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The Sand Trap of Darfur
After four years of delay and neglect, the United Nations has finally authorized a Chapter VII mission to the troubled Darfur region of the Sudan. As most readers are aware, this is the scene of an ongoing genocide perpetrated against the Black African inhabitants of the region by the predominately Islamic Arab population of the Sudan. Complex forces are at work here, ranging from shifting demographics within the region and the rising demand for the limited supply of water, to the desire of outside nations (particularly China) for the oil wealth of the Sudan. All have worked against the international community's ability to take effective action in the Darfur region.
Arabization is another huge problem that has not been discussed in the media. In the intervening four years, while hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced in Darfur, Sudan has simultaneously been encouraging Muslims from other countries to move into Darfur. The idea is to Arabize the entire region of Darfur, and effectively replace Darfur's traditional population with a Muslim one.
The authorization of a Chapter VII mission by the United Nations is no reason to celebrate. The mission is limited by the restrictions on the use of force that have effectively hobbled many UN missions. There is no authority to directly challenge or change the government of the Sudan, or disarm the offending militias and brigands who have perpetrated the slaughter.
In addition to the political limitations of the mission, Darfur is a very inhospitable place. Geographical isolation, harsh climate, limited infrastructure, long supply lines, and an uncooperative Sudanese government will make supplying and supporting any sort of mission in Darfur extremely challenging, to say the least.
Canadian politicians and activists have clamoured for years for Canada to “do something” about Darfur. The Ruxted Group is sure that these same politicians, academics and journalists will now use the existence of a Chapter VII authorization to demand Canada shift its focus from the unfinished business of Afghanistan to the unstarted business of Darfur. While Ruxted is moved by the plight of the people of Darfur, we must point out the differences in the two missions so the people and Government of Canada can have an informed debate as to what sort of support (if any) we should provide this mission.
In Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces are engaged as part of a multifaceted international mission to rebuild a shattered society. We are working with traditional NATO partners with whom we have long relationships and experience, and with whom our forces are well accustomed to working. The non-NATO partners of ISAF include Australia, another long standing ally and partner of Canada, and various Eastern European nations eager to become closer partners of NATO, the EU and other western institutions. These nation’s armies already share many technical and cultural affinities with their ISAF partners. We can take advantage of the superb logistical capabilities provided by many of our partners, and use the local infrastructure, including seaports in Pakistan and a system of highways between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and within Kandahar province itself to support our mission.
In Darfur, any participants in a Chapter VII mission will be part of a large heterogeneous force composed of forces drawn from various African Union nations, and presumably bolstered by large contingents from other developing nations like Bangladesh. While their soldiers may be individually brave and determined, their military forces are poorly trained and ill equipped for the challenge. They do not have the command or communications capabilities to operate large multinational coalitions. They do not have the logistical skills or equipment to operate at extended ranges or for prolonged times from their bases, and they do not have the right equipment to send into an area with limited infrastructure and severe climate. There is no plan to rebuild the destroyed villages, restructure the political system or otherwise remove the causes of the conflict. As in Afghanistan, the enemy can resort to small scale sniping and bombing attacks which might not defeat the force militarily, but may erode the political will to continue at home.
While there is no doubt that Canada could provide some of the elements lacking in the elements of a proposed Chapter VII force in Darfur, we are unable to support any substantial Canadian force in Darfur. Decades of neglect have deprived the Canadian forces of the strategic air or sea lift for our own forces, much less the vastly larger force envisioned for Darfur. Even the recently announced purchase of C-17 transport jets and the upgrade of the C-130 Hercules fleet would only just meet Canada’s needs, and the completion of the conversion to these new airplanes is still several years down the road. The naval leg of our support structure is more than a decade away, even if Gen. Hillier's “big honking ship” plans were to be started today.
Aside from the issue of supporting such a force, Ruxted must ask how our intervention in Darfur would benefit Canada? Afghanistan has provided a safe haven for terrorist groups that have threatened Canada and killed thousands of innocents throughout the world. Stabilizing Afghanistan deprives terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda of their safe havens and discourages other failing states from becoming terrorist havens. The creation of a stable Afghan state ruled by a legitimate, consensual government will also help dampen the cycles of violence which are rippling through the Islamic world and spilling out into other areas. As a leading middle power, our efforts in Afghanistan help protect us and stabilize central Asia, maintaining the conditions required for the peace and prosperity of literally billions of people.
Darfur offers no such rationale for Canadian efforts. The Government of the Sudan is hostile to the endeavour, and can be expected to obstruct the efforts of the Chapter VII mission. Since the Sudan has the support of China, any attempts to increase the UN presence and effectiveness in Darfur are likely to be unsuccessful, especially after the end of the 2008 Olympics. Even without these difficulties, with no plan to rebuild the region or restructure the political environment, there is literally nothing to stop the genocide from resuming once the force is withdrawn. With the mission hobbled by the terms of the resolution, there would be no "exit point" from Darfur, no set of conditions to define when the mission is complete.
Ruxted contends that Canada is a leading middle power, capable of effecting change in the world. This is only possible when Canadians choose to use their wealth and privilege in well-considered operations, in concert with our friends and partners, for clearly defined goals. Afghanistan meets all these conditions, and should continue to be the focus of Canadian attention, military, development and diplomatic efforts to 2009 and beyond. Darfur meets none of these conditions, and would end up being a sand trap for Canadian resources and efforts.
This sounds cruel and hardhearted, but it is not. Ruxted is appalled by the suffering of the people of Darfur, but understands that Canada is unable to make a meaningful military contribution. This is especially true given the toothless Security Council resolution and the dreadful combination of terrain, climate and distance in the mission area. Wishful thinking is not a firm base on which to conduct foreign policy or military operations; pretending that the Canadian Forces can make a difference in Darfur is wishful thinking taken to ridiculous extremes. There are other, non-military steps we can take. These need to be examined without the usual self-serving clamour of the chattering classes, and if feasible all our energy directed to these ends.
To call for Canadian blood to be spilled in the sands of Darfur in an open ended mission for no result is perhaps the greatest folly our politicians, academics and journalists could commit. The Ruxted Group asks all Canadians to look at the evidence and weigh Canada’s abilities and interests dispassionately. Only then can we discuss what Canada can do for the people of Darfur.
) when some expert from the left brings up Darfur is that they use it to attack the Afghanistan mission and/or the Canadian government. In doing this, these donkies completely miss the fact that going into Sudan would be no different than going into Afghanistan. I suspect it would be worse as every loonie in Egypt and the larger Middle East will quit Iraq and head down to Sudan to earn their 72 virgins. Let's see:
