Conflict in Darfur, Sudan - The Mega Thread

[Scoobie Newbie]

If TF 1-08 is short (and I think your refering to 2VP and if not I apologize) why do we have an extra platoon from which to draw from (that has not been yet)?

 

[Disenchantedsailor]

Not sure if it's 2 VP or 1 RCHA all I got from the OPS WO today was the call from LFWA was for 100 All arms. Could have been inflated we all know how comd likes to do that sort of thing.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Weird.

 

[MarkOttawa]

A guest-post at Daimnation!:

Darfur: I sure hope I was wrong
http://www.damianpenny.com/archived/009891.html

And a wild idea:

Darfur: New Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) might make sense
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/08/darfur-new-air-expeditionary-wing-aew.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Greymatters]

I would like to have Layton et. al. explain how deploying to Sudan would be better than Afghanistan.  Do they have some sort of guarantee from the Sudanese government that Canadians wont get killed or injured ?  Are the people in Sudan meek unarmed weaklings or peace-abiding religious monks who would never shoot at a foreigner?  A mission to Sudan would be no better then our current one in Afghanistan, and doubtful if it would be any safer.

 

[The Bread Guy]

UNSC Resolution #1769 (2007)
http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/f/N0744552.pdf

 

[3rd Herd]

Edit to remove quote for PERSEC reasons.

Just look for those who know how to march on graduation parades, they already have the military training. ;D

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today;s Ottawa Citizen is an analysis of the situation in Darfur:

http://digital.ottawacitizen.com/epaper/viewer.aspx

ANALYSIS: CRISIS IN DARFUR
Will she finally see peace?

Is a 26,000-strong UN force finally going to bring relief to the millions of victims in Darfur’s conflict? It’s a modest first step, observers tell CHRIS COBB, but don’t hold your breath just yet

With files from Agence France-Presse and Reuters

The situation in Darfur is so hopelessly chaotic that the prospect of a massive United Nations peacekeeping force, coupled with fresh diplomatic efforts this weekend, are arousing barely a glimmer of optimism that people there will stop killing each other. Four years of fighting in the semi-arid Sudanese province have killed at least 200,000 and have left two million others homeless. Rape, torture, random slaughter, kidnapping and all manner of other brutality has been perpetrated by a dozen or more battling factions — notably, the pro-government Janjaweed, nomadic Arab tribesman who observers say are armed by the government and used to “cleanse” the province of non-Arabs. The government denies any involvement in the Janjaweed’s brutality.

On Tuesday, the United Nations agreed to send 26,000 troops to Darfur, an area roughly the size of France, to boost an existing force of 7,000 ill-equipped African Union troops whose efforts to stabilize the region have failed.

The UN resolution, championed by new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and backed by U.S. President George W. Bush, is, at best, seen by experts as a small step forward into a complex morass that runs the gamut from local tribal rivalries to highstakes international deal making. The UN resolution needed agreement from all five permanent members of the Security Council — the U.S., Britain, France, Russia and China — but China, with major energy interests in the oil-rich country, backs the Sudanese government, which in turn accommodates China’s interests. This mutual interest has, say observers of the UN, given the resolution fewer teeth than Mr. Brown, especially, wanted.

“The Sudanese government has been playing the Chinese like their own cello in the Security Council,” says Fen Hampson, director of Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. “Britain was willing to compromise because they realized that best was going to become the enemy of the possible. So it’s not a great resolution by any means, it’s just a very modest step in the right direction.”

Dealing with the various factions and complex and constantly changing intertribal rivalries in the Darfur conflict is the major stumbling block to any short-term ceasefire, let alone lasting peace, says Mr. Hampson.

“It’s like dealing with Jell-O,” he says. “You hit it with a hammer and it flies in different directions. The (Sudanese) government obviously has some leverage over the Janjaweed, but it’s not clear how much. It’s a highly factionalized, intractable conflict. The other problem from the beginning is that Sudan regularly falls off international radar. One hopes this latest resolution keeps the spotlight on Darfur and puts pressure on all the parties. It’s the only way this will move forward.”

This weekend’s meeting of the various Darfur rebel factions in Arusha, Tanzania is key to any future progress, adds Mr. Hampson. Rebels, split into about a dozen groups, are meeting to work out a single negotiating position for peace talks with the government, and a date and venue for the negotiations.

Meanwhile, implementation of the UN resolution by Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir will show how serious the Sudanese government is taking the new initiative, says Mr. Hampson.

“If they start dragging their feet, which they are quite capable of doing, the peace talks will go nowhere,” he said. “And then you’ve got a real problem, because the Sudanese government pretty much decides where the peacekeeping force can go. It’s a peacekeeping force in a straitjacket.

“But peacekeeping will only work if there is a peace to keep,” he adds, “and the only way we’ll see movement in that direction is if there is movement in the negotiations.”

Mr. Hampson’s colleague, international law specialist Chris Penny, says the UN resolution is the best option under delicate circumstances and should lead to a reduction in violence in places where the UN troops are allowed to operate.

“The question is, does the violence just get pushed elsewhere?”

But Mr. Penny sees the resolution as a potentially viable compromise.

“It leaves control with the Sudanese government,” he said, “but at least it’s a little more constrained than it was. It’s a signal, albeit not as forceful as it might be, that this is an issue of international concern and it’s a signal that China is on board more than it has been.”

The UN Security Council could impose a tougher resolution on Sudan, as it did on Iraq after Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in 1990.

“But invasion would not necessarily be successful,” said Mr. Penny. “You’re seeing in Iraq how difficult it is to consolidate peace when people don’t want you there. So although the authority exists, it’s not practical to expect it will be used any time soon.”

Sudan is seen by the United States as an exporter of terrorism, but much of the involvement of the otherwise engaged Bush administration has been prompted by the influential Christian right in the United States, which says minority Christians in Darfur are being victimized by Sudanese government forces and need protection.

But it’s clear that Gordon Brown is leading the current initiative, says Stephen Lewis, Canada’s former ambassador to the UN.

Mr. Lewis, who retired last year as the UN Special Envoy on HIV-AIDS in Africa, says Mr. Brown’s intervention is “the single most hopeful thing that’s happened around Darfur in the past three or four years. His determination to turn Africa around runs through his veins.”

Mr. Brown is the only G8 leader who has been consistently public in his commitment to Africa during the past several years, says Mr. Lewis.

“He has never flagged on education, conflict, poverty and disease in Africa,” he adds. “One gets the impression he is carving out a position for the United Kingdom that is independent of U.K. involvement in Iraq, and part of that is his commitment in Darfur.”

But whatever the UN resolution achieves, cautions Mr. Lewis, will depend on how the resources are given to the 26,000 troops, most of whom will be African.

“They will need logistical help, food and transport,” he says. “It will take a significant financial commitment, and whether they get it or not will be the true test of whether this is real or another fly-by-night proposition. But I’m inclined to think Brown is very serious about it.”

Mr. Lewis urged the Harper government to commit money to the UN’s Darfur effort. (This week, the federal government added $48 million to the nearly half a billion dollars it’s given for humanitarian aid for Darfur over the last three years.)

“And we should do everything in our power to provide the kind of development aid to relieve the suffering and do something about the sexual violence,” he says. “There is a small nation of seriously traumatized women in Darfur, which is an ongoing aftermath of this crazed, brutish and depraved behaviour. We should be taking the lead on these gender issues.”

A Darfur peace deal was reached with the Sudanese government in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006, but it was only endorsed by one of three negotiating rebel groups. Violence has since spiralled and splinter factions have flourished.

“The most immediate hurdle remains the rebels’ lack of unity and political vision,” said a report published last month by the Small Arms Survey.

In an interview with the BBC’s Africa network, Sudan analyst Julie Flint says the peace talks under way this weekend have little hope of success either because the rebels represented at the talks in Tanzania are only part of a complex situation on the ground in Darfur.

“In looking at this as a government-rebel problem, we’re addressing the wrong problem,” she said. “I would bet you money that most of the people who have died this year in Darfur have been Arab militias and government soldiers. The worst fighting has been between Arab groups once armed by the government now fighting each other.”

After a day of preliminary meetings, the talks kicked off in earnest late Friday, but without the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdel Wahid Mohammed Nur, the founding father of the rebellion and a member of Darfur’s largest tribe. Mr. Nur’s faction contests the legitimacy of the many splinter rebel groups and also argues talks with the government should only be considered once the new “hybrid force” of UN and AU peacekeepers is deployed.

“The more you recognize individuals as faction leaders by inviting them to talks like those in Arusha, the more factions there will be, and consequently disorder on the ground,” his spokesman, Yahia Bolad, told Agence-France Press.

Fen Hampson agrees that the talks are fragile, but he is slightly more optimistic.

“The key is to use this UN resolution to gain some political momentum,” he says. “The peace process in difficult conflicts often has modest beginnings. And you’ve got to start somewhere.”

If we care anything at all about the fate of poor, abused black people – an assumption I am not prepared to accept at face value – then we need to consider this:

But whatever the UN resolution achieves, cautions Mr. Lewis, will depend on how the resources are given to the 26,000 troops, most of whom will be African ... “They will need logistical help, food and transport,” he says. “It will take a significant financial commitment, and whether they get it or not will be the true test of whether this is real or another fly-by-night proposition. But I’m inclined to think Brown is very serious about it” ... Mr. Lewis urged the Harper government to commit money to the UN’s Darfur effort. (This week, the federal government added $48 million to the nearly half a billion dollars it’s given for humanitarian aid for Darfur over the last three years.)

We could put 100,000 African Union troop sin/around Darfur and they will be 100% ineffective unless and until they have:

1. A proper, functioning C3I system – which (a) non AU force(s) will have to provide for them;

2. A proper, functioning logistical system, stretching all the way back to rich, well stocked depots - which (a) non AU force(s) will have to provide for them;

3. A proper, functioning operational level surveillance and reconnaissance system - which (a) non AU force(s) will have to provide for them; and

4. A proper, functioning political guidance system – which the inept, corrupt UN cannot provide to any mission.

Should Canada 'help?'

How?

Sending money and helping to staff the political guidance system is the best bet. We might be tempted top send scarce signals and logistics soldiers – we should resist temptations.  there are brigades of underemployed French, German, Italian and Spanish signals and logistics units; let them do something for a change.

There are many hell-holes in the world, Darfur is, arguably, not the worst. We (Canada as represented by the Chrétien and Martin administrations) picked Afghanistan in general and Kandahar in particular as our hell-hole: let's see that through rather than hopping, like a dilettante, from the one celebrity obsessed cause to another.

 

[vonGarvin]

Shared in accordance with the usual agreements.  From this site:  http://www.ndp.ca/page/5564


"“This U.N. resolution is a long-overdue opportunity for the international community to protect millions threatened by the severe humanitarian emergency in Darfur,” said NDP Foreign Affairs Critic Alexa McDonough. “The government of Canada must show its commitment to halting the devastating violence gripping the lives of Sudanese civilians by supporting this vital mission.”

“After months of Conservative government lip service about Canadian leadership on the world stage, it’s time for Prime Minister Harper to put his money where his mouth is. We’ve waited years for this international consensus and we need an immediate response from the Harper government,” added McDonough. "


More on site

MY COMMENTS

What does the NDP think of THIS UN resolution:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/517/70/PDF/N0651770.pdf?OpenElement
"Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 2006;
2. Authorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;
3. Recognizes the need to further strengthen ISAF, and in this regard calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to ISAF, and to make contributions to the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 1386 (2001);
4. Calls upon ISAF to continue to work in close consultation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the OEF coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;
5. Requests the leadership of ISAF to provide quarterly reports on implementation of its mandate to the Security Council through the Secretary- General;
6. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter."

Well?  I'm waiting....

 

[prom]

well after reading the statement im surprised that the NDP never said pull out the troops and send them to Darfur. For the mean time it seems that they only request "committing to the provision of critical financial, diplomatic and logistical support for UNAMID".

 

[Timmy!]

You watch... the NDP will say something. I have one of those "feelings".

 

[Sig_Des]

You watch... the NDP will say something. I have one of those "feelings".

Is that like one of those feelings in your gullet of something to come, tastes a little like bile?

 

[Timmy!]

Well Sig Des... I finally got one of those "feelings" issued to me the day. I just had to use it today. It seems to be acting funny.  ;D

 

[HItorMiss]

Is that like one of those feelings in your gullet of something to come, tastes a little like bile?

I thought that was the burrito I ate...ooooh boy did I mess that one up  ;D

 

[Greymatters]

Their only purpose is to 'show up' whatever government is currently in power... dont expect anything too brilliant.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail is an on point (in my view) comment by url=http://www.cmss.ucalgary.ca/people/huebert]Rob Huebert (UCalgary/CMSS)[/url]:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070807.wcosudan07/BNStory/National/home

Want to help? Sure, but consider all the costs of sending troops to Darfur

ROB HUEBERT
From Tuesday's Globe and Mail

August 7, 2007 at 3:06 AM EDT

The announcement that several states will be deploying troops to the Darfur region of Sudan is a very positive development for that war-ravaged country. This breakthrough, however, creates a difficult situation for Canada. There will now be calls for us to contribute as well. This is a noble sentiment, but any future decision must be made with a full understanding of the costs to Canada. Many assume such a mission would be preferable to our mission in Afghanistan, but a close consideration of the Sudanese reality does not support such a conclusion.

For example, it is assumed the Sudanese intervention will be a traditional peacekeeping operation. This is based on the belief that the current negotiations will lead to a peace settlement between the rebels and the government. Unfortunately, this flies in the face of all previous actions by the regime in Khartoum, which has shown no hint of giving up its policies of genocide and destruction any time soon. The sad reality is that Khartoum will not end such horrific policies until it is forced to. And this means that to solve the "problem" of Sudan will require the use of military force. Thus, any Canadian deployment that is to be meaningful would probably be more violent and dangerous than the current deployment in Afghanistan.

Another assumption is that the intervention can, or will, be done without the Americans. Regardless of one's view of U.S. foreign policy, the reality remains that if the U.S. does not commit troops any mission is likely to be unsuccessful. Canada has already discovered it cannot deploy by itself as it attempted to do in Central Africa. The power needed to successfully force the Sudanese government to stop its atrocities and those of the militias could only be provided by the United States, if it is willing to deploy.

A third assumption is that Canada can support both the Afghan mission and a deployment to the Sudan. If the Canadian commitment to either is to be meaningful, and not simply tokenism, this is simply wrong. Had the Canadian military not faced significant cuts in the 1990s, it could be possible to talk of both a meaningful Afghan and Sudanese mission. But with today's troop levels, Canada has limited choices. It can either pull out of Afghanistan when its official commitment ends in February, 2009, and redeploy to the Sudan or it can make one mission its main priority and send token forces to the other.

The costs of the first option should be made clear. If Canada pulls out of Afghanistan in 2009, there is a real possibility other contributing states may also re-examine their decision to stay. Likewise, a Canadian withdrawal will be interpreted by the fundamentalists' forces in that country as a victory. Correctly or not, the decision to redeploy will be seen as a reaction to the recent casualties suffered by Canada. And if al-Qaeda, in turn, comes to believe Canada is a "soft target" the chances of an attack on Canada itself increase.

Broadly speaking, the discussion of committing forces to Sudan is understandable. Canadians do not want to see the agony of the Sudanese people continue. But until Canada succeeds in rebuilding its forces (assuming that it is allowed to continue to do so), it will be faced with making hard decisions. A commitment to remedying the crisis in Darfur is noble, but it comes at a greater cost than most Canadians are aware. Any decision must be made on the basis of the existing facts and not on wishful thinking.

Rob Huebert is associate director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

Like most Canadians I am appalled at the ongoing problem in Darfur and, like most Canadian, I want to “do something” to:

1. Relieve the suffering of the people by practicing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) about which so many people – so very many of them Canadians – have preached for so long;

2. Stop the marauding of the Janjiweed militia; and

3. Prevent further such depredations by governments or thugs or both.

I think I and people like me (and DFAIT, DND and the PCO are chock-a-block full of ‘em) know how to do 1 and 2. That is to say that we understand how to conduct the logistical/relief and military operations required.

I doubt anyone in the liberal, democratic West has really thought through item 3. The Bush administration’s Iraq model appears less than ideal. The allied Afghanistan model appears too hard and time consuming for many people – including most Canadians.

That being said, in addition to the cogent points Huebert makes (the awful consequences of ‘obeying’ the will of the people as expressed by parliament and the lack of capacity to continue is Afghanistan and do anything much in Darfur) we need to consider Prof. Roy Rempel’s view that for too long too much of our foreign (and defence) policy has been set  by the media – through its 24/7 coverage of photogenic disasters – and by our dominant “value” off being morally superior to the Americans.

We can, and in my opinion should, send money to help the people of Darfur. We can, and in my opinion should, send money to the UN force – for equipment and logistics. We might be able to send a few civilian and military experts to help plan, control and manage the operation.

We cannot, in any militarily useful way, contribute much of anything – including air transport, C3I/IT or logistics support units to the UN mission. Simply stretching the CF for the sake of political optics (making some Canadian fell better about themselves) is poor public policy.

 

[Greymatters]

"For example, it is assumed the Sudanese intervention will be a traditional peacekeeping operation. This is based on the belief that the current negotiations will lead to a peace settlement between the rebels and the government. Unfortunately, this flies in the face of all previous actions by the regime in Khartoum, which has shown no hint of giving up its policies of genocide and destruction any time soon. The sad reality is that Khartoum will not end such horrific policies until it is forced to. And this means that to solve the "problem" of Sudan will require the use of military force. Thus, any Canadian deployment that is to be meaningful would probably be more violent and dangerous than the current deployment in Afghanistan."


A much ignored fact - the government had the same fairy-land viewpoint about Bosnia in 1992, and look how that turned out!

 

[KevinB]

Greymatter -- Chpt 7 is not "PeaceKeeping" but PeaceMaking -- think Somalia.

IMHO to me fighting in Africa for a white nation is lose-lose.
  To be effective one will need to kill a lot of blacks which regardless of the fact they are de facto terrorists does not play well in the media.
Think the Canadian populace is fickle on Afghan? I give it 60 days from the day a CF solider put his boots on the ground (IF)

 

[CBH99]

Sorry not to have replied sooner to the posted questions...

One thing that I don't think anybody has realized yet, is that Africa is a world all on its own.  When in Africa, a common saying is "TIA" - which is the acronym for "This is Africa".  Basically, everytime something unbelievably stupid, violent, repulsive, challenging, or unfair happens - most people (especially foreigners) simply refer to the good ol' saying of TIA.  At least it was a common saying when we were in country with the film crew.  And, it made perfect sense every single time it was said.

The problems facing the mission in Darfur are biblical, and that is no stretch.  We (the international community) obviously have an obligation to act, for both moral and political reasons.  However, it should be confirmed before anything is done, that we are not going to solve all of the problems facing Darfur.  I'll go into some of the problems that we observed as film-makers that were in the country, because these are problems that will undoubtedly challenge any UN/AU force that is deployed.  Not only that, but there are many problems that I still haven't heard mentioned in any newspaper, or acknowledged by any government.


1.  Geographical Problems.  Darfur is an arid, dusty wasteland with very, VERY little water.  This creates a lot of sustainability problems for the people of Darfur, and any visiting military force.  Global warming (Climate change, whatever the heck you wanna call it) - has almost completely dried up many of the lakes throughout most of Sudan, especially in the arid regions of Darfur.  Some lakes have been dried up altogether, and each year Darfur receives less precipitation than the year before.  Anybody who has been there can see how low the rivers are, and how much strain is being put on water availability.

This puts a huge wrench in any plan to 'calm down' Darfur - a lack of a basic human necessity.  Not only does Darfur suffer from a huge water shortage, but there is absolutely no water treatment/management systems in place, which compounds the problem even more.  Any UN/AU force is going to realize that the really big problems come after the Janjaweed are killed/defeated.....a population returning to an area that has very little of a basic human need, water.  Hard to grow crops in dusty, dry conditions - very little rain - and low running rivers make irrigation almost impossible.  So even if the military threat is defeated, Africa will present another set of problems as soon as your ready for em'.

2.  The Khartoum regime is/has going to throw a wrench into the UN operation every chance they get.  The UN will have to fly in everything it will need and be almost completely self-sufficient, since it cannot rely upon the Khartoum regime for anything.  I remember when I was in country, the government would claim on a daily basis that they were running extremely low on jet fuel, and could not spare any for our helicopter.  However, at the same time, they would be fuelling MI24 Hinds, MI17 HIPS and various cargo planes.  Every time we requested/offered to purchase fuel for our helicopter to assist in the making of our documentary, they would magically run out of jet fuel while simultaneously making sure plenty was available for their own aircraft. 

When we requested fuel so that we could fly our helicopter out of the country, the shortage of jet fuel magically disappeared...

Case in point;  The UN should not and cannot rely upon the Khartoum regime for anything.  If the UN wants to be successful, it will have to be almost 100% independent.

3.  The SPLA - Sudan People's Liberation Army.  These will undoubtedly be considered friendly forces for a few reasons, however they offer their own set of problems as well.  Unlike the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the SPLA is fractured into dozens of different militias, all with the same goal.  The SPLA-based militias, although split and fractured, are all united in their fight against the government forces.  I say they would undoubtedly be considered friendly, because they are friendly towards the AU force already in theatre - and actually do their best to fight off the government forces when given the opportunity. 

As mentioned above though, they are split.  Not even the SPLA can definitively say how many factions it has broken into, since radio communications are essentially non-existent.  Some of the groups are fortunate enough to have one or two pickups, but for the most part they travel on foot everywhere they go.  They are anti-government forces, who have provided aid to UN/AU personnel already in the country.  Their lack of leadership is where the real challenge lies though, and corridinating them to be effective will likely take some leadership/technological support.  This is a problem that can be easily solved and used to the advantage of UN/AU forces -- however, it will be tricky to track down and find out exactly how many factions the SPLA has broken into, and establish some sort of leadership for them to follow.

To put their lack of technological progress into perspective;  besides using donkeys and camels as a form of transportation, and mostly travelling on foot, we observed 2 groups of SPLA fighters using SMOKE SIGNALS to communicate.  They would use the smoke signals to communicate, then quickly scurry and reposition themselves incase any government aircraft came to investigate.  Due to a lack of radios to communicate and coordinate, they would rely on smoke signals to confirm each other's position and process basic communication;  which, ofcourse, was very easily detectable by government forces.

To their credit, they often emerged victorious against any Janjaweed or government forces.  Like a true insurgency, they used the government weaponry as their own, and scavenged battle sites for useful weaponry.

4.  Arabization - a huge problem that I still haven't seen mentioned in any of the newspapers of journals.  Basically, while the government forces have been killing/slaughtering many of the non-Muslim tribes throughout Darfur - the government has simultaneously been encouraging Muslims from other countries to move into Darfur.  The idea is to "Arabize" the entire region of Darfur, and effectively replace Darfur's traditional/Christian population with a Muslim one. 

As hundres of thousands of people have been killed/slaughtered, and millions of others forced into camps or to flee across borders....the government has been inviting tens of thousands of Muslims in neighbouring countries to come and fill the void.  The idea is to Arabize the region, to allow the government to exert control within Darfur without the problems it currently faces.  Even now, as I write this, Muslims from neighbouring African countries are starting to trickle into Darfur - building homes and villages, while being protected by the Khartoum government forces and Janjaweed. 

So even if the UN/AU force magically had the power to instantly defeat the military threat posed by the government forces and Janjaweed, the void that was left by the displaced persons has already started to be filled by Muslims from other countries.  Where are the displaced persons supposed to return to, if their homes have already been taken over by Muslim based tribes?  This is going to be a tricky challenge for any boots on the ground over there - do we forcefully displace civilians, in order to make room for people who were there themselves before they were forcefully displaced??  Ugh - welcome to Africa.

Oh yeah, how could I forget about the very profitable human smuggling trade, and rape camps.  My fingers are getting tired, so I'll sum this one up kinda quick:  Thousands of women and girls are taken against their will, and forced into sexual slavery.  These sex slaves are used by government forces and Janjaweed, and are often kept in "rape pens" with government forces.  (As they were in Shake Hands With The Devil).  These women and girls are beaten, raped, tortured, and used as chattle amongst government forces.  The women/girls who are lucky enough to escape their villages with their freedom are often hunted down and raped/tortured/murdered sometime afterwards.

The women/girls that are not kept by the government troops are usually killed, or sold to human smugglers.  Human smugglers often fly into/out of Khartoum, in which the girls are then sold as a product - usually elsewhere in Africa.  These smugglers operate with relative immunity from the government, and actually purchase their slaves from government-based contacts.  Since human smugglers are often flush with cash, the Khartoum government actually benefits from the presence of human smugglers within the city/country.  The women/girls often end up either sold to brothels within Khartoum, forced into rape pens for government soldiers within Khartoum, or flown elsewhere. 

My fingers are getting tired, so I'll add more a bit later sometime.  I guess to end this ramble on a good note, I should mention -- as somebody who has been inside Sudan, and more specifically Darfur, and as somebody with past CF experience, I honestly believe the military challenge is a relatively easy challenge to overcome.  Its the mountains of other challenges that aren't even getting mentioned in the papers that are going to be the real kicker.  The threat from government forces & Janjaweed is relatively minimal, but I'll go into the details of their capabilities a bit later sometime.

If all of the above seemed a bit pessimistic and depressing, I do apologize, however, just remember..."TIA".

 

[CBH99]

One more thing before I hit the sack...

A fantastic documentary that came out recently about the crisis in Darfur is called "The Devil Came On Horseback", by former Marine Capt. Brian Steidle.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UyvoSaocUQ

Anyhow, night everybody'.