another organization, FM, that deals primarily with the day-to-day budget activities involved in running the Air Force,' Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III explained. 'Keeping organizations aligned will ensure we keep moving towards our long-range strategic goals despite the short-term budget upheaval we face regularly.'

The Air Force will also realign several functions that currently report to the headquarters in an effort to better support combatant commanders and realign some field operating agencies to operational MAJCOMs, merge FOAs with similar missions and deactivate others.

The Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency is also being realigned from headquarters Air Force as a FOA to become part of a new operational numbered air force under Air Combat Command.

Realigning the Air Force ISR Agency into the new 25th Air Force within ACC ensures warfighting commands will have the best possible intelligence from integrated national and tactical ISR capabilities, while appropriately realigning operational activities and 'organize, train and equip' responsibilities of the AF ISR Agency from execution by Headquarters AF to a MAJCOM.

- mod edit to add link -

 

[Navy_Pete]

Really? I'm sure they could cut it down to 3 or 4. Commanders of each service and VCDS; or eliminate the VCDS and rotate each commander through during CDS absences (unless of course I'm missing the point of having a VCDS).

9 x $232 000/year = $2 080 728/year.
Cut down to 4 LGen and you have a savings of $1 155 960/year. Now this is a rough calculation, it's not a huge amount of money when you look at the defence budget as a whole but you could do a good dent in providing better, serviceable equipment (and better fitting uniforms) to soldiers that actually work for a living.

I don't think the savings are in the pay alone; there's also the staff associated with them.  Having said that, I'm sure that $1M/year is still less then a single MPs office, and I'm guessing 5 LGens are more productive then most MPs.

The VCDS is in charge of all the boring, non operational stuff, so it's a completely different role then CDS.  It's the whole business, strategic planning, materiel side of running the military.  The official version is here; http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/vice-chief-defence-staff.page  Not terribly sexy but it's all pretty important.

 

[Journeyman]

.....strategic planning.......

  :rofl:

... now that CMP is a LGen ....  [from a different discussion]

  :  Obviously no one in NDHQ is reading this thread; they're expanding their numbers.

 

[Loachman]

The CDS announced last week the reinstatement of the Chief of Military Personnel command to the rank of LGen ... suicides, mental illness

That'll fix those problems fer sure.

Imagine what we could fix if only Field Marshall rank was re-instated.

 

[medicineman]

Imagine what we could fix if only Field Marshall rank was re-instated.

More people in the field would be properly marshalled?

MM

 

[OldSolduer]

More people in the field would be properly marshalled?

MM

I doubt it. To do that you need a Sgt or a really switched on Cpl.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Really - a Sgt or a Cpl?

I have a border collie at home that does a fantastic job.

All joking aside, though, I am willing to bet that we could run the whole Navy with one RAdm and three Cmdres. The Radm would be CNS, one Cmdre each per coast and one heading the Navres.

The Captains holding the various senior staff officers (or whatever their numbered job is today) would see their status reinstated to what it was during WWII and the post war era when they ran most functions ashore.

 

[Edward Campbell]

There is a problem in my opinion, with HQ 'bloat,' but we need to be sure that we all understand what the problems (and there's more than one) are and why we have them.

The first problem is one of perception: we look at the size of the HQs and the size of the fleets and field force formations and we say "Too many people in HQs." What we forget is that we, all of us, want and need many (I dare say even most) of those people in HQs. I will suggest that every military professional knows that we need HQs and understands that the smaller the fleets and field forces become the more disproportionate the HQs seem. But they aren't all too big, it's just that we need a certain size of Command and Control superstructure even for a tiny combat force. We share the problem with e.g. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and, and , and ...

Second: some tasks are imposed on DND and the CF by government and a slice of the HQ staff is mandated, by outsiders, to do those tasks. Some, indeed many of those tasks are useless bloody busywork, or worse, but that does not alter the fact that we have to do them.

But we do have some control over shape of our C2 superstructure. The MND and CDS could, for example, go the the cabinet with a 'modest proposal' to rectify a 45 year old error. When the great big 1968 pay adjustment (for which we all praise Mr Hellyer) was being designed it was decided to "benchmark" certain ranks and trades against selected civil service jobs - I recall that draughtsmen were one of them - and then restructure military rank/trade pay scales against those benchmarks. One benchmark was the appointment of director in the civil service.

Now, grossly oversimplified, a director is the first executive level in the civil service. Who is the first executive in the military? It's a ship's captain, or regiment/battalion or flying squadron CO. That's obvious, right? But most directors in NDHQ, where the titles are used, are Navy captains or colonels. Why? It was a 'slip' made in the 1960s and the people doing the work were too busy, harassed even, to make the correction. "We'll fix it later," they said. We (I was part of that 'we' for a while) didn't. If we do, and we should, then we will need some more Cdrs and LCols but we'll need a HUGE pile less of Capts(N)s and Cols. But if directorts are over-ranked then what about directors- general? Yep, over-ranked, too; so I've just found jobs for a bunch of those captains and colonels. What about the Cmdrs and BGens? You can see what's coming, right? A sensible command and control superstructure is topped by a three star, the CDS. There are some other three stars, too, mostly OUTCAN, but there is no need for a four star.*

The other thing we can do is think about the shape of the whole structure: why not joint commands, for example, with the CNS, CGS and CAS in Ottawa being professional heads of services?

My point is that size is not the only issue, and some parts of size are beyond our control. But we can manage shape.

____
*Except that once every 50 years or so we will be offered the four star appointment at NATO HQ, Chairman of the Military Committee; we can promote one fo the three stars and send him or her there to do that job ... twice a century.

 

[Rocky Mountains]

Except that once every 50 years or so we will be offered the four star appointment at NATO HQ, Chairman of the Military Committee; we can promote one of the three stars and send him or her there to do that job ... twice a century.

Once upon a time there was acting rank for people working above their pay grade.

 

[Old Sweat]

Once upon a time there was acting rank for people working above their pay grade.

The post is established for a four star, so the person selected is working at his pay grade. It happens so rarely, as Edward, mentioned that it is sort of a lottery for a lucky GOFO.

 

[McG]

A sensible command and control superstructure is topped by a three star, the CDS. There are some other three stars, too, mostly OUTCAN, but there is no need for a four star.

As a compromise solution, what if the CAF eliminated the one or two leaf rank?  Japan and Brazil both skip BGen and go from Col to MGen.  There are also examples of countries that have eliminated the two star and BGen is promoted to LGen.  This model would achieve the desired flattening of our hierarchy while appeasing those who want to see a certain weight of leaf for international prestige.

The other thing we can do is think about the shape of the whole structure: why not joint commands, for example, with the CNS, CGS and CAS in Ottawa being professional heads of services?

But going back to your comment on external constraints, I believe the NDA has just been amended so as to bar this from being implemented. 

Imagine what we could fix if only Field Marshall rank was re-instated.

But we never had that one in our organization.  There was, over a century ago, a Captain General post to oversee our militia. [sarcasm was intended - please don't try to make this happen]

 

[daftandbarmy]

Organizations everywhere are missing the Information Age boat, it seems:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1016/MR1016.chap11.pdf

 

[McG]

One retired US Army Col has arrived at a similar solution for his armed forces as many on this site have reached for ours:  The cuts and effeciencies need to happen at the top, not from the bottom.  Despite the differences in our militaries, a lot of the article's arguments apply just as equally to the CAF.

Consolidation: The Practical but Radical Budget Solution
October 22, 2014 Jared Lieberher
By Col. Stanley A. Murrell, U.S. Army retired

Talking about the dangers of sequestration and military cuts does not seem to address the real problem or what I believe is the best and only way to seriously reduce military costs. We have, it appears, become our own worst enemy.

One would think we are in the business of empire-building. If you require confirmation, just look at the size of the Army, with its many top-heavy agencies filled with general officers, NCOs and high-ranking civilians. It has become a laughing matter, one that needs attention, but we also need to avoid doing the wrong thing.

Here are three things we shouldn’t do. First, we should not take away benefits that were the reason many volunteered for the military in the first place. These volunteers put their lives on hold and left their families to defend—and, in some cases, die for—the rights we enjoy in the U.S. Second, we should not cut military programs that better enable those same people to do the very difficult jobs we ask them to do all over the world—or, in the case of the Reserve and National Guard, right here in America. Finally, we shouldn’t screw with soldiers’ pay, which we all know is meager anyway. If we do these things, it is only a matter of time before volunteers start to say they’ve had enough. In fact, we are seeing it already.

What, then, do we do? It is really pretty simple: There are too many components in the total force. If you take into account all the services, including the Coast Guard, we have 12 different components. (That total is the result of counting the active, Reserve and National Guard components of each service.) We have to reduce the number of components. That means reducing force structure from the top, not the bottom. In the past, force structure has always been cut from the bottom.

We can do this if we are willing to combine forces. I had a joint assignment back in the ‘80s and learned a new term: purple-suiter. It simply meant all the services needed to work together to get the job done, and that philosophy is still true today. We do very little that is service-specific; instead, we task-organize and do primarily joint operations. In all those operations, we needed people to fly planes, drive boats and put their boots on the ground.  ... 

See full article here:  http://armymagazine.org/2014/10/22/consolidation-the-practical-but-radical-budget-solution/#sthash.RyWFax6Q.dpbs

 

[Old Sweat]

One retired US Army Col has arrived at a similar solution for his armed forces as many on this site have reached for ours:  The cuts and effeciencies need to happen at the top, not from the bottom.  Despite the differences in our militaries, a lot of the article's arguments apply just as equally to the CAF.See full article here:  http://armymagazine.org/2014/10/22/consolidation-the-practical-but-radical-budget-solution/#sthash.RyWFax6Q.dpbs

Agree completely. A result of having lots of headquarters, chains of command, agencies, etc is that they get filled up with intelligent, ambitious and energetic officers who are out to make a name for themselves. Hence, they look for invent things to do, both because they can't stand not being hyperactive and because that is the way to get noticed and promoted. As a result rank bloat and staff paralysis doing unimportant things, while nobody the real world and especially the force structure is continually under attack.

 

[Staff Weenie]

Old Sweat - I once worked for a senior Officer like that - we used to say that he spun like a ferret on meth. Whenever he took over a section, he would immediately initiate a wealth of new 'projects' and 'initiatives'. These contributed very little, spun the entire staff out and distracted them from their primary functions, and ultimately the entire thing would collapse like a house of cards once he would be promoted and posted.  I've watched this man go from Capt to Col doing this in posting after posting....

You, and others, have touched on staff paralysis - and here I think we also need to look at a trend over the decades to take decision making and move it to progressively higher levels.  Decisions that could be made by Capt in the 1990's are now delegated only to LCol or Col.  Activities which were once routine are now classified as 'events' which can require L1 approval! My current Col cannot approve some of these on his own authority - if we cannot trust the years of loyalty, and intelligent and dedicated service evidenced by this person, why do we have Colonels in the CAF?

I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.

 

[tomahawk6]

Civilians were hired to fill military jobs because it was "cheaper" to do so.Actually it was just a cover to cut military personnel.Civilians cant do military jobs "cheaper" than uniformed personnel.At the end of the day you have more civilians and less military who actually fight the wars.As for general officers sadly they are needed in NATO staff jobs,NORAD and so called joint commands.The business of defense is keeping the sheeple safe and that aint cheap.

 

[Navy_Pete]

..
I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.

To be fair this is govt wide.  It's the same travel approval policy, so CDS would just be a voice in the wilderness.  Also, you were assuming the system was effective before... ;D

 

[Jed]

Old Sweat - I once worked for a senior Officer like that - we used to say that he spun like a ferret on meth. Whenever he took over a section, he would immediately initiate a wealth of new 'projects' and 'initiatives'. These contributed very little, spun the entire staff out and distracted them from their primary functions, and ultimately the entire thing would collapse like a house of cards once he would be promoted and posted.  I've watched this man go from Capt to Col doing this in posting after posting....

You, and others, have touched on staff paralysis - and here I think we also need to look at a trend over the decades to take decision making and move it to progressively higher levels.  Decisions that could be made by Capt in the 1990's are now delegated only to LCol or Col.  Activities which were once routine are now classified as 'events' which can require L1 approval! My current Col cannot approve some of these on his own authority - if we cannot trust the years of loyalty, and intelligent and dedicated service evidenced by this person, why do we have Colonels in the CAF?

I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.

That sure hits the nail on the head.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Old Sweat - I once worked for a senior Officer like that - we used to say that he spun like a ferret on meth. Whenever he took over a section, he would immediately initiate a wealth of new 'projects' and 'initiatives'. These contributed very little, spun the entire staff out and distracted them from their primary functions, and ultimately the entire thing would collapse like a house of cards once he would be promoted and posted.  I've watched this man go from Capt to Col doing this in posting after posting....

You, and others, have touched on staff paralysis - and here I think we also need to look at a trend over the decades to take decision making and move it to progressively higher levels.  Decisions that could be made by Capt in the 1990's are now delegated only to LCol or Col.  Activities which were once routine are now classified as 'events' which can require L1 approval! My current Col cannot approve some of these on his own authority - if we cannot trust the years of loyalty, and intelligent and dedicated service evidenced by this person, why do we have Colonels in the CAF?

I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.

It's not just the CF, the who PS is going this way as well. Risk adverse is the word of the day. My current DG is apparently nicknamed "The black hole" information, request go in and nothing comes out. I keep telling my MP if they want to improve the PS, empower the frontline managers, but that threatens to many rice bowels.